Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Flight Deck Forums > Rumours & News
Reload this Page >

Indonesian aircraft missing off Jakarta

Rumours & News Reporting Points that may affect our jobs or lives as professional pilots. Also, items that may be of interest to professional pilots.

Indonesian aircraft missing off Jakarta

Old 23rd Nov 2018, 20:02
  #1581 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: WA STATE
Age: 74
Posts: 1
ballscrew-backscrew backdriven

RE JACKSCREW- EG BALLSCREW - being backdriven -- PLEASE SEE MY POST 1522 this thread
Quote:
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK Correct me if I'm wrong, but the coarser the thread pitch (all other things being equal), the more likely a jackscrew is to be back driveable (the spiral ratchet screwdriver principle). Is that what you're saying?

I can't see air loads on the stab being capable of overcoming the combined braking friction in the jackscrew, gearbox and actuator unless we're talking about a previously undisclosed failure in addition to the issues already discussed.
Its MORE than just the pitch ( lead) please take the time to read this simplified explanation

https://www.linearmotiontips.com/how...ll-back-drive/

and for an approximation of loads

https://www.aerospaceonline.com/doc/...actuators-0001

+++++++


Originally Posted by DaveReidUK View Post
Maybe it can, maybe it can't (my money would be on not).

But either way - what is the relevance?

Given the overwhelming evidence implicating the STS/MCAS, why are we throwing Occam's Razor out of the window and postulating an unrelated, independent mechnical failure of the actuation mechanism as a causal factor?

The MAX has the same horizontal stabilizer as the NG, and I'd bet that the actuator/gearbox/jackscrew isn't significantly different either. How many NG loss of pitch trim control incidents have there been in the last 20 years that have been attributable to actuation failure?
CONSO is offline  
Old 23rd Nov 2018, 20:04
  #1582 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: WA STATE
Age: 74
Posts: 1
Originally Posted by Concours77 View Post
Absent command, the jackscrew cannot rotate....

imo
See my 1522 this thread !
CONSO is offline  
Old 23rd Nov 2018, 20:10
  #1583 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2016
Location: Lakeside
Posts: 428
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK View Post
Your inference is indeed correct. This report of the Nov 5th press briefing quotes the three preceding UAS events as occurring on:

Denpasar-Manado
Manado-Denpasar
Denpasar-Jakarta

which were of course consecutive.

Elsewhere it was confirmed that the AoA sensor was changed at Denpasar on October 28th.
“changed”. r/r? R/d/r? R/r/R? Removed, reinstalled. Removed, discarded, replaced. Removed, repaired, Replaced.

On replacement with new, repaired, or same, what is required to re connect to ADIRUs?

I would assume if vane only, a new “o” ring? If inclusive of sensor, sender, is there a specific check item that tests the circuits?

Start with the simple stuff. We are at some very obscure suppositions regarding programming.

Look first to widget(s).

Or should this be in Tech?
Concours77 is offline  
Old 23rd Nov 2018, 20:18
  #1584 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2016
Location: Lakeside
Posts: 428
Originally Posted by CONSO View Post
See my 1522 this thread !
Read, understood. “Limit load of actuator in the 737 = 25,000 pounds.”

At Fail? i.e. 1.5 limit?
Concours77 is offline  
Old 23rd Nov 2018, 20:35
  #1585 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: WA STATE
Age: 74
Posts: 1
Originally Posted by Concours77 View Post


Read, understood. “Limit load of actuator in the 737 = 25,000 pounds.”

At Fail? i.e. 1.5 limit?


from this SLF - Probably 1.5 re limit load. But there may be other factors re size ( area) of MAX stabilizer compared to NG and the effects of a longer lever arm re pitch change per degree stabilizer movement. That kind of discussion is well beyond my old wheelhouse/pay grade. MY cliffs note version is that with a longer lever arm AND same size ( area) stabilizer , less stabilizer angle change ( and load ) is needed to give the same nose up/down pitch change.
CONSO is offline  
Old 23rd Nov 2018, 20:47
  #1586 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: EHAM
Posts: 41
From the evidence it is clear that this accident was not caused by mechanical leadscrew problems. As soon as the AoA reaches about 20 degrees the PITCHTRIM moves down at a very constant speed, exactly following the described MCAS operation. This is consistently dealth with by the PF through regular TRIMUPMANUAL inputs after which the down trimming halts for a few seconds (the way MCAS has been stated to do). At the end these TRIMUPMANUAL inputs are of shorter duration resulting in a runaway down trim.

