FAA seeks to raise Airline Pilot Standards

[MarkerInbound]

If you look at the training requirements under Part 121, PICs and F/Os get almost the same training. They are in class together so they'll have the same classroom training. They are normally paired together in the sim. The difference is the oral exam won't be as long (do you really care if the F/O can explain the difference between a momentary action switch and an alternate action switch) and there are 4 less manouvers on the check ride. No steep turns, no zero flap landing, no jamed stab approach and go around and if you have more than 2 engines they don't have to do the two engine out approach and landing.

[Island-Flyer]

72 hours in a simulator... great, that's advanced training . It would sure replace 1500h in a real aircraft in real conditions, real icing, real ATC radio, noise interference, aircraft vibrations, night IMC, CB's, unexpected headwinds, unreliable fuel gauges, etc...

And since when does 1500 hours guarantee you that? If you're a CFI you will not have gained much actual night IMC, you will not have ever seen icing conditions, all you'll have done is local practice in fair weather. I can go rent a C-152 for 1500 hours and fly only in day VMC in the pattern and be ready for the airlines, right?

Again, my point isn't that higher standards aren't needed - it's that this rule doesn't fix the problem we encountered with the Colgan pilots.

@BTDTB4

I think we're on the same page. My point is that this 1500 hour rule doesn't help anyone - it just makes politicians feel good about themselves. All the actual problems that led to this Colgan flight are a direct result of inadequate airline training, not pilot experience. The training history of the Colgan captain indicates that he would repeatedly fail checkrides and training events, but the fact is in aviation persistence trumps skill every time.

With an overhaul of airline training and checking procedures we could "weed out" the weak pilots so we don't wind up pairing two individuals with below average skills. AQP is not the be-all, end-all of this but it's a step in the right direction.

You can't rate a pilot by numbers in their logbook, the true gauge of their ability is assessed during training and proven during checking. That's where improvements need to be made.

[FLEXPWR]

A lot of things can happen in 1500h. Never mind the night IMC. You could get stuck in a holding near a big airport due to traffic, wondering if you will have enough fuel to continue. You could get a faulty prop (fiber delamination) that shakes the aircraft so much you wonder if it's gonna hold together. You could loose brake fluid on one wheel during touch down. You could have an inflight engine shutdown over the everglades due to a stuck fuel gauge on a single engine aircraft (just switch tanks and you're good to go again, but my heart stopped...), you could get a cracked fuel pipe, a loose carburettor, a compass with a 30 degree error (yes it does exist), a radio failure...

All this happened to me before I had even 700 hours, and all VFR. This is not being overly unlucky, these are small annoyances that make you learn your priorities, and I had seen none of these in a simulator. Sure, quality training IS important, but let's not confuse a brand new shiny light twin piston with EFIS and autopilot, with quality training.

I am not alone to think the picture is wrong here, at least in this perspective: What is good training? Beside training styles and shiny hard cover books, besides the brand new EFIS light piston with GPS, it is THE TRANSFER OF EXPERIENCE. So if my instructor had done all (most of) his quality training in a simulator too, where do you get the experience from?

Even with the best training, nobody can replace exposure to real life situations. Try crop spraying, as one poster mentioned here. I have done it for one year on banana plantations in Africa, and no training or simulator will EVER replace that. Agricultural air work in the bush will sure teach any sim mogul a few things about piloting skills, precision flying, and the definition of a close shave.

Island flyer, I agree that training standards should improve, but I disagree with the statement that more flying hours has nothing to do with Colgan story. These pilots acquired their early experience (below 1500h) ALREADY operating with passengers in a regional, affiliated to a larger carrier. Not the way to go in my opinion.

There are various reasons the captain of a big jet is required to have more hours, way more than the mere 1500 needed for an ATP certificate. Insurance companies: they play also a critical role in defining experience requirements, because they run all their business on statistics.

