Southwest KLGA gear collapse.
Wrong! At SWA they get paid extra for every minute that they over block starting at 5 minutes past block time. Also go arounds are encouraged. If not configured, on speed, and stabilized at 1000 ft then the PM is supposed to tell the PF to go around. IF LGA was pilot error then it was due to the crew not following procedures. However the full NTSB report is not even close to being out so the exact cause is unknown at this time.
junebug172 -Incorrect.
Yes SWA pilots are paid on the basis of Trip length (a specific number of miles). The faster those miles are covered, the less time they spend flying for the same number of dollars per trip (TFP). The SWAPA contract also contains extra pay that adjusts for holding and ground time beyond the blocked leg (sector) time. Ironically, this was introduced with airports like La Guardia in mind.
junebug172- As for their 1000' gate - if they went around every time they were unstable, they'd be late more often than on time.
junebug172 - Would you like me to pull my references directly from their contract?
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Incorrect. They're paid by the trip which is a flat rate. Delays mean they dilute their efficiency and pay. They're incentivized to get from block to block quickly which is why they're always in a hurry.
Would you like me to pull my references directly from their contract?
Would you like me to pull my references directly from their contract?
I've been flying as a pilot for SWA for over 18 years so I know how I get paid! Yes we get what is called TFP (Trip for Pay) which is based on the mileage between cities, but there is a formula that increases the TFP for long hauls. As I said we always got paid extra if we fly over the scheduled block, which under the current CBA starts at 5 minutes over block. As an example I did a 4 day last week where I had 4 legs that overflew the block by a total of 76 minutes and I got paid 1.2 TFP. BTW TFP is leg specific so if we underfly a leg we get what that leg was scheduled for and don't give back any overfly pay from another leg. So our pay is not diluted if we go over scheduled block. But then I may be wrong since you have reference to our CBA and I've only been living it for 18 years.
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TANKER, EX AIRCAL here. When you started you watched our Ca. B737 operation work and how we did 20 minute turns. You improved it and we came to your airline to see what you did to improve ours. Two outstanding airlines and everybody knew how to fly an airplane. Wish it were that way now 30 years later with most airlines but it isn't. Sorry about your bad press about LGA but you have a great airline so keep doing what you are doing. We got bought by a major airline so couldn't do it any more. You still can. Good luck.
followed wisely by a go around.
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LH 446. FRA-DEN. Took 20 minutes to the second landing.
Flight Track Log ? DLH446 ? 31-Jul-2013 ? EDDF / FRA - KDEN ? FlightAware
Flight Track Log ? DLH446 ? 31-Jul-2013 ? EDDF / FRA - KDEN ? FlightAware
Perhaps this is why some people insist on grabbing their carry-on items when evacuating a plane:
The Crash Landing of Southwest 345 | Nick Bradbury
The Crash Landing of Southwest 345 | Nick Bradbury
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I've been flying as a pilot for SWA for over 18 years so I know how I get paid! Yes we get what is called TFP (Trip for Pay) which is based on the mileage between cities, but there is a formula that increases the TFP for long hauls. As I said we always got paid extra if we fly over the scheduled block, which under the current CBA starts at 5 minutes over block. As an example I did a 4 day last week where I had 4 legs that overflew the block by a total of 76 minutes and I got paid 1.2 TFP. BTW TFP is leg specific so if we underfly a leg we get what that leg was scheduled for and don't give back any overfly pay from another leg. So our pay is not diluted if we go over scheduled block. But then I may be wrong since you have reference to our CBA and I've only been living it for 18 years.
Lonewolf, post #216
Lonewolf_50;
Yes, it's a possible outcome, especially at some airlines in Asia where FDM Programs are used to fine or otherwise punish crews for "foqa transgressions" instead of using the data as intended, for learning and proactive risk reduction.
I think in North America, Australia, New Zealand and Europe it is reasonable to expect or at least hope that most carriers do not engage in such uses of safety information and crews accept the intended role of FOQA, and hopefully change operational behaviour rationally, in order to reduce events. It is one of the reasons why FOQA event thresholds should never be published.
In any case, FOQA events normally bracket SOPs and operational factors so that reasonable upper and lower limits are made visible. So "long landings" would also have "short landings", (t/d prior to 1000' from the threshold, etc).
