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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 14th Apr 2019, 05:50
  #3961 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Lost in Saigon View Post


They should have read the bulletin.




Thank you for providing the proof that pilots were not provided with a way of knowing they have an AoA disagree. Unless they happened to work for American Airines who had the optional extra. And yeh the pilots used electric trim up and then hit the cutout switches. There is a question that may be around the additional problem Boeing is investigating about why they didn't trim up further with the electric trim. It's a question because it happens at the start and the end, and there's no logical reason for the pilots to do that, which suggests there may have been an additional system problem. We shall see.
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 05:51
  #3962 (permalink)  
 
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From a U.S. Private Pilot: My buddy's youngest is a First Officer on the B737 with Alaska. His only comment was that an emergency "CESSNA" button on the instrument panel to kill all digital input except for primary controls, slats, flaps, brakes and steering would be nice; allowing for good old fashioned piloting skills and, hopefully, a safe manual (Cessna) landing.

Possibly an enormous over-simplification but is that possible?

Tim.
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 06:13
  #3963 (permalink)  
 
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That’s basically what the stabiliser disconnect switches do on the 737. Pretty much all the controls are string and pulleys.

In any non-normal situation flying the aircraft manually usually comes at the expense of reduced capacity for troubleshooting and decision making. Deliberately increasing workload would be an unusual step to take.

The 737 Max accidents are (IMHO) mainly influenced by design choices that should never have passed certification and trying to slap a sticking plaster on top of those decisions is missing the bigger picture.
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 06:44
  #3964 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Lost in Saigon View Post
No, it is not Boeing PR. As more information becomes available, and there is more understanding of what actually happened, those of us who actually get paid to fly can see that these pilots made a lot of mistakes.

The ET302 pilots did not follow the proper procedures after takeoff when they were faced with an Angle Of Attack disagreement during a day VFR departure. Boeing has taken steps to make the B737 MAX MCAS safer (foolproof?), but there will always be pilots who are their own worst enemies.
I've been mostly silent on this thread, despite reading all posts. But that one rang a bell.

FACT: As far as the world knows exactly seven qualified commercial pilots have seen the scenarios that let to the loss of Lion Air 610 and ET302.

FACT: Of those seven pilots four are dead.

FACT: Of those seven pilots, and the three who are not dead, the only individual who correctly connected the dots was not either pilot 5 or 6. It was a jumpseater sitting behind them, who wasn't responsible for anything, who interrupted the mayhem and allowed the flight to continue and land safely.

A failure that results in an absolute 86 percent of its pilots being overwhelmed, that represents 66 percent of flights on which said failure happened ending up in microscopic sized pieces, this is not a failure that can be allowed on a modern transport aircraft.

If eight out of ten pilots who were exposed to a real life stressor are overwhelmed (empirically and though observation in known environments), how exactly is this their fault??

A failure that results in an absolute 66 percent of its pilots (and passengers) being killed simply cannot be blamed on the pilots. Could they have done better?? You bet. But statistics don't lie- and the numbers here show conclusively that MCAS is a killer unless you line up the slots in just the right way.

Perhaps more concerning: ANU trim above 300?? KIAS can cause you to have no trim control at all. I'll take on MCAS any day, but a stuck trim wheel with no altitude to give and... That's just nuts. I've been interviewing friends of mine who fly heavy iron. Not one can describe an airplane they have flown which loses all trim authority above a certain airspeed and tail loading.

You 737 drivers out there: If you are clocking 320KIAS and you try to use the trim- will it work if you are somewhat mis-trimmed nose-down?? 300KIAS?? 310KIAS?? Where and when does your trim tab become teh hammer nailing the lid shut on your coffin?? I am stunned to see here that people are not discussing this more. MCAS is an abomination, but alone it is simple stupidity. An Airplane that has an envelope within the normal operating range wherein trim will no longer not only be detrimental, it will me immovable...Really??

On every airplane you've got a handy indication of stall speed clean and dirty. If there is a speed above which your horizontal trim may not work, would there not be a need for a little line, to like, ummm, say "Hey dummy- if you are above this line you've got squat in terms of horizontal stabilizer trim control!!"

Finally:

Please stop trying to find the person to pin the blame to. This was a human failure, and it has literally thousands of possible inputs that could have effected the outcome. It is in Boeing's interest to minimize the actual events, as well as their underlying causes. But it is up to people like those of you here- to suss out the difference between corporate protective blame and actual culpability. The pilots had seconds to make decisions that would impact hundreds of lives. Boeing had at least eight years to make decisions that would have kept the bastard MCAS from entering into service in the first place. It is improper to equivocate the two, and moreso to blame the guys who only had a few seconds to guess and act correctly, as opposed to those who had years to do it right- and didn't.