I have been a trainer and a checker in flight and in the sim for a few years now, and the quality training (such called refering to big brand names) brings no more no less of a good pilot than the local flying club. I have found it's the motivation, the passion, the drive to learn and discover that makes the difference in a proficient individual. Not how much he/she can pay to get to the most prestigious school.

There is a problem I see with the "train to proficiency" concept. Of course every pilot must be proficient to the required standards. But I have seen sons of embassadors spending 18 months to do a PPL...they are not motivated, have unlimited reserves of cash, after 5 or 6 years, they will be trained to proficiency... but they engage no interest in what they do. They will remain pilots with poor skills, poor judgement, and just this feeling of entitlement and arrogance.

I read once "Good judgment comes from experience, unfortunately experience often comes from bad judgement..." maybe it was here on PPrune (a thanks to the forgotten quoter). Here is another one: 'Experience is the thing you acquire just after the moment you needed it..."

When was the last time anyone got really scared in the simulator?

[TRF4EVR]

If you could teach a course that would prepare someone to be a proficient, safe pilot, you could also teach a computer to do it. The reason humans are necessary is because they're capable of parallel processing...loosely speaking "learning from experience". Certainly the quality of preparation one receives has great bearing on how quickly they learn from their experiences, but without the experience, the preparation just qualifies you to teach a class on flying airplanes.

There's a reason insurance companies require numbers in logbooks. Some very smart actuaries who have no emotional dog in the fight have determined that these numbers create superior pilots. I don't see any reason to argue with them.

[Gretchenfrage]

the true gauge of their ability is assessed during training and proven during checking

Although this sounds logical, it's more complex today than earlier, due to the erosion of training standards.
At a major carrier the last 5 incidents all involved new trainers. The problem seems to be that t+c's for trainers at almost all airlines are unattractive. Effect is, that the 'wrong' pilots apply. The ones who want to boost egos or the young to enhance or protect their careers. The first are never, the second not yet suited to provide adequate training and checking (the companies love them though, very obedient).

Training needs a huge global quality boost before above statement can validate.

Some very smart actuaries who have no emotional dog in the fight have determined that these numbers create superior pilots

I don't really consent with that statement. Numbers alone can't do the job. However in the absence of the above, numbers are more efficient, because experience works even on less skilled pilots. At least better than the stereotype, short, cheap and mostly virtual sop-drill that todays airlines call 'training'.

It's a complex matter. Numbers needed to be increased, but the worldwide training disaster should to be addressed just as agressively.

[Ramy ragheb]

And what was the reasons for thinking in such a thing, and why the military guys have more options than civilian

[TRF4EVR]

Gretchen: Agreed on all points. Numbers aren't the whole story, but the "numbers don't matter" crowd are dead wrong.

[Island-Flyer]

It's a complex matter. Numbers needed to be increased, but the worldwide training disaster should to be addressed just as agressively.

Gretchen, I agree. This has been my point. I think a number of posters have thought when I refer to training it's to who is training the PPL, CPL, ATP. I couldn't care less who gives pilots their basic training at this time - I'm speaking about the limited scope of an airline looking at perspective employees (pilots). The only training that concerns me is the air carrier training.

I work for a regional airline much like Colgan, we usually provide pilots with their first airline job so many of our applicants come to us with no air carrier experience and limited flight experience (our requirement has been 1500h since 2004).

As a hiring company the 1500h is a nice objective limit to put on someone but in the end it means very little. Did that person really fly 1500h or did he just doctor his logs? Did he fly hard and learn the lessons we all would like people to learn in a C-172 or was he a pattern-rat that has never seen an emergency or unusual situation in his life? Is this applicant simply a moron that can handle an interview well? Did his instructors impart upon him accurate information or just make stuff up?

As the hiring airline I just don't know and have no way of finding out.

