Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
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On an Airbus there is also something called Alpha Floor which in this instance might have been useful and was possibly what the trainee was relying on given his previous experience on A320.
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Just a thought but, the PF had his FD off and the PM had his FD on. Confirm?
Could the PF have been "looking outside" primarily at the piano keys, and the PM "looking inside" primarily at the FD bars?
I say the word "primarily", with a grain of salt too.
Could the PF have been "looking outside" primarily at the piano keys, and the PM "looking inside" primarily at the FD bars?
I say the word "primarily", with a grain of salt too.
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Volume wrote 11th Jul 2013, 21:45:
There is one problem in the display logic of speed tape.
The flight instruments and the ergonomy of a commercial jet's cockpit aim to be as simple and easy to understand as possible. So that when **** hits the fan and pilots' capacity is not sufficient to see, process and understand all info and indications coming from several sources, the systems should guide the pilots as much as possible to the right direction.
Like if the plane is in abnormal nose up position, there are red arrows in the artificial horizon that show the direction where to steer, push down. Or if you get a TCAS avoidance command, your instruments show clearly the direction where to go, up or down, the wrong direction is displayed on red, you can't misunderstand the correct direction.
But the speed tape is different. The logic goes just wrong way. If your speed is too slow or too high and you "steer the plane away from red", you go wrong way. I know this misunderstanding sounds impossible in our ears, we don't make such mistakes and we understand easily and immediately all situations. But we are only one percent of all pilots, the other 99 % make mistakes, and every now and then very stupid ones.
There are some writings here about so called "FLCH-trap". I can't see any way how that could have been the case here. No one uses FLCH-mode with zero altitude in alt selector. As far as I understand that would have been the only way to have this situation in this low altitude. And this was a line training flight. So I'm pretty sure that has not been the case.
But what I would like to know is the mandatoriness of using AT in manual approach in T7. Many airlines accept their pilots to practise their manual flying skills and disconnect AP and AT when there is no special need to use them. This is the case in both Airbus and Boeing families, no big difference. But some triple seven pilots say that triple seven is different, in T7 there are Boeing's own operating procedures require the use of AT in all approaches, and all airlines follow these procedures. Is this really the case? I find it not very easy to believe. My opinion is that it is good for me to practise manul flying, and it's better for the flight safety that I can both fly the plane and use the automation. My idea of Boeing's aircraft design philosophy is that they want the pilots always to have the final authority to decide what to do, and the automation is only a very good help, not so that the automation understands everything better than pilots. Sometimes it feels that Airbus philosophy is a bit different. But is it really so that Boeing is going the Airbus way and have even more strict recommendations to use automation all the time?
Being a glider/PPL FI I used to do jumpseat rides frequently (pre 911...). Of course I always monitored what the pilots are doing (once an FI, forever an FI...). I always scanned speed on the backup ASI, which was a "propper" mechanical one, not an electronic small tape. Matter of habit of course, but mayby also indicating a human factors issue.
The flight instruments and the ergonomy of a commercial jet's cockpit aim to be as simple and easy to understand as possible. So that when **** hits the fan and pilots' capacity is not sufficient to see, process and understand all info and indications coming from several sources, the systems should guide the pilots as much as possible to the right direction.
Like if the plane is in abnormal nose up position, there are red arrows in the artificial horizon that show the direction where to steer, push down. Or if you get a TCAS avoidance command, your instruments show clearly the direction where to go, up or down, the wrong direction is displayed on red, you can't misunderstand the correct direction.
But the speed tape is different. The logic goes just wrong way. If your speed is too slow or too high and you "steer the plane away from red", you go wrong way. I know this misunderstanding sounds impossible in our ears, we don't make such mistakes and we understand easily and immediately all situations. But we are only one percent of all pilots, the other 99 % make mistakes, and every now and then very stupid ones.
There are some writings here about so called "FLCH-trap". I can't see any way how that could have been the case here. No one uses FLCH-mode with zero altitude in alt selector. As far as I understand that would have been the only way to have this situation in this low altitude. And this was a line training flight. So I'm pretty sure that has not been the case.
