37.5 degree angle of bank, one engine out, gear down and at 500 feet

[Jet Jockey A4]

I don't know whether to laugh or cry.

All I know there are some lucky folks onboard that aircraft. They sure came close to a disaster on that flight.

Why did they not just follow the SID, clean up the aircraft on schedule and perform the required check list at a safe altitude all according to company SOPs?

IMHO this was a very poorly executed engine failure/emergency procedure and the crew should be reprimanded for it.

[Big Pistons Forever]

Originally Posted by PURPLE PITOT

. I still stand by my view point, and fail to understand why others do not, that sometimes you may need to think for yourself.

Could you explain how "thinking for yourself" could have produced a better result for this exact set of circumstances then following the Boeing SOP for an engine failure after V1 ?

From what I could see there was nothing especially unusual about this case. Yes the engine failed in a nasty place but from my POV simply following the "book" actions would have caused the the aircraft to climb to safe height after which a routine single engine landing would have been prepared for and executed.

What am I missing ?

[kick the tires]

PP

I haven't read the report, but is it possible that the captain, having determined that they had taken gear damage from the strike, used an old jedi trick that we used to call airmanship, and put the dunlops back down before they uplocked?

and interupt the gear up sequence? Not something I would be comfortable with. I'm no mechanic or specialist in the working of undercarriage but I wouldnt of thought that changing gear up sequence to a gear down one would do the dangly bits much good.

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by Doves

We all know that a swept wing stalls at the end first generating a strong pitch up moment

I don't think so.

[FullWings]

From what I could see there was nothing especially unusual about this case.

Yup.

Yes the engine failed in a nasty place...

Mind you, a V1 cut is what is practiced the most. I wonder what the result would have been if it had happened at 200', 15-20deg NU or during the clean up?

...simply following the "book" actions would have caused the the aircraft to climb to safe height after which a routine single engine landing would have been prepared for and executed.

Does look that way. I haven't been able to view the report yet but judging from the flight profile on the chart, it would appear that not much in the way of automation was used to try and lower the workload.

Also from the chart, if they were that desperate to get on the ground, they were lined up with 36C then 36L shortly after. Doesn't really make sense.

[stilton]

I just think C46r should learn what a paragraph is.

[Heathrow Harry]

What surprises me is that ATC at one of the worlds best and major airports have no way of calling up an overlay with major obstructions on it on their screens

I'm sure we have that at LHR ... don't we???

Tough to be too hard on the Captain - massive bird strike at 16ft - and he got everyone back in one piece

[HeadingSouth]

Report front page shows it all

Dutch irony is that the report shows a low flying aircraft over inhabited areas on the top of the very front page ??

[Roger Greendeck]

I don't see why its being tough on the captain to be highly critical of his actions. We often point out that as captain choosing a course of action is up to us. The corolary of this is that we are responsible for our actions and should be fully willing to accept criticism for poor choices.

In this instance there is no indication of having to choose the lesser of two evils. There is a simple and effective procedure for this very event that is practiced regularly in the sim and, in any reputable organisation operating these types of aircraft, is briefed just prior to taking off.

Whilst it is true to say that he got the aircraft on the ground and so at one level is could be considered a success the investigation has not found anything that indicates the normal procedure would not have worked and plenty of evidence that the crew did many things to reduce the chance of a successful recovery. That the company is reported to consider this '... a unique event which pilots cannot be trained for' beggars belief and is, I suggest a root cause of the problem than one pilots poor choices on the day.

[Ornis]

Gear down, tight turn. Was he thinking 36C or L?

[Centaurus]

Quote:
the flight crew and the training managers of Atlas Blue and Royal Air Maroc regarded this serious incident as a unique event which pilots cannot be trained in.
This statement worries me, and more than a little. What do you think Centaurus?

From reading the full report it is clear that the captain stuffed up badly. Also the first officer blindly lowered the landing gear when the captain called for it shortly after it had been retracted. One would have thought it would have been obvious to the F/O this was a seriously bad call by the captain in-flight performance-wise and at such low altitude. He should have told the captain this but he didn't.

There was mention in the report that the crew (presumably the F/O) was engaged in "programming the computer" as the aircraft was flogging around at low level just above the built up area and within four miles of the airport. The Children of the Magenta Line syndrome comes to mind. There was no need to play with the computer unless the crew were not up to quickly selecting basic navaids for the airport.

