Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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https://globalnews.ca/news/5040395/c...s-plane-crash/
Another side to the story.
That has been corrected.
The last transponder data were received from position N9.027 E39.153 about 21nm east of Addis Ababa at FL086. Terrain elevation at that point is 8130 feet MSL, FL086 reported by the Mode-S Altimeter (which always measures to standard pressure 1013 QNH) corrected for QNH indicates the aircraft was flying at 9027 feet MSL at that position.
A pressure altitude of 8600' equates to approximately 9125' AMSL, so about 100' higher than the figure quoted by Avherald (they appear to have used the SL pressure lapse rate, which is greater than that at altitude).
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Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). I wonder what the Augmentation word really refers to. Don't use software to correct design deficiencies. It is two too many for a new aircraft especially coming from this manufacturer. It might not be the case on this one but the bad wrap is already lasting too long to be put to rest. ... is monitoring closely the situation is becoming meaningless at this point.
Cheers,
Cheers,
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That one fell in many many pieces,this one seems to have struck the ground like a missile in one piece at high speed,hence the substantial cratering...
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Understood. Thank you.
https://globalnews.ca/news/5040395/c...s-plane-crash/
Another side to the story.
https://globalnews.ca/news/5040395/c...s-plane-crash/
Another side to the story.
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It is sad to see a pik of the CEO demonstrating to the world what you should not do on a crash site! The site is the 'property' of the investigators (and maybe police) and the last people to be meddling with the wreckage are airline management. Surely he must know that!
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You have to have the ashtray on the outside of a 747 lavatory door or else you have to lock the whole lav off for the entire flight as per the MEL. Lots of dumb anomalies exist everywhere. Now MCAS is being refereed to in here as a de facto stick pusher. Spose it is. That’s not a superfluous bit of info. Colgan Buffalo? Dynamic system that could mess you up if you didn’t know about it? Now a Certain plane maker likes you to know that fire loops contain Eutectic Salt. That is not worth the brain cells necessary to learn it. I only remember it as it’s such a dumb thing to know. What, is it from Eutectia? A trim thing, I think I’d like to know about.
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. I feel this is not the thread for discussion or speculation about MCAS until further facts are known that might suggest it being involved. But please do not defend the design choice to use software to fix a bad design and leaving the crew flying the planes out of the loop intentionally until one falls from the sky.
There was an extended discussion on PPRuNe about what pilots need to know - as opposed to what was commonly in the conversion course content - about the MAX's flight control system after the LionAir crash in October.
Asking anyone who flies the 737 Max: What, if any, guidance and training have you received since the LionAir accident regarding the potential issues that accompany an AoA sensor failure?
Why do I ask this?
A data point from a bit further up: the captain of this flight was recently qualified in this model (November). His previous experience was in other aircraft. (perhaps previous 737 models, that info will doubtless become available in due course).
Would his conversion training have had the benefit of what came to light after the LionAir accident, or, would that training course have been before the LionAir accident?
LionAir crash was in October of last year. As I understand the info provided, this Captain's qualification on the new model was in November of last year.
The question is of particular interest if a flight control anomaly was major hole in the layered slices of swiss cheese. (Another point made earlier was "on the ground three hours, no significant write ups" which is a significantly different case than LionAir's situation).
If the key cause(s) was(were) something else, it's still of interest in terms of how training and systems operations information is disseminated.
Information like this one: the FAA emergency airworthiness notice of 7 November 2018.
Given the recency of the LionAir accident, and that the FAA issued that to all owners and operators, then I'd expect all operators to have taken an active interest in making sure their flight crews were up to speed on this feature of the Max. Under that assumption (perhaps valid, perhaps faulty) air crews would have some awareness of what to do if that same problem cropped up. It being some months since that accident, would all operators have updated their SOPs, procedures, etc, given the seriousness of this particular malfunction at low altitude?
Asking anyone who flies the 737 Max: What, if any, guidance and training have you received since the LionAir accident regarding the potential issues that accompany an AoA sensor failure?
Why do I ask this?
A data point from a bit further up: the captain of this flight was recently qualified in this model (November). His previous experience was in other aircraft. (perhaps previous 737 models, that info will doubtless become available in due course).
Would his conversion training have had the benefit of what came to light after the LionAir accident, or, would that training course have been before the LionAir accident?
LionAir crash was in October of last year. As I understand the info provided, this Captain's qualification on the new model was in November of last year.
The question is of particular interest if a flight control anomaly was major hole in the layered slices of swiss cheese. (Another point made earlier was "on the ground three hours, no significant write ups" which is a significantly different case than LionAir's situation).
If the key cause(s) was(were) something else, it's still of interest in terms of how training and systems operations information is disseminated.
Information like this one: the FAA emergency airworthiness notice of 7 November 2018.
Given the recency of the LionAir accident, and that the FAA issued that to all owners and operators, then I'd expect all operators to have taken an active interest in making sure their flight crews were up to speed on this feature of the Max. Under that assumption (perhaps valid, perhaps faulty) air crews would have some awareness of what to do if that same problem cropped up. It being some months since that accident, would all operators have updated their SOPs, procedures, etc, given the seriousness of this particular malfunction at low altitude?
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 10th Mar 2019 at 17:24.
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How unaware people to say a CEO at the site is contaminating data instead of showing concern for passengers, employees, everybody. I see footage of the Lauda crash with Niki at the site as he had a great interest in the investigation and in fact if not for Niki the real problem may not have been uncovered as it was stated that reverser deployment in flight would not cause a crash. He forced it to the point where a test crew on a DC-8 determined a reverser deployment in flight is extremely serious and would in the case of a 767 unrecoverable. A CEO at a crash site is an important sign of a company commitment.
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After all of my career in SAR, It's absolutely "regular" to find non-authorized people on wreck sites...
Last edited by guadaMB; 10th Mar 2019 at 17:23. Reason: career spelling
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All this trashing of Boeing's incorporation of software using AOT sensor input to prevent a stall being a bad design - does it take into account the A320 Roussillan crash in which improper maintenance of the AOT sensors provided bad data to the software from which the crew was unable to resolve the problem and crashed. Although the Lion Air investigation is not yet complete people are now ready to ground the MAX and change a solution that involved AOT sensor input through software to avert an accident. I assume their grounding will involve Airbus as they also use AOT sensor input to prevent stalls. Have we reverted to the DC-10 times of grounding a plane destroying a company only to find that a maintenance base used an unauthorized procedure that resulted in carnage. Maybe there is an inherent problem but I've never seen a such a crowd of "shoot first and ask questions later" people. And yes, I do own Boeing stock but I also am invested in Airbus.
Flight profile from runway to last captured ADS-B point:
Altitudes AGL are shown to scale, corrected for QNH, although I can't vouch for the accuracy of GE's terrain elevations.
Altitudes AGL are shown to scale, corrected for QNH, although I can't vouch for the accuracy of GE's terrain elevations.
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T
A data point from a bit further up: the captain of this flight was recently qualified in this model (November). His previous experience was in other aircraft. (perhaps previous 737 models, that info will doubtless become available in due course).
Would his conversion training have had the benefit of what came to light after the LionAir accident, or, would that training course have been before the LionAir accident?
A data point from a bit further up: the captain of this flight was recently qualified in this model (November). His previous experience was in other aircraft. (perhaps previous 737 models, that info will doubtless become available in due course).
Would his conversion training have had the benefit of what came to light after the LionAir accident, or, would that training course have been before the LionAir accident?
