FAA seeks to raise Airline Pilot Standards

[misd-agin]

NEDude - how many guys lost their airspeed and stalled the aircraft? An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.


AngelOrange - the Captain might have had 600 hrs of Captain time at Colgan, PIC, or in the Q400 but he had more than 600 hrs TT.

Turkish crash - Lack of thrust while on G/S. Nothing to do with 'roundout'.

[maninbah]

To clarify

Actually you can get an FAA ATP Single Engine in a C172 (or Piper Cub is suitably equipped). I have one!. .. it was a simple add on to the existing FAA ATP Multi Engine. Granted, there isn't much use for it... and only a few of us have them.. but even so...

[stilton]

Angelorange.


If you are seriously blaming the Turkish Accident on an 'automation failure'
you have lost the plot.


They stalled a perfectly functional Aircraft with two good engines on a clear day
because the Autothrottles didn't function properly.


That was inexcusable negligence and incompetence.

[BTDTB4]

Originally Posted by atpcliff

Quote: The actual training is also identical, it does not matter if you fly an RJ or a B777 and the training requirements are absolutely the same. There are some few exceptions.

This is not true AT ALL, and this is an area where the ATP requirement WILL help. The training at Northwest and Delta, for example, is much, much better than the training at Trans States Airlines, USA Jet Airlines, or Atlas Air. They are ALL -121 carriers, and the training is quite different at each. When I trained at TSA they were NOT AQP, and USAJet/Atlas are not now on AQP either.

]So ... what is it we are to glean from your reference that some airlines are “not” training under the authorizations of AQP? If you compare the training programs of two carriers, one training under the authorizations granted by AQP and the other one not, just exactly what differences are you expecting to see? You make the statement that the training at NWA or DAL being “much, much better” than the training at TSA. Not that I’m putting down the training at either airline, but the obvious question is then – how do you know? What makes these “better” programs better ... and where does the “not-so-good” program fail?

[angelorange]

RTFQ

Stilton:

Please read comments and full accident reports:

http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/ra...TA_ENG_web.pdf

angelorange: "There are so many stall accidents/incidents in recent years with poor to zero recovery technique: .....Turkish B737 1951 - rad alt fault/autoland stall"

In other words the automation was a contributory factor to the crash - yes the pilots should have picked up the fault earlier through better airmanship and monitoring (they continually cancelled rad alt warning) but they did not have sufficient height to carry out stall recovery at that extremely late stage. They would probably have been better off flying the whole approach on raw data manual throttles.

misd-agin:

"AngelOrange - the Captain might have had 600 hrs of Captain time at Colgan, PIC, or in the Q400 but he had more than 600 hrs TT."

He had 618h TOTAL time at the point of joining Colgan - that is the point about this thread and the new FAA 1500h minimums for hiring onto FAR 121. It is not about how many hours (mostly in the cruise on autopilot) he spent on the Q400 once he got the job.

[stilton]

RTFA

I have read it angelorange and I reiterate:

They stalled a perfectly functional Aircraft because they did not pay attention to the speed.


It showed a complete and total lack of Airmanship.


If you can't fly an approach without functioning autothrottles or are dependent on them you have no business in the Cockpit.


To blame this accident on an automation issue is pathetic.

[Island-Flyer]

@angelorange

That is my point regarding the ineffectiveness of this new rule. Requiring FOs to have an ATP won't fix the issue of pilots gaining quality time. In the past you could get your ME commercial and head over to some small 135 operator or an airline like Great Lakes and work your way up there, if you survived you were deemed worthy to proceed to the heavier metal.

This ruling is eliminating the option of pilots to go to Great lakes, Gulfstream International, or any of the other small 19-seat operators. And quite frankly as far as 135 goes, there just aren't enough low-end piston/turboprop 135 operators to fill the need.

What will wind up happening is we'll have pilots grinding out 1500 hours in their Cessna 172 either on their dime or as an instructor. It's my opinion that sitting in the right seat managing a student is not sufficient experience to manage an airliner in all weather conditions.

Of our pilots at my current employer, the former CFI's often fail checks and if by the grace of God are able to make it through their initial training are the worst instrument pilots I've ever seen. Why? Because most are not CFII but only train in VMC. To put it in perspective in 2011 we hired 18 pilots and 12 with under 1500 houts TT, of those 12, 6 had come from being CFI at local flight schools, the rest were either FAR 135 pilots or came from other airlines. Of those 6 CFI's one passed and he has since failed his first PC and had to take two re-attempts as required by ALPA contract.

