Loss of Control In-Flight - Flight Crew training
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Last I checked, some of them were available on YouTube though the quality was not particularly good. They are great video with one important caveat. As knowledgeable and as insight full as Capt Vanderburgh was regarding many aspects of automation dependency and aircraft upsets, he did not have a sufficient grasp of the use of the rudder in large transport aircraft. This was probably due to his extensive military fighter background where the rudder is used quite heavily in maneuvering. His recommendation for aggressive use of rudder in response to an aircraft upset was considered to be contributing factor to the loss of AA587. Otherwise, I highly recommend these videos for any commercial aviator.
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About damn time an authority got some balls. Remember that great presentation " Children of the Mgenta Line".
well those " children" have now grown up to adults of the autopilot autohrottle and the Magenta line with company policies that actively encourage loss of manual flying skills. And they sit next to more children.
well those " children" have now grown up to adults of the autopilot autohrottle and the Magenta line with company policies that actively encourage loss of manual flying skills. And they sit next to more children.
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Nope. Happening with our sims. The floors were not original designed to absorb the stress the new sim motions are inflicting. Can be fixed with new concrete pours, but that will take a while not to mention taking the sim offline in the process.
At last, full marks to a Regulator who has bitten the bullet and addressed the scary fact that, out there, are pilots that cannot fly to save themselves - literally
ICAO study groups as well as State regulators,would be well advised to study the content of this CAA Safety Notice and ensure the message is absorbed by operators under their jurisdiction.
The document succinctly addresses the trend with some operators towards the dilution of simulator training exercises for type ratings and IPC to the extent that most sessions are primarily dedicated to full use of automatics, usually accompanied by a plethora of often unnecessary company mandated SOP call-outs and superfluous briefings. Valuable simulator time, which could be used for pure flying skill practice, is thus wasted. Same problem six months later.
The CAA Safety Notice should used as a template for the inclusion in simulator training of pure flying skill exercises - separate from procedural instrument flying. Only then will personal flying skills of pilots be improved from the current mediocre.
ICAO study groups as well as State regulators,would be well advised to study the content of this CAA Safety Notice and ensure the message is absorbed by operators under their jurisdiction.
The document succinctly addresses the trend with some operators towards the dilution of simulator training exercises for type ratings and IPC to the extent that most sessions are primarily dedicated to full use of automatics, usually accompanied by a plethora of often unnecessary company mandated SOP call-outs and superfluous briefings. Valuable simulator time, which could be used for pure flying skill practice, is thus wasted. Same problem six months later.
The CAA Safety Notice should used as a template for the inclusion in simulator training of pure flying skill exercises - separate from procedural instrument flying. Only then will personal flying skills of pilots be improved from the current mediocre.
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True. We (a US based carrier) initiated new upset training procedures about 18 months ago. Every crew has now been through it once, and it is part of our refresher training. I would think other airlines/regulators world wide are at or very close behind as well. It was quite an undertaking by our training department. The new upset training has little in common with the old. That got my attention, new thinking in the commercial aviation world is a rarity.
I had the great fortune to start commercial flying on B727. No autoland, no autothrust, no auto-spoilers.
Simple AP/FD. Lots of handflying... Just pitch&power.
Thereafter I flew various Airbus Types and never ever experienced any difficulties during training or check rides.
I appreciate the UK initiative. Other regulators/states should follow IMHO.
Simple AP/FD. Lots of handflying... Just pitch&power.
Thereafter I flew various Airbus Types and never ever experienced any difficulties during training or check rides.
I appreciate the UK initiative. Other regulators/states should follow IMHO.
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Bob,
Thanks for your thoughtful response...
Well, they're all aircraft, with fundamentally similar characteristics, so that shouldn't get in the way of our discussion. I'll try to clarify.
Let me tackle this a couple of ways. First, lets say that we were able to freeze time with AF447 established early on in the descent to the ocean, and ask each of the crew 'what are you doing?'. I believe they would all be unable to give cogent answers. If we then ask, 'what is happening?', I anticipate the same result. Therefore, I can't say that 'they did x', where x is any intended action, with knowledge of the possible or probable outcome.
Another approach: you're driving along the motorway, and a truck in front of you drops a large stone which bounces off the road and through your windscreen, and strikes your forehead. Immediately, you lose your sight. You do what instinctively seems right, and apply the brakes, and continue to steer, using your mental model to try to stay on the carriageway. Moments later, your car hits the crash barrier. Did you drive it into the barrier? I would say you did not. You were physiologically blind to your situation, in the same way that the AF crew were cognitively blind to theirs. Like them, you were unable to process and function. Like them, you continued to 'do things', but those things were, with hindsight, wrong.
