Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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8 years ago, An Airbus crashed due to a blocked' AOA sensor- which fooled both the pilots AND HALBUS .
So a few years later during gestation-certification of MAX, Boeing played word games re critical definitions in how failures affect safety of flight- which allowed a single point ' failure' to take control from pilot ( for the first time ever ? ) and then decdided to not notify anyone via some oversight or creative pencil whipping
https://news.aviation-safety.net/201...-check-flight/
Report: blocked AOA sensors caused loss of control during A320 check flight
note this was with experienced pilots !!
So a few years later during gestation-certification of MAX, Boeing played word games re critical definitions in how failures affect safety of flight- which allowed a single point ' failure' to take control from pilot ( for the first time ever ? ) and then decdided to not notify anyone via some oversight or creative pencil whipping
https://news.aviation-safety.net/201...-check-flight/
Report: blocked AOA sensors caused loss of control during A320 check flight
note this was with experienced pilots !!
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A/P autoland needs three a/p channels, why isn't the same criteria used for the AOA indicators? What they really need is 4 AOA vanes so they can dispatch with one unserviceable.
But then using software to correct an inherently unstable design at the extreme of its envelope shows how far the industry has gone away from safety first.
But then using software to correct an inherently unstable design at the extreme of its envelope shows how far the industry has gone away from safety first.
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Apparently this is an additionally chargeable option. All three major US customers (Southwest, American, United) have bought it. Lion and Ethiopian did not. I wonder about others.
And I wonder how the Boeing sales team went about selling this add-on. Why did the US carriers spend the money and others not. Presumably the sales team offered it to everyone. What were their justifications, and why did the US carriers, no fools at tough negotiations, go for it but not others. And how did the FAA certification let it be optional rather than required. How often, for those that fitted it, did it operate ?
And I wonder how the Boeing sales team went about selling this add-on. Why did the US carriers spend the money and others not. Presumably the sales team offered it to everyone. What were their justifications, and why did the US carriers, no fools at tough negotiations, go for it but not others. And how did the FAA certification let it be optional rather than required. How often, for those that fitted it, did it operate ?
There was a report on Reuters awhile back after Lion indicating that WestJet, SilkAir, and flydubai also had AoA Diagree installed so at least some of the international carriers.
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the solution (sarcasm mode on)
If the MCAS isn't that important.... It can't be, because their was no mention of it in the extensive flight training that pilots received on it, according to
Boeing, it would just confuse them. So, why not just deactivate it, and have the planes fly merrily on their way? As all the 'other' 737's do. You don't think there might actually be a reason Boeing hasn't suggested this, do you?
Boeing, it would just confuse them. So, why not just deactivate it, and have the planes fly merrily on their way? As all the 'other' 737's do. You don't think there might actually be a reason Boeing hasn't suggested this, do you?
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Interesting point in the Seattle Times article, I assume this refers to the Lion Air crash, AOA sensors
The black box data provided in the preliminary investigation report shows that readings from the two sensors differed by some 20 degrees not only throughout the flight but also while the airplane taxied on the ground before takeoff.
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'
nope- it is sufficiently stable without MCAS - which is why they only needed it for the extreme unlikely case which allowed them to use the non flight critical certification. The biggedst screw up was NOT limiting its use and allowing a single sensor to control over the normal pilot disconnect. for 737 and similar
read the seattle times article today
That they found it was necessary with 2,5 degrees might indicate that the aircraft might be way off the required natural stability without the help of any system.
nope- it is sufficiently stable without MCAS - which is why they only needed it for the extreme unlikely case which allowed them to use the non flight critical certification. The biggedst screw up was NOT limiting its use and allowing a single sensor to control over the normal pilot disconnect. for 737 and similar
read the seattle times article today
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Apparently this is an additionally chargeable option. All three major US customers (Southwest, American, United) have bought it. Lion and Ethiopian did not. I wonder about others.
And I wonder how the Boeing sales team went about selling this add-on. Why did the US carriers spend the money and others not. Presumably the sales team offered it to everyone. What were their justifications, and why did the US carriers, no fools at tough negotiations, go for it but not others. And how did the FAA certification let it be optional rather than required. How often, for those that fitted it, did it operate ?
And I wonder how the Boeing sales team went about selling this add-on. Why did the US carriers spend the money and others not. Presumably the sales team offered it to everyone. What were their justifications, and why did the US carriers, no fools at tough negotiations, go for it but not others. And how did the FAA certification let it be optional rather than required. How often, for those that fitted it, did it operate ?
