Airbus Within 6ft of the Ground nearly 1 mile Short of Runway
Join Date: Jan 2015
Location: Usually firmly on the ground
Posts: 147
Likes: 0
Received 3 Likes
on
2 Posts
We use standard phraseology, that way the use of one language works well. Any comments on this thread about English being chosen as opposed to another language are just hot air. It’s already happened. We could switch to Klingon and use standard phraseology and have local languages like in this case, and the same problems would continue to occur.
The "standard phraseology" didn't prevent the wrong value from being given. In English. The only difference I can see had English been the only ATC language is that the incorrect value (which is the root problem here, isn't it?) would very likely have been passed on to *everyone*.
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 90
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Can you spell out for me exactly how your comment relates to the incident mentioned in the OP?
The "standard phraseology" didn't prevent the wrong value from being given. In English. The only difference I can see had English been the only ATC language is that the incorrect value (which is the root problem here, isn't it?) would very likely have been passed on to *everyone*.
The "standard phraseology" didn't prevent the wrong value from being given. In English. The only difference I can see had English been the only ATC language is that the incorrect value (which is the root problem here, isn't it?) would very likely have been passed on to *everyone*.
I would strongly suggest that if the CDG controllers used only English language phraseology at all times this incident would not have happened. If they weren't continually flipping between the standard language and French they would probably not have made the error to begin with. Even if they had had a momentary lapse and confused 1011 and 1001 in one transmission, the error would likely have been detected quickly when the correct QNH was transmitted to all other aircraft IN ENGLISH. The fact that the majority of these other transmissions were in a language foreign to the incident crew reduced their opportunity to catch the error.
As to the reasons for the Gallic refusal to adhere to the language stipulated as standard by ICAO (behaviour stubbornly echoed in China, I might add), who can say. It may be that domestic aviation in France would be drastically hindered by deficiencies in English language proficiency amongst the pilot population (it would certainly be in China), it may be national pride. But it's more fun to consider that it's sour grapes. Just be thankful the standard language isn't Esperanto.
Only half a speed-brake
In 4 years the domestic PRC will have the largest traffic flow of all global regions. If they had been forced to use English phraseologies, surely some problems would appear now and then just because of that and the overall safety levels at the busiest world's busiest theatre would reduce.
That is part of what the linguist SLF gentleman had been saying. For all those who failed to understand his message or learn the meaning of it despite waving the flag of professionally utilizing those two very skills.
There are 6 official ICAO languages but that is not the point since the language of international aviation really is English.
Every country is allowed to use their own language and this cannot be disrespected. What happens at CDG and other French airports is select few of the local pilots insist on speaking their own at the detriment of the whole team.
When the CDG ATC tried to mandate English it's the French pilot unions who stood up against the order. Imagine that, a worker's union protecting the individual's legal right against unlawful rulings. Can't have the whole pie and eat it, dears.
All this talk of the French in use completely throws the focus off centre.
Unacceptable performance by a bottom paying operator by pilots without proper work contracts flying unsuspecting Western public.
Dysfunctional ATC reacation to low altitude alert.
Substandard Airport equipment in marginal weather. Which is not only safety issue but an economic too. Everybody pays good money to them to be ready for arriving aircraft.
I don't read too many threads on PPRuNe about Binter speaking Spanish at Fuerteventura, the odd Dash 8 doing the same at Madrid. Italian at Palermo, Greek at Santorini, Russian at Moscow.
That is part of what the linguist SLF gentleman had been saying. For all those who failed to understand his message or learn the meaning of it despite waving the flag of professionally utilizing those two very skills.
There are 6 official ICAO languages but that is not the point since the language of international aviation really is English.
Every country is allowed to use their own language and this cannot be disrespected. What happens at CDG and other French airports is select few of the local pilots insist on speaking their own at the detriment of the whole team.
When the CDG ATC tried to mandate English it's the French pilot unions who stood up against the order. Imagine that, a worker's union protecting the individual's legal right against unlawful rulings. Can't have the whole pie and eat it, dears.
All this talk of the French in use completely throws the focus off centre.
Unacceptable performance by a bottom paying operator by pilots without proper work contracts flying unsuspecting Western public.
Dysfunctional ATC reacation to low altitude alert.
Substandard Airport equipment in marginal weather. Which is not only safety issue but an economic too. Everybody pays good money to them to be ready for arriving aircraft.
I don't read too many threads on PPRuNe about Binter speaking Spanish at Fuerteventura, the odd Dash 8 doing the same at Madrid. Italian at Palermo, Greek at Santorini, Russian at Moscow.
Join Date: Jan 2015
Location: Usually firmly on the ground
Posts: 147
Likes: 0
Received 3 Likes
on
2 Posts
FlightDetent, thank you.