The fact is that 1500 hours does not guarantee that pilot will have sufficient instrument times to show real experience. It did remove an option for learning light FAR 121 operations with smaller aircraft. I don't know about you but my real learning on how to "manage" an aircraft versus how to "fly" an aircarft only began once I started flying in all-weather conditions during commercial operations. The things my captains taught me were what kept me alive in the years to come once I upgraded. This rule really hurts that process.

I would rather have an 800 hour pilot that spent the last 300 hours flying in hard weather at night in an MU-2 than a 1500 hour CFI that spent all his time training in VMC in a C-172.

If we must insist on going this route, then the FAA should consider raising the maximum passenger capacity of an aircraft for FAR 135 commuter operations back to 19 seats.

The more realistic option would have been a crackdown on airline training and checking procedures to weed out those that continually fail their checks.

[AirRabbit]

It seems to me that the point is continually missed here.

Given the fact that prescribing a specific number of hours, unless you can prescribe exactly “how” those hours are gained (then there is always the problem of how that is going to be verified or verifiable) is always going to be problematic, the logical question remains ... what is the alternative?

The alternative is, and always has been, the amount and the quality of training received and assimilated. With very little effort, the type and the amount of training is usually verifiable and is almost always accurate – presuming the company that provided that training is still in business.

It would seem to me that a total number of hours of “experience” certainly can be one source of discriminator in determining who to hire, but it should belong somewhere down on the list of important factors. The most important factor, the only one that can be somewhat accurately verified and is so much more valuable, is the quality and quantity of training conducted and assimilated. What is wrong with having that kind of requirement clearly outlined in the regulations?

Additionally ... I, too, would like to understand the references to "AQP" - what is it about having completed an AQP program that says the pilot is so much better prepared than having completed a training program under the normal regulatory requirements?

[Intruder]

To whom would the US issue green cards for pilot jobs? In your opening, you noted that Europe does not have enough pilots with those qualifications already, hence the airline cadet programs. China, Korea, India, UAE, and other Asia and Middle-East countries are already recruiting away from the US and Europe.

To start, those US pilots now attracted to Asian/ME jobs will find US jobs. Then more military pilots will leave the military early to get more-in-demand, higher-paying airline jobs. More "universities" will crop up and devise programs to satisfy the education option.

In the longer term, corporate and Netjets-type jobs will become more entry-level "jet jobs," and the airlines will recruit from them. Still, there is a good probability of a shortage of qualified pilots 5 or 10 years from now, and US airlines may try cadet programs as well and/or subsidize General Aviation with incentives to earn ratings.

[galaxy flyer]

With something on the order of 17,000 RJ pilots; a similar number of military pilots, and probably 5,000 to 8,000 biz jet jocks, the airlines aren't running out of pilots any time too soon. The RJ operators could have a problem, but the rapid phase-out of small RJs could fix that, too. Add in consolidation and the majors are not going to have a problem picking the best.

[Island-Flyer]

"Additionally ... I, too, would like to understand the references to "AQP" - what is it about having completed an AQP program that says the pilot is so much better prepared than having completed a training program under the normal regulatory requirements?"

AQP is a more extensive training program that 'trains to proficiency' rather than staking it all on a single check ride. Pilots will have to meet qualification standards as set forth by the program in each maneuver or event. The training will be keyed more to practical line flying situations than an unrealistic series of maneuvers and approaches that comprise of today's qualification checks.

Our airline is finishing Phase II and will begin small group trials soon. I have to say the program definitely seems to be more geared to actually qualifying pilots to fly rather than training them to pass the check ride. essentially the mentality will become 'train them until they can do it well, regardless of how many simulator sessions it takes'. Piedmont I know has increased its simulator training to 18 sessions (72 hours total sim training) to meet AQP requirements for initial new hires. National average sim training I believe is 32 hours total for initial new hires under the old program.

[BTDTB4]

Originally Posted by Island-Flyer

AQP is a more extensive training program that 'trains to proficiency' rather than staking it all on a single check ride. Pilots will have to meet qualification standards as set forth by the program in each maneuver or event. The training will be keyed more to practical line flying situations than an unrealistic series of maneuvers and approaches that comprise of today's qualification checks.

