Asiana runway excursion in Hiroshima
Join Date: Jan 2012
Location: Not in a Bus
Posts: 325
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Asia Bad ..... Non-Asia Good?
Anyone else get a bit sick of the ubiquitous assertion that every person coming from the red zone, flying in the red zone, or every airline within the red zone is poorly trained, poorly skilled etc etc, whilst the opposite allegedly goes for the outside? I'd be tickled to see a survey on where many of these posters even believe "AZEA" is "AT".
Never let the truth get in the way of a good story Huh?
Slast, stop misquoting me. I said there may no longer be any need when a CDFA is being flown by the AP.
I even said:
which, I assume you realise, is a MA.
I even said:
Certainly, when the approach itself was high-workload, it made sense to have the FO concentrating on it while the Captain monitored him/her until a few hundred above then started looking out in anticipation of taking over or ordering the GA.
Never let the truth get in the way of a good story Huh?
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2698.pdf
After two recent NPAs in marginal visibility which have ended in spectacular undershoots, one has to wonder what the view out of the front was like in the last 30s or so of the approach. It would appear in both accidents that there was no vertical guidance visible as it would have been of the “four reds” variety, which one hopes would have prompted action.
In both cases, it would appear that any internal VG would have been from whatever modes were being used for a raw data approach as opposed to a path from an RNAV one or precision from an ILS, therefore not necessarily coinciding with the touchdown point. If the FDs were still on, that is a powerful distraction.
It also appears from the plates that there was a CAT III ILS onto the opposite runway, which would have been more appropriate for the weather conditions prevailing (assuming it was serviceable - it isn’t now...
).
I’m starting to think that the best solution would be to replace all NPAs with RNAV ones. Some operators might have to retrofit GPS but that’s cheap compared with a write-off...
In both cases, it would appear that any internal VG would have been from whatever modes were being used for a raw data approach as opposed to a path from an RNAV one or precision from an ILS, therefore not necessarily coinciding with the touchdown point. If the FDs were still on, that is a powerful distraction.
It also appears from the plates that there was a CAT III ILS onto the opposite runway, which would have been more appropriate for the weather conditions prevailing (assuming it was serviceable - it isn’t now...
).I’m starting to think that the best solution would be to replace all NPAs with RNAV ones. Some operators might have to retrofit GPS but that’s cheap compared with a write-off...
CapnBloggs, apologies, I did not mean to misrepresent you.
I interpreted your comment as meaning that "now" (i.e. in 2015), the use of monitored approaches has become irrelevant because the technical capability exists to use an autopilot and a CDFA. That is a commonly asserted position, but one with which I strongly disagree.
The technology developed since the 1970s has made the very lowest visibility landings extremely safe, and potentially could remove a lot of these accidents where there was little if any vertical guidance, but there are many other aspects (e.g. monitoring breakdowns - "the co-pilot's dilemma" - and overall approach management) where using the monitored approach procedure would make operations a lot safer.
I interpreted your comment as meaning that "now" (i.e. in 2015), the use of monitored approaches has become irrelevant because the technical capability exists to use an autopilot and a CDFA. That is a commonly asserted position, but one with which I strongly disagree.
The technology developed since the 1970s has made the very lowest visibility landings extremely safe, and potentially could remove a lot of these accidents where there was little if any vertical guidance, but there are many other aspects (e.g. monitoring breakdowns - "the co-pilot's dilemma" - and overall approach management) where using the monitored approach procedure would make operations a lot safer.
Join Date: Sep 2014
Location: Canada
Posts: 1,257
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
slast:
1. In a modern airliner conducting low-visibility autoland operations, there is already double monitoring to prevent such issues. The PF monitors autoland sequences all the way to landing and rollout. The PM provides an independent, second level of monitoring and decision making.
Since both pilots are already monitoring, there is no need for them to switch roles between PF and PM at DH. In fact PMA might add risk: by taking away both pilots' concentration from monitoring to role switching, at a critical moment.
2. In a modern airliner conducting low-visibility ops using HUD/EVS, there is no inside-outside transition at DH, and so again role-switching at low altitude brings no value to the table.
Let's not do PMA just for the sake of doing it. It doesn't make sense to "force" the use of PMA where it's no longer applicable.
Now, there are a lot of ops (especially regionals) flying equipment with neither autoland nor HUD. For them I agree PMA or a variation of it should be the norm. And in the US at least, this is the case.
