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Air Niugini Aircraft crash, Truk Lagoon

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Air Niugini Aircraft crash, Truk Lagoon

Old 29th Sep 2018, 08:28
  #81 (permalink)  
 
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US Navy bodycam footage from on the wing and inside the cabin:

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Old 29th Sep 2018, 09:41
  #82 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by harrryw View Post
The NOTAM gives the PAPI as out of service.
Was the NOTAM created before or after the aircraft ended up in the water?
Could be a factor. Or maybe not.

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Old 29th Sep 2018, 10:06
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Impressed that they would enter the fuselage of the aircraft. Brave move. The video looks like the hull (its floating) is completely survivable, I hope that suggests the airline just has a manifest count problem rather than a lost pax. Strange things happen, but this looks like it should have been survivable for all on board.
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 10:12
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I was curious about the “cloud break procedure”. Which sounds like (If I may be frank) bullshite, masked as technique.
It is neither BS nor technique.

As the above extract from the approach plate shows, the 3 degree profile brings the aircraft to the MDA (420 feet) at the MAP, which is 2.2 nautical miles from the threshold. Simple maths tells us that a 3 degree profile should have the aircraft at 700 feet when 2.2 nm from the threshold. As per the dashed lines (circled on the plan form view) there is then a visual segment (provided the aircraft is visual) of almost 1 mile to intercept the 3 degree profile at about 1.3 nm from the threshold.

It is unfortunate that the profile view of the procedure suggests that the descent from the MDA to the touchdown zone is coincident with the 3 degree path. It is not. If the aircraft descended on a 3 degree path from the MAP, it would very likely land short.

I'll let the NTSB do the investigating, but just point out that such procedures are not uncommon in this part of the world.
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 10:16
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Wet and short runway with variable winds, so presumabely crew knows there is not much extra runway, and wants to touchdown maybe slightly earlier than usually. PAPIs U/S or not, water refraction creates the illusion of being high, resulting in a more shallow glidepath. Any other lights than PAPIs will strenghten the illusion even further.

Edit: Seeing the plate above, those REILs would appear to be much closer than they actually are in moderate rain.

Last edited by Pirrex; 29th Sep 2018 at 10:20. Reason: REIL
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 10:50
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Originally Posted by chimbu warrior View Post
..It is unfortunate that the profile view of the procedure suggests that the descent from the MDA to the touchdown zone is coincident with the 3 degree path. It is not. If the aircraft descended on a 3 degree path from the MAP, it would very likely land short.
Huh, I don't see any such suggestion in the way the diagram is drawn...seems blatantly obvious that 3 degrees gets you from the FAF to the MAPt and nowhere else (as you correctly point out).
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 11:08
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If you flew 3 degrees from the FAF at 1700 feet, you will not get to the 420 ft MDA before the MAP. You would reach HAMAX (MAP) at 745 ft.
If you want to increase your chances of getting visual, you have to go below the 3 degree profile to get to 420ft and fly level to the MAP or continue visually.
Hence the mention of a ‘cloud break’ procedure. Not ideal, but it’s there.
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 11:12
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I find CW's point entirely reasonable. On first glance at the chart, it would indeed appear that an extrapolated 3 degree path beyond MAP would lead to the runway, but this is misleading as the scale for the 5 & 3nm segments is changed drastically for the final 2.2 nm......
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 11:23
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Wow. That is incredible footage. Standing on a wing, going in and out of a sinking aeroplane.
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 12:56
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Cloud break procedure is a valid instrument arrival to a visual manoeuvre, just check Mt. Hagen PNG and surrounding terrain, we used the cloud break back in the late 80,s. That procedure was a let down AWAY from the runway with the visual manoeuvre back.
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 13:18
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The preference is generally for a constant descent angle approach without intermediate level offs and no driving along at the minima. Possibly the spot height at the right of the red circle necessitates having the MAP further back then normal which would require a low level segment to reach the runway.

