American Airlines jet goes off runway in Jackson Hole, Wyoming
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how many of you have practiced those? (none of course)
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411A:
As I have stated, I agree with some of your barbs at AAL management. But, you really do sound like a sour grapes guy who was rejected by AAL during the pilot interview process.
Tell us that is not the case.
Do not for one minute presume that the American Airlines ineptitude permeates the rest of the airline operations world.
Tell us that is not the case.
An interesting comparison with the Midway accident (alph2z, #146).
What has happened since then … the industry objected to proposed regulatory action – the FAA only recommends a 15% distance margin above the unfactored landing distance.
If the FAA had aligned US contaminated ops with EU requirements, then many of the assumptions and risks in calculating performance would be highlighted – see CS-25; AMC 1591.
There could be significant risk if the contaminated performance is based on the use of reverse.
Reverse is not normally considered for dry / wet landings due to reliability issues – the need to minimise risk (maximising the distance margin) for all landings. However, for contaminated ops where reverse is used, the EU contains the risk by assuming (and warning) that these operations should be infrequent and at best avoided. The risk with small safety-factors is that if reverse fails then an overrun is most likely; there are similar pitfalls with reverse and the use of lower autobrake settings.
Whilst many US operators have suitable performance data, the difference appears to be that contaminated ops are not ‘infrequent’ as in EU, they are accepted as the norm as an economic operation depends on them. This is also the background to the objections against regulation / higher factoring on contaminated runways. Thus if reverse fails on a limiting runway you will most likely overrun the end.
The ‘nay sayers’ might be encouraged by the ‘safe outcome’ arguing that more runway or safety areas will ensure lives saved. This is very short sighted as it can only be a matter of time before a US operator suffers a ‘big one’ – Jamaica was very close, who will be next.
What has happened since then … the industry objected to proposed regulatory action – the FAA only recommends a 15% distance margin above the unfactored landing distance.
If the FAA had aligned US contaminated ops with EU requirements, then many of the assumptions and risks in calculating performance would be highlighted – see CS-25; AMC 1591.
There could be significant risk if the contaminated performance is based on the use of reverse.
Reverse is not normally considered for dry / wet landings due to reliability issues – the need to minimise risk (maximising the distance margin) for all landings. However, for contaminated ops where reverse is used, the EU contains the risk by assuming (and warning) that these operations should be infrequent and at best avoided. The risk with small safety-factors is that if reverse fails then an overrun is most likely; there are similar pitfalls with reverse and the use of lower autobrake settings.
Whilst many US operators have suitable performance data, the difference appears to be that contaminated ops are not ‘infrequent’ as in EU, they are accepted as the norm as an economic operation depends on them. This is also the background to the objections against regulation / higher factoring on contaminated runways. Thus if reverse fails on a limiting runway you will most likely overrun the end.
The ‘nay sayers’ might be encouraged by the ‘safe outcome’ arguing that more runway or safety areas will ensure lives saved. This is very short sighted as it can only be a matter of time before a US operator suffers a ‘big one’ – Jamaica was very close, who will be next.
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Also what AA found out in "discovery" (legal teams) is that the particular accident aircraft A300 had been involved in an inflight upset some time before, and that the flight data recordings from that upset were given to Airbus. In internal memos between Airbus engineers who communicated internally with themselves that OMG, that very A300 vertical stabilizer had experienced ultimate design load factor in it's inflight upset. That revelation was never passed on to AMR. There was also damage to the empennage attach fittings on the A300 that occured before the tail was attached to the plane.
Also, 411 you may want to check the NTSB recommendations (never complied with BTW) of A300 oversensitive rudderpedal design "logic".
A day or two later, when walking in the debris field at the crash site, our chief accident investigator was along side his opposite from Airbus when the two of them came upon the smoldering vertical stabilizer attachment fitting from which the tail ripped. Our investigator asked the Airbus guy. "In flight test, do you guys perform rudder doublets?" The incredulous response was, "No, the tail would come off." The test is full deflection, right or left then relaxed to center. Brief pause, then rudder deflection the other way.
I don't think there were many transport jet pilots around prior to 2002 who gave much thought to how easy it would be to take a rudder, no make that the ENTIRE FIN off a modern jet, well, at least an Airbus fin with a few rudder control inputs and at relatively low speed. I know, I never gave a thought about it on other than smooth use of the rudder in the Boeings and Mickey D's I flew. After all, we were told all about rudder limiters, yaw dampers; and the new fangled Airbi, who would take care of dumb pilots and not allow any over the limit control inputs. Not funny, but I've seen lots of detached Airbus tails floating in water, just one of them from an AA aircraft.