1. In a modern airliner conducting low-visibility autoland operations, there is already double monitoring to prevent such issues. The PF monitors autoland sequences all the way to landing and rollout. The PM provides an independent, second level of monitoring and decision making.
Since both pilots are already monitoring, there is no need for them to switch roles between PF and PM at DH. In fact PMA might add risk: by taking away both pilots' concentration from monitoring to role switching, at a critical moment.
2. In a modern airliner conducting low-visibility ops using HUD/EVS, there is no inside-outside transition at DH, and so again role-switching at low altitude brings no value to the table.
Let's not do PMA just for the sake of doing it. It doesn't make sense to "force" the use of PMA where it's no longer applicable.
Now, there are a lot of ops (especially regionals) flying equipment with neither autoland nor HUD. For them I agree PMA or a variation of it should be the norm. And in the US at least, this is the case.
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: nowhere
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Remove these so-called EUR countries and all fatal accidents in the report are removed. But this is the UN so they must know the facts.
Originally Posted by Slast
I interpreted your comment as meaning that "now" (i.e. in 2015), the use of monitored approaches has become irrelevant because the technical capability exists to use an autopilot and a CDFA. That is a commonly asserted position, but one with which I strongly disagree.
technical capability exists to use an autopilot and a CDFA
The Handover/Takeover very close to the ground is undesirable. I've done it; grabbing the controls and the throttles and getting a feel of what is going on, potentially with manoeuvring required to line it up/decrab, is not ideal.
So the question has to be asked, why are we doing monitored approaches? It's because we don't want the PF, working hard concentrating on the instruments, suddenly looking up at the Minimum and trying to spot the runway. But nowadays, the PF isn't doing that; the AP and ATS is doing it (assuming VNAV and Lateral-mode tracking). And with the emphasis on CDFAs, the aeroplane is already "in the slot". In this case, I agree with Peekay4; both monitor the AP, the PF starts looking approaching the minima, the autocall calls at the mimima (or the PNF does if Hal misses it) and the PF either pickles off the autopilot and lands on the runway he can already see or if he can't hits the GA buttons and off they go. Simple.
I don't have the time or the inclination to go through that complete website; after reading a few pages, to be honest, I think it is a bit sus. If you have a list of recent accidents (post 1980) that have been caused by the non-use of the MA procedure then please post them.
Or, we shall have to agree to disagree.
Monitored Approach [Archive] - PPRuNe Forums
The Handover/Takeover very close to the ground is undesirable. I've done it; grabbing the controls and the throttles and getting a feel of what is going on, potentially with manoeuvring required to line it up/decrab, is not ideal.
For me one of the biggest advantages of the MA is that if the PM has not taken over by DA the PF automatically initiates a Go Around.
Join Date: May 2015
Location: NYC
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There's a lot more at play here. I've lived in Asiana country, and I can tell you that there is a totally different conception of thinking about binary decision making, directions and just generally.
Everything in society is about appearance. Grown men will constantly groom themselves - especially their hair - in elevators, even in the presence of business partners or competitors. Even subway stations have full length mirrors everywhere. Appearance - suit, shoes, hair, skin (men wear makeup just to fit in within the business world), teeth - is routinely looked at something just as important as everything else when in the west, it's not nearly as important. So there is a lot of energy being spent on something that it shouldn't be.
Then you have the way of communication and thinking. You ask someone for directions and they really do not think in the same way a westerner does. It's a very different way of thinking. Go there for a holiday and try it sometime.
Then there is yes/no. First, everything there is thought of in shades of grey. Often where the answer should be no, people will say yes, then a few seconds later if you ask them again, no. It can be quite a shock. The way I think about it, if the answer isn't yes, it should be no. Have you or have you not done XYZ/ Does the state of XYZ exist or not? Answer should never be "yes, uh, no". That's what could cause hull losses and deaths. They aren't thinking like a westerner. They don't focus on the words. Instead, I feel that they are focusing on the bigger picture - not the question being asked. That's actually a cultural strength (?), but in the context of flying a plane or performing surgery or making a series of binary decisions, it's not a strength at all. There's the other issue of language, and they will frequently answer "Yes, I would not like to eat/drink/do XYZ", when they mean "No, I would not like to eat/drink/do XYZ", which is another problem.
I'm calling it how it is after 30 + years of observation and travel there, and they aren't the only ones in that part of the world to do it, but seem to be very good at doing it their way. Everyone's unique, but it's still a shock sometimes when I travel there.
