Southwest KLGA gear collapse.
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why am I asking about the gender? I ask simply because I heard a female voice acknowledge landing clearance...seemingly above 400', and the changeover in control happened at 400'...
knowing the gender would confirm to me, slightly anyway, who was flying the plane and who was working the radio.
the point about carrier landings is a good one...but it isn't what I was looking for.
Lga is not that short a runway...not as demanding as SNA, or DCA or MDW...actually quite civilized.
political correctness can be carried a bit too far.
if someone knows, great...if no one knows, it will eventually come out.
having flown with both genders, I just don't seem to remember too many crashes with women at the controls...I can think of one...but not too many others.
the dynamic in the cockpit is an interesting one...and people are imperfect...the dynamic between two men is one thing...two women another and a man and a woman...is yet another...
aterpster...I've landed on all the runways at lga...I do see your point about 22...but if you go off the end of runway 4 you are in the water, if you are off the end of 22 you are in a major roadway with lots of cars. best not to hit other people.
also, 22 on a visual day has a bit of an offset for noise abatement...4 doesn't...31 , you follow the long island expressway...actually a bit of fun and 13, almost never used gives you the best view of central park and is my favorite.
the thing that makes me wonder is the method of transfer of control...and if it was done as many, ''books'' say...could it have been a momentary transfer of control and suddenly NO ONE was flying the plane at the flare?
knowing the gender would confirm to me, slightly anyway, who was flying the plane and who was working the radio.
the point about carrier landings is a good one...but it isn't what I was looking for.
Lga is not that short a runway...not as demanding as SNA, or DCA or MDW...actually quite civilized.
political correctness can be carried a bit too far.
if someone knows, great...if no one knows, it will eventually come out.
having flown with both genders, I just don't seem to remember too many crashes with women at the controls...I can think of one...but not too many others.
the dynamic in the cockpit is an interesting one...and people are imperfect...the dynamic between two men is one thing...two women another and a man and a woman...is yet another...
aterpster...I've landed on all the runways at lga...I do see your point about 22...but if you go off the end of runway 4 you are in the water, if you are off the end of 22 you are in a major roadway with lots of cars. best not to hit other people.
also, 22 on a visual day has a bit of an offset for noise abatement...4 doesn't...31 , you follow the long island expressway...actually a bit of fun and 13, almost never used gives you the best view of central park and is my favorite.
the thing that makes me wonder is the method of transfer of control...and if it was done as many, ''books'' say...could it have been a momentary transfer of control and suddenly NO ONE was flying the plane at the flare?
Originally Posted by Bubber
My FO landing at Kingston one day kept floating so I said land now or go around. He landed but I didn't touch anything.
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Received this today:
"Heard the Captain (she) was on all the FO's do not pair list (no one wanted to fly with her). Also, an American Airlines pilot was in the jumpseat. He sustained a back injury."
One thing that stood out for me (because I wouldn't do the same) was that this was her second time to LGA (after thirteen years with the company?) and still had not planned to make the landing.
"Heard the Captain (she) was on all the FO's do not pair list (no one wanted to fly with her). Also, an American Airlines pilot was in the jumpseat. He sustained a back injury."
One thing that stood out for me (because I wouldn't do the same) was that this was her second time to LGA (after thirteen years with the company?) and still had not planned to make the landing.
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Taking over an aircraft from an FO is humiliating so I felt there was time to let him fix it but time was running out and gave him a last chance to not have to take control. He responded so would do it again.
Captains all have their comfort zones and this was in mine but soon to not be. In 23,000 hrs only went around once because the FO turned base too soon at SAN. I was on the blind side to the airport. Captains who micro manage their FO soon lose them because they are trying to read your mind, not fly the plane.
Wx go arounds or flights I was not PIC are not included along with aircraft on runways, buffalo and wind reversal making landing illegal.
Captains all have their comfort zones and this was in mine but soon to not be. In 23,000 hrs only went around once because the FO turned base too soon at SAN. I was on the blind side to the airport. Captains who micro manage their FO soon lose them because they are trying to read your mind, not fly the plane.
Wx go arounds or flights I was not PIC are not included along with aircraft on runways, buffalo and wind reversal making landing illegal.
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Winshear...
