Boeing pilot involved in Max testing is indicted in Texas

[fdr]

Originally Posted by WillowRun 6-3

Beyond the truism that Mr. Forkner is guilty of no criminal act unless and until his guilt - both his actions and his mental state - are proven with admissible evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, I tend to believe he is not crimimally responsible (i.e., he has not committed a crime). Three items in support:

First, he may be guilty of monumentally ill-advised, even stupid, statements about his work, and certainly he did not stand in front of the (metaphoric) speeding locomotive of 737 MAX design, development and certification, holding up a "STOP" signal. Boeing's criminal case plea-bargain reeks of insider favoritism (though no one asked me). To prosecute Mr. Forkner as if a "lesser included" of the sordid, corrupt corporate malfeasnace is indeed a process of snagging a scapegoat. He acted badly, but that is not a crime, and not even in light of his specific role in the Boeing MAX debacle (itself a yet additional act of the multi-part drama, The Decline of the Once-Great).

Second, look again at fn.1 of the defense filing. The defense has argued that what Forkner did improperly relative to any and all contacts, communications and other interactions with FAA, singly and collectively, was not material to any decision (or failure to decide or act) by FAA. It's a significance argument. His mishandling of communications and information really did not make any difference, or not a material one.

Third, though closely related to the first point, Boeing is getting away with all this. Who in the legal profession or the aviation safety ecosystem - if such a thing exists any longer - is agitating for clawing back severance and other financial consideration received by Boeing's former CEO and General Counsel? Not that they should be prosecuted (though minds can differ, reasonably or not, on that point), but to walk away heavy with major warbucks??

ET-302 flight crew followed the advice of TBC as promulgated, they disengaged the STAB TRIM -CUTOUT, and then they were confronted with a trim system that defeated the crew's efforts to effect a recovery. That was following the sage advice of the company that had not hitherto disclosed the system being fitted on the aircraft at all. So, who is culpable for that? That is an issue that was known on the B707 and yet exists on every single B737 and is not covered in any meaningful manner that would resolve the matter before a delicate airframe with lots of loved ones on board tries to alter the spin of the planet. The fact that in some recess a word without explanation may exist does not a summer make; the basic aircraft has an issue that can result in a catastrophic outcome and no one seems to give a tinker's cuss. They have Forkner, after all he sent some emails that would certainly make the attorneys shake their heads, but, he didn't set up the pathological corporate structure of the company, that was the guys who got the get-out-of-jail-free-cards and who have made the term Boeing ethics as incongruous as a Jenny Craig's office in Mogadishu. Forkner did not make the policy of no sims please, that was the line he was required. by his lords and masters to peddle on the unfortunate operators.

The concept of a safety eco-system is not consistent with the world we live in anymore. We live in an ISO9001:2015/AS9100:2016, IATA IOSA box-ticking world. I contend that the system that we now have is so compromised by the bureaucracy that the system itself is a threat to be mitigated. This is a system that does what all systems do, to regulate the rate of development, and that places us in a world where parchment and ostrich feathers and ground-up gerbil gonads (ink) are the order of the day. I have more capability to improve flight safety on my ipad than I have in my 777. The same system that demands we ensure that spurs are kept out of the flight deck oversees the system that mandates a TCAS/ACAS II system at ch7.0, and then without apology demands that all such systems must be upgraded to 7.1, at the operator's expense due to a fault in the logic of the system. It's good to be king apparently. The same ecosystem gives us mandated GPWS systems for 60 years, and doesn't intervene on the 5G interference to stop the rapacious bandwidth spread of the comms companies that compromises the GPWS system integrity.

Eco-systems, the same eco thingy that allows an egotist to place 20,000+ LEO satellites into the sky ensuring that the NEO surveys, on which the very survival of every person on the planet may depend is compromised. Safety Eco-Systems; I wish.

[A0283]

Has anyone seen an organization diagram of the 737 MAX Program organization for the period 2012-2018? And, or included, the associated organization diagram for the certification team? A link or a list of functions, roles, and perhaps even names would be much appreciated.

I know from experience that in practice it can work differently from what the diagram shows, but the diagram is where you start ;-). In practice you use the 'paper' and the 'how it actually works' diagram in mind side by side, and insiders would know which people inside the company might have been used as 'background references' and which people would be 'hitchhikers'.