But what I would like to know is the mandatoriness of using AT in manual approach in T7. Many airlines accept their pilots to practise their manual flying skills and disconnect AP and AT when there is no special need to use them. This is the case in both Airbus and Boeing families, no big difference. But some triple seven pilots say that triple seven is different, in T7 there are Boeing's own operating procedures require the use of AT in all approaches, and all airlines follow these procedures. Is this really the case? I find it not very easy to believe. My opinion is that it is good for me to practise manul flying, and it's better for the flight safety that I can both fly the plane and use the automation. My idea of Boeing's aircraft design philosophy is that they want the pilots always to have the final authority to decide what to do, and the automation is only a very good help, not so that the automation understands everything better than pilots. Sometimes it feels that Airbus philosophy is a bit different. But is it really so that Boeing is going the Airbus way and have even more strict recommendations to use automation all the time?
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Arimanship and CRM
This flight was operated with a 4 men crew.
None of them picked up the very low airspeed or the unusual sight of the runway being way too low!
1. Any pilot flying any commercial airplane must be capable of reading and interpreting an airspeed far too low and the associated attitude (unusual attitude…flight with unreliable airspeed
2. There is a TCH of probably 60 feet! When this altitude is reached way in front of a runway pilots must realize they are in serious trouble
3. This was obviously a pax airplane and towards the end of its flight is very light, so landing distance is NOT a factor. I know many pilots who fly freighter 747 at 302 T landing weight into 8000 feet runways on non-precision approaches. That is not too big a problem as long as they know what they are doing.
in case of Asiana, again very light, there is NO need to even land within the TDZ because there is enough runway available.
While this accident is a very sad one it was completely avoidable by 1,2,3 or 4 pilots watching for it to happen.
This is very likely a mentality problem about airmanship and CRM
None of them picked up the very low airspeed or the unusual sight of the runway being way too low!
1. Any pilot flying any commercial airplane must be capable of reading and interpreting an airspeed far too low and the associated attitude (unusual attitude…flight with unreliable airspeed
2. There is a TCH of probably 60 feet! When this altitude is reached way in front of a runway pilots must realize they are in serious trouble
3. This was obviously a pax airplane and towards the end of its flight is very light, so landing distance is NOT a factor. I know many pilots who fly freighter 747 at 302 T landing weight into 8000 feet runways on non-precision approaches. That is not too big a problem as long as they know what they are doing.
in case of Asiana, again very light, there is NO need to even land within the TDZ because there is enough runway available.
While this accident is a very sad one it was completely avoidable by 1,2,3 or 4 pilots watching for it to happen.
This is very likely a mentality problem about airmanship and CRM
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This has all been fascinating to read. This incident is the perfect bookend to Air France 447. Conditions could literally not be more different, and yet so similar.
We will never be able to trust our crew again. In the past, if we worried at all, it was about the equipment breaking. We knew that our crew would fight like hell for our lives. Those days are gone. There seem to be no more pilots, just aviation systems administrators.
As a profession, as a whole, you guys should be mortified. You should rise up in unison and demand that the people sitting in your seats know at least how to operate the throttle. You should all be embarrassed.
Thankfully it usually works. But it's no fun at all.
We will never be able to trust our crew again. In the past, if we worried at all, it was about the equipment breaking. We knew that our crew would fight like hell for our lives. Those days are gone. There seem to be no more pilots, just aviation systems administrators.
As a profession, as a whole, you guys should be mortified. You should rise up in unison and demand that the people sitting in your seats know at least how to operate the throttle. You should all be embarrassed.
Thankfully it usually works. But it's no fun at all.
Last edited by deSitter; 12th Jul 2013 at 09:47.
