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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:14
  #501 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by ManaAdaSystem View Post


You do know there are two pilots in the cockpit?
No, you follow Boeing procedures. You can read them a few posts above this one.
The procedures that were rushed out after Lionair and didnt appear to help either pilot in the cockpit in this case ?
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Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:19
  #502 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by positiverate20 View Post
All I'm saying is, if in the exact conditions in which you speak, if stick shaker triggered, if either your ASI or AoA indicator in front of you is showing something abnormal, then how can you instantly confirm it's an MCAS error in those circumstances? So, given that scenario, how can you automatically set flap one and reduce power?

MCAS is not and cannot be 100% wrong all the time, so why assume that is the problem if you're thrown into that scenario?
Its a fair point. And a clear AOA indication will grant further cognition of the condition. However a trim system that repeatedly trys to shove the nose in to the deck despite the crews efforts to trim back to level flight and cumulatively builds up forces that quickly require two sets of hands pulling on the control column might be the clue that MCAS is trying to kill you ?
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Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:23
  #503 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by blind pew View Post
Trident up on
VC 10 down on
DC9 below windshield up on; above windshield down on.
my first three aircraft.
light switches England down on inside of room.
light switches Ireland down on outside of room.
light switches in Bed and breakfast in Ghent up on outside the room..set a bathrobe alight in the loo after a heavy night out.
only got it wrong once in heavy icing on a dark and dirty night when I switched the engine anti icing off instead of on...and got away with it (switched it back on one at a time with a delay just in case).
For clarity it was an option on Boeings (might be 737 only) to have it either way.

I've flown ex Lufthansa 737s one day and ex Ansett the next where switches operated in the opposite sense. Didn't take much getting used to.
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Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:24
  #504 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by rmac2 View Post
The procedures that were rushed out after Lionair and didnt appear to help either pilot in the cockpit in this case ?
Nobody knows what caused this crash, and nobody knows what actions they did.
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Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:25
  #505 (permalink)  
 
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In the UK:
While the universal standard for light and power/socket switches is down for on, you can easily get three pole bathroom "run on" fan isolator switches in both configurations. Ie those which have up as off and those which have down as off.
Additionally the standard for items in consumer units (house fuse boards) being circuit breakers/MCBs, Rcbo's, and RCD units is up for on.
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Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:28
  #506 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by rmac2 View Post
Its a fair point. And a clear AOA indication will grant further cognition of the condition. However a trim system that repeatedly trys to shove the nose in to the deck despite the crews efforts to trim back to level flight and cumulatively builds up forces that quickly require two sets of hands pulling on the control column might be the clue that MCAS is trying to kill you ?
As a non-737 pilot who has followed the discussion here since Lion Air fairly closely, it seems to me that by far, the surer bet in response to the trim going haywire is to shut off the trim via the switches provided in a prominent place, that will prevent ANY of the hodge podge software modules from moving the trim, than to invent your own procedure that attempts to outsmart the system logic and prevent just ONE of those modules from moving the trim, that you have primed yourself to think about due to the last crash. What if it's not the MCAS, but the STS? or the next secret patch that Boeing will reveal next year? Or simple classic runaway trim?

Cast my vote with the "follow the procedure" crowd.
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Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:31
  #507 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Chesty Morgan View Post
For clarity it was an option on Boeings (might be 737 only) to have it either way.

I've flown ex Lufthansa 737s one day and ex Ansett the next where switches operated in the opposite sense. Didn't take much getting used to.
To be clear, which switches are you talking about? The stab cutouts? The overhead?
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Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:33
  #508 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Skyjob View Post

Good article: What is the MCAS?

Simple answer if jet behaves unexpectedly: disconnect and fly it manually!