The PF was continuously up-trimming as required until those last trim inputs. Those were too short, perhaps because of other distractions. Although the crew was aware of the continuous need to apply up-trim they apparently did not use the auto trim cutout switches.
StuntPilot is offline  
Old 23rd Nov 2018, 20:55
  #1587 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: uk
Posts: 793
Originally Posted by DingerX View Post

Or, for the previous flight, the red lines mark where the cutout comes in. In both cases, the last automatic call for ND trim occurs without corresponding trim movement. The second time, they try to give it a bit of NU trim, only to be countermanded. Cutout again, and the trim moves NU without electrics.
This is what I think too, note also that the repeated ND automatic trim starts coincident with flaps 0 (as it does on the accident flight, so MCAS) - before that the automatic is sometimes up sometimes down.

Also in the descent there is plenty of trim movement with no auto or manual (electric) signals - my guess is cutouts and manual trim using trim wheel, until after landing.

The weird thing is that the auto trim signal is pretty darn quiet through cruise and descent, suggesting that the data is acquired downstream from the cutouts, but there are two brief sets of down-trim spikes during descent. Seems odd to move the cutouts then, maybe bad data?
infrequentflyer789 is offline  
Old 23rd Nov 2018, 20:58
  #1588 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2015
Location: USA
Posts: 415
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK View Post
Given the overwhelming evidence implicating the STS/MCAS, why are we throwing Occam's Razor out of the window and postulating an unrelated, independent mechnical failure of the actuation mechanism as a causal factor?...
Distraction comes to mind.

This may be a wake up call as aviation (and the world) racing towards more automation and artificial intelligence/machine learning. Machine-1, Man-0.
notapilot15 is offline  
Old 23rd Nov 2018, 21:23
  #1589 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: EHAM
Posts: 41
Originally Posted by notapilot15 View Post
Distraction comes to mind.

This may be a wake up call as aviation (and the world) racing towards more automation and artificial intelligence/machine learning. Machine-1, Man-0.
Indeed but it is nothing new: this case reminds me very much of the Turkish crash here at EHAM (deep stall at short final, a 738 was flaring / retarding throttles mid-air after a single radio altimeter failure resulting in a zero altitude reading, this also happened on previous flights of that aircraft but was dealt with promptly, the cause of the RF problem was poorly understood).
StuntPilot is offline  
Old 23rd Nov 2018, 21:40
  #1590 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2005
Location: btw SAMAR and TOSPA
Posts: 565
Stickshaker

On the previous flight the stickshaker was on from flap 0 until landing. For the whole flight!! Also the IAS difference was there for the entire flight. I cannot imagine how mtc would think a simple AOA sensor change would do and release the aircraft for a revenue flight. This is try and error on a life critical fault.
threemiles is offline  
Old 23rd Nov 2018, 21:50
  #1591 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: Hotel Gypsy
Posts: 2,830
Not wanting to start an A vs. B argument, but the European side of the aircraft manufacturer house went, and to some extent still goes, through automation growing pains. Of course, different philosophies mean that A is using Hal as the master whilst B is more aligned to developing Robocop.

Sorry, tired ramblings but my point is that 21st century accidents are now so often down to the "What's it doing now?" scenario.
Cows getting bigger is offline  
Old 23rd Nov 2018, 22:15
  #1592 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Reading, UK
Posts: 11,142
Originally Posted by Concours77 View Post
I would assume if vane only, a new “o” ring? If inclusive of sensor, sender, is there a specific check item that tests the circuits?
You change the whole unit (pictured here) - the ramp is not the place to start taking it apart.