This would require a careful briefing of the relatively non standard approach procedure. In this case I believe it would be safer to have a CDA approach to the threshold and accept the higher minima that this would entail.
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 13:53
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Originally Posted by chimbu warrior View Post




It is neither BS nor technique.

As the above extract from the approach plate shows, the 3 degree profile brings the aircraft to the MDA (420 feet) at the MAP, which is 2.2 nautical miles from the threshold. Simple maths tells us that a 3 degree profile should have the aircraft at 700 feet when 2.2 nm from the threshold. As per the dashed lines (circled on the plan form view) there is then a visual segment (provided the aircraft is visual) of almost 1 mile to intercept the 3 degree profile at about 1.3 nm from the threshold.

It is unfortunate that the profile view of the procedure suggests that the descent from the MDA to the touchdown zone is coincident with the 3 degree path. It is not. If the aircraft descended on a 3 degree path from the MAP, it would very likely land short.

I'll let the NTSB do the investigating, but just point out that such procedures are not uncommon in this part of the world.
Isn't the PNGAIC the investigation authority?
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 15:29
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Why would PNGAIC be the investigating authority? The accident didn't occur in PNG.
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 17:33
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Originally Posted by gulliBell View Post
Why would PNGAIC be the investigating authority? The accident didn't occur in PNG.
The PNGAIC, representing the State of Registry, will be entitled to appoint an accredited representative to the investigation, as will the NTSB as State of Manufacture. The investigation will be the responsibility of the State of Occurrence (Federated States of Micronesia).

AFAIK the report on the last accident in the FSM (a runway overrun at PTPN by an Asia Pacific AL B722 freighter in 2008) is still awaited, so don't hold your breath.
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 18:56
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Technically this is a CRASH....................Ditching procedures advise: Gear Up and Outvalve(s) closed plus the engines should usually detach !
Yes, 737 fwd doors will be above water level when ditching .
Well done Boeing!

Retired Boeing Engineer
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 19:13
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Originally Posted by chimbu warrior View Post




It is neither BS nor technique.

As the above extract from the approach plate shows, the 3 degree profile brings the aircraft to the MDA (420 feet) at the MAP, which is 2.2 nautical miles from the threshold. Simple maths tells us that a 3 degree profile should have the aircraft at 700 feet when 2.2 nm from the threshold. As per the dashed lines (circled on the plan form view) there is then a visual segment (provided the aircraft is visual) of almost 1 mile to intercept the 3 degree profile at about 1.3 nm from the threshold.

It is unfortunate that the profile view of the procedure suggests that the descent from the MDA to the touchdown zone is coincident with the 3 degree path. It is not. If the aircraft descended on a 3 degree path from the MAP, it would very likely land short.

I'll let the NTSB do the investigating, but just point out that such procedures are not uncommon in this part of the world.

Regarding “Cloud Break procedure” - The point I was making was this; There is no such thing in ICAO (gone) AIP, AIM or any other Instrument Approach manual or regulation. Africa and Papua are the only places that I’m aware of it remaining on approach charts. If it’s in Air Niugini manuals then I bow to your superior knowledge. What you’re describing to me is the visual segment post MDA/DDA/DA. ie. the portion of an Instrument approach where the aircraft is maneuvering to landing. It may have a level segment, it may even be a curved one (RNAV RNP 01).

Terminology

- If this RNAV GPS approach is flown to an MDA of 420 in LNAV/VNAV the missed approach is conducted at 420ft, If the runway isn’t in sight. If it is, continue and land. If a portion is flown level to intercept the (missing) PAPI or visual path then so be it.

- If flown in VS (dive and drive, or continuous descent) then in is flown to a MAP.

There is no MAP in an RNAV GPS flown in LNAV/VNAV. It’s an MDA that triggers the missed approach or Visual segment. How long have Air Niugini been doing RNAV RNP Approaches in the 73NG ?
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 20:09
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Addendum:

For what it’s worth; the only Cloud Break Procedure reference that I could find was an old NZ Advisory Circular (2012). It doesn’t appear relevant to a 737-800 on an IAP for a number of reasons. ‘Category’ would be one.