It seems just as likely to me that if only English had been used for all communications, the mistaken value could have been broadcast to all aircraft. Sure, that might have increased the chances of it being caught, but at the cost of multiplying the potential for similiar incidents with similarly inattentive crew.
Again, I'm not sure. Remember the mistaken value was given in the non-native language. The issue here from a linguistic point of view isn't what that language is, it's that it's the ATC's non-native language. In my experience numbers are one of the hardest things to get right in a non-native language.
That is true, but as FlightDetent has pointed out, there appear to be a whole load of other ways of catching this error that deserve attention before deciding it's all the fault of dual language use. I'm sure crew picking up information from ATC communications with other aircraft is helpful to my SLF safety, but I sincerely hope it's not the first layer of safety...
See my quote from the Wikipedia article on Aviation English here. One of the apparent misconceptions of some native English speakers on this thread is that speaking English, whether as a native speaker or not, suffices for RC to be intelligible. According to that page, it can actually be a disadvantage when used by native speakers, especially in non-standard and/or emergency situations.
The suggestion reveals another Western-centric blind spot. Esperanto isn't "neutral"; its use would favour Romance and Indo-European language speakers considerably. Somebody upthread suggested Klingon; the related Wikipedia article states that a design principle of the Klingon language was dissimilarity to existing natural languages in general, and English in particular, so that might make it a better candidate. Whether the more equal unfamiliarity of all pilots with this proposed universal aviation language would enhance safety overall is another question...
If they weren't continually flipping between the standard language and French they would probably not have made the error to begin with.
The fact that the majority of these other transmissions were in a language foreign to the incident crew reduced their opportunity to catch the error.
As to the reasons for the Gallic refusal to adhere to the language stipulated as standard by ICAO
Just be thankful the standard language isn't Esperanto.
My thinking is that the error occurred because (the aircrew did not properly cross-check the QNH, and did not look at their RadAlts*), but also because the ATC controller was speaking in two languages. It doesn't really matter what the languages were, but having to continually flip between native and words translated in their head was a big factor in this incident. Had they stayed in one language, this mis-translation would not have occurred.
Secondly, I can't remember what was said now, but if ATC gave the French QNH as "one thousand eleven" rather than "one zero one one" then this could have been another potential factor in the cock-up. I always bang on about CAP 413, but the phrases and methodology in that document have been carefully designed to avoid confusion when instructions are passed by voice over an imperfect radio link; one subject to distortion, interference, and fading. And being received on headsets in a cockpit that can itself have other audio noise and distractions. All of which means that messages are not always clearly heard; making the use of a set of very specific stock phrases vital. As soon as people start using lazy verbal short cuts then confusion can arise.
In a busy TMA, it must be very tempting to use abbreviations, especially if one has to say "unité zero unité unité" (11 syllables, and a right old mouthful), hundreds of times, rather than the much easier and shorter "mille onze" (2 syllables), but therein lies an elephant trap. If individual digits are spoken - in any language - instead of verbal shorthand, then fewer mistakes will occur.
*Perhaps also; NPAs referenced to QNH should have DHs rather than DAs, i.e. a final decision reference based on the Rad Alt, height rather than the QNH altitude? The QNH can be mis-set by the pilots or ATC as we all know, but a Rad Alt of course measures the actual height above the ground and therefore is a more reliable reference.
In fact the last 2,500' of most NPAs could be referenced to height rather than altitude, which would add a little more precision and safety.
Secondly, I can't remember what was said now, but if ATC gave the French QNH as "one thousand eleven" rather than "one zero one one" then this could have been another potential factor in the cock-up. I always bang on about CAP 413, but the phrases and methodology in that document have been carefully designed to avoid confusion when instructions are passed by voice over an imperfect radio link; one subject to distortion, interference, and fading. And being received on headsets in a cockpit that can itself have other audio noise and distractions. All of which means that messages are not always clearly heard; making the use of a set of very specific stock phrases vital. As soon as people start using lazy verbal short cuts then confusion can arise.
In a busy TMA, it must be very tempting to use abbreviations, especially if one has to say "unité zero unité unité" (11 syllables, and a right old mouthful), hundreds of times, rather than the much easier and shorter "mille onze" (2 syllables), but therein lies an elephant trap. If individual digits are spoken - in any language - instead of verbal shorthand, then fewer mistakes will occur.
*Perhaps also; NPAs referenced to QNH should have DHs rather than DAs, i.e. a final decision reference based on the Rad Alt, height rather than the QNH altitude? The QNH can be mis-set by the pilots or ATC as we all know, but a Rad Alt of course measures the actual height above the ground and therefore is a more reliable reference.
