Air China 767 crashes in South Korea (April 2002)
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The navigational database is updated every 28 days.
The database for each particular airport is loaded in such a way that all SIDs, STARs, runway(s) data along with the available approaches for the runways are included.
Alternatively, the airport would have no SIDs, STARs and any approaches. And only the runway data is included, this means that the FMC will be able to give you the runway length, orientation and airport elevation.
So, 747400CA, if you want to tell a porkie, get your facts right !
The database for each particular airport is loaded in such a way that all SIDs, STARs, runway(s) data along with the available approaches for the runways are included.
Alternatively, the airport would have no SIDs, STARs and any approaches. And only the runway data is included, this means that the FMC will be able to give you the runway length, orientation and airport elevation.
So, 747400CA, if you want to tell a porkie, get your facts right !
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Elevation,
Can you clarify what you mean when? Do you mean Air China's nav database, or THE nav database that everyone who has an FMC absolutely MUST have?
I only ask because here at BA we don't have every single SID, STAR, etc in our FMC. Being a regular visitor to Germany I'd particularly like to know where all the DUS SIDs have gone from ours, although I suspect it is due to too many FCRs that the pink line is not accurate and to avoid complaints from noise sensitive DUS we are required to fly the SID according to the book, not the database. LIS is another one I can think of where the FMC shows diddly squat.
So - to quote you; if you want to tell a porkie get your facts right.
Can you clarify what you mean when? Do you mean Air China's nav database, or THE nav database that everyone who has an FMC absolutely MUST have?
I only ask because here at BA we don't have every single SID, STAR, etc in our FMC. Being a regular visitor to Germany I'd particularly like to know where all the DUS SIDs have gone from ours, although I suspect it is due to too many FCRs that the pink line is not accurate and to avoid complaints from noise sensitive DUS we are required to fly the SID according to the book, not the database. LIS is another one I can think of where the FMC shows diddly squat.
So - to quote you; if you want to tell a porkie get your facts right.
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Elevation, I too must agree with Pandora. I've been flying in and out of PMI for over 3 years and frequently get departures off 06L which do not appear in the FMC data base. You get what you pay for or request and everyone is or can be different!!
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For Elevation -
The WRB 9G departure typically assigned to heavy aircraft departing FRA 25 L/R contains a 'ball note' procedure whereby an aircraft not able to meet the 3500' restriction at FFM 8.4 DME must intercept and track the FFM 260 radial outbound until reaching 3500', thence direct TAU until reaching 4400', thence direct TABUM (if memory serves me corectly).
This departure procedure is not, nor has it been for some time, contained in the 747-400 database - perhaps a consequence of the requirement to track outbound from a waypoint (FFM VOR) to a conditional waypoint (achieving 3500' altitude) before turning towards TAU.
A similar departure (WRB 1F) is contained in the 747-400 database, however, and specifies an identical ground track as the WRB 9G prior to the FFM 8.4 DME / 3500' point.
At lesser takeoff weights (below 800,000 lbs for a 747-400) the WRB 1F procedure may be substuted for the 'missing' WRB 9G and flown in LNAV / VNAV with ease.
At higher weights, however, one must either program a 3500' acceleration height on the 'Takeoff' page (delaying flap retraction to make the 8.4 DME restriction) or depart from the WRB 1F 'magenta line' on the FFM 260R and execute the 'ball note' procedure for the WRB 9G as described above.
Such are the facts, mate - nice try, though.
For all -
No racial slagging here, gents. I fly for an Asian carrier and - to put it mildly - enjoy the country, culture, and people to the hilt.
On the occasion of our listening to the exchange between Frankfurt ATC and the Air China flight, my youngish first officer enjoyed a chuckle before
- selecting the similar WRB 1F departure in the database,
- briefing the necessary MCP / ND selections to perform the FFM 260R / 3500' altitude procedure, and
- flying a flawless WRB 9G departure from runway 25R a few minutes later.
That an Air China crew could not demonstrate a similar level of proficiency on one occasion is admittedly unremarkable by itself. Knowing little about the airline, it would have been forgotten were it not for the tragic crash two days ago.
I simply relate the story to suggest that if the event described in the previous post are representative of the level of training and airmanship across the board, then the tragic consequences of the attempt to circle to land in marginal weather conditions - with rising terrain in close proximity - frankly should not come as a huge surprise.
Having said that, those with greater knowledge of the true state of affairs at this particular airline are invited to comment.
The WRB 9G departure typically assigned to heavy aircraft departing FRA 25 L/R contains a 'ball note' procedure whereby an aircraft not able to meet the 3500' restriction at FFM 8.4 DME must intercept and track the FFM 260 radial outbound until reaching 3500', thence direct TAU until reaching 4400', thence direct TABUM (if memory serves me corectly).
This departure procedure is not, nor has it been for some time, contained in the 747-400 database - perhaps a consequence of the requirement to track outbound from a waypoint (FFM VOR) to a conditional waypoint (achieving 3500' altitude) before turning towards TAU.