May we leave aside dual inputs? (I will say that independent stick position with summing is one of the aspects of the A design which I am very critical of).
Considering the full back stick, early training is often very powerful. The first time I flew an Airbus FBW simulator, I was shown that, whatever the problematic situation I was in, I could simply apply TOGA thrust, hold the stick fully back, and watch the aircraft fly away at its peak performance. This was common teaching, and yet was fundamentally and fatally wrong.
No we don't -- but we should (though we need to adapt it because our stabiliser is much more powerful than the elevator, so the stick could be anywhere, if the stab is extremely LE-down. I do cover it, usuallly as a discussion point, in which I name the other symptoms of the stall and ask which is missing. Very few people get it.
The basics do apply, but flying with protections had become one of the basics, as illustrated by the 'hold the stick back to live' teaching I mentioned. My personal philosophy is that envelope protection which may not be available when it's most needed, is worse than no envelope protection at all.
If we place responsibility for stalling the aircraft on the pilots, we are destined to repeat their failures. Any modern textbook on human factors will illustrate this with words such as, 'the identification of human error is the beginning, not the end, of the investigation'. Investigative agencies would do well to heed those words, though few do.
In a perfect world, the pilots would have recognised the instrument failure (well in a perfect world the recurring faults with the system would have been dealt with before they carried hundreds to their watery grave, but I hope you take my point). They would have resolved it: 'I see that we have cruise thrust, and a suitable pitch attitude, but the speed seems wrong'. They didn't set out not to do that, they behaved the way their training, experience, nature and nurture, and so forth, destined them to.
I'd like to quote another poster here, posting in a different thread. His username is FH1100 Pilot, and he is writing about a helicopter which crashed following an unexpected double-engine flameout at low height, at night. The pilot's name was Dave:
Having done what I've done in my career, and seen what I've seen, those words resonate very powerfully indeed.
Thanks for your thoughtful response...
I am a fast jet pilot not an airline pilot so I will happily defer to those more knowledgeable than myself. However, I’m not quite getting your point.
If an aircraft has full power applied (for virtually the entire time) and descends at 35 AoA from 35000 until impact how is this happening if not done by the pilot?
Another approach: you're driving along the motorway, and a truck in front of you drops a large stone which bounces off the road and through your windscreen, and strikes your forehead. Immediately, you lose your sight. You do what instinctively seems right, and apply the brakes, and continue to steer, using your mental model to try to stay on the carriageway. Moments later, your car hits the crash barrier. Did you drive it into the barrier? I would say you did not. You were physiologically blind to your situation, in the same way that the AF crew were cognitively blind to theirs. Like them, you were unable to process and function. Like them, you continued to 'do things', but those things were, with hindsight, wrong.
I know there was a ‘dual input’ issue and then one of the guys was trying to take corrective action. The Captain seemed to appreciate there was a stall but the FO kept his stick fully back trying to climb.
Considering the full back stick, early training is often very powerful. The first time I flew an Airbus FBW simulator, I was shown that, whatever the problematic situation I was in, I could simply apply TOGA thrust, hold the stick fully back, and watch the aircraft fly away at its peak performance. This was common teaching, and yet was fundamentally and fatally wrong.
Do you use the acronym SABIRS in the civilian world for signs of the stall? The last one is ‘stick fully back’.
I understand that there are different modes or laws with the AP (my current jet has autopilot but far more simple than an Airbus) which will affect handling etc. The basics still apply though.
This is not me disagreeing with you necessarily but I still do not understand how you can say the pilot did not hold the aircraft in a stall. I know it wasn’t a deliberate attempt to hold it in a stall but the stick fully back is what caused the stall isn’t it?
I understand the speed mis-match, caused by icing, was the initial problem but if held straight and level the aircraft would have continued on its merry way until clear of the icing conditions.
I'd like to quote another poster here, posting in a different thread. His username is FH1100 Pilot, and he is writing about a helicopter which crashed following an unexpected double-engine flameout at low height, at night. The pilot's name was Dave:
Like all of us, my ego makes me want to sit here and think to myself and promise you that *I* surely would have done a better job in that situation. But I cannot guarantee that. Perhaps I would have done the same thing, basically sitting frozen on the controls for those eight brief seconds. I like to believe I'm Chuck Yeager/Aaron/Norris all rolled into one awesome human bean. Most of the time though I'm just Chuckles the Clown. I cut that Dave guy a lot of slack.