I can't explain the justification for continuing a non-stabilized approach but when it happens, even with severely non-stable approaches, the justifications and the lack of a go-around haven't materially changed for as long as I've been doing data work, (1986 - present).
The margins rapidly narrow more quickly than many would assume or realize, and here they did so with unfortunate results again. Approach speeds (no wind) eat runway at around 200fps.
Why there was no go-around is obviously the first question to ask. Sometimes it's just a mistake and that happens. But along with that question, the pressures and/or perceptions which energize the decision to continue need to be examined at all levels - cockpit to Flt Ops to the CEOs office.
Squawk 7700's post is well worth reading, and pondering.
Possible "unintended outcomes" of FOQA programs? Standard human reaction, I'd guess.
Organizational point of emphasis: "We have to stop doing X."
Human response: "OK, I'll start doing Y since it reduces the odds of doing X ..."
Possible "unintended outcomes" of FOQA programs? Standard human reaction, I'd guess.
Organizational point of emphasis: "We have to stop doing X."
Human response: "OK, I'll start doing Y since it reduces the odds of doing X ..."
I think in North America, Australia, New Zealand and Europe it is reasonable to expect or at least hope that most carriers do not engage in such uses of safety information and crews accept the intended role of FOQA, and hopefully change operational behaviour rationally, in order to reduce events. It is one of the reasons why FOQA event thresholds should never be published.
In any case, FOQA events normally bracket SOPs and operational factors so that reasonable upper and lower limits are made visible. So "long landings" would also have "short landings", (t/d prior to 1000' from the threshold, etc).
I can't explain the justification for continuing a non-stabilized approach but when it happens, even with severely non-stable approaches, the justifications and the lack of a go-around haven't materially changed for as long as I've been doing data work, (1986 - present).
The margins rapidly narrow more quickly than many would assume or realize, and here they did so with unfortunate results again. Approach speeds (no wind) eat runway at around 200fps.
Why there was no go-around is obviously the first question to ask. Sometimes it's just a mistake and that happens. But along with that question, the pressures and/or perceptions which energize the decision to continue need to be examined at all levels - cockpit to Flt Ops to the CEOs office.
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NTSB: Captain took over Southwest Airlines flight just before landing at New York LaGuardia | Airline Biz Blog
NTSB: Captain took over Southwest Airlines flight just before landing at New York LaGuardia
By Terry Maxon
[email protected]
1:45 pm on August 6, 2013
The National Transportation Safety Board said Tuesday that the captain took over from the first officer just before the Southwest Airlines flight landed at New York LaGuardia Airport and wound up sliding on its nose down the runway.
In its second update on the July 22 accident at LaGuardia, the NTSB said the first officer was the pilot flying and the captain was monitoring as Southwest Flight 345 approached LaGuardia.
SWA 345 proceeded on the approach when at a point below 400 feet, there was an exchange of control of the airplane and the captain became the flying pilot and made the landing, the NTSB said.
It said the flight had an 11-knot (about 12.7 mph) tailwind below 1,000 feet altitude, but an 11-knot headwind at the runway.
The NTSB said the captain had worked at Southwest for nearly 13 years, six as a captain. The first officer started at the Dallas-based airline about 18 months ago.
The agency previously said that it appears the Boeing 737-700 had landed on its nose gear first. That gear collapsed and caused the airplane to skid down the runway on its nose.
At this point in the investigation, no mechanical anomalies or malfunctions have been found, the NTSB said in Tuesdays update. A preliminary examination of the nose gear indicated that it failed due to stress overload.
Keep reading for the entire NTSB report.
WASHINGTON In its continuing investigation of the July 22 accident in which Southwest Airlines flight 345, a B-737-700, landed hard at New Yorks LaGuardia Airport (LGA), the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:
- The captain has been with Southwest for almost 13 years and has been a captain for six of those years. The captain has over 12,000 total flight hours, over 7,000 of which are as pilot-in-command. In 737s, the captain has over 7,900 hours, with more than 2,600 as the pilot-in-command.
