UPS contract plane off runway - KCRW
The weird thing is that the viz and cloud base look well good enough to see perfectly clearly that it was all wrong; so why press on with what is clearly a disastrous approach? A death wish?
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It is nice to see that phone SMS is now part of NTSBs tools, what is next, my old post cards and love letters.
I do appreciate that in this case without CVR and FDR and a crew that was a ultra incompetent in a company run like a 1970s bush operation , the NTSB would turn every stone.
I do appreciate that in this case without CVR and FDR and a crew that was a ultra incompetent in a company run like a 1970s bush operation , the NTSB would turn every stone.
Back to the point, cowboys do still seem to be out there. The part from the NTSB docket cited by Airbubba may indicate some issues within the carrier. They may not have been system-wide but it would appear some individuals probably deserved some special attention. If the Captain had indeed failed some check rides, that raises some questions which will hopefully be answered when the final report is issued.
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
If you don't want the NTSB to look at your social media postings (post mortem), you might want to reconsider your choice of employment.
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The messages did show that the captain had issues getting enough sleep in the recent past, that he improvised poorly, that he "does not like to be in IMC", and tended to bank hard and lose a lot of altitude. From the investigation, I think we can safely conclude that he had sufficient rest at the time of the accident.
The FO did stand up to the him on one occasion, after one week he had her fly every leg so that he could get some sleep. On Thursday, she told him off, and on Friday, he gave her a "good job" plaque.
So, here's the problem. You've got an outfit with about 20 aircraft, 20 captains and 20 FOs stationed at 20 airfields. This is the FO's first job, and it's also clear from her texts that any action she took would likely result in her moving. Both she and the Captain seemed to have SOs in the area.
In late February, she texted this about talking to the chief pilot: "He asked me if [the captain’s] gotten any better and I'm like ummm..he can fly in VFR..lol"
So, like it or not, her SMS history paints a picture of her job and of the captain, that frankly explains how someone would not want to go around (and back to IMC), misjudge the approach on a downsloping tabletop runway early in the morning, bank for the final, and drop it hard.
If you expect a low-hours FO to stand up to a bush league captain, who is sixteen years her senior and two-and-a-half times her weight, well she did, just probably not in time in that dive for the field. Did she say something to the CP? Yes, just not necessarily clear enough that this guy was a danger to himself and others? Well, how much experience did she have? Normalization of deviance, etc. How much are you willing to say, "It's not so bad. He made it to age 47. Just another year of this and I'll have 1500 hours."?
The FO did stand up to the him on one occasion, after one week he had her fly every leg so that he could get some sleep. On Thursday, she told him off, and on Friday, he gave her a "good job" plaque.
So, here's the problem. You've got an outfit with about 20 aircraft, 20 captains and 20 FOs stationed at 20 airfields. This is the FO's first job, and it's also clear from her texts that any action she took would likely result in her moving. Both she and the Captain seemed to have SOs in the area.
In late February, she texted this about talking to the chief pilot: "He asked me if [the captain’s] gotten any better and I'm like ummm..he can fly in VFR..lol"
So, like it or not, her SMS history paints a picture of her job and of the captain, that frankly explains how someone would not want to go around (and back to IMC), misjudge the approach on a downsloping tabletop runway early in the morning, bank for the final, and drop it hard.
If you expect a low-hours FO to stand up to a bush league captain, who is sixteen years her senior and two-and-a-half times her weight, well she did, just probably not in time in that dive for the field. Did she say something to the CP? Yes, just not necessarily clear enough that this guy was a danger to himself and others? Well, how much experience did she have? Normalization of deviance, etc. How much are you willing to say, "It's not so bad. He made it to age 47. Just another year of this and I'll have 1500 hours."?
What an horrendous accident. What the hell was the Captain thinking and doing????????? The visibility and conditions seem perfectly OK for a normal approach and landing, how on earth did he manage to get so far out of shape? Incapacitation, unrecognised ADI failure?
What about company SOPs for stable approaches? Where there any??
Secondly, I’m sorry, I am going to sound very old fashioned here but I cannot believe that anyone - even a 600 hour rookie - thinks it is acceptable and prudent to send text messages while airborne as a pilot of an aircraft, especially when flying a non-autopilot aircraft as PF, and while the other crew member is taking ‘controlled rest’* !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Why was her phone even switched on during flight?