Don't get me wrong- I know how proud we are. I simultaneously joined the Caterpillar Club and destroyed an entire airframe in 1996. I knew what had happened, but I knew that until the NTSB report came out NOT blaming pilot error I would never be free. And if it did blame me I would be crushed to the point of uselessness going forward. We are a proud profession, and we will eat our young in a heartbeat if we feel they have failed our standards in some way.

Eating our young here is a disservice to the profession. They went to work, did their best, their best was not good enough and hundreds died.

That should be enough penalty no??

Apologies for the rant-
dce

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Old 14th Apr 2019, 07:22
  #3965 (permalink)  
 
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To be accurate, they had a stall warning on lift-off. There is guidance for this in the QRH and the Flight Crew Training Manual which wasn’t followed. This must raise questions about pilot training and the role of pilots in operating aircraft which are becoming more automated.
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 08:41
  #3966 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by double-oscar View Post
To be accurate, they had a stall warning on lift-off. There is guidance for this in the QRH and the Flight Crew Training Manual which wasn’t followed. This must raise questions about pilot training and the role of pilots in operating aircraft which are becoming more automated.
I guess we'll find out in the final report. Although the criminal investigations may preclude that. There are a lot of people here I really hope have no genuine role in aviation safety, so clear is their bias.
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 08:59
  #3967 (permalink)  
 
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I imagine right now that Boeing HQ are relying on the belief, like some banks, that they are too big to fail. I'm sure they're confident their friends on Capital Hill will manage this fall from grace and cut them all the slack possible on the way back up. Whether this is in the best interests of safety is debatable, The real bogeyman isn't Airbus since they're a known quantity and can co-exist in the world marketplace with Boeing. It's the Chinese who want to dominate everything, and would love to move up the food chain and build and eventually export their own airliners. Look at Huawai v Apple. I'm sure Trump and everybody else are finessing a soft landing, and providing a helping hand up for America's premier manufacturer and exporter.

G
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 09:19
  #3968 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by wonkazoo View Post
I've been mostly silent on this thread, despite reading all posts. But that one rang a bell.

FACT: As far as the world knows exactly seven qualified commercial pilots have seen the scenarios that let to the loss of Lion Air 610 and ET302.

FACT: Of those seven pilots four are dead.

FACT: Of those seven pilots, and the three who are not dead, the only individual who correctly connected the dots was not either pilot 5 or 6. It was a jumpseater sitting behind them, who wasn't responsible for anything, who interrupted the mayhem and allowed the flight to continue and land safely.

A failure that results in an absolute 86 percent of its pilots being overwhelmed, that represents 66 percent of flights on which said failure happened ending up in microscopic sized pieces, this is not a failure that can be allowed on a modern transport aircraft.

If eight out of ten pilots who were exposed to a real life stressor are overwhelmed (empirically and though observation in known environments), how exactly is this their fault??

A failure that results in an absolute 66 percent of its pilots (and passengers) being killed simply cannot be blamed on the pilots. Could they have done better?? You bet. But statistics don't lie- and the numbers here show conclusively that MCAS is a killer unless you line up the slots in just the right way.

Perhaps more concerning: ANU trim above 300?? KIAS can cause you to have no trim control at all. I'll take on MCAS any day, but a stuck trim wheel with no altitude to give and... That's just nuts. I've been interviewing friends of mine who fly heavy iron. Not one can describe an airplane they have flown which loses all trim authority above a certain airspeed and tail loading.

You 737 drivers out there: If you are clocking 320KIAS and you try to use the trim- will it work if you are somewhat mis-trimmed nose-down?? 300KIAS?? 310KIAS?? Where and when does your trim tab become teh hammer nailing the lid shut on your coffin?? I am stunned to see here that people are not discussing this more. MCAS is an abomination, but alone it is simple stupidity. An Airplane that has an envelope within the normal operating range wherein trim will no longer not only be detrimental, it will me immovable...Really??

On every airplane you've got a handy indication of stall speed clean and dirty. If there is a speed above which your horizontal trim may not work, would there not be a need for a little line, to like, ummm, say "Hey dummy- if you are above this line you've got squat in terms of horizontal stabilizer trim control!!"

