Atlas Air 767 down/Texas
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Does the 767 have accelerated trim rate with flaps extended?
My brutally condensed account of the Rostov (737) accident is that pushover WITH trim (and flap relief + speedtape confusion) put the AC nose heavy into dive from which the crew then did not have the right combination of alertness, skills and altitude to recover.
If the push came with a sustained nose-down trim, how long for it to become impossible to overpower by the other pilots pull?
My brutally condensed account of the Rostov (737) accident is that pushover WITH trim (and flap relief + speedtape confusion) put the AC nose heavy into dive from which the crew then did not have the right combination of alertness, skills and altitude to recover.
If the push came with a sustained nose-down trim, how long for it to become impossible to overpower by the other pilots pull?
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How is that even possible?
I've been through this illusion many times in IMC and while very convincing, nothing that would cause me to shove a 767 control column to the stops.
And I'm disregarding the mentions of the captain pulling opposite.
I've been through this illusion many times in IMC and while very convincing, nothing that would cause me to shove a 767 control column to the stops.
And I'm disregarding the mentions of the captain pulling opposite.
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With so many hacks in effect anyway, would it make sense to program Hal to not allow any maneuvers that would subject inhabitants of the flight deck to more than +/- 3g of vertical push force? I realize that it could be necessary towards the very end to have leeway. But it seems that in an otherwise normal regime, it should not be possible to achieve it somehow by mistake, as what seems the case here.
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I'm having a real hard time with the -4g load, especially in a transport category aircraft designed for -1.0 + safety factor. Even when I hit the -2g limits in an aerobatic, it's really significant.
Edit: in fact does the 767 even have sufficient elevator/stab authority to get itself into that situation, relatively instantaneously?
Edit: in fact does the 767 even have sufficient elevator/stab authority to get itself into that situation, relatively instantaneously?
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Suspect that the -4g pushover would be a significant factor.
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I suspect that a -4G pushover would result in a lot of bent 767, a lot of cargo pinned against the ceiling in the hold, and pilots being forced out of their seats, with everything loose in the cockpit pinned against the cockpit ceiling. If that airplane experienced that event, I opine it was hardly flying, or being flown under control, afterward.
You would think that would quickly be rectified.
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What I find unlikely is the comment that the Captain pulled back so hard he sheared the pins on his control column. I have always been taught on Boeings that you cannot apply excess force to the control column that can result in damage. If the controls are jammed due ice you can pull or push as hard as you physically can. If the Captain and copilot oppose each other there will eventually be a break out and then then the left elevator will follow the Captain’s input and the right elevator will reflect the copilot’s input. This happened on the Egypt Air 767 crash in the atlantic.
Wonder if there are any similarities with Northwest Boeing 720 accident.
ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 720-051B N724US Everglades, FL
The final report on the crash determined the cause of the accident to be the unfavourable interaction of severe vertical air drafts and large longitudinal control displacements, resulting in a longitudinal upset from which a successful recovery was not made.
ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 720-051B N724US Everglades, FL
The final report on the crash determined the cause of the accident to be the unfavourable interaction of severe vertical air drafts and large longitudinal control displacements, resulting in a longitudinal upset from which a successful recovery was not made.
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This latest discussion supports my theory of the stab actuator jackscrew fuselage attach bolt falling out. As the bolt worked its way out to the point where only the threads were engaged with the jackscrew, there would be enough slack to allow an aerodynamically preloaded stab to move slightly stab nose down resulting in a slight pitch up. The PF would instinctively push forward on the column aerodynamically unloading the stab rotational force and allow the bolt to fall out and the stab to rotate stab nose up past its design limit. When the stab moved pat the design limits, contact with the stab structure and the elevator control cables would have compromised the control cable integrity rendering the elevator controls useless. Due to the sudden unexpected negative Gs, the PF would instinctively think they were in a wind shear stall ant push forward on the column and throttles. The other pilot would respond to the precipitous nose down attitude by pulling aft on the column. Being in a sudden loss of control situation, and both pilots equally convinced that their recovery attempt was correct would result in a column disconnect with no resulting elevator movement as the control cable integrity was compromised. When the sudden and severe pitch down occurred, the pitch momentum would allow the stab to stall out. As the pitch down momentum continued, the greater flat square area of the stab forward of the hinge point would push the stab to a stab nose down causing the final pitch up. Look at the picture of the jackscrew and notice no blot or compromise of the attachment lug.
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Just a thought, any g applied is effectively due to a pitch change around the centre of lift/gravity. I think that means a magnified g load at the front of the aircraft, so what is felt on the flight deck is effectively more than the average g felt by the airframe.