Eight screws, gasket, two electrical connectors, probably less than an hour including functional checks.

I'd be fascinated to know how the unit that was removed subsequently tested on the bench. Since I'm in a betting mood, my money would be on NFF.
DaveReidUK is offline  
Old 23rd Nov 2018, 23:59
  #1593 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2015
Location: North by Northwest
Posts: 409
Somewhat under the radar and probably not related but on Nov 14th Sunwing 738M near Dulles left ADIRU failure (6 month old aircraft). Per Avherad "when the captain's instruments began to show erroneous indications. The first officer was handed control of the aircraft as his instruments and the standby instruments remained in agreement." Wonder what instruments?
b1lanc is offline  
Old 24th Nov 2018, 00:05
  #1594 (permalink)  
gmx
 
Join Date: Nov 2018
Location: Brisbane
Posts: 25
Pilot error ?

Originally Posted by threemiles View Post
On the previous flight the stickshaker was on from flap 0 until landing. For the whole flight!! Also the IAS difference was there for the entire flight. I cannot imagine how mtc would think a simple AOA sensor change would do and release the aircraft for a revenue flight. This is try and error on a life critical fault.
The previous crew counteracted MCAS for a while before activating the CUTOUT, in accordance with the runaway stabiliser procedure. The accident crew were also counteracting MCAS for six minutes but do not activate the CUTOUT. It seems that the bad AOA data was probably contributing to a fair amount of confusion, but knowing the previous crew had stabiliser trim issues, and then having those same issues themselves, why didn't they activate the CUTOUT ?
The airline would seem to have significant culpability but is it pretty clear case of pilot error ?
gmx is offline  
Old 24th Nov 2018, 00:09
  #1595 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2017
Location: Europe
Posts: 1,680
Originally Posted by notapilot15 View Post
Distraction comes to mind.

This may be a wake up call as aviation (and the world) racing towards more automation and artificial intelligence/machine learning. Machine-1, Man-0.
Paraphrasing Dr Earl Wiener PhD "Automation reduces workload when the workload is already low. Paradoxically, it increases workload in a cockpit when the workload is already high"
Rated De is offline  
Old 24th Nov 2018, 00:17
  #1596 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2004
Location: NY - USA
Age: 64
Posts: 65
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK View Post
You change the whole unit (pictured here) - the ramp is not the place to start taking it apart.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=waYos1ftm98&t=40

Eight screws, gasket, two electrical connectors, probably less than an hour including functional checks.

I'd be fascinated to know how the unit that was removed subsequently tested on the bench. Since I'm in a betting mood, my money would be on NFF.
As would mine...

Which raises the question: “What post-replacement functional checks are called for (in the AMM), and what functional tests were actually performed after the replacement probe was installed?”

If the AMM calls for fitting a calibrated AOA protractor to the probe and fuselage to verify correlation between probe position and transmitted AOA data, and that was not done - either because of lack of time, lack of test equipment, or lack of training, it’s a serious problem.

I would hope that Lion Air maintenance didn’t just slap on a new probe, ignoring any required correlation tests on the assumption that the original probe itself was bad.
JRBarrett is offline  
Old 24th Nov 2018, 00:38
  #1597 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2015
Location: North by Northwest
Posts: 409
Originally Posted by JRBarrett View Post


As would mine...

Which raises the question: “What post-replacement functional checks are called for (in the AMM), and what functional tests were actually performed after the replacement probe was installed?”

If the AMM calls for fitting a calibrated AOA protractor to the probe and fuselage to verify correlation between probe position and transmitted AOA data, and that was not done - either because of lack of time, lack of test equipment, or lack of training, it’s a serious problem.

I would hope that Lion Air maintenance didn’t just slap on a new probe, ignoring any required correlation tests on the assumption that the original probe itself was bad.


I believe others are asking the same.