As an airline manager it's my job to be able to accurately assess their skills and hone them to be homogenous with company procedures, policies, and safety requirements. All that comes from an air carrier's training program. The airline training and checking is the only means by which a company can assure only qualified individuals are placed in those two front seats. As it stands now this training and checking lacks in its standards and effective execution. While this is less true for major airlines, regional airlines encounter the greatest challenges because their pilots typically lack practical experience. Even at 1500h a fresh applicant does not have sufficient experience to serve as a flight crew member. That's why this number is absurd and that is why the air carrier training program is the real issue at hand regarding these under qualified pilots. Unless we only hire military pilots or Part 135 pilots (of which there are insufficient numbers to fill the required staffing of the US's regional airlines) the regionals will have to take a part of the burden for the shaping of their pilots into professional pilots. That is what should be addressed by the FAA.

I think AQP and the upcoming changes to Subpart N and O will help standardize airline training and checking, but the FAA needs to perform more aggressive audits of training procedures. A culture will eventually have to develop in companies where training of aircrew is not seen as a needless waste but an investment in safety just like preventive maintenance.

Until the FAA addresses the core problem - air carrier training programs, specifically for regional airlines - all we'll get is ineffective band aids like this ATP requirement.

[Intruder]

And what was the reasons for thinking in such a thing, and why the military guys have more options than civilian

Military flight training is more rigorous than civilian flight training, by far. Also, flying in the military -- regardless of whether it is in transports, tactical, helos, or other, is guaranteed to give the pilot experience and exercise his airmanship abilities earlier in his career more than most civilian flying (I give a nod to the professional bush pilots here).

So, the rationale is completely sound, acknowledging reality of the environment rather than sticking with a single number.

[Gretchenfrage]

the regionals will have to take a part of the burden for the shaping of their pilots into professional pilots. That is what should be addressed by the FAA.

That is a huge problem. Regionals are more under financial pressure than the legacy carriers. If they logically bear the brunt of air carrier training, then the burden needs to be shared with the eventual poachers, the biggies. If left alone, quite obviously they'll cut back to the bare necessity, along the line the regulator allows.
Sharing the burden might implicate a transfer sum, once the trained airline pilot changes to bigger carriers. That is what you're referring to that could be addressed and controlled by the FAA.

A problem not encountered in the US but popping slowly up along the rising airline powers is that such countries tend to have ambitious nationalisation programs. This brings with it some astonishing careers for locals, like ab initio (250h) pilots right onto T7's or 330ies and long haul operations.
They build up hours quite rapidly, but not even close the equivalent and needed experience. Still they operate into and share all our airspaces.

How can we address that problem? These countries 'own' their regulators and these will follow their masters voice .....

That might prove the ultimate challenge to the FAA and subsequently Congress, if such carriers continue their expansion and domination.

[BTDTB4]

Originally Posted by Island-Flyer

@BTDTB4
I think we're on the same page. My point is that this 1500 hour rule doesn't help anyone - it just makes politicians feel good about themselves. All the actual problems that led to this Colgan flight are a direct result of inadequate airline training, not pilot experience. The training history of the Colgan captain indicates that he would repeatedly fail checkrides and training events, but the fact is in aviation persistence trumps skill every time.

With an overhaul of airline training and checking procedures we could "weed out" the weak pilots so we don't wind up pairing two individuals with below average skills. AQP is not the be-all, end-all of this but it's a step in the right direction.

You can't rate a pilot by numbers in their logbook, the true gauge of their ability is assessed during training and proven during checking. That's where improvements need to be made.

I agree that any number of hours (if it’s just a number of hours) doesn’t tell anyone much of anything about the person claiming those hours. What was being done during those hours would tell an interested party a bit more – but would still not necessarily convey the whole story. I also agree that in the Colgan case, it was more likely to have been caused by either inadequate training or a failure to assimilate what had been seen and practiced during the training received; but, in either case, training was the issue. As any experienced aviator on this forum will attest, it is a combination of training and experience that makes a pilot what he/she actually is – and does – in the cockpit on any given day. It is true that experience can make up for some lack of training – and it is also true that, to some extent, training can make up for a lack of experience. However, at least in my not-so-humble opinion, the weight of those two arguments goes easily to the favor of training – noting that experience cannot be overlooked completely.