Everything in society is about appearance. Grown men will constantly groom themselves - especially their hair - in elevators, even in the presence of business partners or competitors. Even subway stations have full length mirrors everywhere. Appearance - suit, shoes, hair, skin (men wear makeup just to fit in within the business world), teeth - is routinely looked at something just as important as everything else when in the west, it's not nearly as important. So there is a lot of energy being spent on something that it shouldn't be.
Then you have the way of communication and thinking. You ask someone for directions and they really do not think in the same way a westerner does. It's a very different way of thinking. Go there for a holiday and try it sometime.
Then there is yes/no. First, everything there is thought of in shades of grey. Often where the answer should be no, people will say yes, then a few seconds later if you ask them again, no. It can be quite a shock. The way I think about it, if the answer isn't yes, it should be no. Have you or have you not done XYZ/ Does the state of XYZ exist or not? Answer should never be "yes, uh, no". That's what could cause hull losses and deaths. They aren't thinking like a westerner. They don't focus on the words. Instead, I feel that they are focusing on the bigger picture - not the question being asked. That's actually a cultural strength (?), but in the context of flying a plane or performing surgery or making a series of binary decisions, it's not a strength at all. There's the other issue of language, and they will frequently answer "Yes, I would not like to eat/drink/do XYZ", when they mean "No, I would not like to eat/drink/do XYZ", which is another problem.
I'm calling it how it is after 30 + years of observation and travel there, and they aren't the only ones in that part of the world to do it, but seem to be very good at doing it their way. Everyone's unique, but it's still a shock sometimes when I travel there.
Join Date: Aug 2011
Location: A hemisphere
Posts: 184
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
both pilots were from the same culture. I can not see this to be a contributing factor in this incident
Join Date: Aug 2014
Location: Kemi,Finland
Age: 69
Posts: 68
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In the good old days they built wooden expendables into airplanes,thus diminishing the risks of pilots wrecking the whole kite by mishandling. So perhaps Airbus might want to think again the philosophy of just selling our product,and trusting the training elsewhere being the same standard,what these complex airplanes do require. Manufacturer is always involved when their product is used. There should not be any playgound in here,because any accident has an affect on us all. Even to retired,who still want to know.
Join Date: May 2004
Location: 3.5 from TD
Age: 47
Posts: 1,042
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Was amazed by how little media coverage this accident got. Especially considering that it wasn't that long ago that Asiana had a very similar crash, the 777 in SFO.
Same thing with the Turkish crash. As hard as I looked, I did not see it even mentioned in the BBC here in Hong Kong. Neither crash has gotten any media coverage.
I know none resulted in loss of life, but they were still both very lucky they didn't.
Same thing with the Turkish crash. As hard as I looked, I did not see it even mentioned in the BBC here in Hong Kong. Neither crash has gotten any media coverage.
I know none resulted in loss of life, but they were still both very lucky they didn't.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: what U.S. calls ´old Europe´
Posts: 941
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Well, the media is the media... It is about sensations, not information. They want to sell, not to inform.
When I get really worried is, if such incidents do also not receive a full accident investigation. The budget of most investigators is so restricted these days, that we may just see a "factual report" of some 10-20 pages with just the usual safety recommendations we have read so many times before.
It probably is not just luck which preventet fatalities, it is the crashworthiness design of the aircraft, but that should be analyzed in depth after such accidents, because there is still so much to learn what works perfectly, and what is indeed just luck and should be improved. We can never do enough crash tests to cover all likely scenario, so such accidents are extremely valuable to get as much information for future design as possible.
I expect a little more from the Japanese here than from the Turkish for the other incident.
When I get really worried is, if such incidents do also not receive a full accident investigation. The budget of most investigators is so restricted these days, that we may just see a "factual report" of some 10-20 pages with just the usual safety recommendations we have read so many times before.
It probably is not just luck which preventet fatalities, it is the crashworthiness design of the aircraft, but that should be analyzed in depth after such accidents, because there is still so much to learn what works perfectly, and what is indeed just luck and should be improved. We can never do enough crash tests to cover all likely scenario, so such accidents are extremely valuable to get as much information for future design as possible.
I expect a little more from the Japanese here than from the Turkish for the other incident.
Join Date: Nov 2008
Location: Flyin' low and feeling mean
Posts: 194
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
From Flight Global -
Crashed Asiana A320 drifted below glidepath in low visibility
By: DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW
Japanese investigators have indicated that an Asiana Airlines Airbus A320 began to deviate from its descent path shortly after its autopilot was disengaged, before it collided with the localiser antenna at Hiroshima.