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Maximum use of automation is a culture that has evolved, it's prevalent among newcomers as well as old timers. I am not so sure just because they could do it, they still can. I have observed terrible performance in the sim and on the line. The deficiency lies in scan, hand-eye coordination, call it whatever. The characteristics of mental overload are striking.
So what kind of teeth does a safety bulletin have? This is nothing new, line pilots and training departments are well aware of the problem. Yet few do anything about it. It's just easier that way. What will change this time?
So what kind of teeth does a safety bulletin have? This is nothing new, line pilots and training departments are well aware of the problem. Yet few do anything about it. It's just easier that way. What will change this time?
First, read the question, then provide an answer.
The CAA Safety Notice should be read carefully, evaluating critically what is written, opposed to what people might wish it to state.
The subject is pilot awareness of aircraft trim state, and safety interventions (relating to awareness).
It is concerned about inappropriate trim input or mishandling situations involving adverse trim conditions, particularly in aircraft with conventional control systems.
The recommended action is to identify gaps in training involving flying skills, knowledge, awareness, startle effect, etc.
This could be disingenuous criticism of those operations who have a robust training and safety systems; alternatively a necessary reinforcement of safety action questing aspects which might have been overlooked, particularly relating to recent accidents.
The notice is best read for what it is, a timely safety reminder.
Syllabus items are wide ranging, covering a number of safety issues all of which could challenge flying skills, but none specifically targeting awareness.
The primary subject - awareness, is often ill defined, difficult to quantify, as with most human factors issues.
How are lack of awareness, distraction, workload, or startle to be identified during training, and how related to trim.
If an aspect has been identified then how is this to be managed. As with most training and specifically human factors, the success from ‘trained for’ items cannot be guaranteed to be repeated in real situations, because of changing context.
No two situations are the same, nor pilots; the operational world is uncertain, defined by individual viewpoint.
Recent accidents, as with many previous events, remind us of the limitations of safety systems and training. Aircraft and systems can fail, as can humans, but so too the industry’s ability to imagine rare situations which have to be managed in real time, by real people in real aircraft. Also, we have a major limitation in understanding situations in hindsight, considering what incident pilots understood.
We must not allow the human dislike of uncertainty change our views of what situations could be encountered (oppose to those which were), or how these should be managed.
The important question - to self. Do I actually understand the situation, and not choose what I wish the situation to be; either in flight operations or just reading a safety notice
The subject is pilot awareness of aircraft trim state, and safety interventions (relating to awareness).
It is concerned about inappropriate trim input or mishandling situations involving adverse trim conditions, particularly in aircraft with conventional control systems.
The recommended action is to identify gaps in training involving flying skills, knowledge, awareness, startle effect, etc.
This could be disingenuous criticism of those operations who have a robust training and safety systems; alternatively a necessary reinforcement of safety action questing aspects which might have been overlooked, particularly relating to recent accidents.
The notice is best read for what it is, a timely safety reminder.
Syllabus items are wide ranging, covering a number of safety issues all of which could challenge flying skills, but none specifically targeting awareness.
The primary subject - awareness, is often ill defined, difficult to quantify, as with most human factors issues.
How are lack of awareness, distraction, workload, or startle to be identified during training, and how related to trim.
If an aspect has been identified then how is this to be managed. As with most training and specifically human factors, the success from ‘trained for’ items cannot be guaranteed to be repeated in real situations, because of changing context.
No two situations are the same, nor pilots; the operational world is uncertain, defined by individual viewpoint.
Recent accidents, as with many previous events, remind us of the limitations of safety systems and training. Aircraft and systems can fail, as can humans, but so too the industry’s ability to imagine rare situations which have to be managed in real time, by real people in real aircraft. Also, we have a major limitation in understanding situations in hindsight, considering what incident pilots understood.
We must not allow the human dislike of uncertainty change our views of what situations could be encountered (oppose to those which were), or how these should be managed.
The important question - to self. Do I actually understand the situation, and not choose what I wish the situation to be; either in flight operations or just reading a safety notice
With apologies for the previously-warned thread drift, but this is important...
Bob, I'm sorry, but I must absolutely disagree with you.
Considering 'they held it', if an action is not deliberate, or even conscious, is it an action? I would argue, no, it isn't. They exhibited the outward signs of functioning, they moved controls, they reacted (mostly - but not entirely - inappropriately) to their (deeply confusing) environment, but they were a world away from acquiring and processing information, using it to build an accurate comprehension of their circumstances, referring to experience and training, and acting on it.