If that is a correct premise – there should be at least some experience on which either the PIC or the SIC may rely when it becomes necessary. However, specifying the number of hours of experience is not an easy choice – and that is only partially because it doesn’t indicate what must have occurred during those hours. For decades the FAA has selected to use 250 hours. Why? Probably because that is (at least it was, at the time) the minimum number of hours required before a pilot could obtain a commercial endorsement on his/her pilot certificate. Since an airline was engaged in a “commercial” enterprise, that likely seemed to be the most logical position.

Additionally, there is a regulatory requirement that each airline pilot undergo that airline’s specific training program for pilots and complete an established number of hours of operating experience prior to their being authorized to hold a line and fly for that airline. Both the training program content and conduct, as well as the number of operating experience hours, are part of the US regulations. But, like almost anything else, if the training program is not rigorously constructed, reviewed, updated, and approved by those who know what is needed and know what tools are best used for that purpose; if the training is not then regularly conducted by those who know how to instruct and how to ensure that the instruction has “been assimilated;” if the evaluation is not regularly conducted, both thoroughly and fairly, by competent professionals who know what they need to see; if the operating experience is not conducted by someone with a “critical eye” toward determining if the person really has “learned” all that he/she needs to learn; and, every bit as importantly, if the pilot, individually and regularly, is not concerned that he/she really knows what is going on and whether or not he/she is ready to do the job on their own, or are, at any time, willing to “press ahead” when they do not “know for sure” that they can handle the waiting circumstances … the results are going to be less than what everyone expected originally. Clearly, when any of these aspects are not met, the end-point is simply not, and should not be, acceptable.

The point I am trying to make is that training is an incredibly important part of any airline’s operating philosophy and function. And it is a point that you have also made … that is, and I quote you, “…the fact is in aviation persistence trumps skill every time.” The regulations should be clearly written to provide a “level playing field” for all who participate and to provide an adequate level of operating safety. These rules and regulations should be structured to provide the skills necessary to do the job – and those rules and regulations should then be equally and fairly applied to all who participate. From my perspective, and that of many of my colleagues, the authorizations that are available through an AQP-approved training program manage to provide unacceptable numbers and kinds of deviations from this premise. Such deviations are accepted through a belief that the same goals may be achieved through multiple and, at times, widely differing approaches, where many, if not a lion’s share, of those “beliefs” have been formulated and applied by those whose aviation knowledge was obtained exclusively through simple observation and very little, if any, actual aviation industry background or experience.

I am quite sure that most of the airline operations using AQP are doing so with the utmost professionalism and care … BUT the fact remains that the opportunities for deviating from the kind of rigorous structure, balance, administration, conduct, review, and awareness described above are generously more opportune under an AQP program. It is these opportunities that, when acted upon, allow such deviations, inconsistencies, and faulty applications to go unnoticed and the consequences to begin mounting. I am not overlooking the fact that we can, and do, rely on the individual participants to continue to do their jobs effectively and professionally … but those actions should be in concert with the regulatory requirements to do so – so that all actions in these areas are equally (at least as equally as individuals can be equal in their efforts) realized in the overall aviation system. However, the fact remains that when these deviations constitute the persistence you describe, we wind up with the “trumped skill” you’ve also described, all the while believing that the right thing is being done. WE – you, me, and the regulator – together – if we use the authorizations available under AQP, are conspiring to trump those necessary skills – through inconsistency and inadequacy provided by those deviation authorizations.

[Island-Flyer]

I understand where you're coming from with your reservations regarding AQP. I agree it is a new program for many air carriers and as such is under intense scrutiny from the Administrator. Thus far my experience with AQP is that it has given the flight operations department at my company increased ammunition to procure more funding for pilot training from the executives at the company (who are always looking at training as a way to save a buck). As a result the level of precision in training has increased drastically. It does take dedication and a real willingness of the training department to adhere to the qualification standards.