If it is not in the public domain now, but if someone sees it during the Forkner trial, it would be much appreciated if it can be posted here.
The trial would not make any sense without a detailed diagram. I would expect the trial to focus on the paper diagram, while the people with real expertise would be even more interested in the 'how it worked' diagram, the 'references' and the 'hitchhikers'.

Note: Forkner had 2 different roles in that period. From early 2012 to early 2014 that of Test Pilot, and thereafter until he left for Southwest that of Chief Tech Pilot. Other players are the MAX Program Manager(s) (Messr's ...), the Chief Program/Project Engineer (Mr Teal), the lead engineers of the systems and aerodynamics teams etc. And later you would have a maintenance lead.
Apart from the 737MAX you also have the guys responsible for the overall 737 Program, which would include NG and MAX of course, and will also have a program manager or director, a chief engineer, and a chief test pilot, and ...

[GlobalNav]

Merely a Pawn?

Mr Forkner is certainly not the only culpable Boeing figure, but he is one of them, in my opinion. He complied with the corporate pressures with full knowledge of the design problem and expert understanding of potential consequences.

Every manager and executive that established the business objectives of no additional pilot training and every person who deliberately covered up the need for such bears responsibility and should be made accountable.

Everyone who was replaced and given lucrative severance compensation should be made to forfeit the same.

Fat chance.

[sycamore]

Mr Forkner cannot claim to be a `Test` pilot unless he has gone through a Test Pilot School,either civil or military,and graduated as such.

[Spooky 2]

Originally Posted by sycamore

Mr Forkner cannot claim to be a `Test` pilot unless he has gone through a Test Pilot School,either civil or military,and graduated as such.

I don't think Mark Forkner ever claimed to be a Test Pilot. He was the Chief Technical Pilot on the 737 MAX and nothing more as far as I know. Boeing has a lot of pilots of which some do flight test while others have other duties assigned. Not sure but I believe he started in Flight Training-Airplane which is simply another assignment meant to get the product out the door and in the hands of the customers.

It should be noted that his 737 MAX assignment offered very little opportunity to fly the actual airplane.

[tdracer]

Perhaps there should be a further distinction of Boeing "Test Pilots". There are two separate groups of Test Pilots - "Production" and "Experimental". Production test pilots are the ones that take new production aircraft up for their 'shake down' flight(s) - "B1" flight in Boeing lingo - and also go up with the customer pilot(s) when they do their acceptance flight tests. These aircraft are under full production certificates. Experimental test pilots are exactly that - they fly experimental flight tests of uncertified configurations under experimental airworthiness tickets (either new designs, or significant changes to certified designs). There is some crossover between the two groups (and I know of at least one "Experimental" test pilot who was transferred to "Production" test pilot after he did something really stupid during a flight test and nearly lost the aircraft). but for the most part they remain in two separate camps.

[fdr]

Originally Posted by GlobalNav

Mr Forkner is certainly not the only culpable Boeing figure, but he is one of them, in my opinion. He complied with the corporate pressures with full knowledge of the design problem and expert understanding of potential consequences.

Every manager and executive that established the business objectives of no additional pilot training and every person who deliberately covered up the need for such bears responsibility and should be made accountable.

Everyone who was replaced and given lucrative severance compensation should be made to forfeit the same.

Fat chance.

"and expert understanding of potential consequences" That is a point for a court to consider at some point. The case against Mr Forkner is primarily an 18USC §1001 matter of a false statement to the lords and masters. Whether "expert understanding" actually was either "expert" or was "understanding" is not clear.
I must apologize that I haven't bothered to look at the exact charges, but they center on wire fraud, and the logic applied to dismiss the two fraud charges would potentially also apply to those anyway.

"Expert" status is not determined, and I would suggest that the evidence is that there was no expert in the system, or in risk assessment in a stochastic causation fault analysis. In fact, the fundamental problem of the B737 remains in plain sight and hasn't received more than token discussion on PPRUNE, and zero design review by the regulator, that of a system that relies on a manual backup that may not work in all cases.

"Understanding", as above, there is little evidence that anyone comprehended the impact of having a bad system based on a single channel of data.

