Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
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Unbelievably NOBODY from flight deck had situational awareness. Other wise, Evacuation would have been immediately.
It´s very odd that pilots were not aware of the situation.
Unbelievable ˇˇ
"Conditions for an evacuation"
When the plane and engines are stopped, ordered by Captain, Call-out: EVACUATEˇˇ, EVACUATEˇˇ, EVACUATEˇˇ
In case of having no communication with flight deck, Cabin Crew must initiate an evacuation in the following cases:
-Fire or smoke inside/outside the plane.
-Severe damages in the fuselage of the plane.
-Bomb on board
-If the evacuation has been iniciated in other place of the plane.
-In an expected/unexpected emergency.
-In a ditching
*What does happen if engines are not stopped yet? Cabin Crew must use the comun sense.
I´m surprised with the fact that the Senior Cabin Crew was the last crew member to abandon the plane...There were 3 Captains, one of them should have been the last to abandon the plane instead of the SCC.
It is said that a vehicle run over a survivor who died shortly after the accident with the vehicule. If a crew member had carried out a good coordination on the ground, this person could be alive.
I think that this fatal accident Asiana 214 is going to be a good scenario for study the differents aspects related to CRM. I think it could be considered an example such as Los Rodeos in Tenerife which happened many years ago.
It´s very odd that pilots were not aware of the situation.
Unbelievable ˇˇ
"Conditions for an evacuation"
When the plane and engines are stopped, ordered by Captain, Call-out: EVACUATEˇˇ, EVACUATEˇˇ, EVACUATEˇˇ
In case of having no communication with flight deck, Cabin Crew must initiate an evacuation in the following cases:
-Fire or smoke inside/outside the plane.
-Severe damages in the fuselage of the plane.
-Bomb on board
-If the evacuation has been iniciated in other place of the plane.
-In an expected/unexpected emergency.
-In a ditching
*What does happen if engines are not stopped yet? Cabin Crew must use the comun sense.
I´m surprised with the fact that the Senior Cabin Crew was the last crew member to abandon the plane...There were 3 Captains, one of them should have been the last to abandon the plane instead of the SCC.
It is said that a vehicle run over a survivor who died shortly after the accident with the vehicule. If a crew member had carried out a good coordination on the ground, this person could be alive.
I think that this fatal accident Asiana 214 is going to be a good scenario for study the differents aspects related to CRM. I think it could be considered an example such as Los Rodeos in Tenerife which happened many years ago.
As an aside, on my last CRM they had us read, item by item, the evac checklist. And showed a video of two of our pilots performing an exercise in the sim. RTO due cargo fire warning. Watching them run the checklist was interesting for a lot of my group who had no piloting experience. They had no idea the pilots even "did anything" after it became clear something was not right.
We all know there is a checklist of course, but actually see them run it was enlightening for most.
We all know there is a checklist of course, but actually see them run it was enlightening for most.
Last edited by givemewings; 11th Jul 2013 at 12:36.
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Please no more "if only the ILS was working"
Many, many thousands of pilots fly visual approaches every day without an ILS. How many pilots managed to land at SFO that day without crashing. To say the ILS outage was a contributory factor is nonsense.
I fly the 777 and have flown numerous visual approach without an ILS with no extra stress involved in doing so....and i'm not alone!!!! this is standard practice across the world. If pilots can't fly to an airport without an ILS then they should not be allowed to fly at all. For the armchair experts out there a visual approach is not challenging.
I get the swiss cheese model, but individual responsibility come into play as well. I think that we just need to accept that we all occasionally F up - and these guys did just that.
I must say that I agree with post 1692... having flown with these guys I know these words to be true - I always laugh when non flying guys say "it can't possibly be that bad".
Many, many thousands of pilots fly visual approaches every day without an ILS. How many pilots managed to land at SFO that day without crashing. To say the ILS outage was a contributory factor is nonsense.I fly the 777 and have flown numerous visual approach without an ILS with no extra stress involved in doing so....and i'm not alone!!!! this is standard practice across the world. If pilots can't fly to an airport without an ILS then they should not be allowed to fly at all. For the armchair experts out there a visual approach is not challenging.
I get the swiss cheese model, but individual responsibility come into play as well. I think that we just need to accept that we all occasionally F up - and these guys did just that.
