Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
@ Boeing boy
Our resident engineer , FCeng84, and the wiring diagrams show that the switches cut off the electric trim motor. Trim wheel still works.
"bumping the trim switches on the yoke stops MCAS. then it starts again after 5 seconds if the AoA is still high. You can clearl;y see this on the 610 accident flight data and preceding flight.
So no dedicated MCAS power switches. It's all in the FCC boxes, thence wires to the trim motor.
Gums...
P.S. still can't find an altitude restriction or enabling condition.
Our resident engineer , FCeng84, and the wiring diagrams show that the switches cut off the electric trim motor. Trim wheel still works.
"bumping the trim switches on the yoke stops MCAS. then it starts again after 5 seconds if the AoA is still high. You can clearl;y see this on the 610 accident flight data and preceding flight.
So no dedicated MCAS power switches. It's all in the FCC boxes, thence wires to the trim motor.
Gums...
P.S. still can't find an altitude restriction or enabling condition.
i belive Lion Air was at 5000 feet when they had their issues. Doesn’t make any sense to altitude limit the system as it would need access to digital terrain model to make decisions.
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Most probably not in this case but here it is:Elevator Jam Landing Assist
Elevator Jam Landing Assist
This will give limited changes to the vertical flight path from the spoilers to assist the approach and landing if the normal elevator system jams. The control panel is located on the Aft Overhead Panel, even if it is switched on it will only be active when the flaps are 1 or greater. When in use, the spoilers rise to a preset position; they then extend or retract as the elevator column is pushed or pulled to increase or decrease the rate of descent.
(737 MAX - FBW Spoiler System)
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Training and implications
With regard to the many posts referencing the practice of various maneuvers and events during simulator training sessions:
Have a look at and thought about what is in those simulators.
Specifically, there was a fundamental shift over the last several years about where the software for the simulators comes from, and most specifically for the 787, 737 MAX and most recently the 777-X. One of the biggest differences between the current approach and the "classical" methods concerns the content of available malfunctions and fault scenarios to be trained. There was a very deliberate choice made to limit that content to only those events that are part of the QRH.
Since MCAS was never "advertised" to the flight crews, it almost certainly was not included in the list of "training events" for the MAX simulators. I *might* be wrong, but not based on the content I saw at several of the "working group" events up through about 2 years back.
Bear in mind that there is a huge difference between an engineering simulation and a crew training simulation. The latter type, especially for the MAX and other recent products, contains only what the provider decided that it should contain.
Take a guess as to who that provider is.
Have a look at and thought about what is in those simulators.
Specifically, there was a fundamental shift over the last several years about where the software for the simulators comes from, and most specifically for the 787, 737 MAX and most recently the 777-X. One of the biggest differences between the current approach and the "classical" methods concerns the content of available malfunctions and fault scenarios to be trained. There was a very deliberate choice made to limit that content to only those events that are part of the QRH.
Since MCAS was never "advertised" to the flight crews, it almost certainly was not included in the list of "training events" for the MAX simulators. I *might* be wrong, but not based on the content I saw at several of the "working group" events up through about 2 years back.
Bear in mind that there is a huge difference between an engineering simulation and a crew training simulation. The latter type, especially for the MAX and other recent products, contains only what the provider decided that it should contain.
Take a guess as to who that provider is.
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[QUOTE=gums;10419051]@ Boeing boy
Our resident engineer , FCeng84, and the wiring diagrams show that the switches cut off the electric trim motor. Trim wheel still works.
"bumping the trim switches on the yoke stops MCAS. then it starts again after 5 seconds if the AoA is still high. You can clearl;y see this on the 610 accident flight data and preceding flight.
So no dedicated MCAS power switches. It's all in the FCC boxes, thence wires to the trim motor.
Gums...
P.S. still can't find an altitude restriction or enabling condition.[/QUOTE
This may help post 496 11 march 2019 ethopian airliner down thread (cannnot seem to post link )
Mar 2019, 21:55
permalink) #496 (permalink)
11th Mar 2019, 21:55
Our resident engineer , FCeng84, and the wiring diagrams show that the switches cut off the electric trim motor. Trim wheel still works.
"bumping the trim switches on the yoke stops MCAS. then it starts again after 5 seconds if the AoA is still high. You can clearl;y see this on the 610 accident flight data and preceding flight.
So no dedicated MCAS power switches. It's all in the FCC boxes, thence wires to the trim motor.
Gums...