With AQP we are given the opportunity to assess each pilot on an individual scale and rate as to whether there is an ability to "train out" the unsatisfactory habits that have caused them to be unable to adequately perform the maneuver. The qualification standards in AQP, in my opinion, are spelled out in as much detail as the PTS we used under Appendix E and H.

You are certainly correct in your assessment that AQP takes careful oversight by professional pilots and the regulating bodies. It's a double edged sword in that when applied correctly and in the spirit of providing proper training it is superior, but it does leave a lot of ability for an operator to "cheat" and turn out underqualified pilots. If this does not come with more rigorous oversight from the Administrator it could be disastrous for the industry. This also requires skilled and responsible check airmen - of which I am lucky to have available.

I think we may have to agree to disagree on this. In understand AQP isn't infallible and I respect your opinion and the professional manner in which you've presented it. You've definitely given me some food for thought. I do believe AQP has, at least in our case, increased the standards by which pilots are trained and allows us to more accurately identify weak points in a pilot's skillset and train it to proficiency. If I begin to see our program evolve into weaker training standards I assure you I will come here and eat my piece of humble pie for all to see. Though one way or another we are all going to AQP - the N&O requirements forthcoming in 2014 (I Think) are just a watered down version of AQP that will be mandated for all operators.

[BTDTB4]

Originally Posted by Island Flyer

I understand where you're coming from with your reservations regarding AQP. I agree it is a new program for many air carriers and as such is under intense scrutiny from the Administrator. Thus far my experience with AQP is that it has given the flight operations department at my company increased ammunition to procure more funding for pilot training from the executives at the company (who are always looking at training as a way to save a buck). As a result the level of precision in training has increased drastically. It does take dedication and a real willingness of the training department to adhere to the qualification standards.

With AQP we are given the opportunity to assess each pilot on an individual scale and rate as to whether there is an ability to "train out" the unsatisfactory habits that have caused them to be unable to adequately perform the maneuver. The qualification standards in AQP, in my opinion, are spelled out in as much detail as the PTS we used under Appendix E and H.

You are certainly correct in your assessment that AQP takes careful oversight by professional pilots and the regulating bodies. It's a double edged sword in that when applied correctly and in the spirit of providing proper training it is superior, but it does leave a lot of ability for an operator to "cheat" and turn out underqualified pilots. If this does not come with more rigorous oversight from the Administrator it could be disastrous for the industry. This also requires skilled and responsible check airmen - of which I am lucky to have available.

I think we may have to agree to disagree on this. In understand AQP isn't infallible and I respect your opinion and the professional manner in which you've presented it. You've definitely given me some food for thought. I do believe AQP has, at least in our case, increased the standards by which pilots are trained and allows us to more accurately identify weak points in a pilot's skillset and train it to proficiency. If I begin to see our program evolve into weaker training standards I assure you I will come here and eat my piece of humble pie for all to see. Though one way or another we are all going to AQP - the N&O requirements forthcoming in 2014 (I Think) are just a watered down version of AQP that will be mandated for all operators.

First, thanks for your very kind comment. Second, the point I’m attempting to make is that all of what you’ve seen accomplished under AQP can be accomplished under the “traditional” training program applications. You say that “…qualification standards in AQP are spelled out in as much detail as the PTS we used under Appendix E and H” when actually, the regulatory language that allows training under AQP contains no specific criteria, per se. In fact, 14CFR part 121, subpart Y (“Advanced Qualification Program”), §121.903(b) states “Each certificate holder that obtains approval of an AQP under this subpart must comply with all the requirements of the AQP and this subpart instead of the corresponding provisions of parts 61, 63, 65, 121, or 135 of this chapter. However, each applicable requirement of parts 61, 63, 65, 121, or 135 of this chapter, including but not limited to practical test requirements, that is not specifically addressed in the AQP continues to apply to the certificate holder and to the individuals being trained and qualified by the certificate holder.” In other words, unless you have been granted a specific authorization under AQP to do something else, you will be required to “do business as usual” by complying with the same regulatory requirements that everyone else has to meet.