- The first officer has been with Southwest for about 18 months. The pilot has about 5,200 total flight hours, with 4,000 of those as pilot-in-command. In 737s, the first officer has about 1,100 hours, none of which are as the pilot-in-command.
- This was the first trip the flight crew had flown together and it was the second leg of the trip. The first officer had previous operational experience at LGA, including six flights in 2013. The captain reported having flown into LGA twice, including the accident flight, serving as the pilot monitoring for both flights.
- The en route phase of the flight, which originated in Nashville, was characterized by the flight crew as routine. On approach into LGA, the first officer was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. SWA 345 was cleared for the ILS Runway 04 approach.
- The weather in the New York area caused the accident flight to enter a holding pattern for about 15 minutes. The crew reported that they saw the airport from about 5-10 miles out and that the airplane was on speed, course and glideslope down to about 200-400 feet.
- The crew reported that below 1,000 feet, the tailwind was about 11 knots. They also reported that the wind on the runway was a headwind of about 11 knots.
- SWA 345 proceeded on the approach when at a point below 400 feet, there was an exchange of control of the airplane and the captain became the flying pilot and made the landing.
- The jetliner touched down on the runway nose first followed by the collapse of the nose gear; the airplane was substantially damaged.
At this point in the investigation, no mechanical anomalies or malfunctions have been found. A preliminary examination of the nose gear indicated that it failed due to stress overload.
Investigators have collected five videos showing various aspects of the crash landing. The team will be analyzing these recordings in the coming months.
Parties to the investigation are the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Southwest Airlines, and the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association.
This is a factual update only and no interviews are being conducted.
Further investigative updates will be issued as events warrant. Follow the investigation on Twitter at @NTSB, or on our website at ntsb.gov.
NTSB: Captain took over Southwest Airlines flight just before landing at New York LaGuardia
By Terry Maxon
[email protected]
1:45 pm on August 6, 2013
The National Transportation Safety Board said Tuesday that the captain took over from the first officer just before the Southwest Airlines flight landed at New York LaGuardia Airport and wound up sliding on its nose down the runway.
In its second update on the July 22 accident at LaGuardia, the NTSB said the first officer was the pilot flying and the captain was monitoring as Southwest Flight 345 approached LaGuardia.
SWA 345 proceeded on the approach when at a point below 400 feet, there was an exchange of control of the airplane and the captain became the flying pilot and made the landing, the NTSB said.
It said the flight had an 11-knot (about 12.7 mph) tailwind below 1,000 feet altitude, but an 11-knot headwind at the runway.
The NTSB said the captain had worked at Southwest for nearly 13 years, six as a captain. The first officer started at the Dallas-based airline about 18 months ago.
The agency previously said that it appears the Boeing 737-700 had landed on its nose gear first. That gear collapsed and caused the airplane to skid down the runway on its nose.
At this point in the investigation, no mechanical anomalies or malfunctions have been found, the NTSB said in Tuesdays update. A preliminary examination of the nose gear indicated that it failed due to stress overload.
Keep reading for the entire NTSB report.
WASHINGTON In its continuing investigation of the July 22 accident in which Southwest Airlines flight 345, a B-737-700, landed hard at New Yorks LaGuardia Airport (LGA), the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:
- The captain has been with Southwest for almost 13 years and has been a captain for six of those years. The captain has over 12,000 total flight hours, over 7,000 of which are as pilot-in-command. In 737s, the captain has over 7,900 hours, with more than 2,600 as the pilot-in-command.
- The first officer has been with Southwest for about 18 months. The pilot has about 5,200 total flight hours, with 4,000 of those as pilot-in-command. In 737s, the first officer has about 1,100 hours, none of which are as the pilot-in-command.
- This was the first trip the flight crew had flown together and it was the second leg of the trip. The first officer had previous operational experience at LGA, including six flights in 2013. The captain reported having flown into LGA twice, including the accident flight, serving as the pilot monitoring for both flights.
- The en route phase of the flight, which originated in Nashville, was characterized by the flight crew as routine. On approach into LGA, the first officer was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. SWA 345 was cleared for the ILS Runway 04 approach.
- The weather in the New York area caused the accident flight to enter a holding pattern for about 15 minutes. The crew reported that they saw the airport from about 5-10 miles out and that the airplane was on speed, course and glideslope down to about 200-400 feet.