Finally:

Please stop trying to find the person to pin the blame to. This was a human failure, and it has literally thousands of possible inputs that could have effected the outcome. It is in Boeing's interest to minimize the actual events, as well as their underlying causes. But it is up to people like those of you here- to suss out the difference between corporate protective blame and actual culpability. The pilots had seconds to make decisions that would impact hundreds of lives. Boeing had at least eight years to make decisions that would have kept the bastard MCAS from entering into service in the first place. It is improper to equivocate the two, and moreso to blame the guys who only had a few seconds to guess and act correctly, as opposed to those who had years to do it right- and didn't.

Don't get me wrong- I know how proud we are. I simultaneously joined the Caterpillar Club and destroyed an entire airframe in 1996. I knew what had happened, but I knew that until the NTSB report came out NOT blaming pilot error I would never be free. And if it did blame me I would be crushed to the point of uselessness going forward. We are a proud profession, and we will eat our young in a heartbeat if we feel they have failed our standards in some way.

Eating our young here is a disservice to the profession. They went to work, did their best, their best was not good enough and hundreds died.

That should be enough penalty no??

Apologies for the rant-
dce
No analogizes needed. Superb post and hitting where it hurts: I also joined the "Caterpillar club", as you call it, in 2004, and I cannot tell you the number of pilots around me that (still) believe it could not have happened to them . A form of self preservation possibly ,together with a zest of overconfidence surely. Everyone has read about the "startle effect" in an emergency , and training for that is difficult and not really realistic in a sim . when you enter a sim you expect something unusual will happen.
So please , here , unless you work for Boeing and are afraid to loose your job, let's skip the notion that those Ethiopians kids did not follow proper procedures and are somewhat responsible for this accident..
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 09:42
  #3969 (permalink)  
 
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GlobalNav - "...BS. There's not a crew in the world that doesn't make mistakes, but this crew did not act stupidly nor incompetently...."

So switching on the autopilot with the stick shaker, zooming past 340 VMO with clacker horn tweeting, continuing past 458 kts at low altitude in day VMC is neither stupid nor incompetent? Do tell.
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 09:55
  #3970 (permalink)  
 
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double-oscar, #4005,

‘… they had a stall warning on lift-off. There is guidance for this in the QRH and the Flight Crew Training Manual which wasn’t followed.‘
In addition to stall warning, the crews also had higher stick force (feel shift), airspeed and altitude disagree alerts, ambiguous speed indications; surprise.

Now where in the manual is this combination considered, and belatedly in the FAA AD, how is the description and interaction of these placed in appropriate context.
How should the possibility that the Manufacturer or the Regulator not following their procedures be framed - context, for including a procedure for a situation which was overlooked or not even conceived?

The Lion and Ethiopian crews are the most experienced in our industry in those specific conditions; unfortunately there are unable to relate their experiences for us to learn from. Thus it is everyone’s responsibility to learn from what is known of past events, but not to identify the similarities with (our) current thoughts, or fit understanding to hindsight; instead we all have identify new issue particularly those hidden or already forgotten.
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 10:12
  #3971 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by GlueBall View Post
GlobalNav - "...BS. There's not a crew in the world that doesn't make mistakes, but this crew did not act stupidly nor incompetently...."

So switching on the autopilot with the stick shaker, zooming past 340 VMO with clacker horn tweeting, continuing past 458 kts at low altitude in day VMC is neither stupid nor incompetent? Do tell.
Are you serious?? ….."continuing past 458 kts at low altitude".....that was when they were nose diving towards the ground !!!!!

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Old 14th Apr 2019, 10:33
  #3972 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Alchad View Post
Are you serious?? ….."continuing past 458 kts at low altitude".....that was when they were nose diving towards the ground !!!!!
Yes, the myth that they were flying straight and level at that airspeed has been perpetuated in several posts, which is rather odd given how many times the FDR traces have been posted.
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 12:09
  #3973 (permalink)  
 
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Remedial training for Boeing Designers. Airframe 101:-


Watch and learn.
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 12:10
  #3974 (permalink)  
 
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As mere SLF I'm more than disappointed by the lack of self reflection and 'wouldn't have happened to me' arrogance of some posting on this thread. This mindset makes an unnecessary hole in one of those slices of Swiss cheese.
As an engineer working with safety system reliability I'm puzzled by the arrangement of the two stab trim cutout switches on the Max. if I understand the schematic in # 3882 correctly the Main Stab Trim Cutout switch does everything and the Backup simply provides a set of series contacts for a subset of the Main switch functions.
Given that series contacts didn't appear to be necessary in previous 737 systems it might be concluded that the Backup switch is superfluous other than as a piece of window dressing to make the switch arrangement look like it always used to. This seems like a potential error trap for a pilot expecting the functionality of previous 737s.
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 12:29
  #3975 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by alf5071h View Post
double-oscar, #4005,

‘… they had a stall warning on lift-off. There is guidance for this in the QRH and the Flight Crew Training Manual which wasn’t followed.‘
In addition to stall warning, the crews also had higher stick force (feel shift), airspeed and altitude disagree alerts, ambiguous speed indications; surprise.

