The Atlantic Glider revisited - official report released (Merged)
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As to the other Canadian Glider the crew also got a standing ovation from ALPA, but got work suspention from Air Canada, and were reinstated when coworkers got angry with company.I personnaly met with the first officer then who is now if I'm not mistaking since last spring a 767 retired captain of said AC
A book and movi were made from that incident.
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Roadtrip and Kinsman,
I don't think you're being entirely fair when you assert that Capt Piche was elevated to the status of a hero prematurely. While I agree that the desperate situation he found himself in was quite possibly of his own making and that he had a huge amount of luck, you cannot deny that, in gliding a heavy jet to a safe landing at an airfield, he pulled off an amazing feat of airmanship. The two other possible outcomes would have been a crash landing or a ditching. The chances of either of those being fatality-free are pretty well zero. For his seizing his one and only chance and making it, he surely deserves the accolades bestowed on him.
Rockhound
I don't think you're being entirely fair when you assert that Capt Piche was elevated to the status of a hero prematurely. While I agree that the desperate situation he found himself in was quite possibly of his own making and that he had a huge amount of luck, you cannot deny that, in gliding a heavy jet to a safe landing at an airfield, he pulled off an amazing feat of airmanship. The two other possible outcomes would have been a crash landing or a ditching. The chances of either of those being fatality-free are pretty well zero. For his seizing his one and only chance and making it, he surely deserves the accolades bestowed on him.
Rockhound
Iconoclast
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The rest of the story.
The Air Transat mechanics did not cannibalize a fuel pump and fuel duct from an L-1011. Rolls Royce shipped the new engine minus a fuel pump, a fuel duct and a support bracket. In order to get the aircraft back into the air they removed the pump and duct from the original engine. It was generally agreed that they would have no trouble for the short wait period for the new duct and bracket. Obviously they were wrong because without the bracket the duct rubbed against another piece of hardware and eventually developed a massive leak.
Regarding the actions taken by the pilot it was in direct accordance with the checklist provided for a situation where there was a fuel imbalance. In following the procedure when he received a warning about a fuel imbalance it was too late. It is my understanding that on Air Transat’s 757 Boeing provides a warning when there is a difference of about 1700 pounds. Airbus does not provide a warning until the difference is significantly higher than the warning provided on Boeing aircraft.
IMHO it was the maintenance department and Rolls Royce that should share the blame. I also believe that Airbus should accept some responsibility for the design of the engine installation.
Regarding the actions taken by the pilot it was in direct accordance with the checklist provided for a situation where there was a fuel imbalance. In following the procedure when he received a warning about a fuel imbalance it was too late. It is my understanding that on Air Transat’s 757 Boeing provides a warning when there is a difference of about 1700 pounds. Airbus does not provide a warning until the difference is significantly higher than the warning provided on Boeing aircraft.
IMHO it was the maintenance department and Rolls Royce that should share the blame. I also believe that Airbus should accept some responsibility for the design of the engine installation.
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Rockhound
Do not mistake me, I think the crew did a great job in setting the aircraft down. I was alluding to the possible incorrect application of the fuel imbalance drill. As a trainer on the A330 I do find it difficult to reconcile the crews actions prior to the double engine flame out. But as I mentioned in an earlier post there may well be more information that may explain the crews actions.
As it would be very wrong to lay blame on the crew before the completion of a full investigation, it is also wrong to elevate a crew to the position of hero before all the facts are known. I am sure Captain Piche also feels uncomfortable with the accolade.
My point is even if it is proved the crew failed to deal correctly with a serious fuel leak, we as an industry need to move away from looking for some poor sod to blame and learn from the situation. After all a good crew that has made a serious mistake would be the last ones to do it again, at least that's the theory!
Do not mistake me, I think the crew did a great job in setting the aircraft down. I was alluding to the possible incorrect application of the fuel imbalance drill. As a trainer on the A330 I do find it difficult to reconcile the crews actions prior to the double engine flame out. But as I mentioned in an earlier post there may well be more information that may explain the crews actions.
