Quote:
the flight crew and the training managers of Atlas Blue and Royal Air Maroc regarded this serious incident as a unique event which pilots cannot be trained in.
This statement worries me, and more than a little. What do you think Centaurus?
From reading the full report it is clear that the captain stuffed up badly. Also the first officer blindly lowered the landing gear when the captain called for it shortly after it had been retracted. One would have thought it would have been obvious to the F/O this was a seriously bad call by the captain in-flight performance-wise and at such low altitude. He should have told the captain this but he didn't.
There was mention in the report that the crew (presumably the F/O) was engaged in "programming the computer" as the aircraft was flogging around at low level just above the built up area and within four miles of the airport. The Children of the Magenta Line syndrome comes to mind. There was no need to play with the computer unless the crew were not up to quickly selecting basic navaids for the airport.
The experience of the crew was interesting. The captain had only 340 total flying hours when he first flew the 737 and the F/O had a mere 430 hours before going on to the 737. From then on the remainder of their flying hours was on the 737. Draw your own conclusions. In other words no sound past command decision making experience to fall back on.
From reading the incident report it is clear the captain was well out of his depth. All the simulator training in the world does not necessarily make a good pilot able to cope with the unexpected. Some pilots have cool heads while others instinctively rush things. It is a human factors trait that can only be partially addressed by simulator training. He had a straight forward engine severe damage shortly after lift off.
If he had stuck to FCTM SOP and not rushed things it would have been a normal single engine landing with Flap 15. Instead panic set in and the rest is covered in the report. Lowering the landing gear shortly after the gear had been selected up and on a single engine climb is an example of blind panic without first considering the effect on climb performance. Power reduction on the remaining engine was made probably without noticing what N1 he had.