Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
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The low speed warning on the Eicas would still work, even if in FLCH, but probably came at about 150 feet when with the low speed and rate of descent and with the drag of flap 30 and gear down it would have been too late to be of any use.
Fraom Aileron Drag
And that's exactly the same kind of "Command Gradient" that many have been describing as a potential cause of the issues in this incident - arrogant in the extreme - "You don't have my qualifications, therefore you cannot possibly have anything valuable to add"
@Greenlights
Apart from the relief F/O, who apparently called for the entire last minute "sink rate" from the jump seat. But then I guess you didn't bother reading the whole thread did you? Guess it was "below" you!
And that's exactly the same kind of "Command Gradient" that many have been describing as a potential cause of the issues in this incident - arrogant in the extreme - "You don't have my qualifications, therefore you cannot possibly have anything valuable to add"
@Greenlights
Apart from the relief F/O, who apparently called for the entire last minute "sink rate" from the jump seat. But then I guess you didn't bother reading the whole thread did you? Guess it was "below" you!
If anything commercial pilots should enjoy more reliable and more numerous warning systems for these things, imo, compared to a pilot that never has any passengers in the back.
Why cant a modern airliner with thousands of sensors and millions upon millions lines of code know if its about to hit the ground, and not the runway!
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assumed???ref page 68 post #1360
no no no, you are a "training capt" and you ASSUMED the autothrottle was maintaining the speed (137 kts) ON FINAL APPROACH DURING A VISUAL
oh no straight to jail do not pass go or collect 200.
oh no straight to jail do not pass go or collect 200.
Last edited by airjet; 10th Jul 2013 at 19:57.
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Post 1517: "As ATC in USA is non standard." Quite true in my opinion.
Most recently into NY and MIA twice vectored to the localiser well above the glide, and asked to keep the speed. Into MIA for two most recent visual approaches left hanging above the PAPIs before being cleared for the approach.
It's too early to say at this stage, but I'll bet that ATC was one of the holes in the Swiss cheese. Never in London TMA have I ever been vectored and expected to join any approach too fast or too high.
On another point, it is most certainly my opinion that no initial type rating course ever teaches any more than a rudimentary introduction to the operation of currently installed avionics suites. If I had a dollar for every time I have heard the expression "you will learn more about it on the line" I would be a wealthier man than I now am. It is an inescapable fact,as evidenced by the contributions thus far posted that many of those who fly the 777, that the foibles of the systems are not fully understood, or in many cases not even known.
It's my humble opinion that if we are to be expected to operate aircraft in automated modes, we should have a full and complete knowledge of the systems, precisely how the logic is programmed, what it will do at what stage of flight, and under what circumstances it might deviate from programmed norms. Regrettably in this day and age a $300 (net receipt to the airline) ticket to cross half the globe, will never fund a course of training to meet the requirements needed. And self study, if that's what the airlines expect of their post course rated pilots, will never fill the knowledge gap.
Who here who is qualified on the 777 can put their hand on their heart and honestly claim that they FULLY understand the avionics and flight command logic in every mode of automation?
Most recently into NY and MIA twice vectored to the localiser well above the glide, and asked to keep the speed. Into MIA for two most recent visual approaches left hanging above the PAPIs before being cleared for the approach.
It's too early to say at this stage, but I'll bet that ATC was one of the holes in the Swiss cheese. Never in London TMA have I ever been vectored and expected to join any approach too fast or too high.
On another point, it is most certainly my opinion that no initial type rating course ever teaches any more than a rudimentary introduction to the operation of currently installed avionics suites. If I had a dollar for every time I have heard the expression "you will learn more about it on the line" I would be a wealthier man than I now am. It is an inescapable fact,as evidenced by the contributions thus far posted that many of those who fly the 777, that the foibles of the systems are not fully understood, or in many cases not even known.
It's my humble opinion that if we are to be expected to operate aircraft in automated modes, we should have a full and complete knowledge of the systems, precisely how the logic is programmed, what it will do at what stage of flight, and under what circumstances it might deviate from programmed norms. Regrettably in this day and age a $300 (net receipt to the airline) ticket to cross half the globe, will never fund a course of training to meet the requirements needed. And self study, if that's what the airlines expect of their post course rated pilots, will never fill the knowledge gap.
Who here who is qualified on the 777 can put their hand on their heart and honestly claim that they FULLY understand the avionics and flight command logic in every mode of automation?
Last edited by deefer dog; 10th Jul 2013 at 19:50.
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"Why cant a modern airliner with thousands of sensors and millions upon millions lines of code know if its about to hit the ground, and not the runway!"
