B-738 Crash in Russia Rostov-on-Don
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You obviously don't fly to (or over!) CIS or China then. Winds are always reported in mps and this is well understood by crews who operate in these areas (including the unfortunate FZ crew). Converting from mps to kts is a non-event and requires no mental capacity, just multiply value in mps by 2 to get kts.
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Just listening to truncated 9 minute audio is fatigue inducing. One has to appreciate aircrew holding two hours patiently in addition to unknown numbers of hours they already put in on that day.
RIP.
RIP.
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Been a few accidents in the past with aircraft holding for long periods in Icing conditions then when back to approach speeds have stalled. Lets hope this is not the case.
As far as I am aware all holding should be done in the clean configuration, no flap in the 73 for this reason.
I haven't looked at the Wx at the time..... Just putting it out there
As far as I am aware all holding should be done in the clean configuration, no flap in the 73 for this reason.
I haven't looked at the Wx at the time..... Just putting it out there
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or is it entirely the prerogative of the pilot?
Has anyone thought that maybe, just maybe during the second missed approach with a high body angle one Engine flamed out from fuel exhaustion from low fuel qty in that main tank? They were holding for quite a while. When it flamed out, the other one at high thrust, high nose attitude....... speed fell below VMCA.......stalled spun in......
It's possible......
It's possible......
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As far as icing is concerned, I was under the impression that the aircraft had been holding at FL150. I suspect given the weather in that area at the time, this was in clear air. There has also been speculation as to why the crew requested a climb to FL80 after the missed approach, and I would also suspect that this is related to a suitable level of clear air and to facilitate a subsequent diversion.
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@ACMS
It was posted very early in the thread that they had around 8.5 hours endurance and the accident happened around 6 hours into the flight. They still had 2.5 hours worth of fuel left as per the above figures.
It was posted very early in the thread that they had around 8.5 hours endurance and the accident happened around 6 hours into the flight. They still had 2.5 hours worth of fuel left as per the above figures.
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This is clearly a botched G/A into a stall.
The Tatarstan Boeing 737-500 which crashed at Kazan accident will be much closer to what happened in this accident. In that accident, MAK could only suggest the possibility of a push into a dive caused by Somatogravic Illusion, because the CVR was inoperative. I suspect we will have an operable CVR which may this time confirm an instance of Somatogravic Illusion.
The Somatogravic Illusion is a complicated sounding name, but all it really means is that linear acceleration can fool you into thinking you are pitching up when you are actually pitching over into a dive. If you pull up too steeply on the initial go around and need to pitch over a bit to maintain airspeed, you must use your attitude indicator to make the adjustment. If you get behind the aircraft and unconsciously start flying by the seat of your pants, you can get yourself in trouble very quickly. Modern twin jets are capable of pretty good acceleration rates, especially when light. More than enough to cause that Somatogravic Illusion effect in an unsuspecting aircrew.
To those professional pilots who have a good understanding of the pitfalls of hand flying, I apologize for the fundamental nature of the above paragraph, but I feel it is necessary to write to the LCD (Lowest Common Denominator) in the current situation.
As to why the crew was able to execute a safe GA on the first approach and failed to do so on the second, it is probable that the Go Arounds were just done differently.
What have we got so far in terms of evidence, taking in into account the source/reliability?
* The weather wasn’t great but not limiting in terms of surface conditions
* Two approaches were made, with a period of extended holding between them
* Two missed approaches were flown, both from >1,000’ AGL
* Fuel quantity does not appear to be an issue
* No urgency/distress calls were given
* Up to and including the last RT exchange, communications appeared normal
* During the first part of the final missed approach, speed and altitude increase
* After getting to c. 4,000’, speed carries on increasing but altitude decreases rapidly
* The final descent to impact is short, in the region of 10s
As the FDRs have been recovered it shouldn’t be too long until there are accurate figures, assuming they are readable. At the moment we only have the FR24 data, which although should not be taken as gospel, is at least internally consistent. As it’s all we’ve got to go on, it shows in speed vs. altitude pretty much what you would expect from a GA flown with TOGA thrust, right up to the moment it starts a rapid descent. It doesn’t show the speed -> altitude trade and excessive RoC that you’d expect from a pitch excursion. Also, the extrapolated speeds appear to be well removed from unaccelerated stall speeds, in any configuration.
