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Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France

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Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France

Old 1st Apr 2015, 20:16
  #2861 (permalink)  
 
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Linerider
Not neccessarily.

13,000ft is barometric altitude, but the GPWS uses the radio altimeter. There could be mountain peaks in that area which triggered it. I don't know that to be the case, just offering a possible explanation.
I looked it up and found a page of "a320 flash cards" which details the GPWS modes and alerts.
GPWS BASIC MODES
MODE 1: EXCESSIVE RATE OF DESCENT

Mode 1 has two boundaries. Penetration of the first boundary (2450 feet radio altitude) generates a repeated "SINK RATE" aural alert...

So a peak of 10550' would trigger the "Sink Rate" alert at 13000'.
Ok, have you checked if there are such elevations? The answer is no, there aren't
Pull up 3 minutes in advance? (if you only had looked at the article...)
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Old 1st Apr 2015, 21:23
  #2862 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Multicpl
As it seems we have crew members killing as many people now as the terrorist have done, maybe it is time to re-think the door.

If you forget nearly 3000 during 911
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Old 1st Apr 2015, 22:07
  #2863 (permalink)  
 
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After Shipman British medicine was never the same again and after 9/11 air travel was never the same again.
Very true MtK. Not only air travel but as you allude to the profession of airline pilot. Unless I go to work with a smile on my face I will be considered suspect. If someone wants to get back at a pilot all they have to do is put in a confidential report that the pilot was behaving strange. I still have a few years to go until I retire but thankfully I have more years behind me than in front of me.
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Old 1st Apr 2015, 22:37
  #2864 (permalink)  
 
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In the USA, depressed pilots could continue to fly if their depression was treated by medication as of around 2010 (Don't know off the top of my head, when it became the case in Europe). The problem is, most depression now is treated by an SSRI, such as Prozac. As has been pointed out before in this forum, Prozac and drugs like it, occasionally cause people who may not otherwise take their own life or the lives of others, to do just those things (Not often, but often enough to be a public safety concern). I'm not thinking that depressed pilots shouldn't fly. In many cases of depression, one of the best treatments is to immerse yourself in your work, to get your mind off of of the depression or it's cause, whether it be piloting or playing football (after any needed time off).

It is too risky for a pilot to take Prozac or similar SSRI's. If depressed pilots must be medicated, they should take an amphetamine such as Dexedrine or Adderall, or an amphetamine analog, like Methylphenidate (Ritalin). These drugs may not help depression as much as Prozac and the like, but they don't have the danger to public safety side effect of suicide, while taking others with you.

A depressed pilot might not quite be "on his game". Crewmates and automation can make up for that, but a pilot on Prozac might be hell on wheels (or wings), while he flies the aeroplane into the mountainside.
Of course, the public may never know if Lubitz was on an SSRI, such as Prozac (aka: Fluctin, Fluoxetine HCL), but it seems likely he and many past mass murderers were on them.

I wonder if Jet Blue pilot, who went crazy on a flight and had to be restrained by passengers, was on an SSRI (Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor)?

Change the regulations. Prohibit the use of SSRIs for commercial pilots. Pilots and passengers are better off with an un-medicated depressed pilot than one on Prozac!
In the UK your General Practitioner decides what drugs you are prescribed. Your Aeromedical Examiner (AME), who is the CAA (and hence EASA) approved doctor who examines you is not allowed to prescribe drugs and hence simply responds to your admissions (or not if you choose to cover them up) of what conditions you have and what you have been prescribed. Hence as a pilot you get what your GP prescribes you, without any CAA/AME input. Since your average GP has no clue what drugs are compatible with flying, therein lies the problem.
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Old 1st Apr 2015, 22:53
  #2865 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by RedGritty View Post
Isotope Toast asked:

"Do we know he flipped the switch from CVR data? "

There's no data on the CVR, just separate audio recordings from each pilot's headset microphone and from a general microphone in the instrument panel.

The operation of that guarded cockpit-door switch might not produce much sound at all, it may be unlikely to be audible at the co-pilot's headset microphone or at the instrument-panel microphone.

I've not read of the CVR recording including the sound of the door-open request or override audio-alerts. Either the investigators felt this was not sufficiently important to include in their briefing or perhaps the sound was inhibited by prior movement of the switch to the "lock" position.

The FDR records data including (I believe) some switch activation relating to flight controls. But, so far as I know from what I have read, it does not include the operation of the cockpit door lock/unlock switch. The FDR memory unit has not yet been found anyway.

It does look like the article you refer to (and quite a few others) is very poor quality as you say.
It is not what was on the CVR recording - it is what is NOT on the CVR recording. There are no buzzer sounds from entering the correct code nor the continual alarm from entering the emergency code. Therefore, as the captain was trying to get in with the assistance of the cabin crew one has to assume that the override switch had been activated muting both the buzzer and the alarm. As the period was 8 minutes and the override (apparently) has a 5 minute time out the override would have needed to be operated at least twice which falsifies hypotheses about an incapacitated first officer.
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Old 1st Apr 2015, 23:09
  #2866 (permalink)  
 
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i am curious about his training. He started with Lufthansa training in 2008, took a break in 2009, then started work for Germanwings in 2013. how long was his break away from training and how long is training when completed alll at once?
to me it seems like a long time between starting training in 2008 and 2013.
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Old 1st Apr 2015, 23:33
  #2867 (permalink)  
 
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As the period was 8 minutes and the override (apparently) has a 5 minute time out the override would have needed to be operated at least twice which falsifies hypotheses about an incapacitated first officer.
I thought it was the descent that lasted 8 minutes; do we know for how long the captain was at the door?
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Old 2nd Apr 2015, 00:03
  #2868 (permalink)  
 
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RYFQB

http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/Inter...e-crash-736774

this link refers to the alleged video (article not video) which is accompanied by the timeline from BEA.

10.30 captain has left flight deck, lock is operated?

10.33 captain heard telling FO it was him trying to enter

10.40 right wing clips the mountain.

that is a minimum of 7 minutes, CEO GW confirmed their reset period is 5m (can be 5-20m).
Think it is fairly safe to assume he had tried the code 1st, didn't spend long in toilet again fairly safe to assume he recognised they were in descent.
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Old 2nd Apr 2015, 00:14
  #2869 (permalink)  
 
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3 Minutes......really ?????

BS........... Go figure......
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Old 2nd Apr 2015, 00:45
  #2870 (permalink)  
 
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Not really. Nor will be the reluctance some pilots might have to go on an inflight potty break now (re: passenger perception) and instead try to hold it. That in turn creates a cockpit distraction witn a net safety detriment of far more than trying to mind-read potentially nutty crewmembers.
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Old 2nd Apr 2015, 00:56
  #2871 (permalink)  
 
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Surely this is all about probability and risk factors? We all know the accident statistics! High on the list are CFIT and pilot error or system mismanagement.

I very much doubt that a pilot controlled crash hardly enters statistics for being a risk factor so would not have been considered until it happened.

Bird strikes and double flameouts probably ranked higher as a perceived risk factor.

Take the ditching into the Hudson? Thankfully the result was Ok and the pilot was hailed as a hero, but if not what would have been the public reaction had that plane come down into the City!

What could the authorities have done to prevent further double flameouts due to Bird strikes?

This is an exceptionally rare occurrence but it has happened so We have the two crew on the flight deck fix, probably more for public consumption, public confidence than anything like a real safety benefit.

Adding a low experience CC more access to the flight deck and at times when they are alone with one flight crew member is adding another low risk of giving access to a terrorist in the guise of CC with only one person to deal with and an ability to lock everyone else out.

The probability of that is "probably" equally low as an FO taking out an aircraft so you add an equal risk factor to remove another low risk factor?

That doesn't make sense unless you have already changed opinion to considering pilot suicide mass murder as a much higher risk factor than before which i Doubt it is. It will be public perception which will have changed not the risk factor.

My concern is a witch hunt with every pilot now being regarded as a potential mass murderer when really the best people to note his/her daily actions and moods should be the people he /she works with on a daily basis.

There could be real benefit in training colleagues to notice problems with another pilot and to be more forthcoming to that pilot and his superiors! But even there the most dangerous will be the ones who are good at hiding their emotions not the open book variety?

Last edited by Pace; 2nd Apr 2015 at 01:10.
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Old 2nd Apr 2015, 01:20
  #2872 (permalink)  
 
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@Lonewolf: "@SevereClear: I detect a bit of "filling in the blanks" in the breaking news story that you linked to. Thanks for the link anyway. If one ever needed an illustration of "if it bleeds it leads" in journalism, this one seems a textbook case."

Not just the video links @parismatch.com, but the text below them of supposed FD step-by-step...if not fully fabricated, it and the linked writings are surely subreption.

I hesitated posting the links, but there are data out there + or -. There is so much that disgusts.

