Boeing stays firmly on course... to the bottom
 

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/bo...135973.article

I don't know and, honestly, don't care which of the two unscrupulous organizations are right in this particular case. What amazes me is that, even in the middle of the MAX disaster, Boeing still has the audacity, or, rather, insolence, to juxtapose safety against costs. What ELSE do they need to finally start saving what's left of their reputation?

Hmmm - there cant be many 727s with aux tanks still flying and the've not blown yet in many years of service.
Sounds like a storm in a teacup.

Seems that both organizations are posturing, trying to establish new post Max ground rules. Clearly the FAA would prefer to see its word as law, something Boeing would rather not be the case.

Does Boeing implies that since the risk extremely low in the USA or in the 6 US registered 727s, it is OK for the others since they are operated outside the US?

You said it. I expect Boeing don't want the costs involved in developing a compliant solution to the problem, and would rather it just went away

Ttfn

It's not that it is unsafe today when it was considered safe yesterday. It's just that now years later it looks unsafe in the new eyes of the regulator even though no associated faults have been demonstrated in its limited service life.

Obviously there are many previously certified products out there from all manufacturers that may fit this interpretation, so the issue needs adjudication in fairness. IMO the issue should be treated under continued airworthiness of a certified product where the good experience trumps the what-ifs.

at this time I'm not predicting the outcome but I am disappointed in the suggestions of previous posters that nobody is to be trusted


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If you want to see Boeing's comments and see how the FAA actually responded, here's the link to the AD publication. The discussion of the Boeing comments is at the beginning.

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Gu...2019-23-04.pdf

Reading those comments, and thinking of the issue of a long term latent in-tank fault, I was wondering then why the master MEL could not be revised to require electrical isolation of the in-tank components in the event of an unserviceable condition? Would that not address the issue of a latent fault setting the stage for the then unlikely adjacent ground path fault?

On the other hand: 727. Now wonder why I even care?

That AD is one of a series of ADs proposed in 2016 for the same design architecture concern on multiple Airbus and Boeing models. The issue is with latent (undiscovered) failures in the wiring inside the tank combined with a hot short to FQIS wiring outside the tank from co-routed power wiring. Not all FQIS in-tank issues result in flight deck effects that trigger troubleshooting. My understanding is that Boeing is considering revising the MEL to do just what you suggest, but that only helps if you know you have a fault.

The plane is unsafe, according to the FAA. It is also uneconomical to operate. I'm not sure what Boeing is balking at, it is a relatively small cost to engineer a fix and come up with a cost for it, at which point the few remaining operators will scrap the already uneconomical plane. I would note that the chances of an electrical fault with old wiring that has possibly been exposed to fuel is rather more likely than in a newer aircraft. It may feel like a pointless exercise, but so was estimate that the insurance company had an auto rebuilder generate for my wrecked car, to prove that it was a total loss.

There are millions of tons of products that have been scrapped because they can't meet modern safety requirements and that is a good thing. The world evolves.

I'm not sure why there is a thumbs down above, apologies for a technical error.

Todays paper, behind paywall, has an article stating Boeing is using the argument that the MAX accidents are reason to further automate aircraft, because the automated systems overpowered the pilots. :confused: Calhoun is quoted as saying in November, "We are going to have to ultimately almost - almost - make these planes fly on their own".

I fail to understand the logic of that statement in relation with the Max /MCAS. In the Max would have been autonomous , taking the Lion air case, the accident would have occurred a day earlier on the first flight , but not prevented it.

That is what all of us involved in aviation do, every time we fly. There is nothing remarkable about it.

In terms of 'What could the FAA or Boeing best do with the next hour of their time?', this matter wouldn't be on the agenda. Old aircraft like the 727 are much more crash-prone for a million reasons, and addressing a minor issue like this one is, if one does the maths, a pointless waste of time.

Seems like the FAA can issue an AD telling operators to deactivate the tanks.They could even ground all the affected aircraft until the deactivation is confirmed. Done. All of the operating aircraft are now safe.

If users care to sue Boeing for some compensation then that sets the economic incentive to generate a solution. If that is not enough incentive, then it will moot the issue of creating a fix.

Isn't this issue similar to what is thought to have brought TWA800 down? As a layperson I wouldn't be surprised to learn this system was similar to that in the ill-fated 747.

It could be; however TWA 800 had the misfortune of the crew pumping the fuel out of the suspect tank, thereby admitting a large amount of air which created an explosive mixture. As long as that rapid emptying isn't done then the situation should not repeat. Notwithstanding, the ignition source should not have been available on TWA 800.

However this is not much different than automobiles which mostly use a submerged electric pump with an electric fuel level sensor in the gasoline tanks and it generally doesn't cause a problem as the fuel vapor pressure is high enough to exclude the oxygen rich air.

Why wouldn't you, if you could ? . . . properly designed (and there's the catch) automated systems don't make mistakes, don't get tired, don't drink or take drugs, don't have only 200 hours experience and have never actually flown an aircraft. don't have any of the other aspects of normal human life that effect performance, kids, wives, money issues, they don't need trained, they are 100% capable every day, week, year . . . so if you can make them, they will probably be safer, and they could be proven to be safer mathematically . . .

Boeings human/hybrid approach is demonstrably problematic.