As it would be very wrong to lay blame on the crew before the completion of a full investigation, it is also wrong to elevate a crew to the position of hero before all the facts are known. I am sure Captain Piche also feels uncomfortable with the accolade.
My point is even if it is proved the crew failed to deal correctly with a serious fuel leak, we as an industry need to move away from looking for some poor sod to blame and learn from the situation. After all a good crew that has made a serious mistake would be the last ones to do it again, at least that's the theory!
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Lu Zuc
Thank you for your enlightened comment, it sure sets the maintenance facts straight...
As for the crew, since I personnally know both of them (I've flown with Capt. Piché on the 1011 as an f/o and with F/O DeJager as a Capt. on the 1011 as well), I will refrain from making any kind of comments before the report gets out. I think that anyone who does, is talking through the top of their heads (one way or the other), and like many have said here, instead of laying premature blame (if any), why not try to learn from it.
I've read somewhere that they had 7/1 000 000 000 chances of making somewhat a safe landing from it. Let's, at least, acknowledge that very impressive bit of handling/flying.
Thank you for your enlightened comment, it sure sets the maintenance facts straight...
As for the crew, since I personnally know both of them (I've flown with Capt. Piché on the 1011 as an f/o and with F/O DeJager as a Capt. on the 1011 as well), I will refrain from making any kind of comments before the report gets out. I think that anyone who does, is talking through the top of their heads (one way or the other), and like many have said here, instead of laying premature blame (if any), why not try to learn from it.
I've read somewhere that they had 7/1 000 000 000 chances of making somewhat a safe landing from it. Let's, at least, acknowledge that very impressive bit of handling/flying.
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Anyone who reads aviation accident reports quickly understands that most accidents evolve from a fateful sequence of circumstances and events which lead the participants to their fate. Those up front who share the consequences inevitably play some part in the chain of events.
What distinguishes these two pilots is that they broke the chain of bad luck, mistakes, carelessness, error, or whatever it was and, with considerable skill and really breathtaking coolness conducted that successful long glide to their hot landing on the runway at Lajes.
Sure it could have been better. Sure it could have been worse. The proof is the result - the passengers eventually reached their destination.
Like the rest of you, I don't know if the crew's decision process was right or wrong in managing the crossfeed, but I doubt they had any intention to do other than solve the problem confronting them in the best manner possible. They likely tried to use the best information that training, aircraft systems, and other resources could provide at the moment. If those resources failed - like the hardware - it was probably not primarily due to a character flaw on the crew's behalf, but to various defects in the suppport, training, and operations systems that were behind them.
Ultimately they did what pilots are really supposed to do: stay cool and focussed even when things have gotten way out of the
box; work the problem; steer past the adversity and put down as safely as possible. And they were lucky enough and skillful enough to get that part, the really important part, right.
What distinguishes these two pilots is that they broke the chain of bad luck, mistakes, carelessness, error, or whatever it was and, with considerable skill and really breathtaking coolness conducted that successful long glide to their hot landing on the runway at Lajes.
Sure it could have been better. Sure it could have been worse. The proof is the result - the passengers eventually reached their destination.
Like the rest of you, I don't know if the crew's decision process was right or wrong in managing the crossfeed, but I doubt they had any intention to do other than solve the problem confronting them in the best manner possible. They likely tried to use the best information that training, aircraft systems, and other resources could provide at the moment. If those resources failed - like the hardware - it was probably not primarily due to a character flaw on the crew's behalf, but to various defects in the suppport, training, and operations systems that were behind them.
Ultimately they did what pilots are really supposed to do: stay cool and focussed even when things have gotten way out of the
box; work the problem; steer past the adversity and put down as safely as possible. And they were lucky enough and skillful enough to get that part, the really important part, right.
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Arcniz...
Great post, if english was my first language, that's probably what I would have written...
Sikorsky...