EEEEEEEEKKKKKK this diagram is fatally WRONG! it states that DEACTIVATES when "Pilots override with manual trim" IT DOES NOT! it pauses but REMAINS ACTIVE! which is a completely different thing! If i was looking for a smoking gun this is it! If this diagram came from Boeing then they are F*****kd
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Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:35
  #509 (permalink)  
 
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MAX QA test plan

Originally Posted by Joejosh999 View Post
Id be interested to know of the QA plan, most obviously failure modes, and how it was executed and signed off.
Likewise, great comment. Pax/Ex-IT QA engr here. With all the discussion around MCAS being somewhat of a kludge to overcome an unbalanced design introduced by the heavier more forward mounted engines on the MAX, I have thought since start of this thread about necessity for a robust test script with particular emphasis on wringing out all possible failure types. Big no-no if this is engineer driven, they are notoriously focused on making stuff WORK. Proper test plan would of course pass/fail all feature/functionality stuff, but should primarily focus on making things BREAK, anticipating every possible adverse situation engineers might deem next to impossible, or so minor or rare as to be "insignificant". Testing impact of bad control inputs to MCAS seems rather a no-brainer, no?
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Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:42
  #510 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by rmac2 View Post
The key phrase is "along the lines of" , as apparently Boeing preferred not to admit to the possibility, let alone produce a procedure for it. In the absence of any guidance, what would be the quickest way to inhibit the MCAS system under pressure ? I suspect it would be to reproduce a configuration where it is inactive ?
Unfortunately it would appear that if the MCAS system has intervened due to a fault somewhere, you may be somewhat inhibited in configuring to inhibit. So to speak...

Dodgy airspeed - no AP
Flaps? not at 300Knts
High AOA? its pointing at the ground...

It seems flicking the switches is the only real option, easier said than done when you're hauling back 50Kgs amidst the disco and wondering WTF?
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Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:45
  #511 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by Vessbot View Post
To be clear, which switches are you talking about? The stab cutouts? The overhead?
The overhead. I think it was the Lufthansa with the sweep up - on. Ansett was the more traditional forward - on.
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Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:49
  #512 (permalink)  
 
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I think the intent behind the system is not unusual, but with one AOA sensor? I can't quite get my head around that.

Why not have it read from both, if they disagree, go INOP and warn via ECAM? I don't know about the feasability of retrofitting the proper solution - triplex - but it seems that this is a pretty reckless implementation.
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Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:52
  #513 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Chesty Morgan View Post
The overhead. I think it was the Lufthansa with the sweep up - on. Ansett was the more traditional forward - on.
Thanks for the clarification -- first I thought you meant the stab cutouts, which would have been bonkers crazy stupid (in addition to making me eat my words for the second time on one page!)
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Old 11th Mar 2019, 23:54
  #514 (permalink)  
 
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737 max fleet grounded by Gol in Brazil.

They use their Max fleet for direct flights from Brazil to Florida.... Routes suspended, though imagine that they will be frantically working out how to honour current schedule with a fuel stop added in either the north of Brazil or the Caribbean
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Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:00
  #515 (permalink)  
 
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Crew experience?

I see a number of comments relating to crew hours. In particular it has been said that the FO had '200 hours'. IF this is is total time, and it's correct, then by normal training methodology the FO could, at most, be a newly-minted CPL and have next to no time as a 'released to fly solo' pilot on this aircraft.

The source or veracity of this information appears to be a little hazy, however if it were correct then it would suggest to me that Ethiopian could have been operating outside of their own SOP's as outlined in s1.17.1.7 "Procedure for Flight Crew Pairing" on page 50 of the report into the ET409 accident dated 17th Jan 2012:

ET provided their procedure for crew pairing; the procedure is inserted as Appendix H of this
report. It stipulates under “Inexperience flight crews” that “Captain who has less than 300 hours
and F/O who has less than 100 hours on type should not be scheduled together.”


I offer this as information only and make no personal conclusion nor suggestion that crew experience could have contributed to this accident at this stage, particularly as, to the best of my knowledge, the source of the data is unverified.

Thus this detail from the accident report may simply call into question the veracity of the information regarding pilot hours, the training regime (FO especially), whether '100 hours on type' includes pre-CPL training or 'released to fly solo', relevance to current SOP's for the airline, or failure to follow their own procedure amongst various other possibilities.

FP.

Last edited by First_Principal; 12th Mar 2019 at 00:07. Reason: clarification
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Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:02
  #516 (permalink)  

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Firstly, I disagree about opposite switch direction. Having flown the same type with some switches ON/UP and on a different reg the same functions OFF/UP, I can tell you that many colleagues, and myself, made mistakes. Unlike the perfect people who insist on posting here.

