I see that the Airprox report was published.
https://www.airproxboard.org.uk/uplo...%202018286.pdf
Selectively quoting
Looking first at the actions of the A350 pilot, the Board noted that the need to conduct a go-around was
always a high workload situation for pilots involving aircraft reconfiguration, climb instructions, speed
control, heading changes and likely reconfiguration of aircraft FMS data. In these circumstances, the
PNF would be communicating with ATC whilst the PF would be responding to any instructions from
ATC whilst reconfiguring and flying the aircraft. Notwithstanding, such eventualities are practiced and
subject to well-defined Crew Resource Management procedures that should be pre-briefed as a
potential eventuality before the approach. In this instance, although the PNF had correctly readback
the initial heading as 095°, it was likely that the PF had either misheard the clearance or had mistakenly
set 195° on the FCU instead. In discussing how this might have occurred, a Civil Airline Pilot member
suggested that there had possibly been a Crew Resource Management communication breakdown in
the cockpit. The pilots should have cross-checked the heading selected and, if there had been any
discrepancy, this would then have been resolved. Some members wondered how prepared the crew
were for the potential go-around, and whether the crew had been distracted by the increased workload.
Even when the controller had subsequently instructed the pilot to turn left immediately heading 080°
the pilot had readback heading 095°, and this hinted at a serious loss of situational awareness and lack
of assimilation of information by the A350 crew, especially given that the controller repeated the
instruction on two occasions with no further response received from the A350 crew. It was not until this
was followed by an avoiding action left turn heading 360° that the A350 crew readback the correct
information.