To those who say this F/O should have said something and taken control; yes, of course she should, but I ask this: F/Os are told they must step in and take control, but what training is given to F/O’s about how to actually do this? Conflict management needs to be actually taught, it is no good just putting everyone through CRM training** and ticking their attendance record. Not every one is comfortable or even able to stand up to an aggressive person - especially if the Captain is a gruff, uncommunicative “gear up shut up” type and/or the F/O is perhaps towards the meeker end of the spectrum. Not everyone has had the life experience of facing down bullies in bars etc.
*Yes, I know it wasn’t really ‘controlled rest’, I am being charitable here.
**CRM training usually consists of a morning in a classroom watching some powerpoint presentations and answering questions such as “What is CRM?”, while most in the room are trying to get finished and go home as soon as possible. On more than one occasion I have heard attendees say ‘don’t ask any questions, we want to get this finished ASAP and beat the traffic to get home’. And those difficult Captains who most need to learn about CRM mysteriously never seem to be on these courses. I have never seen any practical training given in conflict management or how to deal with a difficult Captain.
What about company SOPs for stable approaches? Where there any??
Secondly, I’m sorry, I am going to sound very old fashioned here but I cannot believe that anyone - even a 600 hour rookie - thinks it is acceptable and prudent to send text messages while airborne as a pilot of an aircraft, especially when flying a non-autopilot aircraft as PF, and while the other crew member is taking ‘controlled rest’* !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Why was her phone even switched on during flight?
To those who say this F/O should have said something and taken control; yes, of course she should, but I ask this: F/Os are told they must step in and take control, but what training is given to F/O’s about how to actually do this? Conflict management needs to be actually taught, it is no good just putting everyone through CRM training** and ticking their attendance record. Not every one is comfortable or even able to stand up to an aggressive person - especially if the Captain is a gruff, uncommunicative “gear up shut up” type and/or the F/O is perhaps towards the meeker end of the spectrum. Not everyone has had the life experience of facing down bullies in bars etc.
*Yes, I know it wasn’t really ‘controlled rest’, I am being charitable here.
**CRM training usually consists of a morning in a classroom watching some powerpoint presentations and answering questions such as “What is CRM?”, while most in the room are trying to get finished and go home as soon as possible. On more than one occasion I have heard attendees say ‘don’t ask any questions, we want to get this finished ASAP and beat the traffic to get home’. And those difficult Captains who most need to learn about CRM mysteriously never seem to be on these courses. I have never seen any practical training given in conflict management or how to deal with a difficult Captain.
Last edited by Uplinker; 10th Jun 2018 at 11:47.
"Mildly" Eccentric Stardriver
Things change. When I was flying I always made a point to the FO that he/she was the check against me getting it wrong. "If you don't like what I'm doing, say so. I'll either explain to you why, to your satisfaction, or we stay on the ground/ abandon the approach until we are both happy".
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That is how it should be, of course. CRM and MCC. But after decades of including this in initial training, simulators and ground courses, things have not become much better. And they may get worse. An FO with 2000 hours may have the confidence to doubt the captain but hardly an FO with 200 hours.
"Mildly" Eccentric Stardriver
svhar. Exactly why I made my point. We were both learning. the F.O. because they had an awful lot to learn, me because "the more you know, the more you know you don't know". Not quite Rumsfeld, but you get what I mean.
@Herod, you were obviously one of the good guys: the sort that when you see their name as you check in you smile and think, fantastic! he is a nice guy and it will be a good day. The majority of pilots I fly with are good guys/gals, (and one trainer who taught me really was an actual sky god - a terrific bloke), but there are the occasional idiots with an inflated ego and sense of self importance.
They are reducing in numbers now, but there were too many Captains who thought they were a sky god. Not realising that the only reason the entire crew, the ground staff, the fueller, the dispatcher, Operations, passengers etc, etc, appeared to respect them and look up to them was not because they were actually a sky god*, (or even good pilots), but that legally they are responsible for the flight, so their decision is final.
*(they were/are in fact annoying little twats, who if they were not my boss and they behaved liked that in a bar, would get punched).
They are reducing in numbers now, but there were too many Captains who thought they were a sky god. Not realising that the only reason the entire crew, the ground staff, the fueller, the dispatcher, Operations, passengers etc, etc, appeared to respect them and look up to them was not because they were actually a sky god*, (or even good pilots), but that legally they are responsible for the flight, so their decision is final.
*(they were/are in fact annoying little twats, who if they were not my boss and they behaved liked that in a bar, would get punched).
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I recall the NTSB was able to determine probable cause in a California train crash several years ago based on the engineer's use of his smart phone.
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Aterpster
Yes , lets use the word inappropriate and not immoral or illegal, just for arguments sake.
