Boeing stays firmly on course... to the bottom
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Boeing stays firmly on course... to the bottom
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/bo...135973.article
I don't know and, honestly, don't care which of the two unscrupulous organizations are right in this particular case. What amazes me is that, even in the middle of the MAX disaster, Boeing still has the audacity, or, rather, insolence, to juxtapose safety against costs. What ELSE do they need to finally start saving what's left of their reputation?
Boeing and the US FAA have clashed over a safety modification for Boeing 727s, with the regulator rejecting three attempts by the airframer to have the proposal withdrawn.
Boeing claims the fleet exposure is continuing to decline as a result of ageing and retirements, and that the FAA’s proposals will generate unnecessary costs and will not advance air safety.
The FAA counters that it is obliged to inform about aircraft affected by safety issues, regardless of where they are operated, adding that its determination of the unsafe condition was “not driven” by a fleet risk assessment.
Boeing claims the fleet exposure is continuing to decline as a result of ageing and retirements, and that the FAA’s proposals will generate unnecessary costs and will not advance air safety.
The FAA counters that it is obliged to inform about aircraft affected by safety issues, regardless of where they are operated, adding that its determination of the unsafe condition was “not driven” by a fleet risk assessment.
Seems that both organizations are posturing, trying to establish new post Max ground rules. Clearly the FAA would prefer to see its word as law, something Boeing would rather not be the case.
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Boeing points out that 272 aircraft were built with the auxiliary tanks but only six were operated under FAA jurisdiction when the modification was originally proposed.
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Ttfn
It's not that it is unsafe today when it was considered safe yesterday. It's just that now years later it looks unsafe in the new eyes of the regulator even though no associated faults have been demonstrated in its limited service life.
Obviously there are many previously certified products out there from all manufacturers that may fit this interpretation, so the issue needs adjudication in fairness. IMO the issue should be treated under continued airworthiness of a certified product where the good experience trumps the what-ifs.
at this time I'm not predicting the outcome but I am disappointed in the suggestions of previous posters that nobody is to be trusted
.
Obviously there are many previously certified products out there from all manufacturers that may fit this interpretation, so the issue needs adjudication in fairness. IMO the issue should be treated under continued airworthiness of a certified product where the good experience trumps the what-ifs.
at this time I'm not predicting the outcome but I am disappointed in the suggestions of previous posters that nobody is to be trusted
.
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If you want to see Boeing's comments and see how the FAA actually responded, here's the link to the AD publication. The discussion of the Boeing comments is at the beginning.
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Gu...2019-23-04.pdf
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Gu...2019-23-04.pdf
Reading those comments, and thinking of the issue of a long term latent in-tank fault, I was wondering then why the master MEL could not be revised to require electrical isolation of the in-tank components in the event of an unserviceable condition? Would that not address the issue of a latent fault setting the stage for the then unlikely adjacent ground path fault?
On the other hand: 727. Now wonder why I even care?
On the other hand: 727. Now wonder why I even care?
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That AD is one of a series of ADs proposed in 2016 for the same design architecture concern on multiple Airbus and Boeing models. The issue is with latent (undiscovered) failures in the wiring inside the tank combined with a hot short to FQIS wiring outside the tank from co-routed power wiring. Not all FQIS in-tank issues result in flight deck effects that trigger troubleshooting. My understanding is that Boeing is considering revising the MEL to do just what you suggest, but that only helps if you know you have a fault.
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The plane is unsafe, according to the FAA. It is also uneconomical to operate. I'm not sure what Boeing is balking at, it is a relatively small cost to engineer a fix and come up with a cost for it, at which point the few remaining operators will scrap the already uneconomical plane. I would note that the chances of an electrical fault with old wiring that has possibly been exposed to fuel is rather more likely than in a newer aircraft. It may feel like a pointless exercise, but so was estimate that the insurance company had an auto rebuilder generate for my wrecked car, to prove that it was a total loss.
There are millions of tons of products that have been scrapped because they can't meet modern safety requirements and that is a good thing. The world evolves.