Now where in the manual is this combination considered, and belatedly in the FAA AD, how is the description and interaction of these placed in appropriate context.
How should the possibility that the Manufacturer or the Regulator not following their procedures be framed - context, for including a procedure for a situation which was overlooked or not even conceived?

The Lion and Ethiopian crews are the most experienced in our industry in those specific conditions; unfortunately there are unable to relate their experiences for us to learn from. Thus it is everyone’s responsibility to learn from what is known of past events, but not to identify the similarities with (our) current thoughts, or fit understanding to hindsight; instead we all have identify new issue particularly those hidden or already forgotten.
Quite apart from MCAS (when it is fixed on the MAX), and with the same applying to the previous B737 NG model, the biggest story coming out of these crashes is about the effects of the faulty AOA sensor: I am still astonished that Boeing can design, and the FAA can certify, a brand spanking new aircraft model with an archaic flight system, where a single faulty AOA sensor can activate multiple warnings and cascading alerts simultaneously.
And then, to compound the insult, each of those warnings has different, and sometimes contradictory checklists. The checklists are designed to address specific flight conditions, but there seems to be no single clear checklist for sensor failure, nor any way to disable that sensor or the alarms?
What if this scenario happens under heavy workload at night under IMC? Am I missing something?
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 12:37
  #3976 (permalink)  
 
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You're missing nothing. You are asking the questions that should be appearing at BA board level. I can't see anyone subscribing to a MAX+ in 10 years time. Time for a clean sheet of paper, regardless of the MAX outcome.
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 13:03
  #3977 (permalink)  
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Cayman thinking of ditching the Max

Cayman Airways CEO and Board deliberating over their 737 MAX leases and their future.

They have just had 2 new -8 aircraft delivered in Nov and Mar, and 2 more on order for later this year/next.

They are now resorting to using a smaller 737-300 on their new longer routes which the Max was obtained for - now these 733 flights entail a tech stop.
They were also leasing an EAL 767 and the crippling $$$$ costs are the subject of CAY seeking compensation from the Lessor and/or Boeing plus looking into now cancelling all of the MAX leases outright and re-equipping.
They also think that damage limitation v/v pax with the MAX name is an issue.

Last edited by rog747; 14th Apr 2019 at 14:07.
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 13:29
  #3978 (permalink)  
 
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I’m saddened by the tragic loss of life, and the difficult situation that the crew was given. There is no excuse for the deficiencies of the MCAS design.

That being said, there is no universe in which multiple attempts to engage the autopilot at low altitude with an active stick shaker was the correct choice. There are times in this business in which the only correct choice is to turn off all the magic, grab yourself a handful of aircraft, and return to the basics of pitch, power, and performance. Not knowing the specifics of the crew or their airline, I will leave it to someone else to determine if the crew actions were deficiencies of the individuals or deficiencies of their training, but deficient they were.

Last edited by 737 Driver; 14th Apr 2019 at 15:47. Reason: Typo
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 14:04
  #3979 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Alchad View Post
Are you serious?? ….."continuing past 458 kts at low altitude".....that was when they were nose diving towards the ground !!!!!
Liftoff was at 5:38;00, 5:40:42 passing 305 kts, 5:41:20 Clacker (VMO 340), 5:42:10 still found time to talk to ATC and change heading bug, ...that's 1:33 before impact, while nobody thought about MANUALLY pulling back the thrust levers. ...Helloooo.
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Old 14th Apr 2019, 14:16
  #3980 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Fursty Ferret View Post
That’s basically what the stabiliser disconnect switches do on the 737. Pretty much all the controls are string and pulleys.

In any non-normal situation flying the aircraft manually usually comes at the expense of reduced capacity for troubleshooting and decision making. Deliberately increasing workload would be an unusual step to take.

The 737 Max accidents are (IMHO) mainly influenced by design choices that should never have passed certification and trying to slap a sticking plaster on top of those decisions is missing the bigger picture.
For the 737 up to NG one switch disables automatic trim while preserving pilot electrical trim, the second switch disables all electrical trim. On the 737 MAX either switch disables all electrical trim

Manual trim of a significantly out of trim aircraft may be difficult at best.

I have asked how well this change to the cutout was documented in the conversion slideware but have not seen a response.
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