All in all, a bit puzzling at the moment. Why did they GA approaching 1,000’? Could be as simple as they did not make their SAC or there was a WS caution/warning. Whatever was happening, they obviously didn’t like it so threw it away before getting any closer to the ground. Something happened during the missed approach that turned a 4,000fpm climb into a 10,000fpm+ descent within seconds, if the trace is to be believed. Very odd...
* The weather wasn’t great but not limiting in terms of surface conditions
* Two approaches were made, with a period of extended holding between them
* Two missed approaches were flown, both from >1,000’ AGL
* Fuel quantity does not appear to be an issue
* No urgency/distress calls were given
* Up to and including the last RT exchange, communications appeared normal
* During the first part of the final missed approach, speed and altitude increase
* After getting to c. 4,000’, speed carries on increasing but altitude decreases rapidly
* The final descent to impact is short, in the region of 10s
As the FDRs have been recovered it shouldn’t be too long until there are accurate figures, assuming they are readable. At the moment we only have the FR24 data, which although should not be taken as gospel, is at least internally consistent. As it’s all we’ve got to go on, it shows in speed vs. altitude pretty much what you would expect from a GA flown with TOGA thrust, right up to the moment it starts a rapid descent. It doesn’t show the speed -> altitude trade and excessive RoC that you’d expect from a pitch excursion. Also, the extrapolated speeds appear to be well removed from unaccelerated stall speeds, in any configuration.
All in all, a bit puzzling at the moment. Why did they GA approaching 1,000’? Could be as simple as they did not make their SAC or there was a WS caution/warning. Whatever was happening, they obviously didn’t like it so threw it away before getting any closer to the ground. Something happened during the missed approach that turned a 4,000fpm climb into a 10,000fpm+ descent within seconds, if the trace is to be believed. Very odd...
I always brief the go around actions with the other pilot if I'm ever in doubt that we may need to go missed in bad weather. What I mean by actions, is what we as a crew are going to physically do interns of reconfiguring the aeroplane, additional to the turn at ****, climb to ****. I've nearly killed myself twice by botching up missed approaches when I once flew in single pilot ops.
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Originally Posted by DP
I've nearly killed myself twice by botching up missed approaches when I once flew in single pilot ops.
Scared the luv'n shite out of myself. Bought the F/O a steak dinner at Morton's for that eff up.
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As far as icing is concerned, I was under the impression that the aircraft had been holding at FL150. I suspect given the weather in that area at the time, this was in clear air. There has also been speculation as to why the crew requested a climb to FL80 after the missed approach, and I would also suspect that this is related to a suitable level of clear air and to facilitate a subsequent diversion.
Satellit Top Alarm-Bild vom 19.03.2016, 01:45 Uhr - Ukraine | Wetter von kachelmann.
The Somatogravic Illusion is a complicated sounding name, but all it really means is that linear acceleration can fool you into thinking you are pitching up when you are actually pitching over into a dive. If you pull up too steeply on the initial go around and need to pitch over a bit to maintain airspeed, you must use your attitude indicator to make the adjustment. If you get behind the aircraft and unconsciously start flying by the seat of your pants, you can get yourself in trouble very quickly. Modern twin jets are capable of pretty good acceleration rates, especially when light. More than enough to cause that Somatogravic Illusion effect in an unsuspecting aircrew.
Often the sort of airline transport crashes we are seeing where an IMC go-around has turned into a steep climb followed by a stall and dive into the ground, turn out in the end to be nothing more than poor instrument flying ability by the pilot.
Somatogravic Illusions are often used as the catch-all excuse for crashes like these because it's hard to believe there are airline pilots out there simply cannot fly on instruments when most of their career has been watching an autopilot do its work.
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There was no such thing as a cell. It is not summer. There was no thunderstorm. It was just an average wintry crap weather which happens at 100 places every day in this time of the year.
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Satellit Top Alarm-Bild vom 19.03.2016, 01:45 Uhr - Ukraine | Wetter von kachelmann.
Last edited by weatherdude; 20th Mar 2016 at 09:01. Reason: Typo
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I'm struggling to understand why he was hand flying it, surely at 1500ft the autopilot would still be engaged? And therefore the GA would be flown via the autopilot too. It's a dark and stormy night, not a time to exercising your hand flying skills.
Or are all GAs on the B737 hand flown?
Or are all GAs on the B737 hand flown?