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Thoughts on Seattle Times article published Sunday morning Seattle time
This article is generally well written and seems quite accurate. One point of clarification is that early on in the 737MAX development it was thought that MCAS would only be needed at particularly high Mach numbers. For those conditions the prediction was that the original 0.6 degrees of MCAS stabilizer authority would be sufficient. That proved to be pretty close to the case during flight testing and the final MCAS increment size for cruise and higher Mach numbers is very close to 0.6 deg. Later on it was determined that MCAS would also be needed at lower Mach numbers. With that extension of MCAS came the MCAS authority vs. Mach number schedule that is in the current design. The high Mach end of that schedule is approximately 0.6 degrees. Only with Mach Number less than 0.4 is the MCAS authority 2.5 degrees. The larger authority at lower Mach numbers is needed as the effectiveness of the horizontal stabilizer is less at lower speed. It is quite common that flight control functions are given higher authority at lower airspeed and less authority at airspeed increases.
A second point that did not come through particularly clearly in the Seattle Times article is that the pending MCAS software update has been in the works at Boeing since shortly after the Lion Air accident. As the data for the Ethiopian accident is not yet available (or maybe just came available) nothing that Boeing would be getting out the 737MAX fleet over the next couple of weeks could possibly be based on the most recent event. I'm sure that the team at Boeing will be evaluating the ET accident data as soon as they are able to see (1) if MCAS played any role in this accident, and (2) if MCAS did play a role, how would MCAS have behaved differently had the proposed updates been in place.
This article is generally well written and seems quite accurate. One point of clarification is that early on in the 737MAX development it was thought that MCAS would only be needed at particularly high Mach numbers. For those conditions the prediction was that the original 0.6 degrees of MCAS stabilizer authority would be sufficient. That proved to be pretty close to the case during flight testing and the final MCAS increment size for cruise and higher Mach numbers is very close to 0.6 deg. Later on it was determined that MCAS would also be needed at lower Mach numbers. With that extension of MCAS came the MCAS authority vs. Mach number schedule that is in the current design. The high Mach end of that schedule is approximately 0.6 degrees. Only with Mach Number less than 0.4 is the MCAS authority 2.5 degrees. The larger authority at lower Mach numbers is needed as the effectiveness of the horizontal stabilizer is less at lower speed. It is quite common that flight control functions are given higher authority at lower airspeed and less authority at airspeed increases.
A second point that did not come through particularly clearly in the Seattle Times article is that the pending MCAS software update has been in the works at Boeing since shortly after the Lion Air accident. As the data for the Ethiopian accident is not yet available (or maybe just came available) nothing that Boeing would be getting out the 737MAX fleet over the next couple of weeks could possibly be based on the most recent event. I'm sure that the team at Boeing will be evaluating the ET accident data as soon as they are able to see (1) if MCAS played any role in this accident, and (2) if MCAS did play a role, how would MCAS have behaved differently had the proposed updates been in place.
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But, I must say, if anyone trying his best to count the passes couldnt see the gorilla, then I think the expectatations on what a cockpit crew are able to do in a high stress situation with a lot of stuff going on in the cockpit has to be signifcantly decreased.
Scary indeed.
Scary indeed.
To make this video exercise more like the flight situation, change it to one where the viewer must count the number of passes, but then introduce an impediment that momentarily, but repeatedly, blocks his vision. Give the viewer a means to permanently remove the impediment.
Does the viewer realise that his view is being regularly blocked? Does he activate the removal option before time runs out?
One interestingly thing from the Seattle article. The Lion air crew went through 21 MCAS cycles with the Captain retrimming each time. They did not disconnect the trim. The Captain handed the aircraft off to the FO who let the nose fall to far for recovery. The logbook entry from the prior flight should have mentioned the trim disconnect. I would presume Lion Air requires a log book review by each crew.
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I dont say it is an excuse, it certaintly is not an excuse.
But, imagine the pressure Boeing is under to get the Max certified and start delivering.
What would the reaction be if some low level engineers argued for work and modification 6 monts before planned first delivery that would delay certification and first delivery by 2 years, just to pick a number?
The stock would tumble, customers would be raging, top management would lose its bonuses.
I can easily see such a reason for some (semi) top level managers trying to get away with a quick and dirty trick to avoid all the problems following a lengthy delay.
But, imagine the pressure Boeing is under to get the Max certified and start delivering.