I must say that I agree with post 1692... having flown with these guys I know these words to be true - I always laugh when non flying guys say "it can't possibly be that bad".
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United Flight 885 asks:
This thought has been in the back of my mind for several days now, and I bet the UA crew are bitterly regretting that they didn't say something – although whether it would have been responded to or not is another matter!
Every air traffic control frequency is under the control of the ATCO who is providing the service on that frequency. A pilot would virtually never speak directly to another pilot, although that is simply a matter of pressing the transmit button. Usually what happens is to speak through the ATCO i.e. "Tower, doesn't the 777 on finals look a little low?" This serves to bring everyone's attention to the situation and the Controller might well respond with a call to the 777 such as "Asiana 214, you look a little low, are you OK?" The ATCOs are reluctant (appropriately) to tell pilots how to fly the aircraft, they just give us the challenges!
I suspect the UA pilots also thought that the aircraft was very slow too; a 30 knot reduction in normal approach speed would be noticeable I would have thought.
In emergency of course (as here), the UA pilot(s) could have transmitted on the Tower frequency "Asiana 214, you are low and slow, pull up, pull up!" or something, as has already been suggested.
As I said, they will be regretting they didn't, but this is water under the bridge now.
Edit: I don't mean to be ungenerous towards ATC. They do a fantastic job, although some places concentrate the mind a little more than others!
The crew of UA885 saw the aircraft was coming down short of the runway.
Did they communicate with OZ214 by radio to warn them or not? Do regulations prevent them from doing so? Could they have contacted the tower instead?
Did they communicate with OZ214 by radio to warn them or not? Do regulations prevent them from doing so? Could they have contacted the tower instead?
Every air traffic control frequency is under the control of the ATCO who is providing the service on that frequency. A pilot would virtually never speak directly to another pilot, although that is simply a matter of pressing the transmit button. Usually what happens is to speak through the ATCO i.e. "Tower, doesn't the 777 on finals look a little low?" This serves to bring everyone's attention to the situation and the Controller might well respond with a call to the 777 such as "Asiana 214, you look a little low, are you OK?" The ATCOs are reluctant (appropriately) to tell pilots how to fly the aircraft, they just give us the challenges!
I suspect the UA pilots also thought that the aircraft was very slow too; a 30 knot reduction in normal approach speed would be noticeable I would have thought.
In emergency of course (as here), the UA pilot(s) could have transmitted on the Tower frequency "Asiana 214, you are low and slow, pull up, pull up!" or something, as has already been suggested.
As I said, they will be regretting they didn't, but this is water under the bridge now.
Edit: I don't mean to be ungenerous towards ATC. They do a fantastic job, although some places concentrate the mind a little more than others!
Last edited by Lorimer; 11th Jul 2013 at 12:52.
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Quick question, what exactly are the checklist tasks prior to evacuation and how long to do them? 90 seconds sounds a long time to throw a few switches
But more to the point, the crew up front have no idea what things are like behind why didn't one of them go take a look? (Or indeed take charge of the evac)
It seems a slowness to react to things characterises the mishap, which need not be a finger pointing blaming but like Sully said something to consider as part of the whole investigation
Delaying the evac that long (if that is the case) is not 'ok' or acceptable.. one look out back and they'd see the engines were not there making any worries over 'running engines' of little point, or maybe the whole checklist?
But more to the point, the crew up front have no idea what things are like behind why didn't one of them go take a look? (Or indeed take charge of the evac)
It seems a slowness to react to things characterises the mishap, which need not be a finger pointing blaming but like Sully said something to consider as part of the whole investigation
Delaying the evac that long (if that is the case) is not 'ok' or acceptable.. one look out back and they'd see the engines were not there making any worries over 'running engines' of little point, or maybe the whole checklist?
Captain Emad:
Is this a common standard in the industry?
Dutch Roll
I would ask our non pilot participants to review this comment by Dutch Roll. More than once if necessary. The matter of ILS up or not is a red herring. What Dutch Roll points to is some minimum performance metrics that professional pilots adhere to, and that companies require of their professional pilots.
Regarding leading with pitch, or leading with power, I want to thank Captain Bloggs for his reply and the point on handling heavies in the approach environment, in re inertia and drag. Much Appreciated.
