BA pilot grounded over undisclosed anger
The Staines air disaster was the result of the captain’s emotional state.Anger is an emotion that has no place in any aircraft and that applies to passengers and crew.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Britis...ays_Flight_548
Well, these managers were still alive and well in BA until fairly recently….i remember getting shouted at in the middle of the crew room by a senior Flt Ops Tech manager for the crime of parking in a car park that he deemed me not to be worthy of. The look on his face when I fished out my temporary car park pass was a sight to behold. Skipper told me later I should have walked out of the room and taken it further . Life is too short though. Funnily enough, he didn’t last long either.
The Staines accident is examined in detail in this thread:
G-ARPI - The Trident Tragedy: 40 years ago today
G-ARPI - The Trident Tragedy: 40 years ago today
ttps://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?t=647322&referrerid=337296
thanks discorde but this is the later thread where I added another observation after a mate died paragliding with a heart condition that mirrored what I saw in Stan the day before papa india..don’t know how to post the link properly
Staines, UK 1972, June 18th.
thanks discorde but this is the later thread where I added another observation after a mate died paragliding with a heart condition that mirrored what I saw in Stan the day before papa india..don’t know how to post the link properly
Staines, UK 1972, June 18th.
The UK libel laws are particularly aggressive and this country is known for "libel tourism" e.g. SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation). See numerous examples of books published elsewhere, that cannot be sold in the UK due to court orders etc. I still have my illicit copy of Spycatcher somewhere. See also this forum where a particular airline shall never be mentioned in anything but glowing terms.
The Staines Trident crash was due to the Captain bringing in the leading edge droops, which was not called out by either of the two junior crew on the flight deck. They either did not notice (unlikely IMHO) or the gradient of command was an inhibiting factor.
The Staines Trident crash was due to the Captain bringing in the leading edge droops, which was not called out by either of the two junior crew on the flight deck. They either did not notice (unlikely IMHO) or the gradient of command was an inhibiting factor.
Thread Starter
In some parts of the world the attitude that you’re not allowed to question your elders still exists
That of course was the reason for the One,Two,Go Flight 269 disaster at Phuket,Thailand. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-Tw...nes_Flight_269
Asia has an issue that elevates respect for seniors .
The Korean culture has two features—respect for seniority and age, and quite an authoritarian style," said Thomas Kochan, a professor at the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "You put those two together, and you may get more one-way communication—and not a lot of it upward,"Executives of South Korea’s Asiana Airlines say they’re altering its pilot training program to encourage communication among senior managers and subordinates, after a July plane crash in San Francisco that killed three people and injured dozens.
A U.S. hearing into the crash revealed one of the pilots said he did not feel he had the authority to abort a low-speed landing as individuals at a “higher level” had to make that decision, .
A U.S. hearing into the crash revealed one of the pilots said he did not feel he had the authority to abort a low-speed landing as individuals at a “higher level” had to make that decision, .
This is an interesting discussion and I wish to point out we know nothing about the BA captain who may well be the victim of a malicious attempt to ruin his career.
Last edited by Mike Flynn; 23rd Mar 2024 at 10:00.
MF : Agreed. It is one of the reasons Cathay Horrific was populated by young British airline pilots in the late 70s and early 80s. The local talent habitually deferred to authority. Not good.
Major UK airlines commenced their own CRM training using NASA, Bob Helmreich and James Reason to push for the correct attitudes and behaviours. Medical teams looked at what was going on, but stubbornly remained about 20 years behind aviation until the last decade. Now it is mandatory to have Human Factors training. Just took so long.
Major UK airlines commenced their own CRM training using NASA, Bob Helmreich and James Reason to push for the correct attitudes and behaviours. Medical teams looked at what was going on, but stubbornly remained about 20 years behind aviation until the last decade. Now it is mandatory to have Human Factors training. Just took so long.