What would the reaction be if some low level engineers argued for work and modification 6 monts before planned first delivery that would delay certification and first delivery by 2 years, just to pick a number?
The stock would tumble, customers would be raging, top management would lose its bonuses.
I can easily see such a reason for some (semi) top level managers trying to get away with a quick and dirty trick to avoid all the problems following a lengthy delay.
The fact is, the lack of alpha signal monitoring within MCAS is both alien to systems design and in my view is unforgivable
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FDR: Clear Similarities to Lion Air Crash
From The Washington Post:
March 17 ADDIS ABABA, Ethi*o*pia — *Ethiopia’s transport minister said Sunday that information from the flight data recorder on the Ethiopian Airlines jet that crashed last week shows “clear similarities” to the crash of the same type of plane in Indonesia in October.
Dagmawit Moges told journalists that the condition of the “black boxes” — the data and voice record — was good and that enough data had been recovered that her ministry’s Accident Investigation Bureau would release a preliminary report in 30 days on what happened to Flight 302.
“During the investigation of the FDR [flight data recorder], clear similarities were noted between Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and Indonesian Lion Air Flight 610, which will be the subject of further investigation,” Dagmawit said.
Dagmawit Moges told journalists that the condition of the “black boxes” — the data and voice record — was good and that enough data had been recovered that her ministry’s Accident Investigation Bureau would release a preliminary report in 30 days on what happened to Flight 302.
“During the investigation of the FDR [flight data recorder], clear similarities were noted between Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and Indonesian Lion Air Flight 610, which will be the subject of further investigation,” Dagmawit said.
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The fact is, the lack of alpha signal monitoring within MCAS is both alien to systems design and in my view is unforgivable
Turkish Airlines flight 1951, 25 Feb, 2009. B737-800 where one radar altimeter was malfunctioning. The data from the sensor went to zero, the computers thought the plane was on the ground, so they reduced the engine power to idle. The result was a stall at low altitude where many occupants were killed. The idiotic thing was that not only were the computers using just one radar altimeter sensor, they were making no effort to inspect it for reasonableness or filter it against spikes. The data was showing valid heights but then instantly started showing zeros!
Qantas flight 72, 7 Oct, 2008. Airbus A330. Pilot's side air data computer had a momentary spike in the angle of attack data. Silly computers took this as indicating the aircraft was suddenly stalling, and at a speed of about 450 knots, pushed the nose down. Passengers were thrown into the ceiling and many were seriously injured. The idiotic thing was that the computers were using completely raw data and could therefore believe that the angle of attack could, in the space of one second, change from sensible values to a stalling angle. Also idiotic that the computers would happily perform a manouever of such violence.
In this Airbus crash 2 out of 3 AoA sensors were frozen. The stall was NOT caused by faulty flight computers but was the result of the pilots voluntarily trying to stall the aircraft to "check" the AoA protection (which could not save them since sensors were frozen). At 2000 ft this is kind of a roulette russe
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I dont say it is an excuse, it certaintly is not an excuse.
But, imagine the pressure Boeing is under to get the Max certified and start delivering.
What would the reaction be if some low level engineers argued for work and modification 6 monts before planned first delivery that would delay certification and first delivery by 2 years, just to pick a number?
I can easily see such a reason for some (semi) top level managers trying to get away with a quick and dirty trick to avoid all the problems following a lengthy delay.
But, imagine the pressure Boeing is under to get the Max certified and start delivering.
What would the reaction be if some low level engineers argued for work and modification 6 monts before planned first delivery that would delay certification and first delivery by 2 years, just to pick a number?
I can easily see such a reason for some (semi) top level managers trying to get away with a quick and dirty trick to avoid all the problems following a lengthy delay.
Just as aerodynamic problems are best 'engineered out' so such a situation should have been 'managed out' as it arose... we're building aircraft here not widgets and even management always had that aviation ethos back in the day...
I'm getting flavours of VW diesel fuel here,.. and a certain trans Atlantic cynicism.
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If the MCAS isn't that important.... It can't be, because their was no mention of it in the extensive flight training that pilots received on it, according to
Boeing, it would just confuse them. So, why not just deactivate it, and have the planes fly merrily on their way? As all the 'other' 737's do. You don't think there might actually be a reason Boeing hasn't suggested this, do you?
Boeing, it would just confuse them. So, why not just deactivate it, and have the planes fly merrily on their way? As all the 'other' 737's do. You don't think there might actually be a reason Boeing hasn't suggested this, do you?