I'm not sure why there is a thumbs down above, apologies for a technical error.
There are millions of tons of products that have been scrapped because they can't meet modern safety requirements and that is a good thing. The world evolves.
I'm not sure why there is a thumbs down above, apologies for a technical error.
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This seems to have caused no incidents yet in long service, but on the other hand, given an identified risk, the FAA can hardly be expected to default to waiting until people die before they act.
❝Boeing reported that its system safety assessment determined that the FQIS on the Model 727 airplane does not have an unsafe condition. The FAA disagrees (...) Boeing did not provide specific details about the type of assessment that was performed (total fleet risk, average risk per flight hour, peak individual flight risk, etc.).❞
It seems from the above that a factor here is not just Boeing being cheap about implementation, but being cheap about the case they make to contest implementation, & the FAA insisting that the latter, at least, is not good enough.
If you want to see Boeing's comments and see how the FAA actually responded, here's the link to the AD publication. The discussion of the Boeing comments is at the beginning.
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Gu...2019-23-04.pdf
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Gu...2019-23-04.pdf
It seems from the above that a factor here is not just Boeing being cheap about implementation, but being cheap about the case they make to contest implementation, & the FAA insisting that the latter, at least, is not good enough.
Todays paper, behind paywall, has an article stating Boeing is using the argument that the MAX accidents are reason to further automate aircraft, because the automated systems overpowered the pilots. Calhoun is quoted as saying in November, "We are going to have to ultimately almost - almost - make these planes fly on their own".
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Todays paper, behind paywall, has an article stating Boeing is using the argument that the MAX accidents are reason to further automate aircraft, because the automated systems overpowered the pilots. Calhoun is quoted as saying in November, "We are going to have to ultimately almost - almost - make these planes fly on their own".
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That is what all of us involved in aviation do, every time we fly. There is nothing remarkable about it.
In terms of 'What could the FAA or Boeing best do with the next hour of their time?', this matter wouldn't be on the agenda. Old aircraft like the 727 are much more crash-prone for a million reasons, and addressing a minor issue like this one is, if one does the maths, a pointless waste of time.
In terms of 'What could the FAA or Boeing best do with the next hour of their time?', this matter wouldn't be on the agenda. Old aircraft like the 727 are much more crash-prone for a million reasons, and addressing a minor issue like this one is, if one does the maths, a pointless waste of time.
Well, if you don’t have any pilots, you don’t need to worry about stick force gradient (which is where MCAS came in), and with direct control of power and attitude the computers could be programmed to avoid the envelope corners which cause the problem. I’m not saying I agree with the premise, or that the 737 is equipped with sufficient air data sensors to implement in this case, but there is at least some logic there.
Seems like the FAA can issue an AD telling operators to deactivate the tanks.They could even ground all the affected aircraft until the deactivation is confirmed. Done. All of the operating aircraft are now safe.
If users care to sue Boeing for some compensation then that sets the economic incentive to generate a solution. If that is not enough incentive, then it will moot the issue of creating a fix.
If users care to sue Boeing for some compensation then that sets the economic incentive to generate a solution. If that is not enough incentive, then it will moot the issue of creating a fix.
...... In terms of 'What could the FAA or Boeing best do with the next hour of their time?', this matter wouldn't be on the agenda. Old aircraft like the 727 are much more crash-prone for a million reasons, and addressing a minor issue like this one is, if one does the maths, a pointless waste of time.
A case of someone being asked to see what other potential skeletons relating to Boeing products there are hidden in the FAA files - maybe the FAA checking in their 6 o'clock?
However this is not much different than automobiles which mostly use a submerged electric pump with an electric fuel level sensor in the gasoline tanks and it generally doesn't cause a problem as the fuel vapor pressure is high enough to exclude the oxygen rich air.
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Todays paper, behind paywall, has an article stating Boeing is using the argument that the MAX accidents are reason to further automate aircraft, because the automated systems overpowered the pilots. Calhoun is quoted as saying in November, "We are going to have to ultimately almost - almost - make these planes fly on their own".
Boeings human/hybrid approach is demonstrably problematic.