The experience of the crew was interesting. The captain had only 340 total flying hours when he first flew the 737 and the F/O had a mere 430 hours before going on to the 737. From then on the remainder of their flying hours was on the 737. Draw your own conclusions. In other words no sound past command decision making experience to fall back on.

From reading the incident report it is clear the captain was well out of his depth. All the simulator training in the world does not necessarily make a good pilot able to cope with the unexpected. Some pilots have cool heads while others instinctively rush things. It is a human factors trait that can only be partially addressed by simulator training. He had a straight forward engine severe damage shortly after lift off.

If he had stuck to FCTM SOP and not rushed things it would have been a normal single engine landing with Flap 15. Instead panic set in and the rest is covered in the report. Lowering the landing gear shortly after the gear had been selected up and on a single engine climb is an example of blind panic without first considering the effect on climb performance. Power reduction on the remaining engine was made probably without noticing what N1 he had.

[aterpster]

Heathrow Harry:

What surprises me is that ATC at one of the worlds best and major airports have no way of calling up an overlay with major obstructions on it on their screens

I'm sure we have that at LHR ... don't we???

That is a question for the staff at Heathrow.

In the U.S. almost all of our TRACONS have an Emergency Obstruction Video Map (EOVM), which they can call up very quickly if need be. I have linked a PDF file for KLAX. The first page is a portion of the MVA video map, the second page is the same area, but with the EOVM video map.

The EOVM provides only 300 feet of vertical clearance.

Index of /LAX

[macdo]

Two more airlines I won't be positioning with then. Bunch of criminally negligent muppets who only avoided disaster by chance. Appalling incident.

[DOVES]

Were they trained by same instructor and training facility as those of:
Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I think someone has to rethink programs and structure.
What???

The experience of the crew was interesting. The captain had only 340 total flying hours when he first flew the 737 and the F/O had a mere 430 hours before going on to the 737.

I've alway believed that to couple a Captain and a co-pilot having both so little experience is forbidden!
PurplePitot
You know very well that if you abandon the SOPs you venture into an uncharted minefield, the consequences of which you take and impose upon those who sit beside you, and your passengers.
There are cases, in addition to that of the heroic Sully, the United Airlines 232 flight of July 19, 1989, the El Al Flight 1862 of October 4 1992, the SWISSAIR flight 111 of September 2 1998, the AIR FRANCE flight 4590 of July 25, 2000, etc. when the Captain is forced to exercise his emergency authority, and deviate from the published procedures (also because perhaps he is experiencing an unforeseen situation) in order to save his crew and his passengers.
But I wish you never find yourself in a similar situation.

[BOAC]

Hey y'all -

The captain had only 340 total flying hours when he first flew the 737 and the F/O had a mere 430 hours before going on to the 737. From then on the remainder of their flying hours was on the 737. Draw your own conclusions. In other words no sound past command decision making experience to fall back on.

- as presented, this is MEANINGLESS. PLEASE do not get hung up on this quote and produce pages of nonsense

[DOVES]

Capn Bloggs

Originally Posted by Doves

We all know that a swept wing stalls at the end first generating a strong pitch up moment

Capn Bloggs:

I don't think so.

Pitch-up - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Deep Stall.

I know You knew.
You were testing me! Weren't You??!!

[ap08]

The correct way to deal with this incident would be to ban the company from ever entering European airspace again. Unfortunately this is not going to happen

[Bigmouth]

Perhaps it will take 250 bodies and a half mile hole in central Amsterdam to make the Ministry of Agricultural Obfuscation get the shotguns out and start to cull the swarms of those horrible creatures. Canada geese near airfields are a lethal hazard. My God, will we ever learn?

Up until the second to last sentence (... those horrible creatures) I honestly thought you were talking about the pilots.
And though I didn´t really want to say it out loud, I wash´t disagreeing.

[cwatters]

Any web cams on the KPN tower?

[mini]

I've never flown anything bigger than a Rallye 150... but reading this thread makes me feel I've a future in long haul.

Deciphered... What a cluster f**k,

There can be no excuses for the actions carried out during this event.

The big question I have is who certified these guys?

What (alleged) standards has this certifying authority?

Murder waiting to happen IMHO,

Piss poor recruitment and training regimes, i.e "Daddy" has sorted my income?