This relates to the points made by Dutch Roll.
The aAncient Geek.
Course Profile
I am sorry Course Profile, but you are one of the people who needs to review Dutch Roll's points. Please do so. I realize others have made similar critiques of your assertion.
Mary, in re NYC ATC and comms thrills. It ain't just foreigners who run into Laguardia Speak enjoyment.
Some years ago, I was administering an annual instrument check to an Army pilot from Tennessee in the NYC area. His radio comms were smooth, slow, and very clear. Quite a contrast to the speed and brevity of the ATC voices on the radio. As he requested sequencing for an approach, in his unhurried manner, the controller cut in, and said this (from memory, a few words may be wrong)
"Army XXXX, I don't need your life's story, I need your request. Turn right, heading 110 and call me when you know what you want." Being a bit more used to that area's ATC myself, I admit I had to hide my face so he couldn't see me laughing. He calmly did as directed, and we eventually got his approaches in. It was a training flight, not a revenue flight for an air passenger or cargo service.
I appreciate the point you make when dealing with the controllers in the Newark/Laguardia/Kennedy madhouse. It's not for the faint of heart.
PS: it looks to me like the CC did very well under very difficult circumstances. From a few pages up, it appears that one of the CC (purser?) was proactive in working with the flight deck to get the evac initiated. She retained enough SA to coordinate it with the flight deck who among other things are in a position to shut down the engins (engine, at this point) before getting the pax out of the aircraft. When considering the ground loop that aircraft did after impact, I'd not be surprised if the gents on the FD were stunned or in a bit of a daze and had to collect themselves. Her call to the FD may have helped the FD stay in the game and keep the procedures rolling so that an evac could be done as close to "by the book" as could be managed, given the abrupt ground impact and injury to some of the CC. (Guessing, of course).
Just to put that in perspective, in my organisation, below 1000ft, a sustained Vref minus 3 knots would be an automatic fail in the sim.
In my airline, as stated above by Capt Emad, a
sustained speed excursion below Vref would be a fail in the simulator for the flying pilot.
sustained speed excursion below Vref would be a fail in the simulator for the flying pilot.
A sustained speed excursion below Vref and not called by the non-flying pilot would be a fail for the non-flying pilot. Neglecting to call a go-around if the speed is not immediately corrected would also be a fail for the non-flying pilot. That's how it works. Well, in some airlines at least. The importance is placed on noticing the error, and applying an immediate correction, or if that doesn't work, go-around.
If you do this, you won't fail. In fact, in our airline you can screw up your approach but so long as you go-around either of your own accord or when told to, and get it right next time, you generally cannot be failed in the simulator.
If you do this, you won't fail. In fact, in our airline you can screw up your approach but so long as you go-around either of your own accord or when told to, and get it right next time, you generally cannot be failed in the simulator.
Regarding leading with pitch, or leading with power, I want to thank Captain Bloggs for his reply and the point on handling heavies in the approach environment, in re inertia and drag. Much Appreciated.
They screwed up the approach - we have all done that.
They knew that the approach was unstable but they failed to go around. STUPID.
They knew that the approach was unstable but they failed to go around. STUPID.
The aAncient Geek.
Unstable approaches are one of the most common accident causes but pilots still continue into dangerous situations. This happens every day across the industry but most times they get away with it and congratulate themselves on their superiour skills. Time for some serious questions to be asked about human factors. Get-there-itis is a killer.
Well because they turned of a piece of equipment that pilots normally use to land and they ended up crashing.
Mary, in re NYC ATC and comms thrills. It ain't just foreigners who run into Laguardia Speak enjoyment.
Some years ago, I was administering an annual instrument check to an Army pilot from Tennessee in the NYC area. His radio comms were smooth, slow, and very clear. Quite a contrast to the speed and brevity of the ATC voices on the radio. As he requested sequencing for an approach, in his unhurried manner, the controller cut in, and said this (from memory, a few words may be wrong)
"Army XXXX, I don't need your life's story, I need your request. Turn right, heading 110 and call me when you know what you want." Being a bit more used to that area's ATC myself, I admit I had to hide my face so he couldn't see me laughing. He calmly did as directed, and we eventually got his approaches in. It was a training flight, not a revenue flight for an air passenger or cargo service.
I appreciate the point you make when dealing with the controllers in the Newark/Laguardia/Kennedy madhouse. It's not for the faint of heart.
PS: it looks to me like the CC did very well under very difficult circumstances. From a few pages up, it appears that one of the CC (purser?) was proactive in working with the flight deck to get the evac initiated. She retained enough SA to coordinate it with the flight deck who among other things are in a position to shut down the engins (engine, at this point) before getting the pax out of the aircraft. When considering the ground loop that aircraft did after impact, I'd not be surprised if the gents on the FD were stunned or in a bit of a daze and had to collect themselves. Her call to the FD may have helped the FD stay in the game and keep the procedures rolling so that an evac could be done as close to "by the book" as could be managed, given the abrupt ground impact and injury to some of the CC. (Guessing, of course).
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 11th Jul 2013 at 12:56.
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There is a piece of technology that would have prevented this crash happening, but it was turned off. It wasn't broken, it was turned off with no contingency being put in place, because it would have been more expensive to put that contingency in place.
Have you ever set up or moved a precision approach navaid system? Do you have a clue as to what is involved? They are not iPads on casters that you merrily move about as you see fit. There is a reason they are called "precision", and haphazard or rushed installation or movement defeats that "precision".
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Super VC-10
From what I've read, the crew of the United plane were fairly occupied with checklists, a hazmat issue and some other things. They told the Tower that they'd need a few minutes before they could depart. So I think it's likely that they were heads-down and not watching the Asiana land.
The crew of UA885 saw the aircraft was coming down short of the runway.
Did they communicate with OZ214 by radio to warn them or not? Do regulations prevent them from doing so? Could they have contacted the tower instead?
Maybe they did, or is this another hole in the cheese? None of the above is intended as a criticism of the crew of UA885.
Did they communicate with OZ214 by radio to warn them or not? Do regulations prevent them from doing so? Could they have contacted the tower instead?
Maybe they did, or is this another hole in the cheese? None of the above is intended as a criticism of the crew of UA885.
From what I've read, the crew of the United plane were fairly occupied with checklists, a hazmat issue and some other things. They told the Tower that they'd need a few minutes before they could depart. So I think it's likely that they were heads-down and not watching the Asiana land.
Last edited by overthewing; 11th Jul 2013 at 13:11.
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Jazz...Agreed! as I said I have flown with these guys.
"one look out back and they'd see the engines were not there" REALLY. you can't even see the wings from the flight deck how do you think that one can see the engines?
It is too bad that more people/insurance companies/ FAA/ JAA don't have a better understanding of the culture which exists in these countries. We look at this accident through 'Western eyes', go fly in Asia for a while and you will see that that our understanding of CRM is non existent in these parts of the world...to quote a very famous human factors expert "CRM is a child of the West"
"one look out back and they'd see the engines were not there" REALLY. you can't even see the wings from the flight deck how do you think that one can see the engines?
It is too bad that more people/insurance companies/ FAA/ JAA don't have a better understanding of the culture which exists in these countries. We look at this accident through 'Western eyes', go fly in Asia for a while and you will see that that our understanding of CRM is non existent in these parts of the world...to quote a very famous human factors expert "CRM is a child of the West"
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Ross M
I was holding short at KDAL many moons ago doing a runup at 13L. The approaching Hawker was close in and had no landing gear extended! I keyed the mike and announced "Hawker on final, you have no gear!" An immediate go around was performed. He was within 6 ft of runway when he attained positive rate. It was at this time the tower had heard me and commanded a go around, but it was academic at that point. I departed for my mission of the day and never heard anything but the tower controller say thanks.
I was holding short at KDAL many moons ago doing a runup at 13L. The approaching Hawker was close in and had no landing gear extended! I keyed the mike and announced "Hawker on final, you have no gear!" An immediate go around was performed. He was within 6 ft of runway when he attained positive rate. It was at this time the tower had heard me and commanded a go around, but it was academic at that point. I departed for my mission of the day and never heard anything but the tower controller say thanks.
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I worked as an instructor in the Asiana simulator on the A320 and I know how Asiana will fix this problem:- they will forbid landing on ANY runway that does not have some electronic glideslope system and not allow ANY pilot to hand fly an approach, thus perpetuating the total lack of any basic flying skills in 95% of their pilots.
