Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Flight Deck Forums > Rumours & News
Reload this Page >

Airbus Within 6ft of the Ground nearly 1 mile Short of Runway

Rumours & News Reporting Points that may affect our jobs or lives as professional pilots. Also, items that may be of interest to professional pilots.

Airbus Within 6ft of the Ground nearly 1 mile Short of Runway

Old 17th Jul 2022, 11:33
  #161 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2015
Location: Tranquility Base
Posts: 54
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by ZeBedie View Post
Doesn't every A320 pilot set QNH on his altimeter in the cruise when the ATIS is received, before reverting straight back to STD? Then when ATC later tells you to go QNH, the correct value should already be displayed?
We do this too, it is procedure, but I guess not coming from Airbus FCOM, it is just a company SOP for both crew members. We also have to compare the QNH given by approach control when descending to an altitude with an alternative source, typically ATIS. On non-precision approaches we again have to confirm QNH with tower.

I still think the machine should do this automatically by comparing QNH on the perf approach page with the QNH set on the FCU once on QNH.
1201alarm is offline  
Old 17th Jul 2022, 11:40
  #162 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Sydney
Age: 60
Posts: 435
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by The FUB View Post
"FAF altitude checks, MAP set."

Gross error of altimeter QNH should be evident.
Thatís the issue with PBN approaches and incorrect QNH settings, it all looks good. Itís frightening that people flying these approaches donít understand this risk.
roundsounds is offline  
Old 17th Jul 2022, 11:56
  #163 (permalink)  

Only half a speed-brake
 
Join Date: Apr 2003
Location: Not commuting home
Age: 44
Posts: 3,966
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by SW1 View Post
Ive only been back in Europe
I stand geographically corrected.
FlightDetent is offline  
Old 17th Jul 2022, 11:57
  #164 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2012
Location: Having a margarita on the beach
Age: 50
Posts: 2,150
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
This is a typical case study of QNH blunder error where an SOP such as pre-setting the METAR/ATIS QNH prior to TOD could have prevented the incident. Many operators use this procedure as a safety net and it does work well indeed to trap errors both from the crew side and ATC. I believe that after this event more and more operators will include it in their procedures.
sonicbum is offline  
Old 17th Jul 2022, 12:01
  #165 (permalink)  

Only half a speed-brake
 
Join Date: Apr 2003
Location: Not commuting home
Age: 44
Posts: 3,966
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK View Post
AFAIK, the altitude that ATC see on Mode C/Mode S isn't affected by your altimeter setting - it's always based on a 1013 hPa datum.
Mode C is not, however a strange quirk of Airbus avionics suite sends the last used before setting the STD through the downlink S mode.

The extended squitter seems to have a data filed for selected Baro ref, however the last value is retained for transmission instead of STD when the crew changes to that.

Which brings us to another unexpected conclusion. Mode S must have been transmitting Q1011 after this almost doomed crew accepted the wrong instruction.

​​​​​​Hmm, some opportunities there!
​​​​
FlightDetent is offline  
Old 17th Jul 2022, 13:32
  #166 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Europe
Posts: 129
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by vilas View Post
Dual language instructions always has the potential for an incident. It should be stopped.
Indeed. All in French. All you need is a French level 4.
fab777 is offline  
Old 17th Jul 2022, 14:18
  #167 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 67
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
See UK CAA Safety Notice SN2019-001 (Mar 19)



SAM 2M is offline  
Old 17th Jul 2022, 14:27
  #168 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2011
Location: BFE
Posts: 2,331
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Did this happen at an airshow?
vegassun is offline  
Old 17th Jul 2022, 15:31
  #169 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Reading, UK
Posts: 14,286
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by FlightDetent View Post
The extended squitter seems to have a data filed for selected Baro ref, however the last value is retained for transmission instead of STD when the crew changes to that.

Which brings us to another unexpected conclusion. Mode S must have been transmitting Q1011 after this almost doomed crew accepted the wrong instruction.​​​​
AFAIK, baro pressure setting isn't part of the ADS-B extended squitter, but is only sent as part of Mode S EHS, if and when interrogated by SSR.

I don't know whether the CDG controllers typically see it on their screens (either fulltime or as an option) or not.
DaveReidUK is online now  
Old 17th Jul 2022, 16:28
  #170 (permalink)  

Only half a speed-brake
 
Join Date: Apr 2003
Location: Not commuting home
Age: 44
Posts: 3,966
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Point being made, would it not be a useful feature of the ATC kit to automatically track and alert for any selected Baro REF discrepancies of the arriving aircraft?