- The crew reported that below 1,000 feet, the tailwind was about 11 knots. They also reported that the wind on the runway was a headwind of about 11 knots.
- SWA 345 proceeded on the approach when at a point below 400 feet, there was an exchange of control of the airplane and the captain became the flying pilot and made the landing.
- The jetliner touched down on the runway nose first followed by the collapse of the nose gear; the airplane was substantially damaged.
At this point in the investigation, no mechanical anomalies or malfunctions have been found. A preliminary examination of the nose gear indicated that it failed due to stress overload.
Investigators have collected five videos showing various aspects of the crash landing. The team will be analyzing these recordings in the coming months.
Parties to the investigation are the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Southwest Airlines, and the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association.
This is a factual update only and no interviews are being conducted.
Further investigative updates will be issued as events warrant. Follow the investigation on Twitter at @NTSB, or on our website at ntsb.gov.
Originally Posted by mm43
Would seem that this approach became unstable below 1000 feet.
Parties to the investigation are ... and the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 6th Aug 2013 at 23:29.
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shear?
now, an 11 knot tailwind changing to an 11 knot headwind is interesting...but it is increasing performance, no?
but perhaps the PIC felt something was coming up that the FO didn't understand...or perhaps the PIC misunderstood.
There are two captains and a few other pilots that would have loved to do go arounds in the last month...SFO and LGA ...and the go arounds aren't tough at either.
at 400 feet, things would have to be going wrong to make me want to switch who was flying the plane. I've taken over for a copilot who bounced a 737 and wasn't reacting, it just doesn't make sense.
I heard the acknowledgement of landing clearance on the RT, on a US news report. Not that it matters, but the voice sounded female.
Does anyone know the genders involved?
but perhaps the PIC felt something was coming up that the FO didn't understand...or perhaps the PIC misunderstood.
There are two captains and a few other pilots that would have loved to do go arounds in the last month...SFO and LGA ...and the go arounds aren't tough at either.
at 400 feet, things would have to be going wrong to make me want to switch who was flying the plane. I've taken over for a copilot who bounced a 737 and wasn't reacting, it just doesn't make sense.
I heard the acknowledgement of landing clearance on the RT, on a US news report. Not that it matters, but the voice sounded female.
Does anyone know the genders involved?
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at 400 feet, things would have to be going wrong to make me want to switch who was flying the plane. I've taken over for a copilot who bounced a 737 and wasn't reacting, it just doesn't make sense.
BTW: I am not a pilot, this is a real question and not meant as a snarky comment.
Last edited by MurphyWasRight; 7th Aug 2013 at 13:00. Reason: Qoutes missing
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murphywasright
Not necessarily, the criteria for a stable approach may have been met...and that is why I think the change of control is sort of odd. my thought is the PIC/captain somehow felt the shear between 11 knots tailwind to 11 knots headwind might have been dangerous....now I don't think it was mind you...it is an increasing performance shear not a decreasing performance shear.
I also read the captain had only been to LGA twice and neither time had actually landed the plane there. Twice I can understand... that's scheduling...but I sure would want to do the landing for the experience.
Landing on runway 4 isn't the hardest landing at LGA...indeed it may be the easiest.
I also read the captain had only been to LGA twice and neither time had actually landed the plane there. Twice I can understand... that's scheduling...but I sure would want to do the landing for the experience.
Landing on runway 4 isn't the hardest landing at LGA...indeed it may be the easiest.
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Go arounds
Do most professional pilots consider a go around a failure? One would think that in a situation where a problem exists (eg. Hand over of control at 400 feet, concern in SF about speed too slow, can't see the runway, Lion Air) that go around would/should be essentially AUTOMATIC. Am I wrong or are such performances during approach so common in the real world that there would be huge numbers of go arounds? Just asking.
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400 ft seems kind of high to take over unless his approach was way high and needed immediate correction. My FO landing at Kingston one day kept floating so I said land now or go around. He landed but I didn't touch anything.
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All I can think of for relevancy is a female is less likely to have carrier-landing experience, so the slam-it-down instinct (if it was ever carried into commercial flying) is less likely to be present?