EVERY day in the sim I saw evidence of the following problem:- when the auto pilot is out or the automatics are not behaving as expected, a potential disaster ensues.
That is why I left, I tried my best, but got kicked in the teeth for it. They wont allow you to help them ............. what a shame.
EVERY day in the sim I saw evidence of the following problem:- when the auto pilot is out or the automatics are not behaving as expected, a potential disaster ensues.
That is why I left, I tried my best, but got kicked in the teeth for it. They wont allow you to help them ............. what a shame.
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Course...I guess it is clear to those that fly the 777 that you don't really have an understanding of the aircraft - not having a go at you but just stating a fact.
The 777 is very capable of constructing a vertical path identical to an ILS using the flight management system. Flight Path Angle anyone??? The crew could also (had they so wished) used the automation to fly the ILS profile using VNAV without having a valid ILS signal which would have resulted in the crew flying an identical profile to the ILS. In fact Boeing actually suggest that doing so is good practice for flying non ILS approaches....My point? the unavailability of the ILS is no more of an issue than what the captain had for breakfast
Course...do you work for the insurance company?
The 777 is very capable of constructing a vertical path identical to an ILS using the flight management system. Flight Path Angle anyone??? The crew could also (had they so wished) used the automation to fly the ILS profile using VNAV without having a valid ILS signal which would have resulted in the crew flying an identical profile to the ILS. In fact Boeing actually suggest that doing so is good practice for flying non ILS approaches....My point? the unavailability of the ILS is no more of an issue than what the captain had for breakfast
Course...do you work for the insurance company?
Last edited by Javadreaming; 11th Jul 2013 at 13:29.
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@defacto post#1335
I was the one that wrote that comment. However, you missed my point entirely, for which I apologise if I wasn't clear. I wasn't stating my preference (I'm very much in favour of people that are in control of my life being properly trained, regardless of actual job). I was stating what the likely response from the airlines is going to be. The current environment everywhere is to cut back on training, which is considered to be expensive, and externalise the risk somewhere else. Hence, I predict that the call will go out from the airlines for ILS to be active on every major airport, because that externalises the risk onto the airport operators. It also means that the costs are borne by someone else, and the airlines' profits (and so boards' bonuses) are safe.
I predict this will happen regardless of the outcome of the crash inquiry. The question is, what are you, as professional pilots, going to do about this to ensure that you and I are *properly* safe?
I predict this will happen regardless of the outcome of the crash inquiry. The question is, what are you, as professional pilots, going to do about this to ensure that you and I are *properly* safe?
At Gatwick, EGKK, no minor airport, the main runway (08R/26L) is out of use from 23.00 hours until 05.30 for 4 four weeks, Monday to Friday.
The northern runway 08L/26R (normally a parallel taxiway) 2,565 m x 45 m is in use.
It has no electronic naviads at all, only lights and 3 degree PAPIs.
Everybody seems to manage just fine without a localiser or glideslope. AND it's (mostly) dark.
The northern runway 08L/26R (normally a parallel taxiway) 2,565 m x 45 m is in use.
It has no electronic naviads at all, only lights and 3 degree PAPIs.
Everybody seems to manage just fine without a localiser or glideslope. AND it's (mostly) dark.
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Even though the GS was off the air, they could had flown it in LOC/VNAV. Same level of safety. Once they disconnected the A/THR, GS or not, they seem to have crossed the line of their capabilities. (Any PPL holder could manage this).
What will management do to prevent re-occurence? (they have to do something, right?): no more visual approach, circling, NPAs, disconnecting AP above minimum, disengaging A/THR at all.
Can expect SFO to change their speed control to 160 kts to 4nm and provide ILS to every non-US long-haul flights.
As for the root cause (inability to hand fly a visual approach), nothing will be done!
What will management do to prevent re-occurence? (they have to do something, right?): no more visual approach, circling, NPAs, disconnecting AP above minimum, disengaging A/THR at all.
Can expect SFO to change their speed control to 160 kts to 4nm and provide ILS to every non-US long-haul flights.
As for the root cause (inability to hand fly a visual approach), nothing will be done!