In fact the last 2,500' of most NPAs could be referenced to height rather than altitude, which would add a little more precision and safety.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Dec 2020
Location: Manchester
Posts: 52
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"“MINISTERIAL ORDER of 7th SEPTEMBER 1984 relating to radiotelephony procedures for the use of general air traffic. It states in particular (in paragraph 2.4) that French must, except in special case, be used between French flying personnel and French ground stations.”
Is there any other country that specifically mandates local language in ATC. If not why only in France?
Join Date: Jan 2015
Location: Usually firmly on the ground
Posts: 147
Likes: 0
Received 3 Likes
on
2 Posts
Had they stayed in one language, this mis-translation would not have occurred.
Secondly, I can't remember what was said now, but if ATC gave the French QNH as "one thousand eleven" rather than "one zero one one" then this could have been another potential factor in the cock-up.
In a busy TMA, it must be very tempting to use abbreviations, especially if one has to say "unité zero unité unité" (11 syllables, and a right old mouthful), hundreds of times, rather than the much easier and shorter "mille onze" (2 syllables), but therein lies an elephant trap. If individual digits are spoken - in any language - instead of verbal shorthand, then fewer mistakes will occur.
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: IRS NAV ONLY
Posts: 1,230
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Eutychus, you'll be surprised to find it's actually a legal requirement for all comunication between ATC and aircraft to be exclusively in English language at all busy European airports (more than 50,000 international IFR movements per year).
But of course, the regulators had their hands tied when nationalism won over common sense, and there is a provision for countries to conduct a safety study on risks associated with using two languages at the same time, which clearly there isn't any. The fact that places the likes of MAD, BCN and CDG have disproportionally high rate of TCAS RA events is probably just a pure coincidence, and in no doubt has absolutely nothing to do with ATC shuffling two different languages, and moreover, situational awareness of all parties is definitely not reduced by half of communication being in a language you don't understand. No problems there, whatsoever. It's also a pure coincidence that a lot of professional crews flying to those airports list ATC as the main threat during their departure/arrival briefings. Pure coincidence.
Generally a good idea, but I think it falls short when you consider that most Cat 2/3 approaches have very low minima (close to or at the runway), where terrain is generally flat. NPAs sometimes have quite high minima, over terrain that might be quite undulating, and it would be difficult to determine the accurate minima based on RA reading alone.
Perhaps the ATC's MSAW could be enhanced a bit more for NPAs, so if an aircraft crosses the FAF more than 100-200ft lower than the prescribed altitude, it would generate a warning while the aircraft is still quite far from terra firma.
But of course, the regulators had their hands tied when nationalism won over common sense, and there is a provision for countries to conduct a safety study on risks associated with using two languages at the same time, which clearly there isn't any. The fact that places the likes of MAD, BCN and CDG have disproportionally high rate of TCAS RA events is probably just a pure coincidence, and in no doubt has absolutely nothing to do with ATC shuffling two different languages, and moreover, situational awareness of all parties is definitely not reduced by half of communication being in a language you don't understand. No problems there, whatsoever. It's also a pure coincidence that a lot of professional crews flying to those airports list ATC as the main threat during their departure/arrival briefings. Pure coincidence.
*Perhaps also; NPAs referenced to QNH should have DHs rather than DAs, i.e. a final decision reference based on the Rad Alt, height rather than the QNH altitude? The QNH can be mis-set by the pilots or ATC as we all know, but a Rad Alt of course measures the actual height above the ground and therefore is a more reliable reference.
In fact the last 2,500' of most NPAs could be referenced to height rather than altitude, which would add a little more precision and safety.
In fact the last 2,500' of most NPAs could be referenced to height rather than altitude, which would add a little more precision and safety.
Perhaps the ATC's MSAW could be enhanced a bit more for NPAs, so if an aircraft crosses the FAF more than 100-200ft lower than the prescribed altitude, it would generate a warning while the aircraft is still quite far from terra firma.
I am sure the professional pilots among us have all counted down the altitudes versus distance to go for our PF during an NPA - referring to the table provided on the plate: "OK you were 50' high, at six miles you are looking for 2,360 feet" etc.
It would be a relatively simple matter to survey the land on the approach and publish a similar table of Rad Alt heights versus distances to go. Granted, the heights will not always be reducing in a linear progression, and there might be steps in the heights, but the Rad Alt measurement at least will be accurate, and combined with the DME, (assuming there is one available), would give a generally much more accurate picture. Even just having a DH rather than a DA would improve safety, in the sense that a reading 300' out, or reaching the DH at the wrong DME would/should ring alarm bells in the pilots' minds, and having only a DH would at least make them look at the Rad Alt.