Moreover, some of their actions were contrary to 'holding it in a stall', so in strict terms I disagree with you there too.
The aircraft stalled into the ocean, without doubt, but it did so not because any pilot intended it to stall, and almost certainly none of them recognised it was stalling, at least not until it was much too late. By all means say they were confused, overloaded, in dissonance, but we should never say that anyone 'held that aircraft in a stall'. To do that does our profession a grave disservice and perpetuates the underlying faults which led to AF447 and others.
Bob, I'm sorry, but I must absolutely disagree with you.
Considering 'they held it', if an action is not deliberate, or even conscious, is it an action? I would argue, no, it isn't. They exhibited the outward signs of functioning, they moved controls, they reacted (mostly - but not entirely - inappropriately) to their (deeply confusing) environment, but they were a world away from acquiring and processing information, using it to build an accurate comprehension of their circumstances, referring to experience and training, and acting on it.
Moreover, some of their actions were contrary to 'holding it in a stall', so in strict terms I disagree with you there too.
The aircraft stalled into the ocean, without doubt, but it did so not because any pilot intended it to stall, and almost certainly none of them recognised it was stalling, at least not until it was much too late. By all means say they were confused, overloaded, in dissonance, but we should never say that anyone 'held that aircraft in a stall'. To do that does our profession a grave disservice and perpetuates the underlying faults which led to AF447 and others.
Then, sorry, I must disagree with you. ( speaking as s former heavy captain)
AF 447 showed a serious lack of understanding of the handling of a big jet at altitude. Something which appears to have become far too common, with the Magenta line crowd.
They did not lose their ADI, attitude, or their EPR guages, power, as far as I know, and if you have these two parameters and the third, airspeed will sort itself out !
Thats why Boeing, and I suppose, Airbus, have a checklist for unreliable airspeed.
TheiC
Thankyou for your very detailed and thoughtful post.
I was just about to concede that maybe it was just a misunderstanding or lack of knowledge on my part but then I read BaBy’s post.
I know that BaBy was a former Fast Jet QFI as well as an airline pilot. So I know his brain will likely work in the same way to my own in some respects.
The fact that someone who crosses the boundary between the two worlds also questions your explanation does get me thinking again.
I fully appreciate that when IMC at night the situation the pilots were presented with was confusing and terrifying in equal measure. Who knows what I would have done on that Airbus that day. I’m not a large aircraft pilot of course. However, I know what I would have done in my fast jet. It has happened to me, albeit during the day, and my knowledge of power settings and attitudes meant that I was able to conclude fairly quickly that it was obviously a faulty ASI.
I still can’t quite get my head around the idea that you think they didn’t hold it in a stall just because they didn’t know they were in one.
At a lower altitude in my fast jet if I kept pulling back on the stick it would loop. At 35000’ it would stall. The AI and AoA gauges would tell me that along with airframe buffet and all the other constituents of SABIRS.
A standard stall recovery (relax, max, roll or however else you might brief it) would solve it for me and would surely have saved them also).
Again, I have to admit I have never flown a large aircraft so I must defer to those more experienced than myself. Maybe others can help you or I out here?!
BV
I was just about to concede that maybe it was just a misunderstanding or lack of knowledge on my part but then I read BaBy’s post.
I know that BaBy was a former Fast Jet QFI as well as an airline pilot. So I know his brain will likely work in the same way to my own in some respects.
The fact that someone who crosses the boundary between the two worlds also questions your explanation does get me thinking again.
I fully appreciate that when IMC at night the situation the pilots were presented with was confusing and terrifying in equal measure. Who knows what I would have done on that Airbus that day. I’m not a large aircraft pilot of course. However, I know what I would have done in my fast jet. It has happened to me, albeit during the day, and my knowledge of power settings and attitudes meant that I was able to conclude fairly quickly that it was obviously a faulty ASI.
I still can’t quite get my head around the idea that you think they didn’t hold it in a stall just because they didn’t know they were in one.
At a lower altitude in my fast jet if I kept pulling back on the stick it would loop. At 35000’ it would stall. The AI and AoA gauges would tell me that along with airframe buffet and all the other constituents of SABIRS.
A standard stall recovery (relax, max, roll or however else you might brief it) would solve it for me and would surely have saved them also).
Again, I have to admit I have never flown a large aircraft so I must defer to those more experienced than myself. Maybe others can help you or I out here?!
BV
To do that does our profession a grave disservice and perpetuates the underlying faults which led to AF447 and others.
