Originally Posted by
TheiC
With apologies for the previously-warned thread drift, but this is important...
Bob, I'm sorry, but I must absolutely disagree with you.
Considering 'they held it', if an action is not deliberate, or even conscious, is it an action? I would argue, no, it isn't. They exhibited the outward signs of functioning, they moved controls, they reacted (mostly - but not entirely - inappropriately) to their (deeply confusing) environment, but they were a world away from acquiring and processing information, using it to build an accurate comprehension of their circumstances, referring to experience and training, and acting on it.
Moreover, some of their actions were contrary to 'holding it in a stall', so in strict terms I disagree with you there too.
The aircraft stalled into the ocean, without doubt, but it did so not because any pilot intended it to stall, and almost certainly none of them recognised it was stalling, at least not until it was much too late. By all means say they were confused, overloaded, in dissonance, but we should never say that anyone 'held that aircraft in a stall'. To do that does our profession a grave disservice and perpetuates the underlying faults which led to AF447 and others.
Then, sorry, I must disagree with you. ( speaking as s former heavy captain)
AF 447 showed a serious lack of understanding of the handling of a big jet at altitude. Something which appears to have become far too common, with the Magenta line crowd.
They did not lose their ADI, attitude, or their EPR guages, power, as far as I know, and if you have these two parameters and the third, airspeed will sort itself out !
Thats why Boeing, and I suppose, Airbus, have a checklist for unreliable airspeed.