'Ony Soerjo Wibowo, an air safety investigator for the Indonesian government, said that on the plane’s third-to-last flight, from the eastern Indonesian city of Manado to Bali, the plane, which was delivered to Lion Air in August, had recorded no airspeed data.' (cited in NY Times)

and Mr. Ony said that part of his investigation centered on why the plane had not been grounded by Lion Air, given that it had experienced multiple airspeed problems.“This is strange,” he said in an interview on Wednesday. “We found several events that we should investigate, but they didn’t report them.”

It's not clear who 'they' is that didn't report them. But, in looking at the leaked maintenance log, sure looks like some issues were not documented by prior crews. Don't know what condition the AoA sensor that replaced the alleged offending sensor was in either - probably whatever they had in store since it's the same PN as the NG uses (see #1418).
b1lanc is offline  
Old 24th Nov 2018, 02:06
  #1598 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Sydney
Age: 58
Posts: 377
I’ll be interested to see the factual reports on:
  • maintenance history regarding previous similar / related faults
  • What fault indications were presented to the operating crew on this flight per the FDR
  • what actions were completed by the crew in response to the indications
  • what training, both initial and recurrent, was given by the operator on UAS and runaway stabiliser
It would seem what happens behind the scenes systems wise the 737 requires the same responses from crew for both UAS and runaway stab in NG and Max variants? Whether the stab issue be an actual runaway or a response to a UAS and stall protection, the crew response would be the same for an NG or Max. How would knowledge of a system affect the crew response, the message in the FAA and Boeing docs both reinforce the existing Boeing memory item actions.
roundsounds is offline  
Old 24th Nov 2018, 02:15
  #1599 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2018
Location: Jakarta
Posts: 19
Originally Posted by threemiles View Post
On the previous flight the stickshaker was on from flap 0 until landing. For the whole flight!! Also the IAS difference was there for the entire flight. I cannot imagine how mtc would think a simple AOA sensor change would do and release the aircraft for a revenue flight. This is try and error on a life critical fault.
The previous DPS-CGk lion air co pilot Or pilot had got out from the cockpit to get His luggage, said the pax. One of the stewardess brought the heavy books also, seems FCOM

grid.id/amp/04966850/deretan-kejanggalan-yang-dirasakan-penumpang-jt-610-rute-denpasar-jakarta-sebelum-pesawat-lion-air-jatuh-pada-senin-pagi?page=all

Realbabilu is offline  
Old 24th Nov 2018, 05:24
  #1600 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2005
Location: btw SAMAR and TOSPA
Posts: 565
Originally Posted by roundsounds View Post
I’ll be interested to see the factual reports on:
  • maintenance history regarding previous similar / related faults
  • What fault indications were presented to the operating crew on this flight per the FDR
  • what actions were completed by the crew in response to the indications
  • what training, both initial and recurrent, was given by the operator on UAS and runaway stabiliser
It would seem what happens behind the scenes systems wise the 737 requires the same responses from crew for both UAS and runaway stab in NG and Max variants? Whether the stab issue be an actual runaway or a response to a UAS and stall protection, the crew response would be the same for an NG or Max. How would knowledge of a system affect the crew response, the message in the FAA and Boeing docs both reinforce the existing Boeing memory item actions.
I'll be interested to see the factual reports on
- the training records of the flight crew, especially in regard to using the trim cut out procedure
- the records about the maintenance organization and its actions and culture and how it was possible to release the plane fit to fly with IAS disagree, stick shaker on, trim runaway, after a simple vane exchange, or even worse, without any action before the last flight, as the aircraft lost its redundancy
- the log book entries by the crew flying the aircraft on the last 3 sectors, which obviously were not sufficient to address the problem to mtc and the subsequent crew, so this was mentally prepared what could happen
- the certification documents that allow a no majority capable dual sensor system to manipulate essential flight controls and leaves it to the flight crew to identify what might be wrong
​​​It seems much comes down to training, organization, leadership, documentation, culture in the airline, the FAA and Boeing.
threemiles is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service - Do Not Sell My Personal Information

Copyright © 2018 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.