FAA seeks to raise Airline Pilot Standards

[BTDTB4]

Originally Posted by Island-Flyer

AQP is a more extensive training program that 'trains to proficiency' rather than staking it all on a single check ride. Pilots will have to meet qualification standards as set forth by the program in each maneuver or event. The training will be keyed more to practical line flying situations than an unrealistic series of maneuvers and approaches that comprise of today's qualification checks.

Our airline is finishing Phase II and will begin small group trials soon. I have to say the program definitely seems to be more geared to actually qualifying pilots to fly rather than training them to pass the check ride. essentially the mentality will become 'train them until they can do it well, regardless of how many simulator sessions it takes'. Piedmont I know has increased its simulator training to 18 sessions (72 hours total sim training) to meet AQP requirements for initial new hires. National average sim training I believe is 32 hours total for initial new hires under the old program.

So, I take it that you are of the opinion that all Non-AQPers simply “train the test” and as soon as the pilot trainees complete the requisite number of hours, they are deemed “proficient,” and are handed the keys to the jet? Come on … you no more believe that than I do. Actually, I think that the national average in the US for simulator training (soup-to-nuts training … where all the training is completed in an appropriately qualified flight simulator) is more like 28 hours – which is then normally followed by a simulator check (for whatever time that takes) and then is followed by a 4-hour Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) period. A lot of folks contend that this results in 32 hours of simulator training – which is true if you don’t count the time spent on the check and you count the LOFT time as “training.”

In reading your response I wonder if you’ve ever considered the impact on training time that happens with a slight adjustment in the training philosophy. For example, there are new “thought processes” that are making their way through the “halls of flight training venues” – all different, and all with commensurate impact on the overall process. The issue I want to highlight is what you have referred to as having “the training keyed more to practical line flying situations than an unrealistic series of maneuvers and approaches that comprise today's qualification process.”

Most often this process is described as a situational approach to flight training. Crews are told that they will be expected to be able to accurately assess the situation and determine how available resources can be used to resolve the situation. According to this approach, accurate situation assessment is what makes it possible to appropriately apply crew knowledge and skills to that situation. What this does is take the individual flight task, what used to be understood as the basic “unit” of training, and re-classify what is being trained. The new basic training unit becomes the flight “situation” and not the specific maneuver. AQP supporters (and others, admittedly) are motivated by the fact that accidents are often caused by a chain of errors that build up over the course of a flight and if those errors go undetected or unresolved, sometimes they result in a final, fatal error. Of course this is true – unrecognized, unnoticed, and/or unresolved errors can result in your day ending a lot more unpleasantly than you had desired. But following this particular philosophy, the question rapidly becomes one of “is the flight situation” more important than the “flight task that has to be flown,” … or is the “flight task that has to be flown” more important than the “flight situation.” As one can easily see, this approach pits one choice against the other – requiring one to be the recipient of the focused attention and the other to be dealt with as time or circumstances allow.

Under such an “event-based,” or “situational” philosophy (often referred to as “situational training” or “situational evaluation”) the critical aspect, the “flight situation,” now drives the thought processes and usurps the importance of the physical skills that must be exercised. So the training philosophy is now to understand that the combination of task and situation (maneuver and condition) produces a situational structure that determines first the CRM skills, and second the technical skills, likely to be useful in managing the event. For just a moment, let’s presume the task is to train or evaluate a pilot on a missed approach following an instrument approach procedure, where the missed approach would be made into an area of potential icing conditions. For the missed approach task, the crew’s awareness of the weather conditions in the terminal area and their recognition, consideration, assessment, and their collective decisions on how to make the necessary and proper accommodations for those weather conditions becomes THE critical determinant as to whether the event will be judged as “satisfactory” or not. With the “situation” being the most important function, the physical management of the airplane is instantly relegated to a lesser level of performance requirements. So, being late on the application of power, rotating to an improper attitude, or an out-of-sequence configuration change for the missed approach would all become secondary items to the crew’s recognition of the circumstances. Get the recognition and discussion (the situation) portion correct and all of the physical manipulation of the controls, which govern the resulting airplane flight path, may deteriorate to what some consider to be unacceptable levels, but the flight crew gets a passing grade because the critical aspects (the CRM attributes) were scored high. Training at its finest … ? ... perhaps not!

Additionally, if each flight task necessary for the complete and proper technical expertise to be trained and satisfactorily reached, particularly if each such task must be encountered only in a simulated line operational context, the overall time requirements would be dramatically increased. Anyone can do the math. How much time is involved in first taking off, climbing to some intermediate altitude, completing the appropriate check lists, preparing for the descent to the intended airport of landing, briefing the approach, setting the instruments, flying the prescribed arrival and the final approach course … all to get to the threshold and execute the desired “missed approach?” What if it were necessary to do it a second, third, or, heaven forbid, a fourth time? Imagine the simulator time that would be required to see that “missed approach” task accomplished only 4 times! How much better or more competently do think a trainee may perform this particular task after being expected to fly it under these circumstances? How many times would it take for the same task with an engine failed? How about with a tail wind … or crosswind? It’s relatively easy to see just how traditional training tasks – when they are required to be trained in a “practical line flying situation” may actually drive the airline to dramatically increasing the amount of time spent in the flight simulator … to learn the tasks that are otherwise learned – and learned quite well – using simulator times that are substantially less. Why such a program, training a normally qualified pilot, instead of taking 32 hours, may be required to consume, well, perhaps as much as 72 hours … or more!