I would contend the following:

1. That the all operators message following the loss of JT-610 showed that even then, no one, repeat, NO ONE in Boeing understood the enormity of their design flaw. Why? because the crew of ET-302 followed the procedure that TBC came out with, in November, on the 10MAR19 accident. And the procedure didn't work. Why? because the fundamental flaw of the B737 remains that if the normal trim system of the THS is out due to any cause, then the manual trim may not be able to function due to airloads. The solution to the airloads issue on the THS, which result from the requirement to have high deflection of the elevator to correct the flight path problem that will invariably be encountered, well, the solution looks fine in a simulator at 35000', but probably looks rather unlikely at 2500' 300KIAS, and with a big close up view of planet earth in the window getting bigger promptly. In order to recover any manual trim takes unloading the elevators, and that means letting the flight path decay even further. THE B737 STABILIZER meets only the requirements of §25.255 by the letter, not the intent, and never has. it arguably doesn't meet §25.143(a) by the evidence of ET-302. It should have a secondary, independent electric trim system, as the hard evidence is that the situation that ET-302 encountered, was not certain to be recoverable due to the airload lockup of the stabilizer manual trim. You are not allowed to pick and choose the parts of the envelope that your emergency system can be used.... and if you did, then it makes a great case for Airbus sales.
2. Mr Forkner made email comments that appear consistent with his manner of communication which is informal, such as Jedi mind game etc, that isn't a term that would normally arise in a flight test report at Edwards, Pax river, or NTPS or ETPS. His comment that the simulator tried to kill him is consistent with his informal manner of writing.
3. The same email did not suggest that he had any awareness of the enormity of what he had observed, his associated assumption is that there might need training. What he had actually observed was (assuming it wasn't a sim glitch which is about even odds...) was a system that even a perfunctory design review would have determined was a latent lethal design flaw in the aircraft, and was almost certain to arise at some point in the life of the aircraft program. That was a certification stopper, not just a training matter. The fact that Forkner is only thinking of the consequences in terms of training shows how little comprehension he actually had, which is just in keeping with the whole of Boeing engineering as well to well after the crash of ET-302. Arguably, the penny hasn't dropped even yet, as it is apparent that B737's continue to happily fly around with a manual reversion of the trim that may not be possible to function in all cases.

I would counter that Mr Forkner, and indeed the whole sorry mess of certification of the program, TBC and FAA included display a complete lack of expertise and comprehension at the time in what was in effect a pretty darn simple system, which any cursory examination of the system would have raised questions on fault tolerance of the design as it finally emerged.

Internally, how the change was implemented by engineering is shameful. As is the corporate culture that has seen TBC go from a pillar of engineering excellence targetting safe design and manufacture to a system that punishes the very QA system they are mandated to have function in both design and manufacture. That isn't Mr Forkners fault, that lies squarely on the shoulders of the board and senior management of what is now an embarrassing organisation.

The FAA has good people in a lot of places, but the structure of the FAA needs a review and rethink of what it is there for, and what structure works for meeting its objectives. It has gone from a competent administration that balanced promotion and regulation to being an enforcement tool, and then finds itself interfered with by the politicians. It has had better days.





§ 25.143 General.(a) The airplane must be safely controllable and maneuverable during -

(1) Takeoff;

(2) Climb;

(3) Level flight;

(4) Descent; and

(5) Landing.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Saying that Mr. Forkner is culpable, that he should be held accountable, is not the same thing as saying Mr. Forkner should be found Guilty of the criminal acts alleged in the remaining counts of the indictment.

For those hoping to see a conviction, before the evidence is in the record and the jury has been given the instructions, seeing that the man's career probably is over as far as transport category airplanes are concerned, probably will seem not enough. But that's not a valid reason to presume guilty unless proven innocent. Or to assume guilt no matter what the courtroom evidence turns out to show.

[tdracer]

Originally Posted by fdr

The FAA has good people in a lot of places, but the structure of the FAA needs a review and rethink of what it is there for, and what structure works for meeting its objectives. It has gone from a competent administration that balanced promotion and regulation to being an enforcement tool, and then finds itself interfered with by the politicians. It has had better days.

