Boeing pilot involved in Max testing is indicted in Texas

[fdr]

Originally Posted by GlobalNav

Mr Forkner is certainly not the only culpable Boeing figure, but he is one of them, in my opinion. He complied with the corporate pressures with full knowledge of the design problem and expert understanding of potential consequences.

Every manager and executive that established the business objectives of no additional pilot training and every person who deliberately covered up the need for such bears responsibility and should be made accountable.

Everyone who was replaced and given lucrative severance compensation should be made to forfeit the same.

Fat chance.

"and expert understanding of potential consequences" That is a point for a court to consider at some point. The case against Mr Forkner is primarily an 18USC §1001 matter of a false statement to the lords and masters. Whether "expert understanding" actually was either "expert" or was "understanding" is not clear.
I must apologize that I haven't bothered to look at the exact charges, but they center on wire fraud, and the logic applied to dismiss the two fraud charges would potentially also apply to those anyway.

"Expert" status is not determined, and I would suggest that the evidence is that there was no expert in the system, or in risk assessment in a stochastic causation fault analysis. In fact, the fundamental problem of the B737 remains in plain sight and hasn't received more than token discussion on PPRUNE, and zero design review by the regulator, that of a system that relies on a manual backup that may not work in all cases.

"Understanding", as above, there is little evidence that anyone comprehended the impact of having a bad system based on a single channel of data.

I would contend the following:

1. That the all operators message following the loss of JT-610 showed that even then, no one, repeat, NO ONE in Boeing understood the enormity of their design flaw. Why? because the crew of ET-302 followed the procedure that TBC came out with, in November, on the 10MAR19 accident. And the procedure didn't work. Why? because the fundamental flaw of the B737 remains that if the normal trim system of the THS is out due to any cause, then the manual trim may not be able to function due to airloads. The solution to the airloads issue on the THS, which result from the requirement to have high deflection of the elevator to correct the flight path problem that will invariably be encountered, well, the solution looks fine in a simulator at 35000', but probably looks rather unlikely at 2500' 300KIAS, and with a big close up view of planet earth in the window getting bigger promptly. In order to recover any manual trim takes unloading the elevators, and that means letting the flight path decay even further. THE B737 STABILIZER meets only the requirements of §25.255 by the letter, not the intent, and never has. it arguably doesn't meet §25.143(a) by the evidence of ET-302. It should have a secondary, independent electric trim system, as the hard evidence is that the situation that ET-302 encountered, was not certain to be recoverable due to the airload lockup of the stabilizer manual trim. You are not allowed to pick and choose the parts of the envelope that your emergency system can be used.... and if you did, then it makes a great case for Airbus sales.
2. Mr Forkner made email comments that appear consistent with his manner of communication which is informal, such as Jedi mind game etc, that isn't a term that would normally arise in a flight test report at Edwards, Pax river, or NTPS or ETPS. His comment that the simulator tried to kill him is consistent with his informal manner of writing.
3. The same email did not suggest that he had any awareness of the enormity of what he had observed, his associated assumption is that there might need training. What he had actually observed was (assuming it wasn't a sim glitch which is about even odds...) was a system that even a perfunctory design review would have determined was a latent lethal design flaw in the aircraft, and was almost certain to arise at some point in the life of the aircraft program. That was a certification stopper, not just a training matter. The fact that Forkner is only thinking of the consequences in terms of training shows how little comprehension he actually had, which is just in keeping with the whole of Boeing engineering as well to well after the crash of ET-302. Arguably, the penny hasn't dropped even yet, as it is apparent that B737's continue to happily fly around with a manual reversion of the trim that may not be possible to function in all cases.

I would counter that Mr Forkner, and indeed the whole sorry mess of certification of the program, TBC and FAA included display a complete lack of expertise and comprehension at the time in what was in effect a pretty darn simple system, which any cursory examination of the system would have raised questions on fault tolerance of the design as it finally emerged.

Internally, how the change was implemented by engineering is shameful. As is the corporate culture that has seen TBC go from a pillar of engineering excellence targetting safe design and manufacture to a system that punishes the very QA system they are mandated to have function in both design and manufacture. That isn't Mr Forkners fault, that lies squarely on the shoulders of the board and senior management of what is now an embarrassing organisation.

The FAA has good people in a lot of places, but the structure of the FAA needs a review and rethink of what it is there for, and what structure works for meeting its objectives. It has gone from a competent administration that balanced promotion and regulation to being an enforcement tool, and then finds itself interfered with by the politicians. It has had better days.





§ 25.143 General.(a) The airplane must be safely controllable and maneuverable during -

(1) Takeoff;

(2) Climb;

(3) Level flight;

(4) Descent; and

(5) Landing.