Again
Peekay4, I'll try again.
Those "other accidents" have nothing to do with interconnected yokes - well, the Airbus stall accidents have nothing to do with non-interconnected sidesticks.
The problem in all the accidents is - improper flight control inputs. Many people then say, well the "other pilot"could not see what the flying pilot was doing with his controls, that is why he could not correct the mistake.
In the "other accidens" it was proven empirically that being able to see the controls as they were moved by the faulty pilot did not help one bit in those accidents.
Also many people see the algebraic summing of forces as fatal error in the Airbus system - my Egyptair example shows that summing applies exactly the same with mechanical summing (as long as you do not overpower the breakout mechanism). After overpowering the breakout mechanism, the (possibly) opposite deflections could cancel each other out just as well as an algebraic summing.
The above effects are not the big problem in aviation accidents - apparently insufficient training or insufficient affinity with flying is.
Chronus:
The ECAM annunciated failures have nothing to do with the weather, they were recurring and the fact that event number so and so happened just after the initiation of their deviation turn is just a coincidence.
The exclamation "Oh my god" can be expected from someone who sees that his Pilot Flying is scrxxing up, as obvious from the attitude that he can see on his attitude indicator (PFD).
The exclamation (in French) "What is wrong" is not surprising from the mouth of someone who just pulled an airliner at high altitude into a 40 degrees nose high attitude. It is logical that he then not understands that with full aft stick and the nose near the horizon, the altimeter keeps winding down so rapidly.
His instruments do exactly respond in the way you should expect when you treat an airplane like that, the only problem is, he does not understand that.