Total Disconnect
Kaokao,
From the information released by the NTSB and confirmed by Asiana CEO, the aircraft was working normally. From the data released, the aircraft was below normal speed for 30 seconds or more and the low airspeed warning and stick shaker activated appropriately. During the final seconds a go round was called and initiated and the aircraft responded normally with the engines spooling up as the impact occurred.
The pilots' account as reported in Korea bears little semblance to the facts as recorded by the FDR and CVR. This is exactly the cultural problem that western pilots who have worked in Korea and some other asian countries complain about. There is a cultural tendency to create an alternate reality rather than admit a shortcoming and learn from it or prevent it from recurring.
A critical part of the investigation will be to determine if any of the three pilots in the cockpit actually understood the state of the aircraft. Did they totally miss the indications and warnings they were getting? That is hard to believe. If they observed the approach becoming unstable and the speed decaying, why did they not act (PF) or say something (pilots not flying). It seems at this point that there was very little communication happening in the flight deck, and a go round was not considered.
The fact that it took so long after the crash to initiate evacuation is also indicative of the pilots state of mind.
The NTSB has a good history of sound conclusions, and in this accident there is a lot of data available. I agree that we should wait for the final report, but I also think that report will not praise these pilots.