Cheers.
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 20:41
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“Cloud break procedure” as opposed to the instrument approach procedure that keeps you in cloud?
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Old 29th Sep 2018, 22:11
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IMHO and not necessarily related, I always felt dive and drive appropriate for situations where the visibility was good, base above the MDA, and especially when doing non-straight-in approach. Anytime on a straight in approach in limited visibility a CDA approach is preferable.
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Old 30th Sep 2018, 02:14
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Originally Posted by hans brinker View Post
IMHO and not necessarily related, I always felt dive and drive appropriate for situations where the visibility was good, base above the MDA, and especially when doing non-straight-in approach. Anytime on a straight in approach in limited visibility a CDA approach is preferable.
Dive and Drive places the operation at risk of making a single sequencing error for a crossing height. Recall Katmandu's first Airbus accident etc, or Asianas loss in SW S Korea. A single error places you at high risk. Flying a continuous descent with an FMC giving VNAV guidance is generally much safer, In this particular approach however, if the FMC NDB throws up a fix height of the reduced minima at the MAP, then there is a potential for an unstabilised approach to result from that. Notwithstanding that setup, the crew are obliged to have visual reference at the MMA on a CDFA approach, and in this case would be required to have sufficient visibility to see the runway end. The evidence of the submerged aircraft hints that all was not well from that respect, or the crew were working on their seaplane ratings. If windshear wasn't involved, then the whole question of compliance with procedures will be the main center of investigation.

The pax are paying for the flight to be done in accordance with the procedures. If the procedures end up with diversions, that is what it is supposed to be. Making up rules as you go along is great until the wheels fall off the wagon, and people who are paying for a particular standard get left with the result. Normalisation of deviation hurts the flight crew as much as anyone else. They believe they are doing the right thing, and may accept deviations as they are achieving the outcome that the company wants from a short game commercial perspective. Playing the odds however will prove statistics in the end.

I hope that the data finds there was something else going on here, I really do, but cases of planes missing the airport is pretty untidy. Extenuating circumstances should include the design of the approach in this case, but once you go below MDA/DA, then the rest is up to the integrity of the flight crew complying with the requirements to continue a descent below MMA.

This is not meant as a criticism of the particular flight crew in this event, it is a sad lament on the number of events of this type that keep on keeping on, and which indicate that there is a level of normalisation that we as a collective group appear to not be mitigating fully. It is also not a regional or specific concern, it happens in Europe, in Indonesia, with a Canadian carrier in the Caribbean, and sundry other locations. Years ago, I pax'ed on a U.S. airline from LAX to YVR, a Boeing 3 holer, and we landed there in CAT IIIB conditions. I asked the crew afterwards when was their equipment upgraded to do such procedures, and they said it wasn't. Years later, at an airport that is only CAT I, in weather that was certainly CAT III, the aircraft that we were going to operate out, arrived. It was the only aircraft that did that morning, and they system just shrugged it's shoulders. Non compliance is a universal human trait.

The investigating bodies invariably allocate causation to "Pilot Error", I dispute that is really the basic cause; the pilots do not go out there intending to erroneously break the rules, the rules are being bent by the collective and the normalisation is resulting in the odd wild ride. We have seen one of these recently where the pilot's cognitive ability appears to have been impaired through emotional disruption, but otherwise, healthy crews have driven tubes carrying punters into the brine.

Descending towards water below minima without a runway threshold somewhere in the near future is not a perception error, either there is a runway out there that you are looking at a specific aiming point on, or there is not. Wave tops are poor aiming points.

A carrier if interested in ceasing non compliance could do so within days, but would be fighting the unions to do that, and I suspect that the status quo works out reasonably well for the airlines, their pax more often than not get to destination in these events with little or no awareness of the risks involved.

We can stop these events happening, but only if the profession acknowledges that the problem is us, and gets serious about ceasing the practice. I doubt that we have the will or interest in doing so, we naturally assume that the guys/girls who will get caught out are different to us, we do it better etc....

Last edited by fdr; 30th Sep 2018 at 03:13.
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