Originally Posted by
alf5071h
double-oscar, #4005,
‘… they had a stall warning on lift-off. There is guidance for this in the QRH and the Flight Crew Training Manual which wasn’t followed.‘
In addition to stall warning, the crews also had higher stick force (feel shift), airspeed and altitude disagree alerts, ambiguous speed indications; surprise.
Now where in the manual is this combination considered, and belatedly in the FAA AD, how is the description and interaction of these placed in appropriate context.
How should the possibility that the Manufacturer or the Regulator not following their procedures be framed - context, for including a procedure for a situation which was overlooked or not even conceived?
The Lion and Ethiopian crews are the most experienced in our industry in those specific conditions; unfortunately there are unable to relate their experiences for us to learn from. Thus it is everyone’s responsibility to learn from what is known of past events, but not to identify the similarities with (our) current thoughts, or fit understanding to hindsight; instead we all have identify new issue particularly those hidden or already forgotten.
Quite apart from MCAS (when it is fixed on the MAX), and with the same applying to the previous B737 NG model, the biggest story coming out of these crashes is about the effects of the faulty AOA sensor: I am still astonished that Boeing can design, and the FAA can certify, a brand spanking new aircraft model with an archaic flight system, where a single faulty AOA sensor can activate multiple warnings and cascading alerts simultaneously.
And then, to compound the insult, each of those warnings has different, and sometimes contradictory checklists. The checklists are designed to address specific flight conditions, but there seems to be no single clear checklist for sensor failure, nor any way to disable that sensor or the alarms?
What if this scenario happens under heavy workload at night under IMC? Am I missing something?