Our airline is finishing Phase II and will begin small group trials soon. I have to say the program definitely seems to be more geared to actually qualifying pilots to fly rather than training them to pass the check ride. essentially the mentality will become 'train them until they can do it well, regardless of how many simulator sessions it takes'. Piedmont I know has increased its simulator training to 18 sessions (72 hours total sim training) to meet AQP requirements for initial new hires. National average sim training I believe is 32 hours total for initial new hires under the old program.

So, I take it that you are of the opinion that all Non-AQPers simply “train the test” and as soon as the pilot trainees complete the requisite number of hours, they are deemed “proficient,” and are handed the keys to the jet? Come on … you no more believe that than I do. Actually, I think that the national average in the US for simulator training (soup-to-nuts training … where all the training is completed in an appropriately qualified flight simulator) is more like 28 hours – which is then normally followed by a simulator check (for whatever time that takes) and then is followed by a 4-hour Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) period. A lot of folks contend that this results in 32 hours of simulator training – which is true if you don’t count the time spent on the check and you count the LOFT time as “training.”

In reading your response I wonder if you’ve ever considered the impact on training time that happens with a slight adjustment in the training philosophy. For example, there are new “thought processes” that are making their way through the “halls of flight training venues” – all different, and all with commensurate impact on the overall process. The issue I want to highlight is what you have referred to as having “the training keyed more to practical line flying situations than an unrealistic series of maneuvers and approaches that comprise today's qualification process.”

Most often this process is described as a situational approach to flight training. Crews are told that they will be expected to be able to accurately assess the situation and determine how available resources can be used to resolve the situation. According to this approach, accurate situation assessment is what makes it possible to appropriately apply crew knowledge and skills to that situation. What this does is take the individual flight task, what used to be understood as the basic “unit” of training, and re-classify what is being trained. The new basic training unit becomes the flight “situation” and not the specific maneuver. AQP supporters (and others, admittedly) are motivated by the fact that accidents are often caused by a chain of errors that build up over the course of a flight and if those errors go undetected or unresolved, sometimes they result in a final, fatal error. Of course this is true – unrecognized, unnoticed, and/or unresolved errors can result in your day ending a lot more unpleasantly than you had desired. But following this particular philosophy, the question rapidly becomes one of “is the flight situation” more important than the “flight task that has to be flown,” … or is the “flight task that has to be flown” more important than the “flight situation.” As one can easily see, this approach pits one choice against the other – requiring one to be the recipient of the focused attention and the other to be dealt with as time or circumstances allow.

Under such an “event-based,” or “situational” philosophy (often referred to as “situational training” or “situational evaluation”) the critical aspect, the “flight situation,” now drives the thought processes and usurps the importance of the physical skills that must be exercised. So the training philosophy is now to understand that the combination of task and situation (maneuver and condition) produces a situational structure that determines first the CRM skills, and second the technical skills, likely to be useful in managing the event. For just a moment, let’s presume the task is to train or evaluate a pilot on a missed approach following an instrument approach procedure, where the missed approach would be made into an area of potential icing conditions. For the missed approach task, the crew’s awareness of the weather conditions in the terminal area and their recognition, consideration, assessment, and their collective decisions on how to make the necessary and proper accommodations for those weather conditions becomes THE critical determinant as to whether the event will be judged as “satisfactory” or not. With the “situation” being the most important function, the physical management of the airplane is instantly relegated to a lesser level of performance requirements. So, being late on the application of power, rotating to an improper attitude, or an out-of-sequence configuration change for the missed approach would all become secondary items to the crew’s recognition of the circumstances. Get the recognition and discussion (the situation) portion correct and all of the physical manipulation of the controls, which govern the resulting airplane flight path, may deteriorate to what some consider to be unacceptable levels, but the flight crew gets a passing grade because the critical aspects (the CRM attributes) were scored high. Training at its finest … ? ... perhaps not!

Additionally, if each flight task necessary for the complete and proper technical expertise to be trained and satisfactorily reached, particularly if each such task must be encountered only in a simulated line operational context, the overall time requirements would be dramatically increased. Anyone can do the math. How much time is involved in first taking off, climbing to some intermediate altitude, completing the appropriate check lists, preparing for the descent to the intended airport of landing, briefing the approach, setting the instruments, flying the prescribed arrival and the final approach course … all to get to the threshold and execute the desired “missed approach?” What if it were necessary to do it a second, third, or, heaven forbid, a fourth time? Imagine the simulator time that would be required to see that “missed approach” task accomplished only 4 times! How much better or more competently do think a trainee may perform this particular task after being expected to fly it under these circumstances? How many times would it take for the same task with an engine failed? How about with a tail wind … or crosswind? It’s relatively easy to see just how traditional training tasks – when they are required to be trained in a “practical line flying situation” may actually drive the airline to dramatically increasing the amount of time spent in the flight simulator … to learn the tasks that are otherwise learned – and learned quite well – using simulator times that are substantially less. Why such a program, training a normally qualified pilot, instead of taking 32 hours, may be required to consume, well, perhaps as much as 72 hours … or more!

[Island-Flyer]

So, I take it that you are of the opinion that all Non-AQPers simply “train the test” and as soon as the pilot trainees complete the requisite number of hours, they are deemed “proficient,” and are handed the keys to the jet? Come on … you no more believe that than I do. Actually, I think that the national average in the US for simulator training (soup-to-nuts training … where all the training is completed in an appropriately qualified flight simulator) is more like 28 hours – which is then normally followed by a simulator check (for whatever time that takes) and then is followed by a 4-hour Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) period. A lot of folks contend that this results in 32 hours of simulator training – which is true if you don’t count the time spent on the check and you count the LOFT time as “training.”

No, my opinion is not that our current standards just "train to the test", obviously some airlines are better at training than others, however I do know that some air carriers take advantage of the ability to "train to the test".

I can list a dozen air carriers using the standard system for checking that do an excellent job, and I can think of several that do not. It's not that the current system is bad, but it lacks standardization in the quality of training - leaving a lot of the responsibility on the air carrier. Some airlines do well with it like Expressjet, Horizon, and Skywest....while others train to the test and pump out undertrained pilots to save a buck. The fact is that AQP and N&O eliminates the ability of the airlines that look at training as a cost rather than an investment in safety to minimize training.

While I agree with you that training of situational evaluation and practical technical skills as a pilot are critical, I disagree in your assessment that AQP neglects the technical flying skills. Pilots will make their judgment and the instructors/check airmen will have the ability to evolve the situation and "force" a pilot to perform functions critical to the safe operation of an aircraft (such as a single engine missed approach). Additionally through careful monitoring of pilot deficiencies AQP allows for the training and checking of known weaknesses in a pilot's skill.

I know for a fact that repetitive mudane line operations can be bypassed during AQP training. Just like you can quick start a simulator during standard training, you can do the same with AQP. As for the line experiences, I can't tell you from my own experience because the air carrier I work for flies almost all its legs in under an hour.

I know one of our popular AQP test scenarios we developed for "task saturation" is a departure with a prop overspeed that requires an engine shutdown. The pilots can either return to the field (a small airport in mountainous terrain with only a VOR approach) or go to their destination 25 minutes away (a major airport with full facilities). On approach the weather degrades and they have to initiate a single engine missed approach. tower tells them the rain squalls are blowing through and visibility is up and down, the crew must decide whether to go to their alternate or try for another approach. Dispatch is simulated as pressuring them to land where we have maintenance. On their second attempt into the main airport the check airman may or may not cause another missed approach. If they go to their alternate they conduct a normal single engine landing.

That is one of twenty-four situations the pilot will encounter during initial new hire training. The check airmen and instructors will be able to draw on over 300 scenarios for training and evaluation. When training is complete all maneuvers that are listed in the PTS will have been accomplished, but put in a real-world context with difficult decisions and pressures. If the pilot lacks either the judgment, CRM, or technical flying skills on this evaluation, those deficiencies will be specifically trained until the pilot consistently demonstrates proficiency.

Our qualification standards (as I believe is the case with most AQP operators) do not allow for a crew to show non-proficiency in any area without that area being trained to proficiency. So in other words no matter how amazing their CRM, a pilot won't pass until they can perform a satisfactory missed approach as well.

[BTDTB4]

Originally Posted by Island-Flyer

No, my opinion is not that our current standards just "train to the test", obviously some airlines are better at training than others, however I do know that some air carriers take advantage of the ability to "train to the test.

Originally Posted by Island-Flyer

I can list a dozen air carriers using the standard system for checking that do an excellent job, and I can think of several that do not. It's not that the current system is bad, but it lacks standardization in the quality of training - leaving a lot of the responsibility on the air carrier. Some airlines do well with it like Expressjet, Horizon, and Skywest....while others train to the test and pump out undertrained pilots to save a buck. The fact is that AQP and N&O eliminates the ability of the airlines that look at training as a cost rather than an investment in safety to minimize training.

