MAS vs VIR @ LHR... ???
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MAS vs VIR @ LHR... ???
is this for real ...???
Right now at FR24...
""...between Malaysian A359 (MH4) and Virgin B789 (VS251) ... Controller on duty has been relieved and a report has been filed...."
(From some place in FB & FR24 realms)
https://ibb.co/nuLowV
Right now at FR24...
""...between Malaysian A359 (MH4) and Virgin B789 (VS251) ... Controller on duty has been relieved and a report has been filed...."
(From some place in FB & FR24 realms)
https://ibb.co/nuLowV
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Looks like the planes got a little cozy at about the same altitude at 1557Z after a missed approach by MH4 and an attempt to place MH back in sequence in front of VS251:
is this for real ...???
Right now at FR24...
""...between Malaysian A359 (MH4) and Virgin B789 (VS251) ... Controller on duty has been relieved and a report has been filed...."
(From some place in FB & FR24 realms)
https://ibb.co/nuLowV
Right now at FR24...
""...between Malaysian A359 (MH4) and Virgin B789 (VS251) ... Controller on duty has been relieved and a report has been filed...."
(From some place in FB & FR24 realms)
https://ibb.co/nuLowV
[QUOTE=kcockayne;10290523]
I checked this out on FR24 playback. The VIR251 is on a closing hdg to ILS somewhere near the Shard , when the MAS 4 appears on an ESE track heading towards the VIR. It appeared that, perhaps, the ATCO may have been trying to fit the MAS In ahead of the VIR ; or, that the MAS had come off a previous RDR hdg without authorization - I am only guessing - the VIR breaks off with a left turn to the SE, & the MAS is turned left , away from the VIR, before being turned back to the South & established on the ILS. Thereafter, the VIR is brought around with a Left turn to establish on the ILS from the south - nicely spaced behind the MAS. It was difficult to determine if RDR separation was infringed (from the map scale used); but, if the a/c hadn’t been turned, they would have been close. I have to say that I did not notice the vertical separation; maybe they would have been separated. I will look again.[/QUOTE
Looks like there was about 500 feet vertical separation - difficult to ascertain each a/cs’ alt. using FR 24. I am guessing that there was about 3nm separation (decreasing) at the time that the a/c were turned away from each other. Separation may not have been lost - but there wouldn’t have been much if they hadn’t been !
All in all, a successful resolution to a sticky problem. In the circumstances (such as I understand them ), well done.
I checked this out on FR24 playback. The VIR251 is on a closing hdg to ILS somewhere near the Shard , when the MAS 4 appears on an ESE track heading towards the VIR. It appeared that, perhaps, the ATCO may have been trying to fit the MAS In ahead of the VIR ; or, that the MAS had come off a previous RDR hdg without authorization - I am only guessing - the VIR breaks off with a left turn to the SE, & the MAS is turned left , away from the VIR, before being turned back to the South & established on the ILS. Thereafter, the VIR is brought around with a Left turn to establish on the ILS from the south - nicely spaced behind the MAS. It was difficult to determine if RDR separation was infringed (from the map scale used); but, if the a/c hadn’t been turned, they would have been close. I have to say that I did not notice the vertical separation; maybe they would have been separated. I will look again.
Looks like there was about 500 feet vertical separation - difficult to ascertain each a/cs’ alt. using FR 24. I am guessing that there was about 3nm separation (decreasing) at the time that the a/c were turned away from each other. Separation may not have been lost - but there wouldn’t have been much if they hadn’t been !
All in all, a successful resolution to a sticky problem. In the circumstances (such as I understand them ), well done.
Based on Heathrow's own WebTrak radar playback, at their closest point of approach the two aircraft were around 2.6 nm apart with about 200 ft vertical separation.
Last edited by DaveReidUK; 23rd Oct 2018 at 18:04. Reason: Distance derived from GE
A bit more time with the NATS radar data from WebTrak produces the following:
Suggesting that at the closest point of approach, give or take a couple of seconds (tick marks are at 3 second intervals), horizontal separation was 2.44 nm and vertical separation was 225 ± 25 ft.
Suggesting that at the closest point of approach, give or take a couple of seconds (tick marks are at 3 second intervals), horizontal separation was 2.44 nm and vertical separation was 225 ± 25 ft.
if the a/c hadn’t been turned, they would have been close.
Is this what it’s come to? Trial by internet, by people that don’t know the rules, procedures, minima or circumstances?
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Well, if you know for sure that the controller was relieved, I would suggest someone is guilty of leaking inside information! If that is the case, I hope it won't go unpunished!
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Different event - 1700’ lateral separation, same altitude...after we deviated a mile south trying to stay away. Passenger after the flight “that plane looked pretty close.” “That’s because he was...”
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Yes, and this thread has been picked up by some anti-LHR people/groups on social media, quoting the above assertions as proof of responsibility and that ATC have been trialling new procedures to cram in more aircraft.