Also, 411 you may want to check the NTSB recommendations (never complied with BTW) of A300 oversensitive rudderpedal design "logic".
A day or two later, when walking in the debris field at the crash site, our chief accident investigator was along side his opposite from Airbus when the two of them came upon the smoldering vertical stabilizer attachment fitting from which the tail ripped. Our investigator asked the Airbus guy. "In flight test, do you guys perform rudder doublets?" The incredulous response was, "No, the tail would come off." The test is full deflection, right or left then relaxed to center. Brief pause, then rudder deflection the other way.
I don't think there were many transport jet pilots around prior to 2002 who gave much thought to how easy it would be to take a rudder, no make that the ENTIRE FIN off a modern jet, well, at least an Airbus fin with a few rudder control inputs and at relatively low speed. I know, I never gave a thought about it on other than smooth use of the rudder in the Boeings and Mickey D's I flew. After all, we were told all about rudder limiters, yaw dampers; and the new fangled Airbi, who would take care of dumb pilots and not allow any over the limit control inputs. Not funny, but I've seen lots of detached Airbus tails floating in water, just one of them from an AA aircraft.
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Tell us that is not the case.
I should think AA would pay you vast sums for your expertise. Probably take you on as a walk on for VP Flight or Director, Flight Ops.
I expect the AA management wouldn't like my thoughts....IE: AA is right and truly stuck in their misinformed ways.
Their so-called 'aircraft advanced maneuvering' training program was poorly thought out, and would never have passed muster with the older guys that were in AA training positions, long ago...especially the aggressive use of the rudder at higher speeds.
AA found out about this the hard way, with an A300-600.
Regarding their past overruns, Jamaica was a classic...landing long, with a slight tailwind, tankering fuel...AA was very lucky, there.
AA was not so lucky with Little Rock, and that was a classic as well...landing during a thunderstorm, with a management pilot, no less, at the helm.
Very basic mistakes that an airline the size of AA, with very many varied destinations, should not make.
JAC?
We shall have to wait and see what the investigation shows, however...AA running off with the DFDR is hardly something that a reasonable airline would do...unless they had something to hide.
I don't think there were many transport jet pilots around prior to 2002 who gave much thought to how easy it would be to take a rudder, no make that the ENTIRE FIN off a modern jet,
It was well known with more experienced guys, especially from the 707 days.
Retaining adequate knowledge is certainly not AA's strong suit.
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passing information has not been aviation's strong suit. and I will admit that I didn't know you could rip the vertical fin off the plane while using the rudder. Mind you I've taken at least 9 FAA written exams and the subject didn't come up.
My airline was lucky in that we didn't have the Airbus 300 series.
But a crash in Canada and its causes on a different type was not transmitted to our airline in time to prevent a similiar crash.
that is one reason why forums like this are important, you just might learn something.
cheers
My airline was lucky in that we didn't have the Airbus 300 series.
But a crash in Canada and its causes on a different type was not transmitted to our airline in time to prevent a similiar crash.
that is one reason why forums like this are important, you just might learn something.
cheers
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sevenstrokeroll:
More specifically, it's never been the FAA's strong suit, especially when it might dampen a cozy relationship with a giant aircraft company.
passing information has not been aviation's strong suit. and I will admit that I didn't know you could rip the vertical fin off the plane while using the rudder. Mind you I've taken at least 9 FAA written exams and the subject didn't come up.
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411A:
I went through school twice on that airplane in the mid 1960s. As I recall all they taught us is to be careful with the rudder above 250 kias if the pressure didn't reduce. (3,000 to 700 or 750 p.s.i. I think).
So, presumably that could leave the impression that agressive use of the 707 rudder would be okay below 250 kias or even above 250 if the pressured reduced.
It was somewhat academic at my airline since we were never taught to use the rudder for anything other than takeoff or landing or engine failures.
It was well known with more experienced guys, especially from the 707 days.
So, presumably that could leave the impression that agressive use of the 707 rudder would be okay below 250 kias or even above 250 if the pressured reduced.
It was somewhat academic at my airline since we were never taught to use the rudder for anything other than takeoff or landing or engine failures.
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@SKS 777... "Not funny, but I've seen lots of detached Airbus tails floating in water, just one of them from an AA aircraft." (BTW, how can I get the quote function to work...)
Unrelated and from a person not involved professionally into aviation- but could that have been a cause in the AF accident. They found the tail vertical stabilizer. Heavy winds, speed not known, heavy rudder action - bam?