If you are saying that an overhaul of the training regulations would be appropriate … I’ll not argue with that premise. There should be NO airline, anywhere, that, as you say, “pumps out undertrained pilots to save a buck.” That may be a problem with the regulations – it may be a problem with regulatory oversight – it may be a problem with ethics of the airline management or training department. In any case, I am of the opinion that adoption of an AQP process – given all of what can be done under the auspices of AQP – provides far too many opportunities to at least compromise, or more likely, lose, the kind of airline training system that should exist in this, or any other, country.

Originally Posted by Island-Flyer

While I agree with you that training of situational evaluation and practical technical skills as a pilot are critical, I disagree in your assessment that AQP neglects the technical flying skills.

I didn’t say that AQP neglects the technical flying skills … I said that AQP allows the neglect of technical flying skills; and, of course, any training program is wholly dependent on the credibility of those actually doing the job. Perhaps it can be better understood by reading their own words: “provided pilots are trained to a standard of proficiency on all objectives within an approved AQP curriculum, it is not necessary to verify proficiency by virtue of a formal proficiency check on every such item. Rather, the proficiency evaluation may consist of a sample of such items, in order to validate that the training to proficiency strategy has in fact achieved its objectives.” The obvious question arises … if a given task is trained and the proficiency of the pilot in accomplishing that task is not checked because that task has been presumed to have been trained to a defined level of proficiency – why is it that we have to endure a proficiency check for any task? Certainly, we all train with the objective of getting proficient. The instructor wouldn’t recommend us for a check unless he/she was convinced that we each would pass that check. Why don’t we simply stop at that point? Why conduct a check at all? Both you and I could probably develop a logical set of reasons why a check is really not worth the effort and the time that it takes. Don’t you agree?

Another quote from the AQP gurus … “the applicant may elect to categorize certain terminal proficiency objectives as currency items. Currency items refer to flight activities on which proficiency is maintained by virtue of frequent exercise during routine operations. Such items do not need to be addressed for training or proficiency evaluation purposes in periodic training sessions.” Seems simple enough … proficiency is maintained by virtue of frequent exercise during routine operations. Hmm. Why couldn’t we just list all the tasks that are frequently exercised during routine operations and eliminate those tasks from ever having to be revisited during training or proficiency checks again? It surely would cut down on the time requirements and therefore the cost … right?

Need more? How about this quote …“Each air carrier applicant, rather than the FAA, develops its own TPO's on the basis of an instructional systems development (ISD) process outlined in Advisory Circular 120-54, Advanced Qualification Program. Once approved by the FAA, these TPO's become regulatory requirements for the individual carrier. An AQP provides an approved means for the carrier to propose TPO additions, deletions, or changes as needed to maintain a high degree of aircrew proficiency tailored to the operator's line requirements.” In case you were wondering, the term “TPO” stands for “terminal proficiency objective” – the objective of the training. Re-read the quote. The carrier sets its own TPOs that become “regulatory requirements” for that operator, and then that operator is provided a means to add, delete, or change those TPOs, as they deem necessary, based on their own evaluation of their own airline’s “operational requirements.” Each airline is setting and modifying their own regulatory requirements? Wow, that sounds like a real stringent set of rules … right?

Originally Posted by Island-Flyer

Pilots will make their judgment and the instructors/check airmen will have the ability to evolve the situation and "force" a pilot to perform functions critical to the safe operation of an aircraft (such as a single engine missed approach). Additionally through careful monitoring of pilot deficiencies AQP allows for the training and checking of known weaknesses in a pilot's skill.

Isn’t that precisely what the “traditional” training and checking provides as well? Pilots will always have an opinion (of course). Instructors and check airmen will always have the ability to “force” a pilot to perform functions critical to the safe operation of an airplane … if they are motivated to do so. What if the company asks them not to? Or what if the check airmen get together to allow their “buds” to skate, and maybe “force” all the “nerds” just a bit more? When and on what do you “force” and when and on what do you relax? Apparently, if there are enough complaints about something, there is the ability to legally change the standards. I was always under the impression that one of the reasons for having a set of training and evaluation standards for the tasks required was to ensure that everyone had to meet the same requirements – sort of a “leveling of the playing field” … and when everyone pretty much does their own thing … how is that possible any longer?