Because the modern (and the not so modern, like me) pilots that fly them are supposed to use their own well developed sensors to know that if you run out of airspeed and altitude at the same time, it's not going to end well.
Stop blaming the airplane, it makes you sound like a lawyer. A 777 is a machine, inanimate, and only does what it is manipulated into doing.
Because the modern (and the not so modern, like me) pilots that fly them are supposed to use their own well developed sensors to know that if you run out of airspeed and altitude at the same time, it's not going to end well.
Stop blaming the airplane, it makes you sound like a lawyer. A 777 is a machine, inanimate, and only does what it is manipulated into doing.
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If you are taught how to "manipulate" when using the automatic modes, and if you understand these modes. Because if you are of the magenta age, you don't have the fallback of disconnecting the autopilot!
Last edited by deefer dog; 10th Jul 2013 at 19:54.
Nameless Wonder
You are completely wrong about Aileron Drag. His point, I believe, is that there are some very ignorant postings on this thread.
Not differences of opinion between peers but from people who clearly have little or no idea about the subject matter eg the challenges of landing a large jet at 4am (body clock time) whilst under training having, possibly, been kept high on the infamous slam dunk onto the 28s at SFO. Being kept high and having to sort it all out and make the stabilised approach criteria is no mean feat. Whether you think pilots are over paid prima donnas we sure as hell earn our flight pay in those last few minutes.
Anyway, here's BBK's top tip: watch the NTSB press conferences and for a real treat watch Captain Sullenberger's interview that was linked a few pages back. He gives an EXCELLENT insight into human factors and makes the point, with great eloquence, why it is wrong to pass judgement on the crew when the facts are not fully known and analysed.
Not differences of opinion between peers but from people who clearly have little or no idea about the subject matter eg the challenges of landing a large jet at 4am (body clock time) whilst under training having, possibly, been kept high on the infamous slam dunk onto the 28s at SFO. Being kept high and having to sort it all out and make the stabilised approach criteria is no mean feat. Whether you think pilots are over paid prima donnas we sure as hell earn our flight pay in those last few minutes.
Anyway, here's BBK's top tip: watch the NTSB press conferences and for a real treat watch Captain Sullenberger's interview that was linked a few pages back. He gives an EXCELLENT insight into human factors and makes the point, with great eloquence, why it is wrong to pass judgement on the crew when the facts are not fully known and analysed.
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Does anyone know if the pilots can legally refuse a drug and alcohol test after a crash? Can't the Feds do a bench warrant to have compelled them? Too late now. If this was asked and answered already, my apologies.
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"At 200 feet [...] he recognized that the auto-throttles were not maintaining speed and he established a GO-AROUND Attitude."
How many seconds before impact was this? There's conflicting information about the throttle sequence and timing. One statement said TOGA was not applied until 1.4 sec. pre-impact. Another said throttle was increased 7-8 sec before.
An aerospace consultant interviewed here said had they immediately selected full throttle upon stick shaker activation (about 4 sec pre-impact), they might have made it: Pilots union criticizes Asiana crash investigation | Reuters
Of course this depends on many factors, including engine spool-up performance, gross weight, temp, density altitude, descent rate, etc.
When the pilots finally noticed the slow speed (presumably at 7-8 sec pre-crash), did they just nudge up the power a bit?
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I am sorry Zimmerfly that you feel I am not up to speed. Glideslope seems to be pretty central to the train of events here, with the requirement to fly it manually appearing to have been beyond the crew for some reason.
Let me repeat my question: Do you believe this accident would have happenned had the navigation aids been functioning normally?
Let me repeat my question: Do you believe this accident would have happenned had the navigation aids been functioning normally?
Pretend the plane and airport lost all automation. That's the point of continually having pilots fly visuals without automation! To keep their skills up in real world situations when it's safe to do so. The fact that lack of all automation resulted in a crash here is because of automation dependency and lack of raw data skills not because it's required for a safe landing!
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@1a-sound-asleep
Interesting perspective. It brings a lot of light about the cultural component in korean aviation industry.
My friend who works with many koreans shares the point about the way koreans just memorize everything by heart when they have to study something. Understanding the content becomes somehow less important. Its more important to know everything and get a high passing mark.
An analogy
I have met once a korean and while talking about previous jobs I found out she was an English teacher some years before. I was kind of shocked because she struggled getting her pronunciation right very often. She probably knew the grammar and lots of vocabulary very well but when it came to speak the language she couldnt get it right after so many years.
Coming back to this accident, I must say that the reaction of the cabin crew post crashing was amazing. They really excelled getting everybody out despite the obvious challenges. Well done.
PS: on the news now, the korean civil aviation authority will look at the training procedures and start an investigation at all the airlines in the country.
