The NTSB conducted extensive research into the pilot application of rudder following the Pittsburgh 737 crash of 1994, and concluded then that they were unable to reproduce the pattern of rapid rudder movement apparent in the accident. Indeed in a survey of some 10000 sectors, the Board was unable to find another incidence in which a pilot had commanded full rudder deflection as a response to an upset. It was this inference that led them to suspect beyond reasonable doubt that the pilot had not mishandled the aircraft involved in the Pittsburgh accident, and that his inputs were attempting to counter the rudder hardover, the flawed design that Boeing later had to rectify.
How then can we now be expected to accept a new paradigm that suggest that pilots should be told that a rapid, reversing application of full rudder might compromise the structural integrity of an aeroplane? It had been shown in the NTSB’s own research before the AA587 accident that such pilot behaviour was uncharacteristic and unnatural.
Are we now suggesting that pilots need to be warned of all possible control inputs that might be hazardous to the aircraft? Should the Airbus 380 Flying Manual include advice not to roll inverted and pull immediately after take-off?
The accusation that Airbus somehow failed to caution operators that such extraordinary manoeuvres might be potentially hazardous is sheer folly. I suspect if it had been a Boeing 737 that crashed at Queens and not an Airbus, we would not be having this conversation.
The Atlantic is getting wider and wider by the day.