A similar departure (WRB 1F) is contained in the 747-400 database, however, and specifies an identical ground track as the WRB 9G prior to the FFM 8.4 DME / 3500' point.
At lesser takeoff weights (below 800,000 lbs for a 747-400) the WRB 1F procedure may be substuted for the 'missing' WRB 9G and flown in LNAV / VNAV with ease.
At higher weights, however, one must either program a 3500' acceleration height on the 'Takeoff' page (delaying flap retraction to make the 8.4 DME restriction) or depart from the WRB 1F 'magenta line' on the FFM 260R and execute the 'ball note' procedure for the WRB 9G as described above.
Such are the facts, mate - nice try, though.
For all -
No racial slagging here, gents. I fly for an Asian carrier and - to put it mildly - enjoy the country, culture, and people to the hilt.
On the occasion of our listening to the exchange between Frankfurt ATC and the Air China flight, my youngish first officer enjoyed a chuckle before
- selecting the similar WRB 1F departure in the database,
- briefing the necessary MCP / ND selections to perform the FFM 260R / 3500' altitude procedure, and
- flying a flawless WRB 9G departure from runway 25R a few minutes later.
That an Air China crew could not demonstrate a similar level of proficiency on one occasion is admittedly unremarkable by itself. Knowing little about the airline, it would have been forgotten were it not for the tragic crash two days ago.
I simply relate the story to suggest that if the event described in the previous post are representative of the level of training and airmanship across the board, then the tragic consequences of the attempt to circle to land in marginal weather conditions - with rising terrain in close proximity - frankly should not come as a huge surprise.
Having said that, those with greater knowledge of the true state of affairs at this particular airline are invited to comment.
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Geddy,
Since you wish to play this race card, I'd like to make a couple of my points too.
As has already been pointed out repeatedly, the predecessor to these 'reformed' Chinese airlines - CAAC - did indeed have a less than admirable record. What seems to be missed, though, is that during the seventies & eighties when everyone else was flying DC-9, B737, B727, A-300, B747, B757, B767 with EFIS..... when ILS was almost nearly the order of the day, with autoland pioneered and well nigh perfected..... those poor blokes were flying 30-year old, 5-man crew Russian steam rollers - Illusian IL-62, Antonov AN-24, AN-12, Tupolev TU-134, TU-154, BAC-1-11, Tridents.... to name a few, likely with air driven gyros into airfields with no precision approaches (in fact I recall that until the recent airport modernisation drive in China, ILS was probably pretty much the domain of only the large international airports) usually predicated on NDBs with dubious callibrations, AND on QFE, in some cases into some of the highest terrain in the world - around the Himalayas & also in Sinkiang where there's an airport with 15,000 ft elevation (I believe), and quite often with appalling weather during the monsoon/typhoon season when we'd all by relying on precision approach aids (not a damned locater), with NO flight time limitations (I know for a fact that at least until the mid-nineties airline pilots in China were doing around 120-130 hrs per month of stick time).
Now if you can say with your hand on your heart that if you had yourself been operating for any significant period of time with those constraints with a 100% record, then that's your opinion of yourself. Especially on that day when all the above factors come together with Murphy pulling the strings. Show me the guy who says it can never happen to him and I'll show you delusion.
I am not justifying the crash in any way; I am saying that people who live in glass houses had better not throw stones. Before you use the race card, you'd better take a good hard look in the mirror. I've been fortunate enough to fly a good 20 years in pretty good equipment into pretty well organised places with at least a minimal level of support in all areas. I'm thankful for that.
As has also been pointed out by other contributors, Air China's record over the last ten years, coinciding with the time when their equipment was upgraded to Boeing & Airbus, has significantly not been too far behind the west. That is saying something that though they've got quite some way to go, they are moving in the right direction. When was the last time you converted from an Antonov to B777 with fly-by-wire, dual FMC, full glass, Cat 3B capability? You can talk about face then.
I quote General Chuck Yeager : "I have flown injust about everything, with all kinds of pilots in all parts of the world - British, French, Pakistani, Iranian, Japanese, CHINESE - and there wasn't a dime's worth of difference between any of them except for one unchangin, certain fact: the best, most skillful pilot had the most experience."
For Pete's sake, the crew - though young - are still part of our fraternity. They may not have the same skin pigment, but they sure as hell are still airline pilots, like you and I.
Since you wish to play this race card, I'd like to make a couple of my points too.