I fly the 310 and we don't have that message available on our FMC's, and I heard some pilots who fly the 757 at our company saying that they do have that message available... so I think it's only Boeing! If I'm not mistaken, the warning for fuel imbalance comes way late on the 330, anyone can comment?
Great post, if english was my first language, that's probably what I would have written...
Sikorsky...
I fly the 310 and we don't have that message available on our FMC's, and I heard some pilots who fly the 757 at our company saying that they do have that message available... so I think it's only Boeing! If I'm not mistaken, the warning for fuel imbalance comes way late on the 330, anyone can comment?
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Not wanting to cast blame (I'll leave that to the DGAC):
QUOTE
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
released by DIRECTION GENERALE DE L’AVIATION CIVILE
Inspection and/or modifications described below are mandatory. No person may operate a product to which this
Airworthiness Directive applies except in accordance with the requirements of this Airworthiness Directive.
Translation of ‘Consigne de Navigabilité’ ref. : 2002-549(B)
In case of any difficulty, reference should be made to the French original issue.
November 13, 2002 AIRBUS
A340 aircraft 2002-549(B)
GSAC
AIRBUS
A340 aircraft
Fuel leak procedure (ATA 28)
1. APPLICABILITY:
AIRBUS A340 aircraft, models -211, -212, -213, -311, -312 and -313, all serial numbers.
2. REASONS:
! Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2001-440(B) has been released in order to introduce the fuel leak
procedure which required the monitoring of the fuel quantity located in the feed tanks of engines
2 and 3 in case of flight with the split valves closed, with or without fuel jettison (case where a fuel
leak is confirmed after an engine failure).
This monitoring was rendered mandatory to avoid a potentially catastrophic situation that is one
engine failed (No. 4 or No. 1) followed by two engine flame-outs (No. 2 and No. 3).
! In August 2001, an A330-200 equipped with Rolls-Royce engines was diverted following an
extensive fuel leak. During the diversion, the two engines shut down due to lack of fuel. An
emergency landing with all engines off was successfully achieved.
The inquiry revealed that fuel management by the crew directly contributed to the total loss of the fuel.
And a similar AD for the A330.
Looks like captain hero is not immume to bad airmanship.
Lady luck was on their side
QUOTE
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
released by DIRECTION GENERALE DE L’AVIATION CIVILE
Inspection and/or modifications described below are mandatory. No person may operate a product to which this
Airworthiness Directive applies except in accordance with the requirements of this Airworthiness Directive.
Translation of ‘Consigne de Navigabilité’ ref. : 2002-549(B)
In case of any difficulty, reference should be made to the French original issue.
November 13, 2002 AIRBUS
A340 aircraft 2002-549(B)
GSAC
AIRBUS
A340 aircraft
Fuel leak procedure (ATA 28)
1. APPLICABILITY:
AIRBUS A340 aircraft, models -211, -212, -213, -311, -312 and -313, all serial numbers.
2. REASONS:
! Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2001-440(B) has been released in order to introduce the fuel leak
procedure which required the monitoring of the fuel quantity located in the feed tanks of engines
2 and 3 in case of flight with the split valves closed, with or without fuel jettison (case where a fuel
leak is confirmed after an engine failure).
This monitoring was rendered mandatory to avoid a potentially catastrophic situation that is one
engine failed (No. 4 or No. 1) followed by two engine flame-outs (No. 2 and No. 3).
! In August 2001, an A330-200 equipped with Rolls-Royce engines was diverted following an
extensive fuel leak. During the diversion, the two engines shut down due to lack of fuel. An
emergency landing with all engines off was successfully achieved.
The inquiry revealed that fuel management by the crew directly contributed to the total loss of the fuel.
And a similar AD for the A330.
Looks like captain hero is not immume to bad airmanship.
Lady luck was on their side
Iconoclast
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Cover your ass
As I stated in a previous post on this subject the pilots when made aware of the fuel imbalance followed the applicable checklist to the letter.
