Airbus Within 6ft of the Ground nearly 1 mile Short of Runway
As MechEngr notes, if that's how the system normally works, it would require a pretty detailed terrain map to reliably determine altitude to the local ground level.
Only half a speed-brake
My personal favourite is to mandate the ANSPs to publish radio-height at the 1000' AAL checkpoint for every IAP. Darn easy, GPWS, EGPWS and ACAS also started mandatory for big aeroplanes only. I mean, if the issue is flying into terrain and RAs exist, why insist on devising another tool or gadget instead of learning how to utilize the full potential of what we already have?
For the aeroplane discussed, an electronic comparison cross-check between FCU BARO REF and MCDU APPR PG seems a no-brainer.
The more I look at it the more I don't want to look at it. https://geodesy.noaa.gov/GEOID/index.shtml It starts to glaze over the brain when considering that we live on a lumpy blob that is changing shape in ways that are measurable, but not reliably so from any location on the planet. Worse, where the satellites are is affected by the lumpy gravity of that lumpy blob. Gah!
There appears to be a project to convert to using the constellation directly as the reference; there is also a project to generate and equi-potential (they call it orthometric) model that includes differences in local gravity that is very useful in predicting water flow and flood plains. https://geodesy.noaa.gov/GRAV-D/pubs...2007_12_19.pdf
Join Date: Jun 2014
Location: airplane
Age: 33
Posts: 8
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Here, there, and everywhere
Posts: 1,065
Likes: 0
Received 10 Likes
on
5 Posts
Join Date: Jan 2010
Location: Marlow (mostly)
Posts: 324
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"the preliminary report seems to be clear that ...the crew flew straight through (what they believed to be) the MDA at a constant descent rate of 12 ft/sec, without having any visual references. It appears that the need for a go-around was not manifested for a further 6 seconds (72 ft further descent), when the Captain disconnected the autopilot and made a nose-up input, but a full go-around was not initiated for a further 3 seconds when TOGA was applied. So even if the altimeters had been set correctly obstacle clearance would have been significantly infringed – at the lowest point the aircraft would have been 123 feet below the correct MDA, apparently in full IMC. From the Captain’s actions (autopilot disconnect and stick back and then TOGA power 3 seconds later) it seems likely that he was not mentally prepared for a go-around.
So regardless of the altimetry issue, we have a prima facie serious breach of AOM in that the aircraft descended far below the indicated MDA without the Captain having seen visual cues which should already have “been in view for sufficient time for the pilot to have made an assessment of the aircraft position and rate of change of position in relation to the desired flight path.” (ICAO definition of reqjired visual reference)."
To repeat: it's "DECISION to land or go around height/altitude", not "start looking for cues altitude".