Surely that was the idea behind having it in the dataset.
FlightDetent is offline  
Old 17th Jul 2022, 16:37
  #171 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Earth until ..........
Posts: 31
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Every cheese has holes

Originally Posted by sonicbum View Post
This is a typical case study of QNH blunder error where an SOP such as pre-setting the METAR/ATIS QNH prior to TOD could have prevented the incident. Many operators use this procedure as a safety net and it does work well indeed to trap errors both from the crew side and ATC. I believe that after this event more and more operators will include it in their procedures.
This procedure was used by my outfit when we operated Airbus and worked well. However one pitfall ( and this happened on a flight ) is the setting of QNH and forgetting to switch back to STD.
This crew ( PF ) set the QNH but forgot to switch back to STD and was cleared descent to a Flight Level. A Level bust occurred using QNH instead of STD.
B888 is offline  
Old 17th Jul 2022, 18:10
  #172 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: Hampshire
Posts: 21
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Exclamation

Originally Posted by FlightDetent View Post
Point being made, would it not be a useful feature of the ATC kit to automatically track and alert for any selected Baro REF discrepancies of the arriving aircraft?

Surely that was the idea behind having it in the dataset.
Originally Posted by Request Orbit View Post
If this had happened in the LTMA the approach controller would have had a flashing alert on the radar that the wrong QNH was set as soon as they were descending through the TL, surprised thereís not similar for CDG. Link
(Apparently I need to add words to a quote to be able to hit post)
Request Orbit is offline  
Old 17th Jul 2022, 22:25
  #173 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Reading, UK
Posts: 14,286
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by Request Orbit View Post
If this had happened in the LTMA the approach controller would have had a flashing alert on the radar that the wrong QNH was set as soon as they were descending through the TL, surprised there’s not similar for CDG.
The Preliminary Report contains the following Safety Recommendation

Implement without delay, a procedure to mitigate the risks of an incorrect QNH setting affecting both altimeters during approaches using the baro-VNAV function, possibly by crosschecking the QNH with another source of information, in particular with the ATIS information when available or by asking the controller for confirmation of the QNH.
which strongly implies that CDG has no current safety-net involving automated detection of incorrect QNH setting.

The BEA makes no reference to the solution adopted by NATS, though it's anybody's guess whether it is simply avoiding being prescriptive as to the solution that it is recommending CDG should adopt, or whether they are unaware of how other ANSPs tackle the issue.

Last edited by DaveReidUK; 18th Jul 2022 at 06:29. Reason: ANSPs, not ANPs
DaveReidUK is online now  
Old 18th Jul 2022, 00:19
  #174 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 929
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
I have looked but I can't find the FCOM reference for that procedure.

Airmanship isn’t in the FCOM.
This procedure was used by my outfit when we operated Airbus and worked well. However one pitfall ( and this happened on a flight ) is the setting of QNH and forgetting to switch back to STD.
This crew ( PF ) set the QNH but forgot to switch back to STD and was cleared descent to a Flight Level. A Level bust occurred using QNH instead of STD.
That was exactly my point. Trying to fix one point of failure by introducing another point of failure is not airmanship, it is called cultural SOP. With QNH and RNAV approaches, awareness of what the QNH should be from the TAF and comparing it with the ATIS is the best defense. Of course sitting there and just accepting information without cross checking it is certainly not airmanship. Introducing procedures into a flightdeck as a workaround is also not airmanship.
Lookleft is offline  
Old 18th Jul 2022, 01:55
  #175 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 2,276
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by B888 View Post
This procedure was used by my outfit when we operated Airbus and worked well. However one pitfall ( and this happened on a flight ) is the setting of QNH and forgetting to switch back to STD.
This crew ( PF ) set the QNH but forgot to switch back to STD and was cleared descent to a Flight Level. A Level bust occurred using QNH instead of STD.
We do that at my outfit. Weíll set the QNH while doing the perf app page, about an hour out. What you described shouldnít happen in an Airbus, as I believe itíll eventually start flashing at you.

Some people set the destination QNH when climbing through TA on the sid.

Both methods are only technique though.
Check Airman is offline  
Old 18th Jul 2022, 08:16
  #176 (permalink)  
Pegase Driver
 
Join Date: May 1997
Location: Europe
Age: 72
Posts: 3,152
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
DaveReidUK :
The BEA makes no reference to the solution adopted by NATS, though it's anybody's guess whether it is simply avoiding being prescriptive as to the solution that it is recommending CDG should adopt, or whether they are unaware of how other ANSPs tackle the issue.
It is the second option. afaik.
ATC Watcher is offline  
Old 18th Jul 2022, 09:02
  #177 (permalink)  
fdr
 
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: 3rd Rock, #29B
Posts: 1,581
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
When we sit in our aircraft, we have in front of us 120 year old pressure displayed instruments.... we also have a display that gives our geometric altitude, and a synthetic view of the world in front, including terrain alerting and obstacles. Operating into an airfield that is 6,000' up and -30C makes it desirable to actually know what your physical separation from bad days are. In this event, the crew would have received an alert that they were landing in a paddock, outside of the passengers preferred arrival location, and they would see a FPV that was aiming 1nm short of the runway threshold, the display would show the threshold moving away from the FPV at an ever increasing rate until it gets rowdy.