The A320 had been conducting the area navigation (RNAV) approach to runway 28 on 14 April.
It hit an approach light at a height of 4m before carving through the antenna. Flight OZ162 subsequently veered off the runway, suffering substantial airframe damage.
Preliminary findings by the Japan Transport Safety Board show that weather conditions were not ideal, with light rain and fog reducing visibility on the runway to 300m in places.
The aircraft passed the final approach fix at a height of just above 3,000ft and initially followed the correct descent profile.
Its autopilot was disconnected at around 2,100ft but the inquiry’s data indicates that, after this switch to manual operation, the A320 began to drift below the normal glidepath. Its airspeed stayed largely constant, around 130kt, according to flight-recorder data released by the JTSB.
The glidepath deviation gradually became more pronounced until the aircraft hit the localiser, situated 325m before the runway.
Just 2s before the impact the recorder data indicates an attempted go-around, with changes to the side-stick input and the engine thrust-lever positions.
After destroying the antenna the A320 shed debris before reaching the runway, its aft fuselage making ground contact 148m short and its main gear following at 136m.
It travelled 725m along the runway but then started veering to the left and exited 1,154m from the threshold, coming to rest facing almost in the opposite direction.
Passengers evacuated the aircraft through slides, suffering only minor injuries during the accident.
Asiana had previously disclosed that the aircraft’s captain had accumulated over 8,200h and the first officer nearly 1,600h.
Investigators have yet to determine the primary cause and contributing elements to the event.
Crashed Asiana A320 drifted below glidepath in low visibility
By: DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW
Japanese investigators have indicated that an Asiana Airlines Airbus A320 began to deviate from its descent path shortly after its autopilot was disengaged, before it collided with the localiser antenna at Hiroshima.
The A320 had been conducting the area navigation (RNAV) approach to runway 28 on 14 April.
It hit an approach light at a height of 4m before carving through the antenna. Flight OZ162 subsequently veered off the runway, suffering substantial airframe damage.
Preliminary findings by the Japan Transport Safety Board show that weather conditions were not ideal, with light rain and fog reducing visibility on the runway to 300m in places.
The aircraft passed the final approach fix at a height of just above 3,000ft and initially followed the correct descent profile.
Its autopilot was disconnected at around 2,100ft but the inquiry’s data indicates that, after this switch to manual operation, the A320 began to drift below the normal glidepath. Its airspeed stayed largely constant, around 130kt, according to flight-recorder data released by the JTSB.
The glidepath deviation gradually became more pronounced until the aircraft hit the localiser, situated 325m before the runway.
Just 2s before the impact the recorder data indicates an attempted go-around, with changes to the side-stick input and the engine thrust-lever positions.
After destroying the antenna the A320 shed debris before reaching the runway, its aft fuselage making ground contact 148m short and its main gear following at 136m.
It travelled 725m along the runway but then started veering to the left and exited 1,154m from the threshold, coming to rest facing almost in the opposite direction.
Passengers evacuated the aircraft through slides, suffering only minor injuries during the accident.
Asiana had previously disclosed that the aircraft’s captain had accumulated over 8,200h and the first officer nearly 1,600h.
Investigators have yet to determine the primary cause and contributing elements to the event.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Seoul
Posts: 105
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Based on 13 years living in South Korea (and a Korean wife!!!) I could quibble with a few of KublaiKhancun details, however in the main his points are valid. The fact is every culture has differences. Those differences will impact society in different ways. There is no right or wrong. I do feel that some aspects of Korean culture can impact things like flight safety. Those same aspects may very well however have a positive impact on society in other ways. Overall there is no good / bad or right / wrong, just differences. In terms of air safety alone I do think there are valid concerns about the impact of culture on safety.
(And it is not just planes, but also on the Korean TGV i.e. [Editorial] Is the KTX Safe? - The Kyunghyang Shinmun and in the ferry sinking last year )
(And it is not just planes, but also on the Korean TGV i.e. [Editorial] Is the KTX Safe? - The Kyunghyang Shinmun and in the ferry sinking last year )
Join Date: Sep 2014
Location: Canada
Posts: 1,257
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I do feel that some aspects of Korean culture can impact things like flight safety.
@Hogger60
Interesting report, it confirms many of the observations we had right after the crash from the ADS-B data. The aircraft was on the RNAV approach (not the VOR approach), was slightly high at FAF, and then entered too-steep descent. Why, is still the question.
Is it a definite write-off?
Where is it?
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Hadlow
Age: 60
Posts: 597
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts