Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Flight Deck Forums > Rumours & News
Reload this Page >

Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France

Rumours & News Reporting Points that may affect our jobs or lives as professional pilots. Also, items that may be of interest to professional pilots.

Airbus A320 crashed in Southern France

Old 2nd Apr 2015, 02:53
  #2881 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: NO
Posts: 38
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
oldoberon

Diolch; I had missed that, somehow! Add that the FR24 data shows actual descent began at 10:31 + captain shouting at 10:33 and impact at 10:40-10:41 per cvr, he must indeed have been at the door more than 7 minutes, perhaps more than 8.

Last edited by RYFQB; 2nd Apr 2015 at 03:02. Reason: crash time
RYFQB is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 02:56
  #2882 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2010
Location: europe
Age: 67
Posts: 645
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
German Medical Rules v EASA rules

It seems that in Germany one could take an EASA medical and fail it, without the repercussions of the failure being reported to the Aviation Authority (LBA)! Would anyone from Germany please advise if this is indeed the case.

I understand also that EASA had been looking into this potential breach of protocol, and "discussions" with te LBA were headed in the direction of the courts....all prior to the incident in question.
deefer dog is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 03:42
  #2883 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: I wouldn't know.
Posts: 4,495
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
It seems that in Germany one could take an EASA medical and fail it, without the repercussions of the failure being reported to the Aviation Authority (LBA)! Would anyone from Germany please advise if this is indeed the case.
Not in my experience. Medical results and medical history will be transmitted online to the LBA. If one is denied a medical, the LBA does know about it the same minute. However, it takes around one or two weeks until the pilot gets a letter that tells him that he has to submit his license (and any prior issued licenses that are still valid) as well to the LBA and that he is not allowed to use the privileges of said licenses within the reach of the federal aviation law of germany. That is at least my personal experience, corrobated by the experienced of my colleagues. As i use one of the Lufthansa AMCs i would guess that it would be the same for most lufthansa pilots.

Anyway, it seems that that was not a factor here as the FO in question apparently held a valid medical and his next medical examination was due in june.
Denti is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 03:46
  #2884 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2011
Location: Bermuda Triangle
Posts: 65
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
When you think of it, it was stupid devising a system whereby a captain could be denied access to his flight deck.The one key person you want in charge in an emergency,doesnt have access to all of his aircraft.
Totally agree.
svhar is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 03:54
  #2885 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2015
Location: seaside
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Lufthansa Flight Training switched from Ab-Initio ATPL to MPL in March of 2008, so he had an MPL, not a frozen ATPL. Need to ask an MPL trainee, how long that program really takes.
CloudB is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 04:04
  #2886 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Planet Earth
Posts: 91
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Independent events

That doesn't make sense unless you have already changed opinion to considering pilot suicide mass murder as a much higher risk factor than before which i Doubt it is. It will be public perception which will have changed not the risk factor.
Excellent post. Any sensible response to this event has to come as a self instituted change in the way we function not as some cursory change in SOP.

Having said that I have been thinking about the above quoted point. Can deliberate pilot action incidents (if that is what this is) be considered truly independent events (statistically speaking). Probably not, but even if they are not independent events, I agree that the probability might not go up much more.

(Cue statisticians on the forum)
CogSim is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 04:11
  #2887 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: Back in the NorthWest
Age: 77
Posts: 111
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
When you think of it, it was stupid devising a system whereby a captain could be denied access to his flight deck.The one key person you want in charge in an emergency,doesnt have access to all of his aircraft.
The alleged reason for giving no crew member an absolute door lock override from the cabin side is because the code, card, magic wand, whatever, could be obtained under duress by an hijacker. We can question that logic but to the designers of the system it probably seemed eminently sensible.

I remember a briefing on use of the security door. We were told in no uncertain terms that the door must not be opened for any reason in the event of a hijacking, even if the hijackers were murdering passengers one-by-one to force the door to be opened. No heroics, no negotiations. Remember, the armoured door was never designed to save the lives of passengers or even to stop hijackers destroying the aircraft. The purpose of the door was purely to prevent hijackers accessing the cockpit and using the aircraft as a missile.
BOING is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 04:14
  #2888 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2015
Location: cloud surfing
Posts: 2
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Entry codes

The way I see it, the system needs to cater for the following:

1) Prevent unauthorised access to the flight deck
2) Give access to flight deck in emergency such as incapacitation of both pilots
3) Access to flight deck by person who SHOULD HAVE ACCESS - the pilots!

Point 1 and 2 are already catered for by the current system. Which leave us with point 3, highlighted by recent events. To overcome this, before the flight each member of the flight deck sets a personal code that will give them access to enter. A bit like setting the code on a safe in a hotel room.
Whereas the code that gives access to authorised cabin crew (emergency point 2) does not have the power to override the Manual lock (set by the flight crew -current functionality), the individual flight crew member code does.
This ensures that neither of the flight crew can 'lock' the other out of the cockpit whilst at the same time maintaining the current functionality.

I hope that makes some sense
AllAboutTheView is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 04:22
  #2889 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Rockytop, Tennessee, USA
Posts: 5,899
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like on 1 Post
Anyway, it seems that that was not a factor here as the FO in question apparently held a valid medical and his next medical examination was due in june.
And where I work several colleagues have a history of major depressive episodes lasting up to two years and they are somehow certified fit to fly. Others have a condition that it is claimed increases the chances of suicide nine fold and they are able to hold a first class medical.
Airbubba is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 04:34
  #2890 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Feb 2012
Location: USA
Posts: 241
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
On risk, mentally ill pilots, and air transport safety

When reasoning about risk mitigation, it's important to keep in mind a few numbers:
  1. How significant is the risk (likelihood of occurrence times how bad it is when it occurs)
  2. How effective is any given mitigation strategy at reducing the risk?
  3. How much does the mitigation strategy cost? Not only in raw dollars, but also in terms of other risks it introduces?

I would like to see a comparison of the number of commercial passengers killed, over the past 10 years, say, by suicidal/homicidal pilots versus the number killed over the same time period by, say, falling down the stairs and breaking their necks while boarding at non-jetway airports, or by being struck by vehicles in the passenger pick-up / drop-off area, or from allergic reactions to some food consumed on board aircraft.

it's entirely possible that, compared to other risks facing the travelling public, deadly action by insane cockpit crew is not actually very high on the list of things to worry about, and may not warrant complex or costly solutions that in turn introduce other risks.
Gauges and Dials is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 05:25
  #2891 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2010
Location: Eagles Nest
Posts: 485
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
If MH370 is one day proven as suicide and this one then industry has to start looking at it more closely . With FTL's getting tougher in many countries , T&C's being eroded daily . P2F becoming the norm then pilots minds will become a bigger factor going forward . A/C are being manufactured with pilots seats still so the medium term requires humans to be still up front .
So as stresses increase , all the usual suspects of not coping get pushed further away from being talked about . Alcohol , drugs and mental health still are only mentioned in whispers away from the CVR . Can we expect more of the same ?
Toruk Macto is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 05:52
  #2892 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: I wouldn't know.
Posts: 4,495
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
When you think of it, it was stupid devising a system whereby a captain could be denied access to his flight deck.
The one key person you want in charge in an emergency,doesnt have access to all of his aircraft.
More of two persons, remember LAM 470 where the captain locked the FO out and killed all on board by crashing the plane?

Interestingly enough some high ranked security officials in germany are now talking about removing the door again as the safety case is not as easy and one dimensional as originally thought.
Denti is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 05:52
  #2893 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: LAX
Posts: 68
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
When reasoning about risk mitigation, it's important to keep in mind a few numbers:
  1. [*]
I would like to see a comparison of the number of commercial passengers killed, over the past 10 years, say, by suicidal/homicidal pilots versus the number killed over the same time period by, say, falling down the stairs and breaking their necks while boarding at non-jetway airports, or by being struck by vehicles in the passenger pick-up / drop-off area, or from allergic reactions to some food consumed on board aircraft.

it's entirely possible that, compared to other risks facing the travelling public, deadly action by insane cockpit crew is not actually very high on the list of things to worry about, and may not warrant complex or costly solutions that in turn introduce other risks.
You should also throw into this calculation the most dangerous part of any air journey: the drive to the airport.
mseyfang is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 07:04
  #2894 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2015
Location: California
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
@slicer

Well said Mac. I speak as a recently retired NHS surgeon and you are spot on about the utterly disproportionate and corrosive effect Shipman has had on British medicine. Shipman was basically a murderer who happened to be a GP and therefore had the means and opportunity to carry out his crimes. In fact, he was a much respected family doctor, and would almost certainly have passed his compulsory revalidations with flying colours. I fear that the same repressive attitude may spread to the airline industry as a result of this tragedy, and the knee-jerk reactions of those itching to regulate your profession.
The astonishing thing with these kinds of checks is that they seems to rarely be tested, when this is comparatively easy to do, and the results are so useful. I recall reading a story before 9/11 about a middle ranking TSA employee at SFO who decided it would be a good idea to test how well airport security was. As I recall they were concerned mostly for Lockerbie type bombs. So he started a set of well planned luggage tests that would evaluate not only SFO but several other hubs. The results were far worse than anyone expected, and so what did they do? They told the guy to stop the tests and never do anything like this ever again. It is all a little reminiscent of the dark humor of one of my instructors when I once asked how he would deal with a engine failure at night in the countryside. He replied that he would head for the biggest blackest area that was vaguely into wind and fly a few knots above the stall and when he got within 100 feet he said: "I would turn on the landing lights. If there was something really big in front like a house or a barn or something,... I'd turn them off again!"
nsmith is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 07:13
  #2895 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: South Bucks
Posts: 46
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Simple conclusion not yet stated