Originally Posted by Island-Flyer

I know for a fact that repetitive mudane line operations can be bypassed during AQP training.

Just as ”mudane line operations” can be bypassed during “traditional” training. An AQP approval isn’t necessary for this.

Originally Posted by Island-Flyer

That is one of twenty-four situations the pilot will encounter during initial new hire training. The check airmen and instructors will be able to draw on over 300 scenarios for training and evaluation. When training is complete all maneuvers that are listed in the PTS will have been accomplished, but put in a real-world context with difficult decisions and pressures. If the pilot lacks either the judgment, CRM, or technical flying skills on this evaluation, those deficiencies will be specifically trained until the pilot consistently demonstrates proficiency.

Two comments, here.
First – the number of scenarios available for training is impressive … but is this not available under the “traditional” training approach? There are some AQP supporters that describe an AQP program as a “proficiency based program,” as if a training program conducted under the “traditional” approach is not proficiency based, but instead, would be completed after spending the requisite number of hours “in training.” You and I both know that is poppycock – of the first order.
Second – if the training received is based on the PTS (the Practical Test Standards) how is that any different from “training to the test?” Are the other training programs out there devoid of some of those tasks? Do you know of any airline that incorporates a line scenario or a line-like approach to training? Let me help with the answers here … No! and Yes! Quite a few. Hmm. If this is true (and it is, I assure you) why is AQP necessary in the first place.

Originally Posted by Island-Flyer

Our qualification standards (as I believe is the case with most AQP operators) do not allow for a crew to show non-proficiency in any area without that area being trained to proficiency. So in other words no matter how amazing their CRM, a pilot won't pass until they can perform a satisfactory missed approach as well.

I would think this would be one of the standards everyone should meet. I would expect the same thing from ALL airlines. There are no "non-AQP" operators who allow someone to demonstrate a lack of proficiency – again regardless of how amazing their CRM – without having to be re-trained and then demonstrate an acceptable level of proficiency. Should any airline - AQP or Traditional - find themselves in a position of having a pilot - regardless of how amazing their CRM - who is not proficient - collectively or specifically, that airline should keep that person off the line until he/she is retrained and can demonstrate a satisfactory level of proficiency - collectively - including each of the specifics.

[slowjet]

Oh stop it FAA. Tell guys...." If you pull the stick BACK, the cows get smaller........if you push the stick FORWARD.....................the cows.aaaaah !.......Where are my EASA notes ?

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by slowjet

Oh stop it FAA. Tell guys...." If you pull the stick BACK, the cows get smaller........if you push the stick FORWARD.....................the cows.aaaaah !.......Where are my EASA notes ?

Excuse me ... but what's this have to do with flying hours vs training? And what's the FAA got to do with it? Does EASA require a specific minimum number of hours before a person can fly for an airline? If so, what is that number and why was it selected? I wasn't aware that the cockpit crew on AF447 was terribly interested in cows.

[smith]

250

In the UK, BA regularly take on 250hr cadets, after selection and type rating many go straight onto the 777.

Will these guys be able to fly in US airspace and land at US airfields? Or will they need to wait til 1500hrs before they get US trips?

[Wingswinger]

I think you'll find that BA requires FOs to have 2500 hrs or more before they can bid onto a LH fleet - unless things have changed since my days there (not that long ago).

[FLEXPWR]

72 hours in a simulator... great, that's advanced training . It would sure replace 1500h in a real aircraft in real conditions, real icing, real ATC radio, noise interference, aircraft vibrations, night IMC, CB's, unexpected headwinds, unreliable fuel gauges, etc...

Errr, let me see, if I spend the next two weeks watching porn movies, study the Kama Sutra and play with myself, would that make me a great lover?

I don't think we can simulate everything, and you gotta do the real thing to get proficient. Preferably far away from an 80 ton airliner with 200 pax inside.

Flex

[sidestickbob]

At last progress and sense. I personally always thought it was a scandal that someone could get a UK ATPL without flying anything bigger than a Seneca but I think the FAA not requiring f/o's to have a type rating was an even bigger debacle! This rule goes totally against logic after all the f/o is there (in part) to take command if the captain becomes incapacitated. So if I was sitting in seat 17A on an N registered 767 and the skipper keeled over I don't think I would take much comfort in the knowledge that the aircraft would now be flown by someone who hasn't got a type rating on it!