As has already been pointed out repeatedly, the predecessor to these 'reformed' Chinese airlines - CAAC - did indeed have a less than admirable record. What seems to be missed, though, is that during the seventies & eighties when everyone else was flying DC-9, B737, B727, A-300, B747, B757, B767 with EFIS..... when ILS was almost nearly the order of the day, with autoland pioneered and well nigh perfected..... those poor blokes were flying 30-year old, 5-man crew Russian steam rollers - Illusian IL-62, Antonov AN-24, AN-12, Tupolev TU-134, TU-154, BAC-1-11, Tridents.... to name a few, likely with air driven gyros into airfields with no precision approaches (in fact I recall that until the recent airport modernisation drive in China, ILS was probably pretty much the domain of only the large international airports) usually predicated on NDBs with dubious callibrations, AND on QFE, in some cases into some of the highest terrain in the world - around the Himalayas & also in Sinkiang where there's an airport with 15,000 ft elevation (I believe), and quite often with appalling weather during the monsoon/typhoon season when we'd all by relying on precision approach aids (not a damned locater), with NO flight time limitations (I know for a fact that at least until the mid-nineties airline pilots in China were doing around 120-130 hrs per month of stick time).
Now if you can say with your hand on your heart that if you had yourself been operating for any significant period of time with those constraints with a 100% record, then that's your opinion of yourself. Especially on that day when all the above factors come together with Murphy pulling the strings. Show me the guy who says it can never happen to him and I'll show you delusion.
I am not justifying the crash in any way; I am saying that people who live in glass houses had better not throw stones. Before you use the race card, you'd better take a good hard look in the mirror. I've been fortunate enough to fly a good 20 years in pretty good equipment into pretty well organised places with at least a minimal level of support in all areas. I'm thankful for that.
As has also been pointed out by other contributors, Air China's record over the last ten years, coinciding with the time when their equipment was upgraded to Boeing & Airbus, has significantly not been too far behind the west. That is saying something that though they've got quite some way to go, they are moving in the right direction. When was the last time you converted from an Antonov to B777 with fly-by-wire, dual FMC, full glass, Cat 3B capability? You can talk about face then.
I quote General Chuck Yeager : "I have flown injust about everything, with all kinds of pilots in all parts of the world - British, French, Pakistani, Iranian, Japanese, CHINESE - and there wasn't a dime's worth of difference between any of them except for one unchangin, certain fact: the best, most skillful pilot had the most experience."
For Pete's sake, the crew - though young - are still part of our fraternity. They may not have the same skin pigment, but they sure as hell are still airline pilots, like you and I.
ex-Tanker
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The Captain is alive in hospital - poor guy. The press have already begun to hound him. No face saving allowed there.
As regards circling approaches in the Far east, I have done very many - in real minimum conditions- many having an ILS or VOR approach only at one end. Quite a few fields have a built in trap:
When you get a hill like that on final, there is a stacking up effect of clouds, so that the vis/cloudbase on final is even less than that which is on the ATIS. This is an insidious trap and the temptation to press on, just a little bit, as you are or were "sure of position", is very great.
Why would the other runway not have been in use? Well looking at the hill, the take off performance with tailwind must be pretty marginal, so the field probably gets changed earlier rather than later. You can (I have done) ask for the straight in - tail wind landing but it takes strong captaincy, when the other guys are accepting the circling approach.
Let us try to learn from the situation (not the cause - which we don't know yet) and have a little sympathy with the flight crew, who will now be "going through it".
As regards circling approaches in the Far east, I have done very many - in real minimum conditions- many having an ILS or VOR approach only at one end. Quite a few fields have a built in trap:
When you get a hill like that on final, there is a stacking up effect of clouds, so that the vis/cloudbase on final is even less than that which is on the ATIS. This is an insidious trap and the temptation to press on, just a little bit, as you are or were "sure of position", is very great.
Why would the other runway not have been in use? Well looking at the hill, the take off performance with tailwind must be pretty marginal, so the field probably gets changed earlier rather than later. You can (I have done) ask for the straight in - tail wind landing but it takes strong captaincy, when the other guys are accepting the circling approach.
Let us try to learn from the situation (not the cause - which we don't know yet) and have a little sympathy with the flight crew, who will now be "going through it".
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From the Korean press:
____________________________________________
The following is a transcript of the last contact between the airliner and Gimhae control:
(11:16:14)
Tower: 129 approaching?
(delete)
(11:18:02)
Tower: 700 Approved. Roger.
(11:19:43)
Tower: CCA129 Give me Tower radio check.
Airport Radar: Already sent. No received?
Tower: No contact, CCA129 Gimhae Tower Radio check.
(11:20:03)
Airport Tower: This is Gimhae Tower on guard CCA129 Contact 118.1.
(delete)
(11:20:15)
Pilot: Gimhae Tower CCA129 Circle approach 18R.
Airport Tower: CCA129 Report turning base.
Pilot: WILL CO CCA 129.
Airport Tower: CCA 129 Check wheels down. Wind 210 Cleared to land RWY36L. Not in sight.
Airport Tower: Cleared to land 18R.
Pilot: Circle (?), Cleared to 18R and Gimhae East.
(11:23:00)
Airport Tower: CCA129 Say again.
Pilot:.....