I've touched on this before in other threads, but the FAA has experienced it's own "brain drain" problem. I was a DER/AR for over 25 years before I retired. Must of the FAA people I dealt with were in the same age group as me - and now many if not most of them have also retired. Further, for a long time, many of the people at the Seattle FAA office were ex-Boeing (often disgruntled ex-Boeing but that's another story). They had real world experience working with aircraft systems, and it showed. The last few years before I retired, the new youngsters coming it simply had no real world experience - fresh faced kids right out of college with minimal mentor support from those with decades of experience. They were into box-checking without really comprehending what the meaning of those boxes was. Submit such and such document, check the box. They lacked the deeper understanding what checking those boxes meant - and hence lacked the judgement to determine if something was really safe regardless of if they could check their box.
I found it extremely frustrating trying to deal with them - submittals would get rejected for ridiculous reasons (seriously - I had a submittal rejected because my 8110 form listed one of the effected models as the 747-SP, when the TCDS says 747SP), and I frequently had to explain very basic aspects of the submittals that anyone familiar with commercial aircraft should know (again, seriously - I had to explain "EGT").

[olster]

Fdr you really nailed it. The 737 as you are well aware has a large powerful stabiliser attached to a small elevator. I have anecdotally seen in the simulator a stab runaway that would have had a catastrophic outcome due air loads if it were not for the timely press of the freeze button. Assuming of course that the sim is programmed to match the aircraft. The fact remains that if your stab runs away at the wrong energy level and you don’t catch it swiftly you could get unravelled real quick. This is regardless of how the stab runs away, MCAS or not this is an Achilles heel on type that remains in a corner of the envelope that I hope nobody finds. Bring on the narrow body mini 777 with full fbw would have been my original advice prior to the tragic accidents and remains so. The Max fiasco is a stain on Boeing which they have to live with and move on from. The fact that executives with large and unimaginable pay have come through this unscathed while functionaries are pursued is beyond shocking. The one source of alpha in defiance of basic engineering principles coupled with the lack of prescription on MCAS to pilots still defies belief.

[fdr]

Originally Posted by tdracer

I've touched on this before in other threads, but the FAA has experienced it's own "brain drain" problem. I was a DER/AR for over 25 years before I retired. Must of the FAA people I dealt with were in the same age group as me - and now many if not most of them have also retired. Further, for a long time, many of the people at the Seattle FAA office were ex-Boeing (often disgruntled ex-Boeing but that's another story). They had real world experience working with aircraft systems, and it showed. The last few years before I retired, the new youngsters coming it simply had no real world experience - fresh faced kids right out of college with minimal mentor support from those with decades of experience. They were into box-checking without really comprehending what the meaning of those boxes was. Submit such and such document, check the box. They lacked the deeper understanding what checking those boxes meant - and hence lacked the judgement to determine if something was really safe regardless of if they could check their box.
I found it extremely frustrating trying to deal with them - submittals would get rejected for ridiculous reasons (seriously - I had a submittal rejected because my 8110 form listed one of the effected models as the 747-SP, when the TCDS says 747SP), and I frequently had to explain very basic aspects of the submittals that anyone familiar with commercial aircraft should know (again, seriously - I had to explain "EGT").

My experience has been similar. I actually like working with the FAA and most of the guys are pretty good. There are great guys in the FSDO in KORL, KABQ, TAD, MIDO ATL, ACOs in LAX... etc.. some are really good. Others make you shake your head.

example: We were asked to determine one device had no chance to the wing loads of the wing.... of a Boeing. A nontrivial matter. Proving a negative sounds like good scientific process, but has its own issues. So we thought about it, did some flight tests with a couple of jets and decided the most effective way of doing that was to use imaging of targets on the wing through a registered gnomon. It was pretty neat, and much later, we found that it was similar to a process that Airbus had tried and found effective for the same application. It was possible to determine the change in the spanwise and chordwise bending of the wing to a load, and we were able to use accelerated flight to prove the exact deflection to load that occurred. We got to the point of having to explain that with a steel ruler clipped to a table edge and moving the ACO's engineers pen along the beam of the ruler to show that, surprise, surprise, bending changes dependent on the arm and mass(force) applied. Even with that we ended up having to do other methods to actually get the ACO guy to accept the data we provided. Similar matter on ice accretion certification. After years of communicating with NASA Lewis on LEWICE modelling, they advised that the FENSAP modelling was so superior they recommended using that instead, and we did find that spectacular in it's realistic modelling of icing, and in fact of flow dynamics in the boundary layer and even sub boundary layer. And it is not approved by the FAA, even with the enthusiastic support of the FAA Icing Resource at that time, of Boeing, etc... so we are left with nonsense sus scale testing in the ice tunnel out of Bethpage, or doing in-flight icing modelling which is an absolute waste of time, resources and acts as an impediment to development while increasing flight test risk.

