Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
Notes from July 11 NTSB press conference
These are my own notes. While I was typing as I listened, I am neither stenographer nor pilot. If someone posts better notes, I'll happily delete this post, or respond to corrections. I've consolidated material from the opening statement and answers to press questions.
From the CVR:
There is a sink rate comment before the 500 foot auto callout
Over time there are verbal glide path comments: first above, then on, then below
timestamps were not provided for the above, but were provided or relative order given for this final set (where I is the time of impact)
I-35 automated 500 foot callout
shortly thereafter crew member calls landing checklist complete
I-18 200 auto altitude callout
I-9 100 auto altitude callout
very shortly thereafter is the first comment regarding speed
I-3 a call for Go-around
I-1.5 second call for Go-around by a different crew member
Regarding the FDR:
220 of the 1400 parameters have been validated so far.
Engines and flight control services appear to have responded as expected to control inputs.
No anomalous behavior of the autopilot, flight director, and autothrottles observed.
She specifically stated that the fuel tanks were not breached, and that it was not a fuel-fed fire. She re-iterated a previous comment giving the near engine as the starting point, with an oil tank rupture providing the initial fire fuel.
Personal note: because the discussion here has shown intense interest in modes, I listened carefully, and believe no Flight recorder based mode information was given today at all. (yesterday's presser mentioned that multiple A/P and A/T modes were seen in the last 2.5 minutes, but today did not even revisit that).
From the CVR:
There is a sink rate comment before the 500 foot auto callout
Over time there are verbal glide path comments: first above, then on, then below
timestamps were not provided for the above, but were provided or relative order given for this final set (where I is the time of impact)
I-35 automated 500 foot callout
shortly thereafter crew member calls landing checklist complete
I-18 200 auto altitude callout
I-9 100 auto altitude callout
very shortly thereafter is the first comment regarding speed
I-3 a call for Go-around
I-1.5 second call for Go-around by a different crew member
Regarding the FDR:
220 of the 1400 parameters have been validated so far.
Engines and flight control services appear to have responded as expected to control inputs.
No anomalous behavior of the autopilot, flight director, and autothrottles observed.
She specifically stated that the fuel tanks were not breached, and that it was not a fuel-fed fire. She re-iterated a previous comment giving the near engine as the starting point, with an oil tank rupture providing the initial fire fuel.
Personal note: because the discussion here has shown intense interest in modes, I listened carefully, and believe no Flight recorder based mode information was given today at all. (yesterday's presser mentioned that multiple A/P and A/T modes were seen in the last 2.5 minutes, but today did not even revisit that).
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NTSB: Preliminary review of FDR data traces do not indicate any anomalies with autopilot, flight director or auto-throttle systems.
Last edited by Machaca; 11th Jul 2013 at 22:44.
Clayne
So you are saying that a non precision approach is safer, in the long run, than a precision approach. Words fail me!
BBK
So you are saying that a non precision approach is safer, in the long run, than a precision approach. Words fail me!
BBK
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NTSB Briefing 11th July
... but Archae 86, what was her very last sentence? Something like:
"This was a visual approach which is a completely normal approach flown on a nice day with 10 mile visibility."
A very telling comment I would suggest, which she didn't have to make, but has a telling inference.
"This was a visual approach which is a completely normal approach flown on a nice day with 10 mile visibility."
A very telling comment I would suggest, which she didn't have to make, but has a telling inference.
not an autoland
Originally Posted by Lorimer
... but Archae 86, what was her very last sentence? Something like:
"This was a visual approach which is a completely normal approach flown on a nice day with 10 mile visibility."
A very telling comment I would suggest, which she didn't have to make, but has a telling inference.
"This was a visual approach which is a completely normal approach flown on a nice day with 10 mile visibility."
A very telling comment I would suggest, which she didn't have to make, but has a telling inference.
A rough approximation to her answer was "but it was not doing an autoland--they were hand flying it" and went on to say that was a perfectly reasonable thing to be doing--using comments you likely recall more accurately than I.
(at least that's what I recall)
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SFO expansion
A question from a non-pilot.
Those of us who live in the Bay Area are all too familiar with SFO delays in low vis conditions. Caused - I've always been told - by the need to essentially cut takeoffs/landings in half because the runways are so close together that modern jetliners can't safely operate in parallel at that airport without optimal visibility.