Bubba:
This should be on the cover of every command upgrade book in every airline around the world. It should be part of the emergency briefing and should float around the L1 window, maybe even play in the left seat headset every hour as a reminder 
...
Guys & gals, My home base airport is plagued with frequent wind-shear that will hammer you anywhere between 1000 down to as low as 50 feet. Tailwind becoming headwind or the other way around.
11 knots tail to 11 knots headwind is an energy gain or positive shear of 22 knots. which will cause the aeroplane to accelerate towards flap blow-back speed, and depending on the severity of the shear can accelerate quite rapidly with a large positive trend vector and this will tend to balloon the aircraft above the glide slope.
Technically it is now a de-stabilised approach, but the way i and other based crews have managed the energy gain is to close the thrust levers, raise the nose to avoid further acceleration, then once the speed is under control, together with the lower ground speed, increase the rate of descent to recapture the glide.
Sometimes it works, but sometimes the shear is too strong to get back to a stabilised approach, so the answer is of course a go around.
If the FO in this accident flight did the initial steps, but wasn't regaining the glide in time, the captain should have called a go around and allow her to fly the procedure, then elect to fly the next approach himself if he thought her performance was really that bad.
Taking control of a none life threatening situation (400 feet agl????) he removed his capacity to effectively manage the situation, which i think he may have done a better job of rather than being somewhat egoist and trying to salvage something he may have seen becoming more and more unachievable. (press on itis? saving face?) to touch down on the nose wheel, would suggest approaching high on the glide, if it was onto a limited runway the natural instinct is to avoid flaring which could lead to a long landing and subsequent possible overrun.
Less paperwork would need filling here if at any point prior to touchdown the crew had chosen to go around, first, even before taking over control. I fully appreciate he was within his rights as the commander to do so, but his command prowess should have led his fingers to rest lightly touching the black buttons as that 4 whites became 3 whites and the touchdown markers got lower and lower in the window.
To cut to the chase, i dont think the FO being on a dont pair with list nor that she is female had anything to do with this accident. Accident stats, especially on the NG put the handling pilot in most fatal crashes... as the Captain. No idea what kind of conversation they were having from the handover of control.. but from 400 feet. thats 24 seconds thinking time coming down at 1000 fpm.
I may also be completely wrong, but thats just my own 0.02
Captains who micro manage their FO soon lose them because they are trying to read your mind, not fly the plane.
... Guys & gals, My home base airport is plagued with frequent wind-shear that will hammer you anywhere between 1000 down to as low as 50 feet. Tailwind becoming headwind or the other way around.
11 knots tail to 11 knots headwind is an energy gain or positive shear of 22 knots. which will cause the aeroplane to accelerate towards flap blow-back speed, and depending on the severity of the shear can accelerate quite rapidly with a large positive trend vector and this will tend to balloon the aircraft above the glide slope.
Technically it is now a de-stabilised approach, but the way i and other based crews have managed the energy gain is to close the thrust levers, raise the nose to avoid further acceleration, then once the speed is under control, together with the lower ground speed, increase the rate of descent to recapture the glide.
Sometimes it works, but sometimes the shear is too strong to get back to a stabilised approach, so the answer is of course a go around.
If the FO in this accident flight did the initial steps, but wasn't regaining the glide in time, the captain should have called a go around and allow her to fly the procedure, then elect to fly the next approach himself if he thought her performance was really that bad.
Taking control of a none life threatening situation (400 feet agl????) he removed his capacity to effectively manage the situation, which i think he may have done a better job of rather than being somewhat egoist and trying to salvage something he may have seen becoming more and more unachievable. (press on itis? saving face?) to touch down on the nose wheel, would suggest approaching high on the glide, if it was onto a limited runway the natural instinct is to avoid flaring which could lead to a long landing and subsequent possible overrun.
Less paperwork would need filling here if at any point prior to touchdown the crew had chosen to go around, first, even before taking over control. I fully appreciate he was within his rights as the commander to do so, but his command prowess should have led his fingers to rest lightly touching the black buttons as that 4 whites became 3 whites and the touchdown markers got lower and lower in the window.
To cut to the chase, i dont think the FO being on a dont pair with list nor that she is female had anything to do with this accident. Accident stats, especially on the NG put the handling pilot in most fatal crashes... as the Captain. No idea what kind of conversation they were having from the handover of control.. but from 400 feet. thats 24 seconds thinking time coming down at 1000 fpm.