Interesting perspective. It brings a lot of light about the cultural component in korean aviation industry.
My friend who works with many koreans shares the point about the way koreans just memorize everything by heart when they have to study something. Understanding the content becomes somehow less important. Its more important to know everything and get a high passing mark.
An analogy
I have met once a korean and while talking about previous jobs I found out she was an English teacher some years before. I was kind of shocked because she struggled getting her pronunciation right very often. She probably knew the grammar and lots of vocabulary very well but when it came to speak the language she couldnt get it right after so many years.
Coming back to this accident, I must say that the reaction of the cabin crew post crashing was amazing. They really excelled getting everybody out despite the obvious challenges. Well done.
PS: on the news now, the korean civil aviation authority will look at the training procedures and start an investigation at all the airlines in the country.
Last edited by skytrax; 10th Jul 2013 at 20:18.
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Can any of the resident 777 pilots confirm the information that is in the media - that A/T won't engage if Flight Directors disagree (one is ON another OFF).
Last edited by olasek; 10th Jul 2013 at 20:19.
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What's it doing now..?
I recall a Turkish 737 with 3 crew burying itself in a field short of AMS.. Autothrust took some of the blame, even with a clear error indicated on the PFD. -They were behind the aircraft.
A 777 crew who clearly recognized and safely landed an aircraft from a Low Energy situation. -They were ahead of the Aircraft
And now a 777; in all likelihood behaving exactly as designed (though the design may now be improved -FLC behavior et al) spread all over SFO and CNN.
The crew appear to have been several seconds behind the jet
ULH is challenging, and both B&A have made huge inroads into reducing that stress and increasing safety, however, the notion proposed here by several; that a visual landing in a Wide Body jet in VMC on a 2+mile runway is approaching the limits of their skill set..
I fear releasing the 12 hour student to do same at another Californian Airport was a grave mistake..
Thousands of crews have operated hundreds of Aircraft into SFO, and very few of them clipped the sea wall and killed people. it's unfortunate our profession is being brought into disrepute; especially having to explain the trainer/student scenario on this trip, clearly it's a shock to the general public, though i suggest the situation for surgeons may not be dissimilar.
Coward & Burkhill always looked good after 038. They look even better today..
A 777 crew who clearly recognized and safely landed an aircraft from a Low Energy situation. -They were ahead of the Aircraft
And now a 777; in all likelihood behaving exactly as designed (though the design may now be improved -FLC behavior et al) spread all over SFO and CNN.
The crew appear to have been several seconds behind the jet
ULH is challenging, and both B&A have made huge inroads into reducing that stress and increasing safety, however, the notion proposed here by several; that a visual landing in a Wide Body jet in VMC on a 2+mile runway is approaching the limits of their skill set..
I fear releasing the 12 hour student to do same at another Californian Airport was a grave mistake..
Thousands of crews have operated hundreds of Aircraft into SFO, and very few of them clipped the sea wall and killed people. it's unfortunate our profession is being brought into disrepute; especially having to explain the trainer/student scenario on this trip, clearly it's a shock to the general public, though i suggest the situation for surgeons may not be dissimilar.
Coward & Burkhill always looked good after 038. They look even better today..
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My respect for the authorities investigating this crash would likely have improved somewhat if they had only said "at this point we are not ruling out ANY cause...except for the weather. Any damfool can see it is a lovely clear day, with all the other airplanes landing without a problem".
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Moving start of runway 300ft 'saved lives' ... (Wall St Journal, paywall alert)
Well, if you ignore the nav aid shutdown at the same time, possibly.
Runway Shift at SFO Might Have Helped Avert Greater Disaster - WSJ.com
Well, if you ignore the nav aid shutdown at the same time, possibly.
Runway Shift at SFO Might Have Helped Avert Greater Disaster - WSJ.com
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@olasek:
from p. 27 of the Boeing Automatic Flight manual B777 Systems Summary [Automatic Flight]
from p. 27 of the Boeing Automatic Flight manual B777 Systems Summary [Automatic Flight]
The autothrottle can be operated without using the flight director or the autopilot. In this condition, the autothrottle operates in either the THR REF, SPD, HOLD, or IDLE modes.
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I think this is perfectly appropriate as I think the function of auto-throttle will be a major, if not THE major contributing factor in this accident
Korean newspapers running stories on "mechanical failure" etc. is just typical face-saving nonsense.
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Felixthecat
Felix you are right, the effect is called 'cognitive tunneling' and it can also affect vision as well as the mind concentrates on a particular item of concern/interest. This is often called colloquially 'tunnel vision' but hearing and comprehension of what is being said tends to go first. The one sense that breaks through this tunneling is 'haptics' the sense of touch. This explains the extraordinary efficacy of the large manual applied with force to the back of the head. 
SalNichols…..When we are overloaded the brain cannot do anymore it is overloaded so it starts to filter. One of the first seances it filters is the sense of hearing. It can be seen in the simulator when everything is going to hell and the alarms are not cancelled even though they are blaring away in the background, the other pilot will give you an instruction and you may not even register it. It was taught to me in Human Factors during my ATPLs way back when and also demonstrated in CRM classes. I don't know the reference but Im sure someone here will….I'm not making it up…and I am far from a great pilot.
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Korean culture
#15351 by 'a sound asleep'
For the sake of balance in the discussion.
Looks like the piece originated at
Op-Ed: "My Flight Training Experience In Korea" — Civil Aviation Forum | Airliners.net
You should see the response #3 in the thread. Basically trainees posting their experiences on website happens everywhere. Airline dictating what to train happens everywhere.
#1542
I commented earlier but S Koreans adopted rote memorization based education because it's cheapest. Why? Because S Korea was the Poorest nation on the planet in 1953. And of course inertia has carried on since then.
About former Korean English teacher who can't really speak well, you can try to blame rote memorization but rather the real cuase is lack of chance for them to practice English with native English speakers. Until about 1980s, there weren't that many chances for S Koreans to practice English. Not enough traffic going in or out.
The situation has changed with increased traffic and more native English speakers teaching in S Korea (a whole cottage industry in itself) but basically Koreans who started schooling before 1990's had limited chance of real practice in speaking English.
So I should warn you not to blame 'rote' memorization.
For the sake of balance in the discussion.
Looks like the piece originated at
Op-Ed: "My Flight Training Experience In Korea" — Civil Aviation Forum | Airliners.net
You should see the response #3 in the thread. Basically trainees posting their experiences on website happens everywhere. Airline dictating what to train happens everywhere.
#1542
I commented earlier but S Koreans adopted rote memorization based education because it's cheapest. Why? Because S Korea was the Poorest nation on the planet in 1953. And of course inertia has carried on since then.
About former Korean English teacher who can't really speak well, you can try to blame rote memorization but rather the real cuase is lack of chance for them to practice English with native English speakers. Until about 1980s, there weren't that many chances for S Koreans to practice English. Not enough traffic going in or out.
The situation has changed with increased traffic and more native English speakers teaching in S Korea (a whole cottage industry in itself) but basically Koreans who started schooling before 1990's had limited chance of real practice in speaking English.
So I should warn you not to blame 'rote' memorization.
Finfly
Windshear can occur on CAVU days. Minus the facts, it's wise to not rule out anything. My belief is it had nothing to do with this accident, but I'm sure as heck not going to rule it out till the facts are gathered and analyzed if I was charged with investigating this.
Windshear can occur on CAVU days. Minus the facts, it's wise to not rule out anything. My belief is it had nothing to do with this accident, but I'm sure as heck not going to rule it out till the facts are gathered and analyzed if I was charged with investigating this.
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Probably been mentioned but......yes, the ILS GP is not operational as has been notamed for some time now for 28L SFO.
Why didn't they do the RNAV(GPS)28L approach (as we did a couple of weeks ago in a b772), disengage the A/P at DA then hand fly the darn thing to the r/way like they do at every CAT 1 ILS they probably do everywhere else in nice wx, and still have A/T back up.
Even if cleared for a "visual approach" by the approach controller they can still hook onto the RNAV and not get into the murky areas of a real hand flown visual approach and the funny things that can happen with FLCH, hand flying and thrust HOLD.
Or did they let themselves get suckered into a visual approach with no instrument approach back up because the controller cleared them for a visual approach the instant he head those magic words "we have the r/way (or the aircraft in front) in sight".
The controllers in the US love those words 'cos then they can get rid of you.
This is assuming of course that nothing else was wrong and perhaps these dudes don't even know how to spell RNAV!
Why didn't they do the RNAV(GPS)28L approach (as we did a couple of weeks ago in a b772), disengage the A/P at DA then hand fly the darn thing to the r/way like they do at every CAT 1 ILS they probably do everywhere else in nice wx, and still have A/T back up.
Even if cleared for a "visual approach" by the approach controller they can still hook onto the RNAV and not get into the murky areas of a real hand flown visual approach and the funny things that can happen with FLCH, hand flying and thrust HOLD.
Or did they let themselves get suckered into a visual approach with no instrument approach back up because the controller cleared them for a visual approach the instant he head those magic words "we have the r/way (or the aircraft in front) in sight".
The controllers in the US love those words 'cos then they can get rid of you.
This is assuming of course that nothing else was wrong and perhaps these dudes don't even know how to spell RNAV!