Point is, our safety is predicated on a weak system of communications, mon dieu, and placing the fix at the same side that is already showing problems with task saturation and process maintenance seems to be less than optimal. The people with the vested interest in arrival at the correct place in space if not time are the drivers.

At cruise, the difference is a curiosity, geometric altitude is normally around 1500' higher than the FL, but it remains quite stable for periods dependent on the airmass, on an approach, the PA and geometric altitude converge, and at around 3000' PA there is normally not more than 20' error at ISA, but as per cold temp correction factors, there is considerable difference to the uncorrected PA altitude... If the corrections are correctly applied, or the G/S is a valid (geometric) track, then the FPA sits on the end of the runway. There is no cognitive load to looking at a happy map of the world in front, and this display is specifically not corrected to PA for the very reason that we want to see real world, not someones communicated information on the local airmass characteristics.

It happens to display on an iPad, it can display on an iPhone... Could it be added as a display to any aircraft? of course, but there is no current TSO standard that would be relevant to such a display, as we are firmly committed to the 18th century in technology.





fdr is offline  
Old 18th Jul 2022, 09:14
  #178 (permalink)  
Thread Starter
 
Join Date: Dec 2020
Location: Manchester
Posts: 50
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
I suspect 99% of the replies on here have missed the overriding law in aviation.

Its referred to as 'tombstone safety'. Nothing changes until there are deaths and it costs more in insurance payouts than to fix the problem.

How much would it cost, apart from the dint in nationalistic pride, for it to be compulsory for English to be used at one of the busiest airports in Europe. Let's remember standard RT phraseology does not mean having to be fluent. Indeed if you said 'QNH' to a typical Englishman you might as well be talking Mandarin. How hard can it be?
Youmightsaythat is offline  
Old 18th Jul 2022, 14:30
  #179 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 2019
Location: OnScreen
Posts: 223
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by Youmightsaythat View Post
I suspect 99% of the replies on here have missed the overriding law in aviation.

Its referred to as 'tombstone safety'. Nothing changes until there are deaths and it costs more in insurance payouts than to fix the problem.

How much would it cost, apart from the dint in nationalistic pride, for it to be compulsory for English to be used at one of the busiest airports in Europe. Let's remember standard RT phraseology does not mean having to be fluent. Indeed if you said 'QNH' to a typical Englishman you might as well be talking Mandarin. How hard can it be?
Fortunately, for this situation, the third one got the correct QNH in French instead of the wrong one in English. Otherwise, that aircraft might have created a real smoking hole.

I did not see an explanation/assumption in the report, why the ATC got it wrong in English.
WideScreen is offline  
Old 18th Jul 2022, 14:35
  #180 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 2019
Location: OnScreen
Posts: 223
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by fdr View Post
When we sit in our aircraft, we have in front of us 120 year old pressure displayed instruments.... we also have a display that gives our geometric altitude, and a synthetic view of the world in front, including terrain alerting and obstacles. Operating into an airfield that is 6,000' up and -30C makes it desirable to actually know what your physical separation from bad days are. In this event, the crew would have received an alert that they were landing in a paddock, outside of the passengers preferred arrival location, and they would see a FPV that was aiming 1nm short of the runway threshold, the display would show the threshold moving away from the FPV at an ever increasing rate until it gets rowdy.

Point is, our safety is predicated on a weak system of communications, mon dieu, and placing the fix at the same side that is already showing problems with task saturation and process maintenance seems to be less than optimal. The people with the vested interest in arrival at the correct place in space if not time are the drivers.

At cruise, the difference is a curiosity, geometric altitude is normally around 1500' higher than the FL, but it remains quite stable for periods dependent on the airmass, on an approach, the PA and geometric altitude converge, and at around 3000' PA there is normally not more than 20' error at ISA, but as per cold temp correction factors, there is considerable difference to the uncorrected PA altitude... If the corrections are correctly applied, or the G/S is a valid (geometric) track, then the FPA sits on the end of the runway. There is no cognitive load to looking at a happy map of the world in front, and this display is specifically not corrected to PA for the very reason that we want to see real world, not someones communicated information on the local airmass characteristics.

It happens to display on an iPad, it can display on an iPhone... Could it be added as a display to any aircraft? of course, but there is no current TSO standard that would be relevant to such a display, as we are firmly committed to the 18th century in technology.


fdr I agree with your writing, though my issue is, that this "tool" still is the (admittedly much better) primary driver for the flight path.

What we are missing is the "independent and automated verification" of what flight path the flight crew creates/follows with the tools they have available (or should have available in the ideal situation). The verifier is the one that saves the lives, when the flight crew screws up, for whatever reason.
WideScreen is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service - Do Not Sell My Personal Information

Copyright © 2021 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.