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Just a thought, any g applied is effectively due to a pitch change around the centre of lift/gravity. I think that means a magnified g load at the front of the aircraft, so what is felt on the flight deck is effectively more than the average g felt by the airframe.
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Against the ceiling until the negative Gs ended, and then forward into the throttle quadrant? A frightening thought.
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FO pushes full forward. Captain pulls back and splits the yokes (as designed). So you have a stab trimmed for 240 knots, one elevator full down and one elevator full up. And a lot of power has been added, which of course is "nose up".
That does not result in what the airplane did.
That does not result in what the airplane did.
You'd need to be a rocket scientist to figure out the cumulative effect of all these devices.
Shear pins? Que?
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Sorry, I cannon post the link. There is an article on Quora "What-caused-an-Atlas-Air-767-to-crash". For updates and details click on (more)... Among the latest updates regarding the NTSB investigation, the article includes a picture of the recovered jackscrew and its position at impact.
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I wonder if the report of a 4 g push over is accurate. The single poster ABusDrivr also said that the nose pitched up 10 degrees with the power increase but the NTSB said the pitch up was about 4 degrees in its March 12, 2019 update.
Under NTSB CVR protocols only a few people will ever hear the CVR recording. Has someone been authorized to release a gist of the contents through Atlas or the Teamsters?
From the NTSB CVR Handbook cited previously, here is the non-disclosure agreement:
Further guidance for CVR contents disclosure in the interest of safety:
Is the version of events from ABusDrivr based on a briefing from the Atlas union or airline safety folks? Or, is it crew van speculation based on what little information has been publicly released?
It could literally be months before the CVR transcript is released.
Did ABusDrivr give us a hot tip on what to expect? Or, did he drop off the Beale Ciphers and depart, never to be heard from again?
Under NTSB CVR protocols only a few people will ever hear the CVR recording. Has someone been authorized to release a gist of the contents through Atlas or the Teamsters?
From the NTSB CVR Handbook cited previously, here is the non-disclosure agreement:
Cockpit Voice Recorder Handbook for Aviation Accident Investigation, February 2016
CVR NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
ACCIDENT ID:_________________________________
Each of the undersigned acknowledges that he/she has read National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regulations in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 831.11 and 831.13, which are printed on the reverse side of this document, and agrees to comply with those rules.
Each undersigned further agrees not to disclose or cause to be disclosed any information from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording or any transcript thereof except as expressly authorized by the NTSB. Approval from the NTSB Investigator-In-Charge must be obtained before disclosure of any information. Disclosure of information to his/her respective organization shall include only that information which is directly related to safety and at no time shall non-pertinent remarks, comments, or conversations be disclosed to any person, party, or organization.
By placing his/her signature hereon, the undersigned acknowledges that the unauthorized release of CVR information shall be grounds for immediate dismissal from the investigation, and may result in further legal sanction.
I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE CONDITIONS.
SIGNATURE NAME (PRINTED) PARTY DATE
____________________ ________________________ ______________ _________
CVR NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
ACCIDENT ID:_________________________________
Each of the undersigned acknowledges that he/she has read National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regulations in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 831.11 and 831.13, which are printed on the reverse side of this document, and agrees to comply with those rules.
Each undersigned further agrees not to disclose or cause to be disclosed any information from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording or any transcript thereof except as expressly authorized by the NTSB. Approval from the NTSB Investigator-In-Charge must be obtained before disclosure of any information. Disclosure of information to his/her respective organization shall include only that information which is directly related to safety and at no time shall non-pertinent remarks, comments, or conversations be disclosed to any person, party, or organization.
By placing his/her signature hereon, the undersigned acknowledges that the unauthorized release of CVR information shall be grounds for immediate dismissal from the investigation, and may result in further legal sanction.
I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE CONDITIONS.
SIGNATURE NAME (PRINTED) PARTY DATE
____________________ ________________________ ______________ _________
8.3. CVR disclosure policy does not prohibit a party from implementing safety-of-flight related changes within its organization as a result of its participation in a CVR group, however, the NTSB requires approval by the IIC and the directors of the Offices of Research and Engineering and Aviation Safety of the subject matter prior to any disclosure of CVR information to the group member’s organization. It is the CVR group member’s responsibility to notify the CVR group chairman prior to disclosure. Disclosure of information to a group member’s respective organization shall include only information that is directly related to safety. At no time shall CVR remarks, comments, or conversations be disclosed to any person, party, or organization.
It could literally be months before the CVR transcript is released.
Did ABusDrivr give us a hot tip on what to expect? Or, did he drop off the Beale Ciphers and depart, never to be heard from again?