Are the "sporty" maneuvers requested by SFO controllers motivated entirely by noise abatement requirements, or does it have something to do with the closely spaced runways? Would moving the runways farther apart make any difference?
Those of us who live in the Bay Area are all too familiar with SFO delays in low vis conditions. Caused - I've always been told - by the need to essentially cut takeoffs/landings in half because the runways are so close together that modern jetliners can't safely operate in parallel at that airport without optimal visibility.
Are the "sporty" maneuvers requested by SFO controllers motivated entirely by noise abatement requirements, or does it have something to do with the closely spaced runways? Would moving the runways farther apart make any difference?
Fflow
The terrain and adjacent airports along with the direction of departures (off 1L/R usually) under flying the downwind for the landing runways (usually 28L/R) would contribute in addition to noise abatement considerations.
The terrain and adjacent airports along with the direction of departures (off 1L/R usually) under flying the downwind for the landing runways (usually 28L/R) would contribute in addition to noise abatement considerations.
There is an RNAV GPS Approach available for R28L
They could have programmed the FMC and followed LNAV VNAV right down to the runway if they had wanted to
They could have programmed the FMC and followed LNAV VNAV right down to the runway if they had wanted to
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Firefighting technique
14 min long video of firetrucks trying to put out the fire of the Asiana AFTER everyone got out.
Comments there are NOT highly complementary of the SFO firefighters.
Anyone here care to comment?
Btw, here's 1st half of video showing scene 4 seconds after impact (although the uploader has the time wrong...).
Comments there are NOT highly complementary of the SFO firefighters.
Anyone here care to comment?
Btw, here's 1st half of video showing scene 4 seconds after impact (although the uploader has the time wrong...).
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automation dependency will come up as a huge factor in this investigation if they are Truthful
That being said, I don't remember an NSTB air carrier crash investigation in which partiality to any business entity, department of government, preferred "philosophy of flying" or any other bias has deflected the Board from seeking the truth. Their investigations are pretty much the gold standard against which accident investigations performed in other countries are assessed.
If, as public information so far suggests, flight crew performance was a primary cause of this fatal accident, then we can depend that the NTSB will carefully consider all aspects affecting that performance -- and those aspects will included flight crew initial and type-transition training, qualification, recurrent training, and how the patterns of company flight operations (and transitions between types) affect crew skill levels and their cognitive biases.
For those on this forum who haven't read NTSB Accident Reports on air carrier crashes, I suggest that you may find it well worth your while to invest some time studying a few. Given the strong opinions voiced here, I'm sure many can find fault with these reports. For me, they are models of calm, objective and impartial truth-seeking.
I-35 automated 500 foot callout
shortly thereafter crew member calls landing checklist complete
shortly thereafter crew member calls landing checklist complete
Go-round, come back for another go.
Loss of face - maybe...Loss of aircraft - no
Firefighting technique
14 min long video of firetrucks trying to put out the fire of the Asiana AFTER
everyone got out.
Comments there are NOT highly complementary of the SFO
firefighters.
Anyone here care to comment?
everyone got out.
Comments there are NOT highly complementary of the SFO
firefighters.
Anyone here care to comment?
Sort of what appears to have happened to Asiana...
Last edited by tdracer; 12th Jul 2013 at 01:07.
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Cabin Crew
That picture can't help but tear at you. I hope those kids understand how well they performed last Sunday. Three of them were chucked out onto the runway, a couple of others knocked senseless in the impact or in the attack of the slides, and yet not one single passenger that remained on the aircraft perished. When the shock wears off, I sincerely hope they find the ability to look at themselves with pride. Very well done, all of them.
I wondered about the delay myself. The only thing I could think beyond the fog of war was an attempt to configure the plane per their SOP not knowing the true extent of the damage. They did still have operable radios as evidenced by transmissions to the tower, perhaps that led them to believe he still had an airplane behind him rather than a carcass.
My bet is fog of war. Among other questions, that is one I hope the crew is asked.
My bet is fog of war. Among other questions, that is one I hope the crew is asked.
HazelNuts39 #1815
Asked
"Maybe a dumb question, but if 137 kts was the VREF, doesn't that mean that the stall speed may have been 111 kts?s?"
A reasonable question, and nobody answered, so I'll have a go.