Last edited by Right20deg; 23rd Mar 2024 at 09:30. Reason: Spelling
Sudden twang
Well done for adding a correction/caution to that.
it was speculated that the Captains state of mind influenced what happened but it was never proven . Essentially he had a row in the crew room before departure but that was all that could be proven. As you point out CVRs are there largely because of this tragic incident
Well done for adding a correction/caution to that.
it was speculated that the Captains state of mind influenced what happened but it was never proven . Essentially he had a row in the crew room before departure but that was all that could be proven. As you point out CVRs are there largely because of this tragic incident
But not anger directed inappropriately at co-workers. Given the propensity for the Captain to “lash out without warning” this would have a detrimental effect on safety.
Tabs please !
The extract from the AAIB report reads.....
"(1) The abnormal heart condition of Captain Key leading to lack of concentration and impaired judgement sufficient to account for his toleration of the speed errors and to his retraction of, or order to retract, the droops in mistake for the flaps."
Trident I G-ARPI: Main document (fss.aero)
"(1) The abnormal heart condition of Captain Key leading to lack of concentration and impaired judgement sufficient to account for his toleration of the speed errors and to his retraction of, or order to retract, the droops in mistake for the flaps."
Trident I G-ARPI: Main document (fss.aero)
Thread Starter
The extract from the AAIB report reads.....
"(1) The abnormal heart condition of Captain Key leading to lack of concentration and impaired judgement sufficient to account for his toleration of the speed errors and to his retraction of, or order to retract, the droops in mistake for the flaps."
Trident I G-ARPI: Main document (fss.aero)
"(1) The abnormal heart condition of Captain Key leading to lack of concentration and impaired judgement sufficient to account for his toleration of the speed errors and to his retraction of, or order to retract, the droops in mistake for the flaps."
Trident I G-ARPI: Main document (fss.aero)
If as Mr Good Cat implies in #39 that PI did not have a CVR, which is what I recall, and no one survived, then where is the information that the captain either retracted the droops or called for them to be retracted by mistake? The order in which the scenario unfolded, which no one really knows, is surely crucial to who did what.
Thread Starter
If as Mr Good Cat implies in #39 that PI did not have a CVR, which is what I recall, and no one survived, then where is the information that the captain either retracted the droops or called for them to be retracted by mistake? The order in which the scenario unfolded, which no one really knows, is surely crucial to who did what.
Absolutely Mike, I wasn't trying to apportion blame anywhere. The comment was made that the captain actually did something or called for something that was complied with, maybe he was not 'in charge', or more likely 'in control' because he was incapacitated by a heart attack. My point was that if the first issue the crew had was a captain becoming incapacitated then everything that followed and who did what is unknown. This inexperienced crew had the misfortune to be confronted with multiple issues, one likely influenced by another, at the worse possible time in the flight.
If I recall correctly from reading the Staines AIB report, Captain was assumed to be PF and the wire FDR readout indicated that several attempts were made to fly the anticipated pitch attitude for flap retraction but this produced a descent due to the LE devices being retracted which the crew would not have expected and a higher than normal attitude was adopted to maintain at least level flight which resulted in a loss of airspeed. PF was clearly confused but not incapacitated, normal SOP would require PF to call for PM to retract TE/LE devices.
The extract from the AAIB report reads.....
"(1) The abnormal heart condition of Captain Key leading to lack of concentration and impaired judgement sufficient to account for his toleration of the speed errors and to his retraction of, or order to retract, the droops in mistake for the flaps."
Trident I G-ARPI: Main document (fss.aero)
"(1) The abnormal heart condition of Captain Key leading to lack of concentration and impaired judgement sufficient to account for his toleration of the speed errors and to his retraction of, or order to retract, the droops in mistake for the flaps."
Trident I G-ARPI: Main document (fss.aero)
Thread Starter
Captain Key was aged 51 and had 15,000 flying hours experience, including 4,000 on Tridents. Keighley was aged 22 and had joined line flying a month and a half earlier, with 29 hours as P2. Ticehurst was aged 24 and had over 1,400 hours, including 750 hours on Tridents