Another safety improvement I think would be to mandate a Rad Alt auto call-out at, say 300', and not allow that to be pin-UNprogrammable. That way if a crew suddenly heard "three hundred" when not expecting it, their immediate actions would be to go-around.
It would be a relatively simple matter to survey the land on the approach and publish a similar table of Rad Alt heights versus distances to go. Granted, the heights will not always be reducing in a linear progression, and there might be steps in the heights, but the Rad Alt measurement at least will be accurate, and combined with the DME, (assuming there is one available), would give a generally much more accurate picture. Even just having a DH rather than a DA would improve safety, in the sense that a reading 300' out, or reaching the DH at the wrong DME would/should ring alarm bells in the pilots' minds, and having only a DH would at least make them look at the Rad Alt.
Another safety improvement I think would be to mandate a Rad Alt auto call-out at, say 300', and not allow that to be pin-UNprogrammable. That way if a crew suddenly heard "three hundred" when not expecting it, their immediate actions would be to go-around.
Only half a speed-brake
I stand corrected on the minister decree of FR use if in force as applicable.
Airbus should have automated crosscheck between the the FCU selection and MCDU. Same as the recently implemented useless THS reminder (narrowbody).
The method of transferring critical QNH value to airborne craft by voice only will be hopefully become obsolete soon. No idea when and how.
The NPAs should have a RA hard crosscheck somewhere (1000 afe) PUBLISHED by the AIS similar to G/S validity with DME or marker overflight.
Keep the ideas coming...
Airbus should have automated crosscheck between the the FCU selection and MCDU. Same as the recently implemented useless THS reminder (narrowbody).
The method of transferring critical QNH value to airborne craft by voice only will be hopefully become obsolete soon. No idea when and how.
The NPAs should have a RA hard crosscheck somewhere (1000 afe) PUBLISHED by the AIS similar to G/S validity with DME or marker overflight.
Keep the ideas coming...
The method of transferring critical QNH value to airborne craft by voice only will be hopefully become obsolete soon. No idea when and how.
Tech solution: ATC data base automatically transmits current local QNH to aircraft ADCs via data link - no humans involved! (Except to check for disparity between received QNH and expected QNH). Presentation in flight deck:
Last edited by Discorde; 12th Aug 2022 at 08:40.
And before too long altimetry will be via GPS, which will solve the problems of mis-setting. Transition levels consigned to history! Pressure altimetry (via data link with automatic adjustments to cross-check GPS) will be the back-up system.
Join Date: Oct 2015
Location: Tranquility Base
Posts: 77
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As long as we don't have that operators also should adopt a policy of presetting QNH during cruise in low workload from a weather report, and once you set QNH you again should confirm what you got from ATC with an independant source right before you do your altimeter check.
Quite so unfortunately. In the past few years we have had a number of occasions where the TSO'd GPS navs have decided to go cross country biggly, in L/L and height, yet the ipad GPS was not affected. Each time we happened to be near a certain quite large workers paradise country that is a bit uppity over some rocks in a local pond. Ipads were rock solid and were correct by radar fixes, TSO'd units went away and eventually came to their senses when we were in an area of less inhospitable natives.
Salute!
I seem to agree...last thing I would soley rely upon would be GPS for altitude. Maybe use it as a crosscheck with the baro stuff. And then a radar altimiter that has a connection to a geographic terrain map.......
Gums sends...
I seem to agree...last thing I would soley rely upon would be GPS for altitude. Maybe use it as a crosscheck with the baro stuff. And then a radar altimiter that has a connection to a geographic terrain map.......
Gums sends...
Only half a speed-brake
As long as we don't have that operators also should adopt a policy of presetting QNH during cruise in low workload from a weather report, and once you set QNH you again should confirm what you got from ATC with an independant source right before you do your altimeter check.
Only half a speed-brake
Cards, 1980's. Unnecessary.
During approach preparation the PF fills
the MCDU Perf APPR page with the crew's latest QNH.
Later during descent, upon ATIS receipt, the Perf APPR page is updated.
When instructed to descent to altitude crew verifies the value against the prepared entries before re-setting the altimeters.
======
First 2 as per current SOP, the third as suggested and spelled out in the book for those with inadequate personal techniques.
Less work, more safe.
During approach preparation the PF fills
the MCDU Perf APPR page with the crew's latest QNH.
Later during descent, upon ATIS receipt, the Perf APPR page is updated.
When instructed to descent to altitude crew verifies the value against the prepared entries before re-setting the altimeters.
======
First 2 as per current SOP, the third as suggested and spelled out in the book for those with inadequate personal techniques.
Less work, more safe.