P.S. still can't find an altitude restriction or enabling condition.[/QUOTE
This may help post 496 11 march 2019 ethopian airliner down thread (cannnot seem to post link )
Mar 2019, 21:55
permalink) #496 (permalink)
11th Mar 2019, 21:55
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time for all new posters to RTFT. Ok not possible. Draw your own conclusions
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Something isn't quite making sense here....
IF that supposed ATC info is correct - that there seemed to be a sustained and abnormal acceleration - and this DOES seem to be borne out by the FR24 data, which seems to show increasing speed and increasing altitude then the aircraft flight path is NOT the same as Lion Air. Whatever various press releases seem to be claiming.
The Lion Air FDR data appears to show an aircraft exchanging kinetic and potential energy as it dives and accelerates, then climbs and slows , as it either is "MCASed" nose down or pulled back nose up alternately. The final DIVE is where the speed finally builds to by far the highest speed in the whole accident sequence.
ET doesn't do that. The FR24 data (unless there's something newer floating around) shows ground speed continuously increasing (albeit not at a constant rate) while the overall altitude trend is to climb - albeit with some instability. In other words, the ET aircraft seems to be gaining significant energy throughout the flight. No stab system malfunction can add total energy to the aircraft.
Dare I suggest something totally unrelated to MCAS, even though everyone has already jumped on that bandwagon (and grounded the aircraft). What about an uncontrolled high thrust event? Too much thrust, inability to reduce power from TO, something like that.
IF that supposed ATC info is correct - that there seemed to be a sustained and abnormal acceleration - and this DOES seem to be borne out by the FR24 data, which seems to show increasing speed and increasing altitude then the aircraft flight path is NOT the same as Lion Air. Whatever various press releases seem to be claiming.
The Lion Air FDR data appears to show an aircraft exchanging kinetic and potential energy as it dives and accelerates, then climbs and slows , as it either is "MCASed" nose down or pulled back nose up alternately. The final DIVE is where the speed finally builds to by far the highest speed in the whole accident sequence.
ET doesn't do that. The FR24 data (unless there's something newer floating around) shows ground speed continuously increasing (albeit not at a constant rate) while the overall altitude trend is to climb - albeit with some instability. In other words, the ET aircraft seems to be gaining significant energy throughout the flight. No stab system malfunction can add total energy to the aircraft.
Dare I suggest something totally unrelated to MCAS, even though everyone has already jumped on that bandwagon (and grounded the aircraft). What about an uncontrolled high thrust event? Too much thrust, inability to reduce power from TO, something like that.
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What about an uncontrolled high thrust event? Too much thrust, inability to reduce power from TO, something like that.
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Something isn't quite making sense here....
IF that supposed ATC info is correct - that there seemed to be a sustained and abnormal acceleration - and this DOES seem to be borne out by the FR24 data, which seems to show increasing speed and increasing altitude then the aircraft flight path is NOT the same as Lion Air. Whatever various press releases seem to be claiming.
The Lion Air FDR data appears to show an aircraft exchanging kinetic and potential energy as it dives and accelerates, then climbs and slows , as it either is "MCASed" nose down or pulled back nose up alternately. The final DIVE is where the speed finally builds to by far the highest speed in the whole accident sequence.
ET doesn't do that. The FR24 data (unless there's something newer floating around) shows ground speed continuously increasing (albeit not at a constant rate) while the overall altitude trend is to climb - albeit with some instability. In other words, the ET aircraft seems to be gaining significant energy throughout the flight. No stab system malfunction can add total energy to the aircraft.
Dare I suggest something totally unrelated to MCAS, even though everyone has already jumped on that bandwagon (and grounded the aircraft). What about an uncontrolled high thrust event? Too much thrust, inability to reduce power from TO, something like that.
IF that supposed ATC info is correct - that there seemed to be a sustained and abnormal acceleration - and this DOES seem to be borne out by the FR24 data, which seems to show increasing speed and increasing altitude then the aircraft flight path is NOT the same as Lion Air. Whatever various press releases seem to be claiming.
The Lion Air FDR data appears to show an aircraft exchanging kinetic and potential energy as it dives and accelerates, then climbs and slows , as it either is "MCASed" nose down or pulled back nose up alternately. The final DIVE is where the speed finally builds to by far the highest speed in the whole accident sequence.