Unrelated and from a person not involved professionally into aviation- but could that have been a cause in the AF accident. They found the tail vertical stabilizer. Heavy winds, speed not known, heavy rudder action - bam?
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grimmrad,
I could not hazard a guess about what happened to the tail of the A330 over the Atlantic other than it came off, not unheard of in big Airbus accidents.
The AF A330 would probably have been cruising at around 280 knots indicated B4 running into any trouble (turbulence or frozen pitots or whatever).
The AA A300 was flying I think somewhat less than 200 knots.
Of all the jet transport commercial line pilots flying back before 2002, there were probably only one or two who knew anything was probably dangerous about rudder reversals. (Rudder reversals were not taught at AMR, neither were there any cautions about rudder reversals mentioned in Boeing, Airbus or McD flight manuals, AMR flight manuals anyhow). Anyway 411's airline is fortunate to have him as he was probably one of those one or two knowledgeable pilots concerning rudder reversals and fin strength of modern jet transports.
I could not hazard a guess about what happened to the tail of the A330 over the Atlantic other than it came off, not unheard of in big Airbus accidents.
The AF A330 would probably have been cruising at around 280 knots indicated B4 running into any trouble (turbulence or frozen pitots or whatever).
The AA A300 was flying I think somewhat less than 200 knots.
Of all the jet transport commercial line pilots flying back before 2002, there were probably only one or two who knew anything was probably dangerous about rudder reversals. (Rudder reversals were not taught at AMR, neither were there any cautions about rudder reversals mentioned in Boeing, Airbus or McD flight manuals, AMR flight manuals anyhow). Anyway 411's airline is fortunate to have him as he was probably one of those one or two knowledgeable pilots concerning rudder reversals and fin strength of modern jet transports.
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With regard to what was and what was not taught regarding flight control application ... we'll probably not know for sure whether or not a specific comment was made or a specific reference was included regarding "control reversals" ... specifically "rudder reversals," for any specific airline training program. But I can say, rather confidently, that the AA "Advanced Airplane Maneuver Training" materials talked specifically about rudder application using the reference of maintaining "coordinated flight." The last time I looked, that meant keeping the inclinometer index centered ("the ball in the middle"). To my knowledge and throughout my career, there never was any instruction to "rapidly reverse" ANY control application ... and, again, to my knowledge, the only thing that even approached this condition was the recovery from the infamous "Dutch roll." As anyone who ever was required to see and recover from this infamous condition in the airplane can confirm, the procedure was to first "center the rudder pedals and maintain that position," then apply up to full aileron control opposite to the direction of roll as the wings passed through the level flight position and then immediately return the aileron control to the neutral position and freeze it there. If the roll reversed and exceed wings level, the aileron control was again to be used, up to full input opposite the roll direction, and, again, immediately return the aileron control to the neutral position and freeze it there. This procedure was to continue until the Dutch roll was arrested. Why? This was deemed to be the appropriate control application to recover from the condition. And, as anyone familiar with flight test techniques can confirm, full control application at speeds below design maneuvering speed is allowed provided the controls are immediately returned to the neutral position. Sound familiar? And, one would be well-reminded about the surfaces involved and the differences between the aileron surface and maximum deflection versus the rudder surface and maximum deflection.
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AAMPS, as it was taught at AMR dealt mainly with low altitude, low energy, high angle of attack recovery from a wing down in an effort to minimize the extension of huge spoiler panels to level wings in slow flight, with ground contact imminent, if on the back side of the power curve.
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What tells us at what time this aircraft finally accepted it was on the ground and released all its airborne lockouts.?
It appears to have reacted for a considerable period of time as though weight was "not" on the main gear and the landing gear bogie's had not passed their tilt on touch down signals....is this a case of a ("the aircraft still thought it was airborne") lack of communication signals due a soft touch contaminated landing aircraft?
It appears to have reacted for a considerable period of time as though weight was "not" on the main gear and the landing gear bogie's had not passed their tilt on touch down signals....is this a case of a ("the aircraft still thought it was airborne") lack of communication signals due a soft touch contaminated landing aircraft?
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Originally Posted by SKS777FLYER
AAMPS, as it was taught at AMR dealt mainly with low altitude, low energy, high angle of attack recovery from a wing down in an effort to minimize the extension of huge spoiler panels to level wings in slow flight, with ground contact imminent, if on the back side of the power curve.
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The "know-it-all" dolts on this BB ought to STFU and wait for a premliminary report. Any of you genius' seen the logbook history of the airplane?? Talked to the pilots involved??