As I wrote, in this case , without CVR or FDR or personal OFDM as we have, I can see the exception.
But I am strongly against flightdeck Video, more then 2 hrs CVR and personalized OFDM.
It is abused by some company's.
I do not like CCTVs and NSA et Al being able to suck out any info from anyone. The world does not become any safer by these devices on a general basis, what we need is less nutters and more people in government. Clearly demonstrated in Canada yesterday and in Singapore on Tuesday.
And on a specific case like this, it is clear that FAA did not have proper control over this Company and its somewhat strange structure and minimalist approach to Ops Training and Safety. The SMS messages did confirm that both were not up to standard, that I have to admit. It is clear to me that it is the Company and FAA that failed here, no need for reading SMS, big need for Auditing and a better model for this kind of Ops.
But , looking at the postings her , Post Mortem, I suppose more the one of us would loose our medical and command, retroactively , if taken seriously at all postings.
No one will ever get my phone , as there will never be any need.
Happy Flying
As I wrote, in this case , without CVR or FDR or personal OFDM as we have, I can see the exception.
But I am strongly against flightdeck Video, more then 2 hrs CVR and personalized OFDM.
It is abused by some company's.
I do not like CCTVs and NSA et Al being able to suck out any info from anyone. The world does not become any safer by these devices on a general basis, what we need is less nutters and more people in government. Clearly demonstrated in Canada yesterday and in Singapore on Tuesday.
And on a specific case like this, it is clear that FAA did not have proper control over this Company and its somewhat strange structure and minimalist approach to Ops Training and Safety. The SMS messages did confirm that both were not up to standard, that I have to admit. It is clear to me that it is the Company and FAA that failed here, no need for reading SMS, big need for Auditing and a better model for this kind of Ops.
But , looking at the postings her , Post Mortem, I suppose more the one of us would loose our medical and command, retroactively , if taken seriously at all postings.
No one will ever get my phone , as there will never be any need.
Happy Flying
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From the NTSB Aviation Accident Final Report:
According to data from the captain's CPAP machine, he used the machine between about 0659 and 1630. Data from the first officer's personal electronic devices (PED) indicated activity about 1755. The flight crew departed CRW for SDF about 2302.
The flight crew arrived at SDF about 0025 on May 3. They departed SDF about 0450 and arrived at CRW about 0549. The captain's CPAP machine showed use from 0654 until 1242 and his PED records showed an outgoing text message about 0715. PED records for the first officer indicated activity from 1711 to about 1800. The flight crew departed CRW for SDF about 2302.
The flight crew arrived at SDF about 1206 on May 4. They departed SDF about 0528 on a return flight to CRW, arriving about 0637. The captain's CPAP showed use from 0712 to 1511. He cooked dinner for his girlfriend that night and met her around 1900. He got ready for work around 2100. The first officer's PED records showed an outgoing text message about 1330. She talked to her brother from 1658 to 1838, cooked dinner, then talked to her brother again.
The flight crew arrived at SDF about 0025 on May 3. They departed SDF about 0450 and arrived at CRW about 0549. The captain's CPAP machine showed use from 0654 until 1242 and his PED records showed an outgoing text message about 0715. PED records for the first officer indicated activity from 1711 to about 1800. The flight crew departed CRW for SDF about 2302.
The flight crew arrived at SDF about 1206 on May 4. They departed SDF about 0528 on a return flight to CRW, arriving about 0637. The captain's CPAP showed use from 0712 to 1511. He cooked dinner for his girlfriend that night and met her around 1900. He got ready for work around 2100. The first officer's PED records showed an outgoing text message about 1330. She talked to her brother from 1658 to 1838, cooked dinner, then talked to her brother again.
Probable Cause and Findings
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
the flight crew's improper decision to conduct a circling approach contrary to the operator's standard operating procedures (SOP) and the captain's excessive descent rate and maneuvering during the approach, which led to inadvertent, uncontrolled contact with the ground. Contributing to the accident was the operator's lack of a formal safety and oversight program to assess hazards and compliance with SOPs and to monitor pilots with previous performance issues.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
the flight crew's improper decision to conduct a circling approach contrary to the operator's standard operating procedures (SOP) and the captain's excessive descent rate and maneuvering during the approach, which led to inadvertent, uncontrolled contact with the ground. Contributing to the accident was the operator's lack of a formal safety and oversight program to assess hazards and compliance with SOPs and to monitor pilots with previous performance issues.
https://t.co/t7ImyP4PFT