ET doesn't do that. The FR24 data (unless there's something newer floating around) shows ground speed continuously increasing (albeit not at a constant rate) while the overall altitude trend is to climb - albeit with some instability. In other words, the ET aircraft seems to be gaining significant energy throughout the flight. No stab system malfunction can add total energy to the aircraft.
Dare I suggest something totally unrelated to MCAS, even though everyone has already jumped on that bandwagon (and grounded the aircraft). What about an uncontrolled high thrust event? Too much thrust, inability to reduce power from TO, something like that.
The normal reaction to too much thrust would be to simply continue the climb. That would buy some time to sort out whatever happened.
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i said draw your own conclusions. But with 737 in the screen name I’m happy that he’s not flying a Max, with or without the training that goes with it. Of course other than Brazil, there would have been no training. And I wonder what the Brazilian certifying authority allowed as training since they grounded their fleet anyway.
After 1000 feet I noticed a decrease in aircraft performance. I picked up that the autothrottles were not moving to commanded position even though they were engaged. I'm sure they were set properly for takeoff but not sure when the discrepancy took place. My scan wasn't as well developed since I've only flown the MAX once before. I manually positioned the thrust levers ASAP. This resolved the threat, we were able to increase speed to clean up and continue the climb to 3000 feet.
Shortly afterwards I heard about the (other carrier) accident and am wondering if any other crews have experienced similar incidents with the autothrottle system on the MAX? Or I may have made a possible flying mistake which is more likely. The FO (First Officer) was still on his first month and was not able to identify whether it was the aircraft or me that was in error.
Shortly afterwards I heard about the (other carrier) accident and am wondering if any other crews have experienced similar incidents with the autothrottle system on the MAX? Or I may have made a possible flying mistake which is more likely. The FO (First Officer) was still on his first month and was not able to identify whether it was the aircraft or me that was in error.
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Either they where to busy controlling the A/C and did not reduce thrust or they hoped the nose up momentum caused by engine thrust would help them to overcome a nose down trim or whatever caused the dive.
The normal reaction to too much thrust would be to simply continue the climb. That would buy some time to sort out whatever happened.
The normal reaction to too much thrust would be to simply continue the climb. That would buy some time to sort out whatever happened.
What if they were so concerned about MCAS that they were taking THOSE actions even though it wasn't an MCAS issue? And not addressing the thrust?
Ive seen previous cases where crews were so focused on the 'threat of the week' that they reacted to other symptoms as if they wree the expected, high profile, event.
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One options suggested by the FR data is that there was no flap set for takeoff.
The data shows a 63 second ground roll followed by a rotation at 207 knots. At this point the MCAS may have simply been doing its job.
Hard to believe this would happen, but it's happened before.
The data shows a 63 second ground roll followed by a rotation at 207 knots. At this point the MCAS may have simply been doing its job.
Hard to believe this would happen, but it's happened before.
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One options suggested by the FR data is that there was no flap set for takeoff.
The data shows a 63 second ground roll followed by a rotation at 207 knots. At this point the MCAS may have simply been doing its job.
Hard to believe this would happen, but it's happened before.
The data shows a 63 second ground roll followed by a rotation at 207 knots. At this point the MCAS may have simply been doing its job.
Hard to believe this would happen, but it's happened before.
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Did the aircraft even make it to FMC thrust reduction altitude? Capt Kremin's scenario of a flapless takeoff, MCAS activation at liftoff and takeoff thrust for almost the entire duration of the flight could provide a plausible explanation for the continuous increase in speed during the sequence from the known data.
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I have no quibble about the MCAS being involved somehow; but while we know why Lion Air had its activation of the MCAS, we don't know why ETH 302 did. This may be a reason. The aircraft took over 3 minutes to get above 500' AGL This points to very early activation of the MCAS, which needs the flaps to be up to work.
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If the MCAS is triggered by one sensor, than simply adding another won't be enough. There needs to be three just like having a standby A/H as a tie breaker.
Surely any mandated modification will require more than a simple software update.
Concorde was grounded for a lengthy period after a design flaw led to a disaster. Extensive modifications were required to the wing tanks before the aircraft was deemed safe. Any solution proposed by Boeing will need to be very conclusive in restoring safety for it to be accepted and it won't be quick or cheap.
Surely any mandated modification will require more than a simple software update.
Concorde was grounded for a lengthy period after a design flaw led to a disaster. Extensive modifications were required to the wing tanks before the aircraft was deemed safe. Any solution proposed by Boeing will need to be very conclusive in restoring safety for it to be accepted and it won't be quick or cheap.