Hardly a trial ! And, after 38 years as an ATCO, I certainly do not lack knowledge of the rules, minima or circumstances.
Hi K. Apologies, I wasn’t specifically flaming you, more the thought that people are now looking at FR24 and similar and bringing incidents and non-incidents into the public domain without any balance or knowledge of rules and procedures. I.e. the person that found and posted this on the internet originally.
However I’m sure someone such as yourself with 38 years experience will sympathise with the thought that a colleague’s best endeavours, regardless of pilot errors or equipment failures, are equivocated over by essentially lay men. I’m sure you are fully conversant with the rules and caveats regarding 2.5 mile separation.
However I’m sure someone such as yourself with 38 years experience will sympathise with the thought that a colleague’s best endeavours, regardless of pilot errors or equipment failures, are equivocated over by essentially lay men. I’m sure you are fully conversant with the rules and caveats regarding 2.5 mile separation.
Thanks for that. I was not very upset about your comments & did feel that you were addressing the originator, rather than myself. However, I did want to establish my credentials & re-emphasize my intentions. I was also very keen to stress that I was, in no way, attributing any blame to anyone - least of all the ATCO. I presume he was the one who took remedial action in this incident , & I stressed that , as far as I was concerned, he did a good job of conflict resolution, sequencing & expedition subsequent to the “event”. As regards the rest of your comments; I agree entirely with you.
Regards K
Regards K
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There are many possible reasons why these two aircraft have come into conflict and not necessarily any errors on anyone's behalf, the resolving turns look like great execution of avoiding action showing that the safety networks in place have worked and prevented what could have been a far worse outcome. Wait for the outcome of the Airprox board before pointing fingers.
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I see that the Airprox report was published.
https://www.airproxboard.org.uk/uplo...%202018286.pdf
Selectively quoting
https://www.airproxboard.org.uk/uplo...%202018286.pdf
Selectively quoting
Looking first at the actions of the A350 pilot, the Board noted that the need to conduct a go-around was
always a high workload situation for pilots involving aircraft reconfiguration, climb instructions, speed
control, heading changes and likely reconfiguration of aircraft FMS data. In these circumstances, the
PNF would be communicating with ATC whilst the PF would be responding to any instructions from
ATC whilst reconfiguring and flying the aircraft. Notwithstanding, such eventualities are practiced and
subject to well-defined Crew Resource Management procedures that should be pre-briefed as a
potential eventuality before the approach. In this instance, although the PNF had correctly readback
the initial heading as 095°, it was likely that the PF had either misheard the clearance or had mistakenly
set 195° on the FCU instead. In discussing how this might have occurred, a Civil Airline Pilot member
suggested that there had possibly been a Crew Resource Management communication breakdown in
the cockpit. The pilots should have cross-checked the heading selected and, if there had been any
discrepancy, this would then have been resolved. Some members wondered how prepared the crew
were for the potential go-around, and whether the crew had been distracted by the increased workload.
Even when the controller had subsequently instructed the pilot to turn left immediately heading 080°
the pilot had readback heading 095°, and this hinted at a serious loss of situational awareness and lack
of assimilation of information by the A350 crew, especially given that the controller repeated the
instruction on two occasions with no further response received from the A350 crew. It was not until this
was followed by an avoiding action left turn heading 360° that the A350 crew readback the correct
information.
always a high workload situation for pilots involving aircraft reconfiguration, climb instructions, speed
control, heading changes and likely reconfiguration of aircraft FMS data. In these circumstances, the
PNF would be communicating with ATC whilst the PF would be responding to any instructions from
ATC whilst reconfiguring and flying the aircraft. Notwithstanding, such eventualities are practiced and
subject to well-defined Crew Resource Management procedures that should be pre-briefed as a
potential eventuality before the approach. In this instance, although the PNF had correctly readback
the initial heading as 095°, it was likely that the PF had either misheard the clearance or had mistakenly
set 195° on the FCU instead. In discussing how this might have occurred, a Civil Airline Pilot member
suggested that there had possibly been a Crew Resource Management communication breakdown in
the cockpit. The pilots should have cross-checked the heading selected and, if there had been any
discrepancy, this would then have been resolved. Some members wondered how prepared the crew
were for the potential go-around, and whether the crew had been distracted by the increased workload.
Even when the controller had subsequently instructed the pilot to turn left immediately heading 080°
the pilot had readback heading 095°, and this hinted at a serious loss of situational awareness and lack
of assimilation of information by the A350 crew, especially given that the controller repeated the
instruction on two occasions with no further response received from the A350 crew. It was not until this
was followed by an avoiding action left turn heading 360° that the A350 crew readback the correct
information.
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so in 100 years of aviation advances and technological leaps, even going to the moon, the one thing that hasn't moved a millimetre is...
ATC and pilots communicating verbally over radio's...
G
ATC and pilots communicating verbally over radio's...
G
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the one thing that hasn't moved a millimetre is...
ATC and pilots communicating verbally over radio's...
ATC and pilots communicating verbally over radio's...