I'm super lazy, so going from memory, last I looked was probably over 25 years ago, VREF was 1.3 Vs so stall with VREF = 137 would be 137/1.3 which is 105. I stand ready to be corrected.
Asked
"Maybe a dumb question, but if 137 kts was the VREF, doesn't that mean that the stall speed may have been 111 kts?s?"
A reasonable question, and nobody answered, so I'll have a go.
I'm super lazy, so going from memory, last I looked was probably over 25 years ago, VREF was 1.3 Vs so stall with VREF = 137 would be 137/1.3 which is 105. I stand ready to be corrected.
"Maybe a dumb question, but if 137 kts was the VREF, doesn't that mean that the stall speed may have been 111 kts?s?"
A reasonable question, and nobody answered, so I'll have a go.
I'm super lazy, so going from memory, last I looked was probably over 25 years ago, VREF was 1.3 Vs so stall with VREF = 137 would be 137/1.3 which is 105. I stand ready to be corrected.
A reasonable question, and nobody answered, so I'll have a go.
I'm super lazy, so going from memory, last I looked was probably over 25 years ago, VREF was 1.3 Vs so stall with VREF = 137 would be 137/1.3 which is 105. I stand ready to be corrected.
Plus - once below 200 feet AGL (with the ~200-ft wingspan of the 777) there would have been a growing cushion (literally and figuratively) from ground effect, allowing the aircraft to mush along at - or even slightly below - Vso.
Not that I'd ever want to have to count on it to make the runway.
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V Ref
On the heavy weight B777-200ER with a max landing weight of approx 213,000 kgs or 465,000 lbs the Vref varies from 139 knots at Max Landing Weight to 129 knots at very light weights.
Vref is either the greater of 1.3 Vs or 1.2 Vmca.
The 129 knots figure covers a very wide range of lighter weights and is obviously the Vmca protection figures coming into play. It is also a general requirement for an 'add on' to Vref commonly all the headwind and half the gust up to a maximum of 20 Knots although with the 777 the add on with autothrottles in SPD mode is 5 knots. Have I have read that the V ref figure was 134 Knots but the 'bugged' figure was 137 Knots . the 'bugged' figure being V ref PLUS the add on.
134 Knots as Vref covers a landing weight around 435,000 lbs, 187,00 kgs mark.
APS weight typically for a 11 hour flight 320,000 lbs 145,000 Kgs. 300 plus people plus a bit of cargo 75-80000lbs, 35,000 kgs plus minimum fuel for say a divert to LAX and 30 mins reserve 22-25,000 lbs 10,000 kgs give a weight appropriate to the V ref of 134.
Vref is either the greater of 1.3 Vs or 1.2 Vmca.
The 129 knots figure covers a very wide range of lighter weights and is obviously the Vmca protection figures coming into play. It is also a general requirement for an 'add on' to Vref commonly all the headwind and half the gust up to a maximum of 20 Knots although with the 777 the add on with autothrottles in SPD mode is 5 knots. Have I have read that the V ref figure was 134 Knots but the 'bugged' figure was 137 Knots . the 'bugged' figure being V ref PLUS the add on.
134 Knots as Vref covers a landing weight around 435,000 lbs, 187,00 kgs mark.
APS weight typically for a 11 hour flight 320,000 lbs 145,000 Kgs. 300 plus people plus a bit of cargo 75-80000lbs, 35,000 kgs plus minimum fuel for say a divert to LAX and 30 mins reserve 22-25,000 lbs 10,000 kgs give a weight appropriate to the V ref of 134.
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Considering the total damage to the fuselage - separation of tail section, landing gear and engines and also the post impact fire - it was truly miraculous that the wing tanks did not rupture and ignite a nightmare inferno, TG. (I'm assuming there was fuel in the wings). Perhaps we could learn from Boeing's 777 wing tank fuel design?
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Centaurus wrote:
If the sophisticated computer systems will do their best not allow the pilot to crash, why disable (by design) the A/T wake-up in FLCH-mode? Or to rephrase the question: In what cases will the plane crash when A/T wakes up in FLCH-mode? I’m not a professional pilot, but just curious; who would ever say “Thank God the A/T didn't wake up in FLCH mode”? Is this feature really needed?
Thus the sophisticated computer systems will do their best not to allow the pilot to crash.