I may also be completely wrong, but thats just my own 0.02
Last edited by 767200ER; 9th Aug 2013 at 00:02.
the way i and other based crews have managed the energy gain is to close the thrust levers, raise the nose to avoid further acceleration, then once the speed is under control, together with the lower ground speed, increase the rate of descent to recapture the glide.
Staying tightly/aggressively on the slope is the quickest way to pick up that you're getting a dose of windshear. Raising (and lowering) the nose to compensate for speed errors merely hides it for longer.
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I must disagree with the views of one our colleagues...I do think the do not fly list does help us understand what was going on in the cockpit...and to correct 767200er, I think the girl was the captain and the boy was the copilot...please correct me if I am misunderstanding.
if someone is on everyone's list...it means this person just might be the most demanding and finest pilot on the line...or , more likely...a weak sister (gender doesn't matter , its just a phrase).
if they gained 11 knots on the ASI, it was still a manageable situation. I don't think they gained much of anything...I do think someone screwed up, was looking at the wrong spot or hadn't landed at such a short runway in a long time...
And 7000' of runway isn't that short.
even if this plane landed halfway down the runway (not good form), the thing would have stopped before the end. using the radome as a wheel brake substitute is not a good idea.
Remember that JETBLUE pilot who went a little ape? Wondering...do they check bloodsugar on post accident blood tests?
if someone is on everyone's list...it means this person just might be the most demanding and finest pilot on the line...or , more likely...a weak sister (gender doesn't matter , its just a phrase).
if they gained 11 knots on the ASI, it was still a manageable situation. I don't think they gained much of anything...I do think someone screwed up, was looking at the wrong spot or hadn't landed at such a short runway in a long time...
And 7000' of runway isn't that short.
even if this plane landed halfway down the runway (not good form), the thing would have stopped before the end. using the radome as a wheel brake substitute is not a good idea.
Remember that JETBLUE pilot who went a little ape? Wondering...do they check bloodsugar on post accident blood tests?
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Raising the nose momentarily by a couple of degrees (read level flight, not a climb) is entirely dependant on the severity of the shear and where it occurs
while it does increase the glide deviation, and seems counter-intuitive, its energy management 101, if you're above path in descent because of atc(energy gain in this case), you slow down while level and then accelerate to recapture your profile once you can descend, (lower groundspeed in this case) so you can still lose enough feet per mile to recapture the glide as opposed to being high and fast. this is done knowing:
A- the wind you have on the ND is trending towards the reported surface wind which means it wont normally swing round again.
B- pireps give you some clue as to where you can expect the shear, and so you know if its at 1000 feet you have time to correct, if its at 200 feet and is not severe, you can manage it, probably without having to raise the nose at all just reduce thrust
C- If you cant recover it... just go around.
while it does increase the glide deviation, and seems counter-intuitive, its energy management 101, if you're above path in descent because of atc(energy gain in this case), you slow down while level and then accelerate to recapture your profile once you can descend, (lower groundspeed in this case) so you can still lose enough feet per mile to recapture the glide as opposed to being high and fast. this is done knowing:
A- the wind you have on the ND is trending towards the reported surface wind which means it wont normally swing round again.
B- pireps give you some clue as to where you can expect the shear, and so you know if its at 1000 feet you have time to correct, if its at 200 feet and is not severe, you can manage it, probably without having to raise the nose at all just reduce thrust
C- If you cant recover it... just go around.
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I had an approach into TGU one day with a check airman riding jump seat planning to check pilots landing there. We were told we had a 30knot headwind so told him we would hold approach profile and when the updraft causes a 20knot increase because of the hill on final we would land because the ground speed was normal. It happened and he never came back. Sometimes you should stay on glide slope. We didn't have one so keep your profile:.l
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We have a no fly list under our contract. People that have a lot of no flys are people with issues. Professional standards (a union committee member) generally spend most of their time dealing with these people. I don't know anything about this captain, but having dealt with problem children in the past I would say that some of the holes in the cheese were lined up beforehand.