I confess - I've never flown airliner. But even the worst case of magenta-line syndrome presumably learned on something that you actually have to fly, rather than giving gentle suggestions to. How could he even have passed his PPL?
N4790P
Somewhat confused as the motion systems haven't changed. I assume the motion pad wasn't correct to start with and more aggressive use caused the problem?
The CAA Safety Notice should be read carefully, evaluating critically what is written, opposed to what people might wish it to state.
The subject is pilot awareness of aircraft trim state, and safety interventions (relating to awareness).
It is concerned about inappropriate trim input or mishandling situations involving adverse trim conditions, particularly in aircraft with conventional control systems.
The recommended action is to identify gaps in training involving flying skills, knowledge, awareness, startle effect, etc.
This could be disingenuous criticism of those operations who have a robust training and safety systems; alternatively a necessary reinforcement of safety action questing aspects which might have been overlooked, particularly relating to recent accidents.
The notice is best read for what it is, a timely safety reminder.
Syllabus items are wide ranging, covering a number of safety issues all of which could challenge flying skills, but none specifically targeting awareness.
The primary subject - awareness, is often ill defined, difficult to quantify, as with most human factors issues.
How are lack of awareness, distraction, workload, or startle to be identified during training, and how related to trim.
If an aspect has been identified then how is this to be managed. As with most training and specifically human factors, the success from ‘trained for’ items cannot be guaranteed to be repeated in real situations, because of changing context.
No two situations are the same, nor pilots; the operational world is uncertain, defined by individual viewpoint.
Recent accidents, as with many previous events, remind us of the limitations of safety systems and training. Aircraft and systems can fail, as can humans, but so too the industry’s ability to imagine rare situations which have to be managed in real time, by real people in real aircraft. Also, we have a major limitation in understanding situations in hindsight, considering what incident pilots understood.
We must not allow the human dislike of uncertainty change our views of what situations could be encountered (oppose to those which were), or how these should be managed.
The important question - to self. Do I actually understand the situation, and not choose what I wish the situation to be; either in flight operations or just reading a safety notice
The subject is pilot awareness of aircraft trim state, and safety interventions (relating to awareness).
It is concerned about inappropriate trim input or mishandling situations involving adverse trim conditions, particularly in aircraft with conventional control systems.
The recommended action is to identify gaps in training involving flying skills, knowledge, awareness, startle effect, etc.
This could be disingenuous criticism of those operations who have a robust training and safety systems; alternatively a necessary reinforcement of safety action questing aspects which might have been overlooked, particularly relating to recent accidents.
The notice is best read for what it is, a timely safety reminder.
Syllabus items are wide ranging, covering a number of safety issues all of which could challenge flying skills, but none specifically targeting awareness.
The primary subject - awareness, is often ill defined, difficult to quantify, as with most human factors issues.
How are lack of awareness, distraction, workload, or startle to be identified during training, and how related to trim.
If an aspect has been identified then how is this to be managed. As with most training and specifically human factors, the success from ‘trained for’ items cannot be guaranteed to be repeated in real situations, because of changing context.
No two situations are the same, nor pilots; the operational world is uncertain, defined by individual viewpoint.
Recent accidents, as with many previous events, remind us of the limitations of safety systems and training. Aircraft and systems can fail, as can humans, but so too the industry’s ability to imagine rare situations which have to be managed in real time, by real people in real aircraft. Also, we have a major limitation in understanding situations in hindsight, considering what incident pilots understood.
We must not allow the human dislike of uncertainty change our views of what situations could be encountered (oppose to those which were), or how these should be managed.
The important question - to self. Do I actually understand the situation, and not choose what I wish the situation to be; either in flight operations or just reading a safety notice
Surely they bear some responsibility???
OPENDOOR
SABIRS is used to recognise the signs of an approaching stall.
Speed reducing
Attitude increasing
Buffet
Instability
Rate of descent
Stick fully back
In my current jet there is an AoA Warner when the gear is down and an E bracket in the HUD to show target AoA. Thee is also a ‘gear not down’ audio warning that sounds at low power and low altitude.
Do airliners routinely have AoA gauges? Is it something that is considered much during flying and approaches in particular?
BV
Speed reducing
Attitude increasing
Buffet
Instability
Rate of descent
Stick fully back
In my current jet there is an AoA Warner when the gear is down and an E bracket in the HUD to show target AoA. Thee is also a ‘gear not down’ audio warning that sounds at low power and low altitude.
Do airliners routinely have AoA gauges? Is it something that is considered much during flying and approaches in particular?
BV