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Having a spent a fair deal of time as a flight instructor (initial entry and line) and mishap investigator, I would offer the following about qualifications and standards:
It is common pilot chatter bemoaning "lowest common denominator" standards. The fact is, all standards for qualification are effectively "lowest common denominator". That "common denominator" is established, and you are either found to be qualified to a given standard or you are not. One danger is when the standards (or enforcement) are set to produce a given number of "qualified persons" and not based upon the actual requirements of the task. Another danger is when subjective higher "standards" are bandied about by the pilot population (particularly the self anointed "better" pilots), yet are never formalized into the actual standards, training and enforcement.
In order for standards to be of any value, not only must they address the minimum performance to successfully accomplish the task, but they must be the basis of the training provided, the operating behavior of the crews and then enforced. But we, as a group, do not like to discuss how we are trained and evaluated to a "minimum" standard, even though there can be no other rational method for certifying individuals for a given crew position. You are either "qualified" or you are not, in the flying world. As one of my mentors would say, "It's just like pregnancy. You are either pregnant or you are not. There is no such state as almost pregnant, more pregnant or less pregnant."
I find it hard to imagine a justification for bestowing "qualified" status to any position that would be at the controls of any aircraft that did not include the ability to shoot a visual approach in VMC, but I'm long retired and the world changes. However, if that standard (ability to land hands on) is legitimate, then rather than decrying airports without G/S (which is confusing airport standards with pilot standards), get that standard established, trained to and enforced. And by "trained to", I include the opportunity and requirement to perform it on a regular basis.
I haven't a clue as to what caused this flight crew to get in the pickle they got into. That's the task of the mishap investigators of the NTSB. However, I do know the principles of standards, training to standards, operating to standards and enforcing standards, and a lot of the chatter in this thread is oblivious to these.
It is common pilot chatter bemoaning "lowest common denominator" standards. The fact is, all standards for qualification are effectively "lowest common denominator". That "common denominator" is established, and you are either found to be qualified to a given standard or you are not. One danger is when the standards (or enforcement) are set to produce a given number of "qualified persons" and not based upon the actual requirements of the task. Another danger is when subjective higher "standards" are bandied about by the pilot population (particularly the self anointed "better" pilots), yet are never formalized into the actual standards, training and enforcement.
In order for standards to be of any value, not only must they address the minimum performance to successfully accomplish the task, but they must be the basis of the training provided, the operating behavior of the crews and then enforced. But we, as a group, do not like to discuss how we are trained and evaluated to a "minimum" standard, even though there can be no other rational method for certifying individuals for a given crew position. You are either "qualified" or you are not, in the flying world. As one of my mentors would say, "It's just like pregnancy. You are either pregnant or you are not. There is no such state as almost pregnant, more pregnant or less pregnant."
I find it hard to imagine a justification for bestowing "qualified" status to any position that would be at the controls of any aircraft that did not include the ability to shoot a visual approach in VMC, but I'm long retired and the world changes. However, if that standard (ability to land hands on) is legitimate, then rather than decrying airports without G/S (which is confusing airport standards with pilot standards), get that standard established, trained to and enforced. And by "trained to", I include the opportunity and requirement to perform it on a regular basis.
I haven't a clue as to what caused this flight crew to get in the pickle they got into. That's the task of the mishap investigators of the NTSB. However, I do know the principles of standards, training to standards, operating to standards and enforcing standards, and a lot of the chatter in this thread is oblivious to these.
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Automation Complacency?
Automation can really catch you out. If you are flying manual thrust, you absolutely know who is responsible for the thrust . YOU! Pilots get tired, and used to autothrust taking care of the speed. However, we are still responsible for airspeed whether it's being achieved by our own efforts, or by the AT system. I believe we need to be reminded about the basics, and practice them. I say this both as a current airbus pilot and FI/aeros instructor.
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J-Class:
No way. These protections activate only in situations where the correct control of the plane has been lost, alfa floor activates when the plane approaches stall AOA.
Planes can not be flown so that the pilots in purpose let the protections take care of anything. Exception: Airbus stall protection takes care of stall margin when pilots pull the stick fully back after receiving GPWS warning.