Comparing this to Asiana is valid. Discussion of culture is relevant because both carriers have had a large number incidents on a proportionate basis. I am sure SWA has taken steps to be more standard but they still rush all the time. I was holding in the alleyway at LAX yesterday and a SWA jet careened from Echo taxiway on to Delta. There was an obvious side load put on the gear, he had to be doing over 20kts in the turn. Both the F/O and I simultaneously said "holy sh##".
Comparing this to Asiana is valid. Discussion of culture is relevant because both carriers have had a large number incidents on a proportionate basis. I am sure SWA has taken steps to be more standard but they still rush all the time. I was holding in the alleyway at LAX yesterday and a SWA jet careened from Echo taxiway on to Delta. There was an obvious side load put on the gear, he had to be doing over 20kts in the turn. Both the F/O and I simultaneously said "holy sh##".
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I think SWA pilots do a fine job and this accident is not what their pilots do. Something went wrong and the airline as a whole can't be blamed for one accident. She landed on the nose wheel and it broke. Let her explain why she did and nobody else did.
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Over the years at LGA when landing on runway 4 during VMC conditions with a dry runway I've made the following observation. Almost all aircraft stop and turn off runway 4 before the 13/31 intersection at taxiways Q, G or P.
The consist exception to this rule is the DC-9-80 series which almost always rolls beyond the 13/31 intersection and make taxiway U.
The video is now down off You Tube but when it was up you could tell they "landed" just before taxiway CY which leaves 75% of the runway in front of them. So they complied with the "landing" within the first third of the runway the only problem was they couldn't taxi to the gate.
If she had flared and not derotated then that would have been pushing the first third rule but still manageable.
For you WN guys, what is your procedure to select flaps 30 for landing vs. flaps 40?
The consist exception to this rule is the DC-9-80 series which almost always rolls beyond the 13/31 intersection and make taxiway U.
The video is now down off You Tube but when it was up you could tell they "landed" just before taxiway CY which leaves 75% of the runway in front of them. So they complied with the "landing" within the first third of the runway the only problem was they couldn't taxi to the gate.
If she had flared and not derotated then that would have been pushing the first third rule but still manageable.
For you WN guys, what is your procedure to select flaps 30 for landing vs. flaps 40?
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bubbers44 wrote:
I wish you had extended the same courtesy to the Asiana crew.
I think SWA pilots do a fine job and this accident is not what their pilots do. Something went wrong and the airline as a whole can't be blamed for one accident. She landed on the nose wheel and it broke. Let her explain why she did and nobody else did.
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A bad landing by one pilot and failure to do a VFR Landing with a check airman aboard and pilots monitoring from thousands of feet to hitting the rocks short of the runway is not the same type of accident. She will be held accountable as I hope the Korean pilots will.
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Bubbers, talk about being a hypocrite. Shall we also discuss all the incidents and accidents of SWA? Or you prefer to view this incident in isolation but Asian ones with more sweeping statements.
Last edited by airbus_driver319; 10th Aug 2013 at 03:18.
Lets hope this is more than pin the blame on the pilot, but rather it causes a review of the systemic failures that aided this in happening, both SWA and Asiana.
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Go fly on an Asian carrier if you wish. They have different standards than we do but doing a visual approach seems to be a challenge for them. It is not for us, so take your choice. Hypocrite, I don't think so but I know which airlines I trust and which I don't. Have a nice day.
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After reading 80+ pages earlier about how Asiana pilots can't fly, I find it ironic to list these facts.
==SWA
Short haul route.
Working during normal business hour.
Not in training of any kind.
Normal condition at airport, with all landing guidance systems working.
==Asiana
10+ route
Working at 4AM body clock.
In 'training'
Part of landing guidance system down.
Happy 60th Anniversary of Cease Fire Agreement of the bloody Korean war btw.
==SWA
Short haul route.
Working during normal business hour.
Not in training of any kind.
Normal condition at airport, with all landing guidance systems working.
==Asiana
10+ route
Working at 4AM body clock.
In 'training'
Part of landing guidance system down.
Happy 60th Anniversary of Cease Fire Agreement of the bloody Korean war btw.
When the SW pilots crashed, it was because they didn't want to go around because it would cost them money. Their contract dictates that they get paid by the mile, so the faster they cover those miles, the more likely it is that they can legally pick up an extra trip that month and make more money. Pure money grubbing.
Similar ending, but very different circumstances.