Still reading the backlog but amazed at the lack of critical reasoning of the many who have argued that a two person cockpit rule is a knee jerk response and not guaranteed to prevent a repeat. Of course not guaranteed but consider this simple, obvious but (so far not stated) conclusion that can be made if a two person cockpit rule had been applied - at the moment the captain left the cockpit, the FO was in SOLE control of the aircraft. If a FA or any person had been substituted for the absent captain, the FO would NOT have had SOLE control and would have had to overpower the substitute by force or persuasion to prevent him/her opening the door to the returning captain.
GXER is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 07:27
  #2896 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2015
Location: California
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
@Pace

Surely this is all about probability and risk factors? We all know the accident statistics! High on the list are CFIT and pilot error or system mismanagement.

I very much doubt that a pilot controlled crash hardly enters statistics for being a risk factor so would not have been considered until it happened.
This is something I have thought about a lot WRT to things like the Space Shuttle, but it seems just so hard to solve. I recall reading somewhere that when they designed the Shuttle they thought that it would have a 2% failure rate, and this proved to be pretty close. Notwithstanding, communicating the "success" of this design proved virtually impossible after the two disasters. If this problem cannot be solved it will only mean that the US will fall behind in space exploration because we can't stomach a very small number of astronauts dying (while of course at the same time ignoring the huge number of other deaths that matter far more to all of us personally). I guess that the basic problem is that homo-sapiens and statistics are fundamentally incompatible.

There could be real benefit in training colleagues to notice problems with another pilot and to be more forthcoming to that pilot and his superiors! But even there the most dangerous will be the ones who are good at hiding their emotions not the open book variety?
Is the problem here that 90% of the time the crew have never worked together before? ISTM that this whole thing just boils down to: who do you trust, and why?
nsmith is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 07:28
  #2897 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: NUTTER IN VECC
Age: 59
Posts: 30
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
GXER

With respect, I think that has been discussed at length, the conclusion being that the additional two FA eyes introduces other potential risks. The key issue to be resolved (and I don't know if it ever can be, satisfactorily) is how to weigh and balance the many risks.
Tom Bangla is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 07:28
  #2898 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: Back in the NorthWest
Age: 77
Posts: 111
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Interestingly enough some high ranked security officials in germany are now talking about removing the door again as the safety case is not as easy and one dimensional as originally thought.
I can see some sense in this. Currently if hijackers gain access to the cockpit they can lock themselves safely inside until they destroy the aircraft. However, now that passengers realise that their death is almost certain if they take no action it is more likely that they will attack the hijackers en masse and the removal of the armoured cockpit door would facilitate this. Sheer numbers will overcome the hijackers - just hope there is a dead-heading pilot on board.

Pretty certainly a weak cockpit door could have helped in the recent situation but only because the aircraft was an Airbus with flight envelope protection. (Disclaimer, since I never flew the 'bus I do not know how effective the system is). Quite likely, on an aircraft without this protection the wayward pilot would simply have rolled the aircraft upside down and it would have been game over.

.
BOING is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 07:32
  #2899 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Reading, UK
Posts: 15,741
Received 171 Likes on 83 Posts
Originally Posted by GXER
Still reading the backlog but amazed at the lack of critical reasoning of the many who have argued that a two person cockpit rule is a knee jerk response and not guaranteed to prevent a repeat.
The argument isn't that it won't prevent a repeat, but that the two-person rule may have other potential, unintended consequences.

There's nothing "simple" about it.
DaveReidUK is offline  
Old 2nd Apr 2015, 07:42
  #2900 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: Perth
Age: 61
Posts: 65
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Right wing?

How do we know that the right wing of the plane hit the mountain some time before the final crash? Where is this information coming from?

Is it from the "video"? How could we see that it is the right wing?

There does not seem to be any high mountains or jutting cliffs down the crash valley on the right hand side as you fly up it to the impact point. Is there a scrape somewhere on the ground?
ana1936 is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service

Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.