So at the end of a long night, the Airbus-experienced OZ 214 pilot may have mistakenly thought he had alpha floor protection on a B777? Perhaps this shouldn't surprise us - after all, the pilots of AF 447 seem to have thought they had alpha floor protection on their A330 too, even while their aircraft was operating outside Normal Law and they were in a deep stall...
Planes can not be flown so that the pilots in purpose let the protections take care of anything. Exception: Airbus stall protection takes care of stall margin when pilots pull the stick fully back after receiving GPWS warning.
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Quote:
On an Airbus there is also something called Alpha Floor which in this instance might have been useful and was possibly what the trainee was relying on given his previous experience on A320.
Quote:
320 or 777 or cessna 152, you still have to check the speed on final anyway.
You are so right, but having converted recently from A 320 the PF could have been in a mindset of false reliance on the systems( alpha floor, alpha prot). I saw it happen to myself, when things got tight in a sim session I ( sometimes ) lapsed into the old aircrafts SOPs. But this was real life!
BTW this is not Boeing bashing, do not know the 777 in detail.
Basic flying skills would have saved the day....and they are eroding!
On an Airbus there is also something called Alpha Floor which in this instance might have been useful and was possibly what the trainee was relying on given his previous experience on A320.
Quote:
320 or 777 or cessna 152, you still have to check the speed on final anyway.
You are so right, but having converted recently from A 320 the PF could have been in a mindset of false reliance on the systems( alpha floor, alpha prot). I saw it happen to myself, when things got tight in a sim session I ( sometimes ) lapsed into the old aircrafts SOPs. But this was real life!
BTW this is not Boeing bashing, do not know the 777 in detail.
Basic flying skills would have saved the day....and they are eroding!
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Quote:
Originally Posted by armchairpilot94116
Former pilot?s animation re-creates Saturday?s SFO crash | SFGate Blog | an SFGate.com blog
Simple animation of what it should've been like.
That's fantastic!
Also, he says this:
Quote:
“this was a very unique crash that will be influential in evaluating pilot training and qualifications.”
Originally Posted by armchairpilot94116
Former pilot?s animation re-creates Saturday?s SFO crash | SFGate Blog | an SFGate.com blog
Simple animation of what it should've been like.
That's fantastic!
Also, he says this:
Quote:
“this was a very unique crash that will be influential in evaluating pilot training and qualifications.”
It really saddens me to see people placing thegblame on cc for the deaths of those 2 girls. By all accounts the cc did what they were supposed to do, including passing on vital info to the cockpit crew. The picture of them out of uniform, looking for all the world like they have just had a scolding from mum just breaks my heart. They no doubt will be wondering if there was anything else they could have done.
I have flown many times to Asia, including China. Now while I'm not saying this is the case, it is very difficult to get non English speaking Chinese pax to sit down if they don't want to. Especially kids and teens. And I can be a very assertive person when I need to be. Now lets imagine this. Let's say those crew did go around the cabin, trying to put on seatbelts of non compliers. They would have been up for landing and possibly killed. Less crew to evacuate now. The priority is the safety of the crew member. You can only tell them, you can't rugby tackle them. Once you've secured the cabin and that no contact period has started, if they stand up, they stand up. You do not get out of your seat.
I'm just appalled by some of the comments here. I hope the crew of OZ are getting the appropriate support. There is currently a BookFace campaign by flight attendants worldwide for anyone who wants to send a letter or card of support to the Asiana cc. Perhaps knowing that their colleagues the world over think they did an incredible job will make the recovery process that bit easier. If I find the details I'll post them here.
I have flown many times to Asia, including China. Now while I'm not saying this is the case, it is very difficult to get non English speaking Chinese pax to sit down if they don't want to. Especially kids and teens. And I can be a very assertive person when I need to be. Now lets imagine this. Let's say those crew did go around the cabin, trying to put on seatbelts of non compliers. They would have been up for landing and possibly killed. Less crew to evacuate now. The priority is the safety of the crew member. You can only tell them, you can't rugby tackle them. Once you've secured the cabin and that no contact period has started, if they stand up, they stand up. You do not get out of your seat.