In all programs that I have worked on all procedures relative to the operation of the aircraft are written by pilot / tech writers. It is obvious that these tech writers along with the reliability and safety engineers never conceived of this type of problem. If you were to check the Failure Modes Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) you would most likely find that the Rolls Royce RMS engineers never considered the catastrophic failure of the subject duct due to abrasion against another piece of hardware. If they did then the Airbus RMS engineers never carried the failure to the aircraft level.
Blaming the pilots for following Airbus instructions seems to me to be shifting the blame from the locals (Airbus Industrie) and Rolls Royce to the operators of the aircraft. So much for the DGCA analysis.
In all programs that I have worked on all procedures relative to the operation of the aircraft are written by pilot / tech writers. It is obvious that these tech writers along with the reliability and safety engineers never conceived of this type of problem. If you were to check the Failure Modes Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) you would most likely find that the Rolls Royce RMS engineers never considered the catastrophic failure of the subject duct due to abrasion against another piece of hardware. If they did then the Airbus RMS engineers never carried the failure to the aircraft level.
Blaming the pilots for following Airbus instructions seems to me to be shifting the blame from the locals (Airbus Industrie) and Rolls Royce to the operators of the aircraft. So much for the DGCA analysis.
Wonder how many Pilots/ Engineers would have diagnosed the leak from the first fault msges(Before any imbalance msg)
Low Oil Temp in cruise
High Oil pressure in cruise.
Apologies if the wording is not exactly as the ECAM.
Low Oil Temp in cruise
High Oil pressure in cruise.
Apologies if the wording is not exactly as the ECAM.
Possibly he means what he said.
The leaking fuel close to ambient temperature at cruising altitude would cool whatever it leaked/sprayed upon, be that the oil reservoir or other parts of the engine where oil flowed.
And the increased viscosity would result in increased oil pressure.
So very easy to see after the fact. Hands up everybody who would react to Low Oil Temperature by checking for a fuel leak, even before last August?
The leaking fuel close to ambient temperature at cruising altitude would cool whatever it leaked/sprayed upon, be that the oil reservoir or other parts of the engine where oil flowed.
And the increased viscosity would result in increased oil pressure.
So very easy to see after the fact. Hands up everybody who would react to Low Oil Temperature by checking for a fuel leak, even before last August?
Iconoclast
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Great ball of fire.
The leaking fuel close to ambient temperature at cruising altitude would cool whatever it leaked/sprayed upon, be that the oil reservoir or other parts of the engine where oil flowed.
The kinematic viscosity for MIL-PRF-23699F turbine oil is:
@ 100 C 4.90 to 5.40
@ 40 C 23.0 Minimum
@ -40 C 13,000 Maximum
It is just pure luck that the leaking fuel did not ignite. If it did we would not be having this conversation.
Not that I know alot,But I believe the leak was after the oil cooler.
Hence much fuel flow through the cooler so over cooling the Oil.
Just imagine trying to diagnose that, but I guess if I see those messages now I will take a carefull look at the fuel usage calculated to actual! My sympathies are with the crew.
The final accident report will make interesting reading & I guess will show much mitigating circumstances.
Hence much fuel flow through the cooler so over cooling the Oil.
Just imagine trying to diagnose that, but I guess if I see those messages now I will take a carefull look at the fuel usage calculated to actual! My sympathies are with the crew.
The final accident report will make interesting reading & I guess will show much mitigating circumstances.
Lu, while your scenario when the fire goes out is reasonable, it seems that the first ECAM indications of Low Oil Temp and High Oil Pressure appeared when the engines were still running.
Now while the fuel temperature will be somewhere between ambient temperature at altitude and temperature at takeoff, the cooling effect from a dense fluid of higher temperature can be higher than that of a less dense fluid at lower temperature -- and the density of fuel is some thousands of times that of air.
And we haven't even worked in the heat of evaporation
Now while the fuel temperature will be somewhere between ambient temperature at altitude and temperature at takeoff, the cooling effect from a dense fluid of higher temperature can be higher than that of a less dense fluid at lower temperature -- and the density of fuel is some thousands of times that of air.
And we haven't even worked in the heat of evaporation