Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
Course profile
"There is a piece of technology that would have prevented this crash happening, but it was turned off. It wasn't broken, it was turned off with no contingency being put in place, because it would have been more expensive to put that contingency in place.
To me, it seems a highly difficult position to defend."
I won't speculate as to the precise role the lack of an ILS played in this accident but in a wider context I would say it is good thing if it is addressed. SFO and JFK are major international airports and I can only guess that their use of non precision approaches is to do with capacity issues. International long haul pilots are not used to flying visual approaches regularly because other countries, from what I have seen, use the ILS as intended. If one does have to shoot a non precision approach then it is normally because the airport doesn't have an ILS at all.
As for stabilised approaches then you need to interview ATC as to why they give unworkable constraints like 180 kts to 5 nm. As others have said you learn to ignore it if you want to make the 1000 ft gate all done and dusted.
To me, it seems a highly difficult position to defend."
I won't speculate as to the precise role the lack of an ILS played in this accident but in a wider context I would say it is good thing if it is addressed. SFO and JFK are major international airports and I can only guess that their use of non precision approaches is to do with capacity issues. International long haul pilots are not used to flying visual approaches regularly because other countries, from what I have seen, use the ILS as intended. If one does have to shoot a non precision approach then it is normally because the airport doesn't have an ILS at all.
As for stabilised approaches then you need to interview ATC as to why they give unworkable constraints like 180 kts to 5 nm. As others have said you learn to ignore it if you want to make the 1000 ft gate all done and dusted.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Way back in the 'anals' of this thread, and now I think deleted, I asked which of the various quotes from 'FCOM' was the 'real' one. I now have the answer.
The FCOM 'Automatic Flight' section DOES mention the inhibition of stall protection via the A/T with the FLCH pitch mode. The FCOM section on 'Flight Controls' does NOT mention it in coverage of stall protection.
Logic?
Since we have no idea which (if any) mode 214 was in, this is posted purely for the elimination of (my) confusion.
EDIT:
It does appear that confusion over the 'delay' in evacuation is creeping in. My understanding is that it did not commence until 90 seconds after coming to rest, and this has NOTHNG to do with certification evac trials involving a different 90 seconds in which to clear the a/c..
The FCOM 'Automatic Flight' section DOES mention the inhibition of stall protection via the A/T with the FLCH pitch mode. The FCOM section on 'Flight Controls' does NOT mention it in coverage of stall protection.
Logic?
Since we have no idea which (if any) mode 214 was in, this is posted purely for the elimination of (my) confusion.
EDIT:
It does appear that confusion over the 'delay' in evacuation is creeping in. My understanding is that it did not commence until 90 seconds after coming to rest, and this has NOTHNG to do with certification evac trials involving a different 90 seconds in which to clear the a/c..
Last edited by BOAC; 11th Jul 2013 at 11:10.
Plectron, were they ab initio or recurrent crew? I only ask because as trainee crew they tend to actually let you make your mistakes in the sim and rectify it the next day... I also see the most hesitation on the ditching exercise but I suspect this is due to the movement of the sim not being familiar at first. I messed up my first ditch exercise because it felt like we were still moving but we weren't...
If recurrent then I would hope there was a debrief that you didn't see... :/
If recurrent then I would hope there was a debrief that you didn't see... :/
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@NigelOnDraft
When I worked as CC with Northwest many moons ago, we were to chant "brace for impact" in unison until the plan landed (or worse). Upon the AC's stopping, we checked our watches. If the flight deck didn't get on the PA to say "stay seated" or something similar (I don't recall the exact wording) or to say "Evacuate the airplane", either within 20 seconds (don't recall the exact time period), CC was to evacuate the AC. CC had the right to evacuate on its own if doing so was obvious, but the above was the procedure.
Of course in Asian 214's case, no one had time to prepare to brace for impact.
In operator I work for, and I presume most, remember when the situation is clearly catastrophic / dire, the CC can evacuate on their own initiative.
Of course in Asian 214's case, no one had time to prepare to brace for impact.
I haven't flown into SFO as crew but looking the sat photo and TV shots where exactly is this "laser" light supposed to have come from when they were at 500' approx 1 .5 nm from the sea wall over the open water?????
Rubbish ****ty attempt to provide an excuse.......
If there was indeed a laser light why
1/ didn't it effect the PF?
2/ why didn't the PM say something?
3/ why didn't the TC direct the PF to go around if he ( the TC ) couldn't see?
It's bogus....
Rubbish ****ty attempt to provide an excuse.......
If there was indeed a laser light why
1/ didn't it effect the PF?
2/ why didn't the PM say something?
3/ why didn't the TC direct the PF to go around if he ( the TC ) couldn't see?
It's bogus....
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Do we get many people trying to shine l@sers into cockpits during a bright July midday sun?
Besides isn't most of that approach over the sea?
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After the simulated touchdown in the water it was my task to issue the evac command. However, I took the option of playing dead - that is, I said nothing. And in the cabin, nothing happened. At all. Nobody did anything. Minutes passed. Finally. I gave up and asked: "Does anyone seriously think this aircraft is going to taxi to the gate?" (Remember this was a water "landing" - ditching). Finally, they carried on with the evac and everyone went out the slide into the water. Lots of giggles and wet FAs. Everyone passed of course.
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United Flight 885
The crew of UA885 saw the aircraft was coming down short of the runway.
Did they communicate with OZ214 by radio to warn them or not? Do regulations prevent them from doing so? Could they have contacted the tower instead?
Maybe they did, or is this another hole in the cheese? None of the above is intended as a criticism of the crew of UA885.
Did they communicate with OZ214 by radio to warn them or not? Do regulations prevent them from doing so? Could they have contacted the tower instead?
Maybe they did, or is this another hole in the cheese? None of the above is intended as a criticism of the crew of UA885.
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Is the ILS really a factor? If they had glidescope would that have meant any better an approach seeing as they have seemingly missed/ignored several factors in their visual approach (airspeed, appropriate altitude, apparent nose angle, possibly config of the AT, observer call outs). With the ILS would that have been one more thing they were chasing to get right, or would that have been another layer of automation to save their bacon?
I work in IT, so as far as the IT comparisons go its limited by fact that its kind of hard to restore an airliner or a life from backup. I would also believe that the installation of equipment as technical as an ILS array would be performed by engineers capable of identifying if they have options to do it with minimum downtime. I know I hate it when people outside my area of speciality expect my work can just happen with the click of fingers without knowing what is involved.
Certainly there is going to be some very hard questions to answer about what occurred in that cockpit.
I work in IT, so as far as the IT comparisons go its limited by fact that its kind of hard to restore an airliner or a life from backup. I would also believe that the installation of equipment as technical as an ILS array would be performed by engineers capable of identifying if they have options to do it with minimum downtime. I know I hate it when people outside my area of speciality expect my work can just happen with the click of fingers without knowing what is involved.
Certainly there is going to be some very hard questions to answer about what occurred in that cockpit.
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"Blinded" for thirty seconds?
Pathetic - the only word I can think of to apply here.
Whole thing still comes down to an inability to exercise reasonable decision-making discretion. Unstabilized? Go around.
ILS is irrelevant. "Blinded" is irrelevant.
Pathetic - the only word I can think of to apply here.
Whole thing still comes down to an inability to exercise reasonable decision-making discretion. Unstabilized? Go around.
ILS is irrelevant. "Blinded" is irrelevant.
There will be changes after this report comes out.
1/ An RNAV approach to all runways if the GS is not available
2/ ATC not requiring 180 kts to 5nm
3/ focus on training Pilots to monitor better
4/ requiring speed and sink rate calls by the PM below 500' ( our company does them and this small call "may" have prevented this accident )
1/ An RNAV approach to all runways if the GS is not available
2/ ATC not requiring 180 kts to 5nm
3/ focus on training Pilots to monitor better
4/ requiring speed and sink rate calls by the PM below 500' ( our company does them and this small call "may" have prevented this accident )
[quoterequiring speed and sink rate calls by the PM below 500' ( our company does them and this small call "may" have prevented this accident )][/quote]
Pfffffffffff,
do i feel Another SOP-change coming?
Pfffffffffff,
do i feel Another SOP-change coming?
Well don't laugh because whilst trying not to appear a ****** smart ass our company require these calls below 500' when hand flying and visual.
If the PM in Asiana had been required to call these speeds there is a very good chance this whole sorry mess might not have happened.
If the PM in Asiana had been required to call these speeds there is a very good chance this whole sorry mess might not have happened.
Last edited by nitpicker330; 11th Jul 2013 at 11:55.
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90 secs from when??
Checklists have to be run prior to evacuation. Certainly in my experience,
Coupled with the undoubted shock of having piled in and watched your landing gear overtake you, I think 90 seconds is entirely plausible.
In my experience, Boeing evac checklists are shorter than Airbus ones, but unless someone has evidence of Asiana's SOP's regarding evacuation, I see it entirely wrong to start criticising the flight crew for this relatively short delay.
Coupled with the undoubted shock of having piled in and watched your landing gear overtake you, I think 90 seconds is entirely plausible.
In my experience, Boeing evac checklists are shorter than Airbus ones, but unless someone has evidence of Asiana's SOP's regarding evacuation, I see it entirely wrong to start criticising the flight crew for this relatively short delay.
Listen, in normal circumstances you have to wait until the cockpit crew can access the situation, shut down Engines, decide the best doors to use etc etc.
How would you feel if you decided to evacuate 10 pax into a running Engine?
Yes this wasn't the case in Asiana but none the less after they gained their senses back they made their assessment and then their call.
How would you feel if you decided to evacuate 10 pax into a running Engine?
Yes this wasn't the case in Asiana but none the less after they gained their senses back they made their assessment and then their call.
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I thought that Manchester (?) showed that there MUST be at least a quick check before an ordered evacuation ?
Obviously in a catastrophic situation the CC must take the initiative.
Obviously in a catastrophic situation the CC must take the initiative.
90sec is a certification guideline not a rule when starting evac. Again, please go read about QF32 to understand why immediate evac may not be a good idea.
Again, the plane may be "broken" but this does not always mean that evacuation should immediately follow.
Again, the plane may be "broken" but this does not always mean that evacuation should immediately follow.
If the cockpit are alive and you have contact with them ( via phone or face to face ) you wait for THEM to make the call.
If they are not contactable and there is obvious fire or threat to staying on board then the cabin crew will initiate Evac.
There must be a set "chain of command"
Ok?
If they are not contactable and there is obvious fire or threat to staying on board then the cabin crew will initiate Evac.
There must be a set "chain of command"
Ok?
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Bloggs, I gotta object to this mindset:
"Fly it like the autopilot flies an ILS. You get low on slope, you pull the nose up. Primary effect of controls. If you then get slow or know form experience that you will get slow, put the power up. As you say, pitch and power work together, but the initial reaction is to stay on-slope with the stick, then compensate (if necessary) with the power."
Isn't that EXACTLY the mindset that crashed Asiana, and AF447 as well?? They went with "pitch first for altitude" and got behind the curve. And then got confused because "it always worked before" or "that's what A/P does". When in the Asiana case any goose of engines FIRST, anywhere between say t-120s and t-20s would have made the runway. Instead they're in your "power second" mindset (at 3am circadian time) and don't get to the power until like t-7s, fatally late.
And of course AF did go full power but rode all the way in behind the curve without EVER releasing pitch.
I'd go with a much simpler phrase: Power good, pitch bad. Much safer to attempt G/A with (because of) excess energy than the way Asiana attempted their G/A.
"Fly it like the autopilot flies an ILS. You get low on slope, you pull the nose up. Primary effect of controls. If you then get slow or know form experience that you will get slow, put the power up. As you say, pitch and power work together, but the initial reaction is to stay on-slope with the stick, then compensate (if necessary) with the power."
Isn't that EXACTLY the mindset that crashed Asiana, and AF447 as well?? They went with "pitch first for altitude" and got behind the curve. And then got confused because "it always worked before" or "that's what A/P does". When in the Asiana case any goose of engines FIRST, anywhere between say t-120s and t-20s would have made the runway. Instead they're in your "power second" mindset (at 3am circadian time) and don't get to the power until like t-7s, fatally late.
And of course AF did go full power but rode all the way in behind the curve without EVER releasing pitch.
I'd go with a much simpler phrase: Power good, pitch bad. Much safer to attempt G/A with (because of) excess energy than the way Asiana attempted their G/A.
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In my experience, Boeing evac checklists are shorter than Airbus ones, but unless someone has evidence of Asiana's SOP's regarding evacuation, I see it entirely wrong to start criticising the flight crew for this relatively short delay.
Last edited by ross_M; 11th Jul 2013 at 12:31.