Mike: Jeppesen/AERAD plates will include departure frequencies on many SIDs (certainly those associated with major airports) and if not printed on the plate, ATC will give the freq as part of the clearance. London Control freqs ARE on the Stansted plates.
In my opinion, the issue with the FO is not so much that he had a lot to do but that he did not appear prioritise those tasks successfully. The frequency change to London will often clash with a turn on a SID, thrust reduction or flap retraction procedures or maybe even a level off. This is unfortunate but is a simple fact of life and as such has to be dealt with.
Priorities are always: Aviation, Navigation, Communication, Adminstration. The flying of the aeroplane in accordance with the standard flight profiles (attitudes, speeds, acceleration etc) coupled with following the SID take care of numbers 1 and 2 priority - AND ATC MUST WAIT THEIR TURN! In fact, there is a strong arguement to suggest that priorities 1 and 2 are infact inseperable when operating commercial aeroplanes under IFR - but comms and paperwork are always lower priorities.
You will hear cries of "but you must talk to London ASAP or you are not being controlled" but this is tosh (and I have this first hand from controllers there). The reasons are obvious if you think about it - what do you do if you lose comms? You follow the cleared departure and level off at the assigned altitude/Flight Level. This is what the controller is expecting you to do and he will be expecting you to be following that departure until he (or she of course) hears you check in and then tells you otherwise.
So, if you have to delay ATC check-in 10, 20, 30 seconds while you get the Captain to put his flight path right, then you do just that. ATC will still be there - but you opportunity to correct a flightpath error may not.
I get the impression that the FO was head down and distracted by the comms and was unduly pre-occupied with matters other than monitoring the performance of the aeroplane and the Captain, which is to FO's primary duty. If he had been paying more attaention to what the Captain was doing and had joined the FE in making "Attitude" calls or even taking control (I know from experience that this takes some nerve!) then the accident may well have been avoided. It does appear from the report, however, that the Captain was behaving in an autocratic and "superior" manner towards the FO, making (quote) "derogatory" comments towards him.
The following passage from the accident report is telling, I think:
In May 1999, a survey of KAL flight crews was conducted by the University of Texas Department of Psychology, through the consulting project. Over 550 pilots and flight engineers participated, in what was called the Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire (FMAQ), responding to questions regarding 'Command Structure'. They were asked to detail their level of agreement to the following statements:
1. Juniors should not question the captain unless there is a threat to safety.
2. First Officers should never assume command of the aircraft.
3. Captains should take control/fly in emergencies.
Responses regarding these statements were then combined to form a composite score, from which was measured the differences in attitudes toward command. These were then compared to the results from sixteen other national airlines in which identical surveys had been conducted. The results showed, among other things, that KAL flight crews as a whole preferred the 'captain-centered' methodology of flight deck operation, with a relatively greater reliance on the captain.
Ultimately, it was not a "maintenance error" but an "aircrew error". The aeroplane was serviceable apart from a single instrument and there were two other instruments (more if you count the performance instruments such as HSI etc) telling the crew what was REALLY going on. The Captain appears to have belittled his FO to the extent that the chap was unwilling to question the Captain's performance and it is (speculation here) likely that the Captain would have been unreceptive to that questioning, anyway.
It bears a striking resemblance to the performance of Captain Keys in the BA Trident crash at Staines in the 70's - 25 years of lessons unlearned, it would appear.