Aiport Tower: CCA129 Say position now.
Pilot: CCA129 on base turn on final.....(no more radio)
____________________________________________
The following is a transcript of the last contact between the airliner and Gimhae control:
(11:16:14)
Tower: 129 approaching?
(delete)
(11:18:02)
Tower: 700 Approved. Roger.
(11:19:43)
Tower: CCA129 Give me Tower radio check.
Airport Radar: Already sent. No received?
Tower: No contact, CCA129 Gimhae Tower Radio check.
(11:20:03)
Airport Tower: This is Gimhae Tower on guard CCA129 Contact 118.1.
(delete)
(11:20:15)
Pilot: Gimhae Tower CCA129 Circle approach 18R.
Airport Tower: CCA129 Report turning base.
Pilot: WILL CO CCA 129.
Airport Tower: CCA 129 Check wheels down. Wind 210 Cleared to land RWY36L. Not in sight.
Airport Tower: Cleared to land 18R.
Pilot: Circle (?), Cleared to 18R and Gimhae East.
(11:23:00)
Airport Tower: CCA129 Say again.
Pilot:.....
Aiport Tower: CCA129 Say position now.
Pilot: CCA129 on base turn on final.....(no more radio)
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HIALS :
My sentiments entirely : Some of the comments here are from fools who have never had to circle in the soup. Captain Wu Xin Lu was only doing his best and I`m most definately on his side.This sort of thing can happen to anyone at any time if one is unlucky enough to have it all stack up at once. He is a colleague and deserves to be supported by all who lay claim to be part of aviation. Unfortunately aviation these days seems to have its share of WELL FROGS that look up and see a small piece of blue sky and thats their world. I sincerly hope Captain Wu is back flying again soon.
KIFIS
My sentiments entirely : Some of the comments here are from fools who have never had to circle in the soup. Captain Wu Xin Lu was only doing his best and I`m most definately on his side.This sort of thing can happen to anyone at any time if one is unlucky enough to have it all stack up at once. He is a colleague and deserves to be supported by all who lay claim to be part of aviation. Unfortunately aviation these days seems to have its share of WELL FROGS that look up and see a small piece of blue sky and thats their world. I sincerly hope Captain Wu is back flying again soon.
KIFIS
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Few Cloudy, you are right on the money.
Kimhae is a combined military/civil airfield, where military and any other consideration have priority over the wishes of a non-Korean captain. A Korean crew would also have some difficulty getting rwy 36L under these circumstances. Knowing that, they are very reluctant to "rock the boat" so its hard to imagine the circumstances where they would actually make such a request. What hope would a non-Korean speaking crew have, with a likely imperfect grip on English?
Korean based crews do a lot of Kimhae flights before checkout, and they are all very aware of the need to not delay the base turn for rwy 18R. IMHO there should be a note on the approach charts indicating the danger of extending the downwind. It should not be a requirement to be based in Korea to have this knowledge.
Kimhae is a combined military/civil airfield, where military and any other consideration have priority over the wishes of a non-Korean captain. A Korean crew would also have some difficulty getting rwy 36L under these circumstances. Knowing that, they are very reluctant to "rock the boat" so its hard to imagine the circumstances where they would actually make such a request. What hope would a non-Korean speaking crew have, with a likely imperfect grip on English?
Korean based crews do a lot of Kimhae flights before checkout, and they are all very aware of the need to not delay the base turn for rwy 18R. IMHO there should be a note on the approach charts indicating the danger of extending the downwind. It should not be a requirement to be based in Korea to have this knowledge.
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Even for professional pilots what a temptation to comment on a crash which happened only hours ago and and what a drive to draw early conclusions?!
Remember the Korean Airlines thread some weeks ago? It was the same melting pot: race, culture, loosing face, one-man show, single pilot ops a.s.o. Heated replies, some aggressive.
Some moderate and sensible like gengis post.
Why can’t we all (or at least the real pilots among us) stay back a bit and wait several days for more information and trust the professional investigators before speculating to an extend which is not justified.
Regards
Remember the Korean Airlines thread some weeks ago? It was the same melting pot: race, culture, loosing face, one-man show, single pilot ops a.s.o. Heated replies, some aggressive.
Some moderate and sensible like gengis post.
Why can’t we all (or at least the real pilots among us) stay back a bit and wait several days for more information and trust the professional investigators before speculating to an extend which is not justified.
Regards
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gengis:
Your point may be valid but for the single reason that Air China is itself falsifying its safety record by consistently claiming 47 years of crash-free operation. The company itself has not been around for that long, and its predecessor had an absolutely horrible safety record.
No matter how often you repeat a lie, it remains just that: a lie.
There are still TU-134s and 154s flying around today, and no one would suggest that this in itself is a reason to expect a higher hull-loss rate.
Your point may be valid but for the single reason that Air China is itself falsifying its safety record by consistently claiming 47 years of crash-free operation. The company itself has not been around for that long, and its predecessor had an absolutely horrible safety record.