Secondly, a question. Why did the Ethiopian B737 in this case keep accelerating? At 1000 ft AGL, in VMC, it is simple to see that the a/c is accelerating, without reference to instruments. (Maybe not for the FO, drastically inexperienced as he/she was).

I believe the training, regulatory and operating standards vary widely around our world. Just because every country has a CAA or equivalent, does not mean they are all able to adhere to the same standards. Most of us know that they do not. Most of us are just worried about the usual easily-voiced criticisms of nationalism, racism and the like, so we do not express our opinions.

Smaller, and less developed countries are unable to produce sufficient nationals to train or to operate complex jets to the same standards as the bigger, more developed countries. The accident stats bear this out.
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Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:04
  #517 (permalink)  
 
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Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community

Just released.

"we have not been provided data to draw any conclusions or take any actions"
Attached Files
File Type: pdf
CAN_2019_03.pdf (20.2 KB, 383 views)
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Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:10
  #518 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by RoyHudd View Post
Firstly, I disagree about opposite switch direction. Having flown the same type with some switches ON/UP and on a different reg the same functions OFF/UP, I can tell you that many colleagues, and myself, made mistakes. Unlike the perfect people who insist on posting here.
Actually what I said was it didn't take much getting used to not that mistakes weren't made.
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Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:16
  #519 (permalink)  
 
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I don't know if it's behind a paywall but NYT has a chart showing which 737 MAX operators have grounded them as of today.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...-airlines.html

Grounded - # of 737 MAX in operator's fleet
=================================
China Southern Airlines - 22
Air China - 15
SpiceJet - 13
Hainan Airlines - 11
Shanghai Airlines - 11
Xiamen Airlines - 10
Lion Air - 10
Jet Airways - 9
Shandong Airlines - 7
Shenzhen Airlines - 6
SilkAir - 6
Ethiopian Airlines - 4
China Eastern Airlines - 4
Lucky Air - 3
Cayman Airways - 2
Eastar Jet - 2
Fiji Airways - 2
Fuzhou Airlines - 2
Kunming Airlines - 2
Okay Airways - 2
9 Air - 1
Garuda Indonesia - 1
Comair - 1

Not Grounded (partial list)
====================
Southwestern Airlines - 34
Air Canada - 24
American Airlines - 24
Norwegian Air - 18
TUI fly - 15
WestJet - 13
FlyDubai - 11
Turkish Airlines - 11
Smartwings - 7
GOL Airlines - 7
Aeromexico - 6
Aerolineas Argentinas - 5
Oman air - 5
(remainder omitted for brevity)
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Old 12th Mar 2019, 00:19
  #520 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by joema View Post
I don't know if it's behind a paywall but NYT has a chart showing which 737 MAX operators have grounded them as of today.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...-airlines.html

Grounded - # of 737 MAX in operator's fleet
=================================
China Southern Airlines - 22
Air China - 15
SpiceJet - 13
Hainan Airlines - 11
Shanghai Airlines - 11
Xiamen Airlines - 10
Lion Air - 10
Jet Airways - 9
Shandong Airlines - 7
Shenzhen Airlines - 6
SilkAir - 6
Ethiopian Airlines - 4
China Eastern Airlines - 4
Lucky Air - 3
Cayman Airways - 2
Eastar Jet - 2
Fiji Airways - 2
Fuzhou Airlines - 2
Kunming Airlines - 2
Okay Airways - 2
9 Air - 1
Garuda Indonesia - 1
Comair - 1

Not Grounded (partial list)
====================
Southwestern Airlines - 34
Air Canada - 24
American Airlines - 24
Norwegian Air - 18
TUI fly - 15
WestJet - 13
FlyDubai - 11
Turkish Airlines - 11
Smartwings - 7
GOL Airlines - 7
Aeromexico - 6
Aerolineas Argentinas - 5
Oman air - 5
(remainder omitted for brevity)
I believe GOL can go on 'Grounded' list now.
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