To make one point, we did a flight test in a military jet that had the ability to set up a known asymmetry in loading at a known arm to determine the impact on lift from the device we were certifying, the fact that lift and drag are orthogonal took some effort to achieve comprehension. We were able to prove measurable lift variations in the order of 30ft.lbs, which on a total lift of 8500lbs is pretty high resolution, around 0.1% change.... and that was not able to be comprehended by guys with aeronautical engineering degrees and years of experience in the OEM's prior to being brought into the FAA.

[fdr]

Originally Posted by olster

Fdr you really nailed it. The 737 as you are well aware has a large powerful stabiliser attached to a small elevator. I have anecdotally seen in the simulator a stab runaway that would have had a catastrophic outcome due air loads if it were not for the timely press of the freeze button. Assuming of course that the sim is programmed to match the aircraft. The fact remains that if your stab runs away at the wrong energy level and you don’t catch it swiftly you could get unravelled real quick. This is regardless of how the stab runs away, MCAS or not this is an Achilles heel on type that remains in a corner of the envelope that I hope nobody finds. Bring on the narrow body mini 777 with full fbw would have been my original advice prior to the tragic accidents and remains so. The Max fiasco is a stain on Boeing which they have to live with and move on from. The fact that executives with large and unimaginable pay have come through this unscathed while functionaries are pursued is beyond shocking. The one source of alpha in defiance of basic engineering principles coupled with the lack of prescription on MCAS to pilots still defies belief.

The B737 is well past its use-by date. The grandfathering of 1960's rules has been stretched pretty damn far.
A circular fuse that takes LD3s would be a starting point. The control laws of the B777 & & 787 are really a mixed bag of goodness. The absolute safety level of the C*U is definitely attractive, but when driving the plane, the C* Airbus normal law is a delight. The Airbus laws get a bit odd around the crosswind takeoff and landing phase, but that is not something that can't be improved on with some logic. The amount of switching to force the control laws to revert to alternate or direct is pain on an Airbus, the single switch in the Boeing is a simple manner of getting rid of most if not all of the anomalies.

The U term of the Boeing keeps the crew in the loop with the stabilizer setting, it is the speed reference value that is being set for the flight control system, which means the driver is on the trim all the time in manual flight. The A3xx events of upsets almost invariably involve the change of laws that the crew then have being unable to comprehend that they need to move the manual trim wheel. That is the downside. Upside is when working it does exactly what a pilot wants with an effectively well-damped yet neutral stability pitch law. The fact that Boeing FBW has a phugoid due to the U term is just an irritant, as is the philosophical curiosity that manual flight with the ATR engaged can give essentially a FD in speed mode and the ATR in speed, so they can get out of sorts and cause the driver to flop about the sky a bit. It is below the importance of the coffee cup holder, but it is there.

So control laws wise, the Airbus is nicer to fly in normal mode, and without a great crosswind. Have a fault, and the Brand B system has maintained the driver in the loop, [HMI: D.I.T.L] Why "driver"? If the Pilot-in-command forgets to rotate the aircraft 'cuz the FD is not pointing upwards, it is hard to use the term pilot anymore, it is more a driver, a person who has a certificate of some form that permits them to sit in the seat, competency being apparently an arbitrary requirement any more.

Oh yeah, putting enough wing and flaps and LEDs to get the Vappr down below Vmo would be a great thing too. Was always amazed that my B744s had lower approach speeds than the B737. The number of overruns per sectors flown per type speak for itself. Having a low Vs1g is a safety matter, worth the~ 2% of structure that the flap system costs to the plane.

[olster]

The A380 at normal landing weight has a lower Vapp than the B737-800 at proportionally similar weight value. I always thought that the high Vapp on the -800 was due to geometry ie potential tail strike issues than the wing itself.

[fdr]

Originally Posted by olster

The A380 at normal landing weight has a lower Vapp than the B737-800 at proportionally similar weight value. I always thought that the high Vapp on the -800 was due to geometry ie potential tail strike issues than the wing itself.