Of course, I agree with you that AQP is not infallible; just as any training program used by any part 121 operator is not infallible. But I do not agree that AQP has increased the standards by which pilots are trained. Indeed, the standards expected of pilots training for your airline may have increased, but unless the requirements used by your airline were not fully in compliance with the standards found in the existing rules, that increase you see is not due to a requirement of AQP. How do I know this? I know this because AQP includes no … none … zero … performance standards … for anyone, for any task. In fact, the material found on the FAA public Website that contains information about AQP clearly states the following:
“An AQP entails proficiency based qualification. That is, provided that pilots are trained to a standard of proficiency on all objectives within an approved AQP curriculum, it is not necessary to verify proficiency by virtue of a formal proficiency check on every such item. Rather, the proficiency evaluation may consist of a sample of such items, in order to validate that the training to proficiency strategy has in fact achieved its objectives. Terminal proficiency objectives (TPO's), together with associated performance standards, replace the FAA’s traditional event driven compliance requirements. Each air carrier applicant, rather than the FAA, develops its own TPO's on the basis of an instructional systems development (ISD) process outlined in Advisory Circular 120-54, Advanced Qualification Program. Once approved by the FAA (meaning the AQP officials), these TPO's become regulatory requirements for the individual carrier. An AQP provides an approved means for the carrier to propose TPO additions, deletions, or changes as needed to maintain a high degree of aircrew proficiency tailored to the operator's line requirements.”(underline added for emphasis)
This blurb starts out by making a statement that I believe is intended to allay any potential concerns before they materialize … “don’t worry, AQP training is better because it is proficiency based.” Really? Do they think that traditional programs are NOT proficiency based? Ridiculous! So – what’s the big deal? AQP or not – everything is “proficiency based!”

The only things an AQP-approved training program actually authorizes are deviations from existing regulatory requirements. Each of the deviations authorized under AQP may be requested under a traditional training program – but, each would be subjected to the scrutiny of a wider range of persons within the FAA, and each such request may be subjected to public notice and comment – which would allow competing airlines, and the public in general, to know and comment on each such request.

The only things an AQP-approved training program requires that are not required under a “traditional” training program are the following:
1) The training program must be constructed using an Instructional Systems Design concept (specified in an Advisory Circular published by the AQP office);
2) Specific data must be collected (that, once collected and examined, may indicate that a particular task, individual, or group of individuals might benefit from additional or remedial training or a change in a specific aspect of a particular training segment) and;
3) “…approved training on and evaluation of skills and proficiency of each person … to use his or her resource management skills and his or her technical (piloting or other) skills [must be accomplished] in an actual or simulated operations scenario” … quote from §121.917(b).

None of the requirements made by AQP are disallowed in a traditional training program and none would require anything beyond presentation of such additions to the Training Program Approval Authority (the Feds call this the “TPAA”), a review by that person (including whomever that person may choose to involve), and an approval by that person.

Additionally, I agree that, as you say, “…AQP takes careful oversight by professional pilots and the regulating bodies…” In fact, I would say that the same “careful oversight by professional pilots and the regulating bodies” is appropriate for ALL airline training and evaluation practices.

I am also familiar with Training modifications which you reference (i.e., the N&O requirements forthcoming in 2014) – at least as much as one can be by reading the Notices published in the Federal Register. Because there are virtually “no” performance standards under AQP, it is difficult for me to judge these proposed standards against any AQP training program because, first, AQP training programs are held as “proprietary” to that airline (and rightfully so, for the most part), but without something to compare … a comparison attempt would have to be considered “DOT” instead of “DOA” that is … instead of “dead-on-arrival”, it would be “dead-on-thought.” In fact, that everyone using AQP has differing standards (some actually describe it as “widely differing standards”) of performance for their crews is one of the concerns I have for adopting AQP … and, it also allows each airline to have differing standards within the airline, but different from fleet to fleet.