No matter how often you repeat a lie, it remains just that: a lie.
There are still TU-134s and 154s flying around today, and no one would suggest that this in itself is a reason to expect a higher hull-loss rate.
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I have done this approach many times.A lot of S.Korea´s airfields involve circling approaches.This particular one is not the most difficult but there is that hill on the extended centreline of 18/36 which proved to be the culprit here.
Apparently the Captain had only been there five times previously,and I am betting that he always had the luxury of a straight-in ILS to 36.If his first attempt at landing a 767(apparently low hours on type) at Pusan on 18R was in poor visibility,he was really up against it unfortunately.IMHO,Pusan is a Cat A airfield if you only ever do the straight-in 36.BUT...if you circle to 18,it becomes a Cat C.The location of the hillock is smack on a visual approach trajectory..about 30 seconds downwind and just west of the runway.
Attention to drift on the downwind has to be meticulous by use of the CTR MAP and track line data(was rwy 18 set up in the FMC???)Attention to the trend vector when turning base is also imperative as a back up to visual reference when in marginal conditions.If you turn base too late in poor conditions,you´ve had it.If you consider that both guys were probably looking 2 O´Clock whilst on base,instead of 11 or 12 O´Clock,it completes the picture.I notice that all sim checks for Far Eastern carriers include a circling approach and if you overshoot the rwy centreline on turning final,its an automatic failure.
We always used to cut the downwind to 20 seconds and turn base early approaching the runway at almost 45 degrees,making the final adjustment onto rwy centreline at about 500 or 600 feet.
If you have the luxury of doing it or seeing it being done in nice weather,you involuntarily make a mental note of what an awful deathtrap it could be in bad weather.Something these poor guys probably didnt have the chance of doing.
If I was investigating the accident I would want to know 4 things straight off:
i)As the pilot survived,was this his first circle to 18 approach at Pusan?If yes,what about the FO?
ii)Did they have the expectation of landing straight in and then were changed at the last minute?ie.did they brief the approach?
iii)What was the config of the a/c on downwind and base?Gear seems to have been down but did they have final flap and ref +5?The radius of turn would be crucial.
iv)Was the autopilot flying?If yes(I am betting yes-use of the AP even on visual approaches is extensive in the Far East),bank angle would be limited to bank angle selector.Its not enough for this approach unless base turn is imediate.You need more..35 degrees and more if necessary.......
(i),(iii) and (iv) are forgiveable and tell a story of a man trapped by bad luck and circumstance as with Erebus.I just hope the crew arent guilty of (ii),as there´s never any mitigating circumstances here.
Whatever comes to light,my thoughts and prayers are with the pilot and his crew and passengers.
Apparently the Captain had only been there five times previously,and I am betting that he always had the luxury of a straight-in ILS to 36.If his first attempt at landing a 767(apparently low hours on type) at Pusan on 18R was in poor visibility,he was really up against it unfortunately.IMHO,Pusan is a Cat A airfield if you only ever do the straight-in 36.BUT...if you circle to 18,it becomes a Cat C.The location of the hillock is smack on a visual approach trajectory..about 30 seconds downwind and just west of the runway.
Attention to drift on the downwind has to be meticulous by use of the CTR MAP and track line data(was rwy 18 set up in the FMC???)Attention to the trend vector when turning base is also imperative as a back up to visual reference when in marginal conditions.If you turn base too late in poor conditions,you´ve had it.If you consider that both guys were probably looking 2 O´Clock whilst on base,instead of 11 or 12 O´Clock,it completes the picture.I notice that all sim checks for Far Eastern carriers include a circling approach and if you overshoot the rwy centreline on turning final,its an automatic failure.
We always used to cut the downwind to 20 seconds and turn base early approaching the runway at almost 45 degrees,making the final adjustment onto rwy centreline at about 500 or 600 feet.
If you have the luxury of doing it or seeing it being done in nice weather,you involuntarily make a mental note of what an awful deathtrap it could be in bad weather.Something these poor guys probably didnt have the chance of doing.
If I was investigating the accident I would want to know 4 things straight off:
i)As the pilot survived,was this his first circle to 18 approach at Pusan?If yes,what about the FO?
ii)Did they have the expectation of landing straight in and then were changed at the last minute?ie.did they brief the approach?
iii)What was the config of the a/c on downwind and base?Gear seems to have been down but did they have final flap and ref +5?The radius of turn would be crucial.
iv)Was the autopilot flying?If yes(I am betting yes-use of the AP even on visual approaches is extensive in the Far East),bank angle would be limited to bank angle selector.Its not enough for this approach unless base turn is imediate.You need more..35 degrees and more if necessary.......
(i),(iii) and (iv) are forgiveable and tell a story of a man trapped by bad luck and circumstance as with Erebus.I just hope the crew arent guilty of (ii),as there´s never any mitigating circumstances here.
Whatever comes to light,my thoughts and prayers are with the pilot and his crew and passengers.
Gengis. Chuck Yeager's observation may have been accurate in terms of the pilots that he flew with or observed. But in my experience both as an airline captain (retired) and as flight simulator instructor observing different nationalities with their individual ethnic cultural attitude to operating big airliners - I can say I have seen some truly frightening things in the simulator from highly experienced pilots. In particular the alarming lack of situational awareness when faced with simple position orientation without blind use of the magenta line. I have seen personally in the privacy of the simulator basic handling and navigational incompetency from senior check captains that would floor you. When shown a hard copy print-out of their flight path in for instance a cross-wind night circling approach, one sees sheer disbelief in their eyes and a glum embarrassed silence. Yeagers assertation that the best pilots are the most experienced is sheer horse-sh..t.
How could you possibly believe that by quoting it in your post.
Despite basic RMI information directly in front of their eyes these veterans of Asian skies were hopelessly out of their depth as were the compliant first officers in the right hand seat who merely sat watching impassively as the captain flew around in circles below MDA/MSA pressing buttons. True, airliners in this part of the world are not crashing into hills every day in bad weather. Thank radar vectoring and reliable autopilots for that.
The Air China accident and others to come (as they surely will when history repeats itself) can be blamed on culture mores that will never change - despite the most skilful PR spin doctors.
How could you possibly believe that by quoting it in your post.
Despite basic RMI information directly in front of their eyes these veterans of Asian skies were hopelessly out of their depth as were the compliant first officers in the right hand seat who merely sat watching impassively as the captain flew around in circles below MDA/MSA pressing buttons. True, airliners in this part of the world are not crashing into hills every day in bad weather. Thank radar vectoring and reliable autopilots for that.
The Air China accident and others to come (as they surely will when history repeats itself) can be blamed on culture mores that will never change - despite the most skilful PR spin doctors.
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Few Cloudy[U]
Your reference to 'stacking up' of clouds is spot on. I live about 15nm from Kimhae and the cloud base on the lee side of our local hills was about 300m at that time so you can assume that the upwind side was somewhat less. And it was more or less continuous heavy rain. Our VFR helicopter service from Kimhae to Koje was a non-starter that day.
As SLF I've witnessed a few circling approaches into Kimhe 18R in good VMC and from the LH window seat the high ground to the north looked interestingly close. Not quite as close as I've experienced often over the years at EGPB but for a big jet, close enough.
We use Kimhae almost exclusively and our expat communnity here was very subdued that day.
C-dog
Your reference to 'stacking up' of clouds is spot on. I live about 15nm from Kimhae and the cloud base on the lee side of our local hills was about 300m at that time so you can assume that the upwind side was somewhat less. And it was more or less continuous heavy rain. Our VFR helicopter service from Kimhae to Koje was a non-starter that day.
As SLF I've witnessed a few circling approaches into Kimhe 18R in good VMC and from the LH window seat the high ground to the north looked interestingly close. Not quite as close as I've experienced often over the years at EGPB but for a big jet, close enough.
We use Kimhae almost exclusively and our expat communnity here was very subdued that day.
C-dog
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Having flown the approach into Pusan several times I will make the following comments.
1- Due to the mountains to the North the Take Off minima for runway 36 is lower than for Runway 18, therefore in order to expedite departures they tend to use runway 18 under this weather conditions.
2- In South Korea in the military airfields (most) it is almost impossible to request the opposite runway to the one in use, one of the reasons is that most of them have the arresting cables for the fighters. Is a norm in these airports that the arresting cables can only cross the runway on the far end of the runway. Even if Busan does not use the arresting cables very often, they follow the procedures of the other military airfields, so even if the pilot ask for runway 36, chances are that he was not going to get it, it would be interesting to know if he actually requested it. Believe me is not easy to convince the guy in the tower to let you use the opposite runway.
3- The circle approach to runway 18 is very tight and is a right hand pattern, what means that for a very good part of the approach the Captain can’t see the runway and the tailwind may blow you way out of your intended track, in Korea one thing may be the wind at sea level and another story at downwind altitude, I have seen 50 to 60 kts. changes in wind speed. In bad weather is very demanding even for pilots that fly there regularly, I imagine that for somebody that is not familiar with low level circle approaches and with Busan airport in particular it may be extremely difficult.
Centaurus; Your comments may bring some sense of confidence to the non-Asian pilots, the less experienced ones may think that just by not being Asians they may never crash in a circle approach. Also remember that the fact of pilot being a checker means absolutely nothing as many times those positions have to do more with the time you spend at the office looking for the job than your flying abilities, actually I’ll rather fly with the guys are in the line every day, they are more current an do not have that false sense of security that the position gives to the checkers, remember the KLM Captain in Tenerife.
Unfortunately crashes happen everywhere, certainly in some Asian countries there is a trend, one of the main problems is cultural, , but another one is the fact that airlines tend to buy airplanes and to open routes even if they do not have enough qualified pilots to fly them, fortunately some airlines (like Emirates) are reconsidering this approach. I hate to say this but if the low cost carriers in Europe continue to grow at the same pace, something like this may happen.
For those of you that are fortunate not to fly these kind of approaches please bear in mind that what this pilot was doing was not an easy task. If you ever have to fly to Busan or any other airport like it in Korea, Japan or any other part of the world be extremely careful, you don’t have to be Asian to make these kind of mistakes, the pilots of Cross-air that had their unfortunate CFIT accident not long ago were not Asians, the only thing you need to be to make this mistake is to be a Pilot regardless of your race of nationality. Please show respect for your colleagues.
1- Due to the mountains to the North the Take Off minima for runway 36 is lower than for Runway 18, therefore in order to expedite departures they tend to use runway 18 under this weather conditions.
2- In South Korea in the military airfields (most) it is almost impossible to request the opposite runway to the one in use, one of the reasons is that most of them have the arresting cables for the fighters. Is a norm in these airports that the arresting cables can only cross the runway on the far end of the runway. Even if Busan does not use the arresting cables very often, they follow the procedures of the other military airfields, so even if the pilot ask for runway 36, chances are that he was not going to get it, it would be interesting to know if he actually requested it. Believe me is not easy to convince the guy in the tower to let you use the opposite runway.
3- The circle approach to runway 18 is very tight and is a right hand pattern, what means that for a very good part of the approach the Captain can’t see the runway and the tailwind may blow you way out of your intended track, in Korea one thing may be the wind at sea level and another story at downwind altitude, I have seen 50 to 60 kts. changes in wind speed. In bad weather is very demanding even for pilots that fly there regularly, I imagine that for somebody that is not familiar with low level circle approaches and with Busan airport in particular it may be extremely difficult.
Centaurus; Your comments may bring some sense of confidence to the non-Asian pilots, the less experienced ones may think that just by not being Asians they may never crash in a circle approach. Also remember that the fact of pilot being a checker means absolutely nothing as many times those positions have to do more with the time you spend at the office looking for the job than your flying abilities, actually I’ll rather fly with the guys are in the line every day, they are more current an do not have that false sense of security that the position gives to the checkers, remember the KLM Captain in Tenerife.
Unfortunately crashes happen everywhere, certainly in some Asian countries there is a trend, one of the main problems is cultural, , but another one is the fact that airlines tend to buy airplanes and to open routes even if they do not have enough qualified pilots to fly them, fortunately some airlines (like Emirates) are reconsidering this approach. I hate to say this but if the low cost carriers in Europe continue to grow at the same pace, something like this may happen.
For those of you that are fortunate not to fly these kind of approaches please bear in mind that what this pilot was doing was not an easy task. If you ever have to fly to Busan or any other airport like it in Korea, Japan or any other part of the world be extremely careful, you don’t have to be Asian to make these kind of mistakes, the pilots of Cross-air that had their unfortunate CFIT accident not long ago were not Asians, the only thing you need to be to make this mistake is to be a Pilot regardless of your race of nationality. Please show respect for your colleagues.
Circling Approach Area
From the FAA TERPS:
260. Circling Approach Area This is the obstacle clearance area which shall be considered for aircraft maneuvering to land on a runway that is not aligned with the FAC (Final Approach Course) of the approach procedure.
a. Alignment and Area The size of the circling area varies with the approach category of the aircraft, as shown in table 4. To define the limits of the circling area for the appropriate category, draw an arc of suitable radius from the center of the end of each usable runway. Join the extremities of the adjacent arcs with lines drawn tangent to the arcs. The area thus enclosed is the circling area (see figure 15 -- sorry no URL available).
Table 4. Circling Approach Radii. Par260 a.
Approach Radius (miles)
Category
260. Circling Approach Area This is the obstacle clearance area which shall be considered for aircraft maneuvering to land on a runway that is not aligned with the FAC (Final Approach Course) of the approach procedure.
a. Alignment and Area The size of the circling area varies with the approach category of the aircraft, as shown in table 4. To define the limits of the circling area for the appropriate category, draw an arc of suitable radius from the center of the end of each usable runway. Join the extremities of the adjacent arcs with lines drawn tangent to the arcs. The area thus enclosed is the circling area (see figure 15 -- sorry no URL available).
Table 4. Circling Approach Radii. Par260 a.
Approach Radius (miles)
Category
Code:
A 1.3 B 1.5 C 1.7 D 2.3
Join Date: Apr 2001
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Well gentlemen, it seems that in spite of some galant efforts by the more moderate amogst us, and those trying to look at the incident operationally, the whole race issue is coming up again. I guess Arafat and Sharon will NEVER agree!
My 2 cents worth is this.....
1/ I have flown heavy jets in Asia into some of the more obscure airports, and believe me flying circling approaches in IMC, setting feet on the MCP with a metres clearance given (not all aircraft can convert the MCP feet to metres!), with QFE, and with a contrller then overiding what is on the jepp chart with different bearings to tracks and step heights to maintain, leads me to have some sympathy for the Air China crew.
2/ I havent seen the chart, but it seems there is insufficient warning of the proximity of the high ground, by what has been said.
3/ I have flown with expat and local pilots and find very good and bad examples of both. However, as an informed generalisation that will no doubt upset many, I would definately say that the situational awareness of many Asian crew is generally less than that of others with similar airline experience (and this is totally accountable to the varying amounts of experience BEFORE joinong the airline).
4/ CRM is increasing in Asia, as with the world in general, though I still see operational inadequacies resulting from unquestioning F/O's and proud captains in Asia.
Lets see if the Air China crash was a result of 1,2,3, or 4. I would imagine a combination of all to a varying degree, in which case the reaction should be both sympathy AND criticism.
My 2 cents worth is this.....
1/ I have flown heavy jets in Asia into some of the more obscure airports, and believe me flying circling approaches in IMC, setting feet on the MCP with a metres clearance given (not all aircraft can convert the MCP feet to metres!), with QFE, and with a contrller then overiding what is on the jepp chart with different bearings to tracks and step heights to maintain, leads me to have some sympathy for the Air China crew.
2/ I havent seen the chart, but it seems there is insufficient warning of the proximity of the high ground, by what has been said.
3/ I have flown with expat and local pilots and find very good and bad examples of both. However, as an informed generalisation that will no doubt upset many, I would definately say that the situational awareness of many Asian crew is generally less than that of others with similar airline experience (and this is totally accountable to the varying amounts of experience BEFORE joinong the airline).
4/ CRM is increasing in Asia, as with the world in general, though I still see operational inadequacies resulting from unquestioning F/O's and proud captains in Asia.
Lets see if the Air China crash was a result of 1,2,3, or 4. I would imagine a combination of all to a varying degree, in which case the reaction should be both sympathy AND criticism.
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I'm afraid I just can't let the claimants that Air China has a poor safety record get away without rebuttal.
CAAC had a lamentable safety record. I agree.
But - CAAC was a monolithic umbrella organisation underwhich the regional divisions operated their airlines as autonomous, self-managed entities. The Divisions were responsible for all the tasks that constitute "Airline Management" in near isolation from each other.
That is to say - the Beijing Division of CAAC was a totally seperate organisation (airline) to the Guangdong Division of CAAC.
All of the accidents that CAAC aircraft suffered are attributable to Divisions other than the Beijing Division. The Beijing Division had a flawless safety record when it became Air China.
Because of our western ignorance of the structure of CAAC in this regard it is tremendously easy to label the monolithic umbrella organisation as unsafe without recognising valid distinctions. In this case, Beijing Division of CAAC and latterly Air China were the rare and commendable distinction in China. It is accurate to state that Air China and it's predecessor organisation had a 47 year accident free record. It is through ignorance that such a claim appears incorrect.
Why are we able to distinguish good operators in bad regions (like Lan Chile in South America) elsewhere in the world, yet unable to see that similar distinctions might occur in China? We all know that whilst Asian carriers have a dispropotionate rate of accidents, this label excludes the Hong Kong and Japanese carriers which have excellent records and reputations. In this debate, until the other day Air China should have been in the correct category. Rather than being labelled "asian" as a kind of implicit insult, it should have been seen as a worthy and good example, like CX, KA, JL & NH are.
CAAC had a lamentable safety record. I agree.
But - CAAC was a monolithic umbrella organisation underwhich the regional divisions operated their airlines as autonomous, self-managed entities. The Divisions were responsible for all the tasks that constitute "Airline Management" in near isolation from each other.
That is to say - the Beijing Division of CAAC was a totally seperate organisation (airline) to the Guangdong Division of CAAC.
All of the accidents that CAAC aircraft suffered are attributable to Divisions other than the Beijing Division. The Beijing Division had a flawless safety record when it became Air China.
Because of our western ignorance of the structure of CAAC in this regard it is tremendously easy to label the monolithic umbrella organisation as unsafe without recognising valid distinctions. In this case, Beijing Division of CAAC and latterly Air China were the rare and commendable distinction in China. It is accurate to state that Air China and it's predecessor organisation had a 47 year accident free record. It is through ignorance that such a claim appears incorrect.
Why are we able to distinguish good operators in bad regions (like Lan Chile in South America) elsewhere in the world, yet unable to see that similar distinctions might occur in China? We all know that whilst Asian carriers have a dispropotionate rate of accidents, this label excludes the Hong Kong and Japanese carriers which have excellent records and reputations. In this debate, until the other day Air China should have been in the correct category. Rather than being labelled "asian" as a kind of implicit insult, it should have been seen as a worthy and good example, like CX, KA, JL & NH are.