The Vs1g charts would tell the story from the AFM, but the FCTM manoeuver margin suggests that the speed difference is entirely dependent on the weight, and there is no difference to the factor applied between Vs1g and Vref. Simple observation to be made by a B738 driver if the relatively higher refs. were due to a change in the factor and not the weight, then your stable attitude on final would be about 4 degrees lower on the 800 compared to a B737 that doesn't have any additive, and I cannot recall any such nose-low attitude, it is almost exactly the same attitude difference as a no slat approach would be.... Just on weight alone, the difference in 1.3 Vs manoeuver margin between the 700 and 800 is 20KIAS, just due to weight

[FlightDetent]

What are those speeds, then?

The competitor is clearly designed for Vat = Vref = 140 kts at MLW, to stay inside ICAO category C.

The increased weight A321 went over, but this was culled back with the NEO...

Resulting Vapp is 145 at MLW due the A/THR / handling / wind additive.

I can guess Vf=30 will bring some extra speed over Vref, but is f40 not the standard for the -800?

[fdr]

Originally Posted by FlightDetent

What are those speeds, then?

The competitor is clearly designed for Vat = Vref = 140 kts at MLW, to stay inside ICAO category C.

The increased weight A321 went over, but this was culled back with the NEO...

Resulting Vapp is 145 at MLW due the A/THR / handling / wind additive.

I can guess Vf=30 will bring some extra speed over Vref, but is f40 not the standard for the -800?

Actually, having a quick look at the manuals, I stand corrected on the Vref that is used for the B737NGs at least. A bit more digging brings up an anecdotal reason for the change unrelated to the tail geometry. The info is related to the stick shaker margin, which is set to trigger before the stall, so there is an offset of the margin per § 25.207 - Stall warning. VSW is normally +5KIAS or +5% of VSR.

I would suspect that there was an increase in VSW for the 600 above the =5KIAS/+5% level for handling, which gives a lower delta from VSW to Vref than the VSR to Vref. Not sure if the B737 was ever amended to 1.23 for refs instead of 1.3, but anyway, at all times, it meets the 1.23 level anyway, and if still certified to 1.3 then the stall warning margin was increased above the §25.207 requirements.

For VSW:
B737-600:
Vref40= ~1.46g
Vref30= ~1.44g

B737-700:
Vref40= ~1.42g
Vref30= ~1.43g

B737-800:
Vref40= ~1.53g
Vref30= ~1.61g

B737-900:
Vref40= ~ 1.54Vs1g
Vref30= ~ 1.66 Vs1g

Adjusting to Vrefxx/Vs1g:

B737-600:
Vref40= ~1.27 Vs1g
Vref30= ~1.26 Vs1g

B737-700:
Vref40= ~1.25 Vs1g
Vref30= ~1.26 Vs1g

B737-800:
Vref40= ~1.30 Vs1g
Vref30= ~1.33 Vs1g

B737-900:
Vref40= ~ 1.30 Vs1g
Vref30= ~ 1.35 Vs1g

[A0283]

About February 9th, 2022FORT WORTH .. A judge tossed 2 of 6 fraud counts against the former Boeing pilot involved in evaluating the 737 MAX… federal judge in Fort Worth dismissed, on technical grounds, counts that accused Forkner making and using “a materially false writing … concerning an aircraft part,” in violation of federal law.. he denied Forkner’s attorneys’ request for dismissal of 4 other wire fraud counts for not stating a case.

[WillowRun 6-3]

All rise......

It's regrettable PPRuNe doesn't yet have a stringer covering the trial, which (per reliable news outlet reports) opened today.

[Sallyann1234]

Originally Posted by WillowRun 6-3

It's regrettable PPRuNe doesn't yet have a stringer covering the trial, which (per reliable news outlet reports) opened today.

This looks a good source to follow:

https://dfw.cbslocal.com/2022/03/18/...arges-737-max/

[beachbumflyer]

Originally Posted by tdracer

Exactly
Having been a DER/AR for most of my career (AR is the delegated equivalent of a DER), I'm quite frankly appalled at Forkner's (alleged) behavior. If management had instructed me to do something like that, I'd have told them to shove it, and I have little doubt that all those DER/ARs that I worked with over the years would have done the same.
Forkner's actions have brought all ARs into disrepute.

What's a DER?