The Federal Register notifications for this pending rule change contained what the Feds called a “Technical Report,” where they described the specific tasks that would be “different” for an “AQP-carrier” from what a “non-AQP carrier” would have if the proposed rules were to be adopted as written. There were 6 AQP-airlines in the comparison (all de-identified). The stunning issue was that for “recurrent” training and testing, for each of those 6 AQP airlines the FAA recognized “differences” in how tasks the AQP-airline would have to perform from how the tasks non-AQP airlines would have to perform that approached 100% of the tasks! Said differently, almost 100% of the tasks referenced in the proposed rules were either “not addressed” or were addressed “differently” by each of the AQP airlines. According to the Report, “different” could mean either the task was different, was authorized to be ignored or substituted completely by another task (i.e., performing "windshear" recoveries instead of approach-to-stall recoveries! What's up with that?!?), or the way the task was to be performed by the AQP airline was different than what the nonAQP airline would be required to do – but, interestingly enough, not one of the tasks referenced was described – at all – the way the AQP airline would be required to perform it. To me, this report was a VERY enlightening revelation, and it is THE issue that got me to looking more closely at what an AQP authorization really meant.

The next thing I’ll likely hear from someone on this forum is that I spend a lot of words and a lot of time making my points. Guilty; and proudly so. I do this because if I’m going to be in this industry for as long as I hope to be, I surely want ALL of us to be guaranteed, as much as possible, that we ALL get the training that we need and that ALL of us meet exactly the same minimum requirements for competency and safety! Gaining deviations, substituting one task for another task, and allowing the adjustment of standards for the performance of piloting tasks on an airline by airline basis doesn't seem to me to be the way to achieve what I think are the necessary requirements to achieve what I would hope we all would like to have!

[LongBeachTrijet]

And since when does 1500 hours guarantee you that? If you're a CFI you will not have gained much actual night IMC, you will not have ever seen icing conditions, all you'll have done is local practice in fair weather. I can go rent a C-152 for 1500 hours and fly only in day VMC in the pattern and be ready for the airlines, right?

1) Renting an airplane for 1500 hours does not equate to being a CFI for 1500 hours. When you rent, you're flying when you want to and at your convenience. As a CFI, it is a job on which is relied for income. And although you still make go/no-go decisions, it is still not without the added pressure that flying is your livelihood.

2) Flying a rental for building hours does not equate to a CFI instructing to build hours. Not only are you teaching and demonstrating, but you're constantly looking for that fine line between how far to let the student "screw up" (we learn from those screw-ups) in order to facilitate learning and not bending the metal. And believe me, the little stick time that I got from instructing was definitely made up for by the instances of having to prevent bending metal. On top of all that, you're still gaining decision making and CRM skills that wouldn't be gained by just renting.

So, no. Renting isn't the same as instructing.

Overall, this is a good rule since it is better at encouraging a career progression approach to an airliner/corporate jet etc. vs pay to play. Sure, there will be those that slip through the cracks (like those resourced enough to rent an airplane for 1500 hours). But there are cracks in any system. However, without this rule, it encourages aspiring pilots to go through the zero to hero programs.

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by BTDTB4

I know this because AQP includes no … none … zero … performance standards … for anyone, for any task. In fact, the material found on the FAA public Website that contains information about AQP clearly states the following:
“An AQP entails proficiency based qualification. That is, provided that pilots are trained to a standard of proficiency on all objectives within an approved AQP curriculum, it is not necessary to verify proficiency by virtue of a formal proficiency check on every such item. Rather, the proficiency evaluation may consist of a sample of such items, in order to validate that the training to proficiency strategy has in fact achieved its objectives…”

I’ve looked through what information I can find on the FAA website, and I’m not sure where you say this information may be found … can you be a bit more specific?