I'm just appalled by some of the comments here. I hope the crew of OZ are getting the appropriate support. There is currently a BookFace campaign by flight attendants worldwide for anyone who wants to send a letter or card of support to the Asiana cc. Perhaps knowing that their colleagues the world over think they did an incredible job will make the recovery process that bit easier. If I find the details I'll post them here.
Last edited by givemewings; 12th Jul 2013 at 11:59.
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Wings, I have not seen anything but high phrase for the CC here in the US. How can anybody blame the CC for the deaths of the 2 girls as they were ejected from the A/C. Foolish really.
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No one here in the US faults the cabin crew. Going from what they considered a normal approach to sliding sideways off the runway with landing gear and one engine ripped off in two seconds gives them no time to prepare.
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Many have asked why there is no low speed aural warning. There is. The Stick Skaker is both an Aural, and a Tactile, Stall(slow speed) Warning.
The Stick Shaker activated 4 seconds before impact.
Lots of talk of A/T Hold, but if the Flying Pilot had just pushed either one of the Go-Around Switches the first time he heard the Stick Shaker, or the first time someone said "Go-Around", I am pretty sure this accident would have not happened.
This was obviously an Unstable Approach by any normal standard, and the Go-Around call should have been made much earlier. The big question is "Why was no Go-Around call made much earlier?" and/or "Why were the Go-Around switch not pushed when they should have been?"
The Stick Shaker activated 4 seconds before impact.
Lots of talk of A/T Hold, but if the Flying Pilot had just pushed either one of the Go-Around Switches the first time he heard the Stick Shaker, or the first time someone said "Go-Around", I am pretty sure this accident would have not happened.
This was obviously an Unstable Approach by any normal standard, and the Go-Around call should have been made much earlier. The big question is "Why was no Go-Around call made much earlier?" and/or "Why were the Go-Around switch not pushed when they should have been?"
Last edited by Lost in Saigon; 12th Jul 2013 at 14:11.
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deSitter, read the fine print
The explanation below the animation states that the ghost airplane would have departed frame immediately if animated with the proper approach speed, and thus the image was purposely slowed down to match the too-slow speed of the mishap aircraft.
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I totaly agree with "Lost in Saigon".... with the limitted amount of information I could collect from overseas .. it seems pretty obvious, that the approach was never ever stable. So, why did this crew continue when passing the MAPt?? Just follow the given instruction (without knowing asianas SOPs, but I would be really horrified, if there are SOPs with a differnet instruction..)
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I think Flight Level Change for a final approach segment is particularly dangerous. I have never done it, except once on a B734 while observing a prospective Captain upgrade who I was giving OE (line training) to. I immediately terminated his training. I don't have the enthusiasm to root through my manuals at this time, and I don't recall if there is a particular prohibition on the use of FLC when low to the ground, but there should be one.
In the past, I had always been taught that the acceptable vertical modes for a final approach segment are: GS; VNAV; or VS. Is there a gap in training where this is not being stressed at Asiana or other carriers?
In the past, I had always been taught that the acceptable vertical modes for a final approach segment are: GS; VNAV; or VS. Is there a gap in training where this is not being stressed at Asiana or other carriers?
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FLCH
Airbus has kind of solved the problem by requiring that you switch off both FD's on a visual approach , this forces the a/t into speed mode . The Airbus equivalent to FLCH though can also trap you if you leave the FD's on and select idle open dec with the alt selector on airport elevation. One wonders why there was no awareness that the thrust levers were at idle as on Boeings they are back driven unlike on the Airbus , if the PF had his hand on the throttles he would have been aware that they were at the idle position.
If Asiana pilots really want to gently practice visual hands-on approaches coming in over water, they have the best opportunities and the best place in the world to do it, Incheon.
Last edited by jolihokistix; 12th Jul 2013 at 14:36.