The video and image libraries though are illustrating the enormity of the efforts needed in this recovery and investigation. Few if any ever know or see the number, skill sets, physicality and mental grit recovery and investigative teams attain, let alone in terrain of such extreme difficulties. French officials seem to me to be providing plenty of logical information and the recovery teams are professional not voluntary. Having been fortunate to trade stints at respective areas with French mountaineers/SAR/ski patrol, I learned from interaction that France has highly skilled mountaineers who are also police and a very different system than we deploy in the Rocky Mountains --that is why I agree with another of your points that it is unlikely anything would be purloined, equally because of professional integrity, site/scene protocol, checks and triple checks, and the severity of punishment if discovered. That said, of course anything will likely happen, given the need for immediate gratification of our present Internet Culture...real or made up.
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Old 2nd Apr 2015, 01:23
  #2873 (permalink)  
 
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When you think of it, it was stupid devising a system whereby a captain could be denied access to his flight deck.
The one key person you want in charge in an emergency,doesnt have access to all of his aircraft.
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Old 2nd Apr 2015, 01:53
  #2874 (permalink)  
 
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oldoberon

Diolch; I had missed that, somehow! Add that the FR24 data shows actual descent began at 10:31 + captain shouting at 10:33 and impact at 10:40-10:41 per cvr, he must indeed have been at the door more than 7 minutes, perhaps more than 8.

Last edited by RYFQB; 2nd Apr 2015 at 02:02. Reason: crash time
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Old 2nd Apr 2015, 01:56
  #2875 (permalink)  
 
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German Medical Rules v EASA rules

It seems that in Germany one could take an EASA medical and fail it, without the repercussions of the failure being reported to the Aviation Authority (LBA)! Would anyone from Germany please advise if this is indeed the case.

I understand also that EASA had been looking into this potential breach of protocol, and "discussions" with te LBA were headed in the direction of the courts....all prior to the incident in question.
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Old 2nd Apr 2015, 02:42
  #2876 (permalink)  
 
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It seems that in Germany one could take an EASA medical and fail it, without the repercussions of the failure being reported to the Aviation Authority (LBA)! Would anyone from Germany please advise if this is indeed the case.
Not in my experience. Medical results and medical history will be transmitted online to the LBA. If one is denied a medical, the LBA does know about it the same minute. However, it takes around one or two weeks until the pilot gets a letter that tells him that he has to submit his license (and any prior issued licenses that are still valid) as well to the LBA and that he is not allowed to use the privileges of said licenses within the reach of the federal aviation law of germany. That is at least my personal experience, corrobated by the experienced of my colleagues. As i use one of the Lufthansa AMCs i would guess that it would be the same for most lufthansa pilots.

Anyway, it seems that that was not a factor here as the FO in question apparently held a valid medical and his next medical examination was due in june.
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Old 2nd Apr 2015, 02:46
  #2877 (permalink)  
 
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When you think of it, it was stupid devising a system whereby a captain could be denied access to his flight deck.The one key person you want in charge in an emergency,doesnt have access to all of his aircraft.
Totally agree.
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Old 2nd Apr 2015, 02:54
  #2878 (permalink)  
 
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Lufthansa Flight Training switched from Ab-Initio ATPL to MPL in March of 2008, so he had an MPL, not a frozen ATPL. Need to ask an MPL trainee, how long that program really takes.
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Old 2nd Apr 2015, 03:04
  #2879 (permalink)  
 
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Independent events

That doesn't make sense unless you have already changed opinion to considering pilot suicide mass murder as a much higher risk factor than before which i Doubt it is. It will be public perception which will have changed not the risk factor.
Excellent post. Any sensible response to this event has to come as a self instituted change in the way we function not as some cursory change in SOP.

Having said that I have been thinking about the above quoted point. Can deliberate pilot action incidents (if that is what this is) be considered truly independent events (statistically speaking). Probably not, but even if they are not independent events, I agree that the probability might not go up much more.

(Cue statisticians on the forum)
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Old 2nd Apr 2015, 03:11
  #2880 (permalink)  
 
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When you think of it, it was stupid devising a system whereby a captain could be denied access to his flight deck.The one key person you want in charge in an emergency,doesnt have access to all of his aircraft.
The alleged reason for giving no crew member an absolute door lock override from the cabin side is because the code, card, magic wand, whatever, could be obtained under duress by an hijacker. We can question that logic but to the designers of the system it probably seemed eminently sensible.

I remember a briefing on use of the security door. We were told in no uncertain terms that the door must not be opened for any reason in the event of a hijacking, even if the hijackers were murdering passengers one-by-one to force the door to be opened. No heroics, no negotiations. Remember, the armoured door was never designed to save the lives of passengers or even to stop hijackers destroying the aircraft. The purpose of the door was purely to prevent hijackers accessing the cockpit and using the aircraft as a missile.
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