[BTDTB4]

Originally Posted by AirRabbit

I’ve looked through what information I can find on the FAA website, and I’m not sure where you say this information may be found … can you be a bit more specific?

The specific area where this particular quote was taken is item number 3, at the following link.
http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/aqp/more/background/
However, all of the information under the Heading of “Distinguishing Features” at that same link are more than a little “interesting.”

The material found under the Heading of “Mandatory Requirements” at this same link is equally revealing.

[4runner]

I'm willing to bet that those that disagree with the 1500 hour rule are those who have not yet acquired those magic numbers. And those who have the necessary experience probably realize that those hours do count for something. Kinda like people without a university degree that say "it's just a piece of paper", yet those of us who have a degree know that it amounts to more than 4 years. Sometimes the sum of all the parts equal more than their number.

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by 4runner

I'm willing to bet that those that disagree with the 1500 hour rule are those who have not yet acquired those magic numbers. And those who have the necessary experience probably realize that those hours do count for something. Kinda like people without a university degree that say "it's just a piece of paper", yet those of us who have a degree know that it amounts to more than 4 years. Sometimes the sum of all the parts equal more than their number.

It just may be that at least some of those who disagree with the 1500 hours are those who know pilots who have those numbers (...or more...) and still can’t do the job ... and very likely know of those who have not yet reached 1500 hours and are doing the job quite nicely ... thank-you-very-much.

I would suggest taking a step back, refocusing, and recognize that it is the “necessary experience” that is necessary – and that this experience is completely different from any preconceived number of hours. At the risk of sounding redundant ... it isn’t the number of hours that is the problem ... it’s the experience gained during whatever flight time is logged. If the “necessary experience” is gained – the number of hours it took is practically irrelevant ... as it is the experience that is, and should be, the focus. Unfortunately, I know of more than a few “pilots” who have more than 1500 hours (some substantially more), and I wouldn’t let them take my airplane around the traffic pattern!

I’m suspicious that you may not know anyone who actually spent “more than 4 years” getting that 4-year piece of paper.

[Big Pistons Forever]

In a perfect world every airline would make good training a company priority and spend what ever it takes to do it right. In the real world training is a cost centre and cost need to "managed" (ie reduced). In the real world, especially for Part 121 Regionals, the bare minimum of tick the box training is the norm. Meet the absolute minimum standard and you are good to go. I think the only reason that airlines could get away with this was because up until recently, new hires almost invariably appeared with solid Part 135 or corporate experience including ME and IFR time.

Sadly the massive diminution of terms and conditions has driven the experience level of new hires down. Expecting the airlines to spend the money to properly train a 250 hr new hire is IMO a fantasy. Demanding an ATR is not the ideal solution but it is not subject to interpretation. It will make sure that new hires bring some experience to the job instead of the guarantee that a 250 hour new hire will have none and be totally dependent on the quality and effectiveness of the airline training system.

[Natstrackalpha]

Ha!

Ha! Its a ploy by the Europeans to stop all their pilots from going over to the States in droves because it is more cost effective to train in the States and the training is more pragmatic - as opposed to cripplingly expensive. The training industry in the States will only be catering for richy richies of which there are less than normal poories.
The flood of thousands of pilots will cease and brilliant schools like some national schools in the States will go down the pan as there will be plenty of instructors, with few to train.

Surely, the difference between a twin Cessna in the filth at night is actually good training but is far removed from the ambiance of an airliner flightdeck and in-the-same-loop CRM and all the rest of it in the rarified atmosphere and noise at FL410

but, who wants to be a Captain anyway, until you have got well used to being in the right seat and benefitted from ever greater depths of absolutes and worldly knowledge from el Capitano.