FAA seeks to raise Airline Pilot Standards

[BTDTB4]

Originally Posted by Island-Flyer

@BTDTB4
I think we're on the same page. My point is that this 1500 hour rule doesn't help anyone - it just makes politicians feel good about themselves. All the actual problems that led to this Colgan flight are a direct result of inadequate airline training, not pilot experience. The training history of the Colgan captain indicates that he would repeatedly fail checkrides and training events, but the fact is in aviation persistence trumps skill every time.

With an overhaul of airline training and checking procedures we could "weed out" the weak pilots so we don't wind up pairing two individuals with below average skills. AQP is not the be-all, end-all of this but it's a step in the right direction.

You can't rate a pilot by numbers in their logbook, the true gauge of their ability is assessed during training and proven during checking. That's where improvements need to be made.

I agree that any number of hours (if it’s just a number of hours) doesn’t tell anyone much of anything about the person claiming those hours. What was being done during those hours would tell an interested party a bit more – but would still not necessarily convey the whole story. I also agree that in the Colgan case, it was more likely to have been caused by either inadequate training or a failure to assimilate what had been seen and practiced during the training received; but, in either case, training was the issue. As any experienced aviator on this forum will attest, it is a combination of training and experience that makes a pilot what he/she actually is – and does – in the cockpit on any given day. It is true that experience can make up for some lack of training – and it is also true that, to some extent, training can make up for a lack of experience. However, at least in my not-so-humble opinion, the weight of those two arguments goes easily to the favor of training – noting that experience cannot be overlooked completely.

If that is a correct premise – there should be at least some experience on which either the PIC or the SIC may rely when it becomes necessary. However, specifying the number of hours of experience is not an easy choice – and that is only partially because it doesn’t indicate what must have occurred during those hours. For decades the FAA has selected to use 250 hours. Why? Probably because that is (at least it was, at the time) the minimum number of hours required before a pilot could obtain a commercial endorsement on his/her pilot certificate. Since an airline was engaged in a “commercial” enterprise, that likely seemed to be the most logical position.

Additionally, there is a regulatory requirement that each airline pilot undergo that airline’s specific training program for pilots and complete an established number of hours of operating experience prior to their being authorized to hold a line and fly for that airline. Both the training program content and conduct, as well as the number of operating experience hours, are part of the US regulations. But, like almost anything else, if the training program is not rigorously constructed, reviewed, updated, and approved by those who know what is needed and know what tools are best used for that purpose; if the training is not then regularly conducted by those who know how to instruct and how to ensure that the instruction has “been assimilated;” if the evaluation is not regularly conducted, both thoroughly and fairly, by competent professionals who know what they need to see; if the operating experience is not conducted by someone with a “critical eye” toward determining if the person really has “learned” all that he/she needs to learn; and, every bit as importantly, if the pilot, individually and regularly, is not concerned that he/she really knows what is going on and whether or not he/she is ready to do the job on their own, or are, at any time, willing to “press ahead” when they do not “know for sure” that they can handle the waiting circumstances … the results are going to be less than what everyone expected originally. Clearly, when any of these aspects are not met, the end-point is simply not, and should not be, acceptable.

The point I am trying to make is that training is an incredibly important part of any airline’s operating philosophy and function. And it is a point that you have also made … that is, and I quote you, “…the fact is in aviation persistence trumps skill every time.” The regulations should be clearly written to provide a “level playing field” for all who participate and to provide an adequate level of operating safety. These rules and regulations should be structured to provide the skills necessary to do the job – and those rules and regulations should then be equally and fairly applied to all who participate. From my perspective, and that of many of my colleagues, the authorizations that are available through an AQP-approved training program manage to provide unacceptable numbers and kinds of deviations from this premise. Such deviations are accepted through a belief that the same goals may be achieved through multiple and, at times, widely differing approaches, where many, if not a lion’s share, of those “beliefs” have been formulated and applied by those whose aviation knowledge was obtained exclusively through simple observation and very little, if any, actual aviation industry background or experience.

I am quite sure that most of the airline operations using AQP are doing so with the utmost professionalism and care … BUT the fact remains that the opportunities for deviating from the kind of rigorous structure, balance, administration, conduct, review, and awareness described above are generously more opportune under an AQP program. It is these opportunities that, when acted upon, allow such deviations, inconsistencies, and faulty applications to go unnoticed and the consequences to begin mounting. I am not overlooking the fact that we can, and do, rely on the individual participants to continue to do their jobs effectively and professionally … but those actions should be in concert with the regulatory requirements to do so – so that all actions in these areas are equally (at least as equally as individuals can be equal in their efforts) realized in the overall aviation system. However, the fact remains that when these deviations constitute the persistence you describe, we wind up with the “trumped skill” you’ve also described, all the while believing that the right thing is being done. WE – you, me, and the regulator – together – if we use the authorizations available under AQP, are conspiring to trump those necessary skills – through inconsistency and inadequacy provided by those deviation authorizations.