American Airlines jet goes off runway in Jackson Hole, Wyoming
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Safetypee, the Operations Specifications are regulatory requirements tailored to each operator. They are generated from a standard, generic template, and are how the FAA adjusts the regulatory corpus, so-to-speak, to cover a wide variation in operator mission profiles, equipment, geography, etc.
AA does have the data on board for an inflight evaluation, and it includes the 15% margin. What is interesting is the way this data is presented, which I suspect is typical of many operators. There are four columns. The left two cover dry and good/wet braking actions, do not require reverse thrust, and include the 67% and 92% margins required by 121.195. The right two contain the data for medium/fair and poor braking action, DO require reverse thrust, and includes only the 15% margin.
What doesn't jump out of the page and grab you by the throat is the increasing workload requirement in parallel with the rapidly diminishing margin. Instead, it just looks like good is a bit worse than dry, fair is somewhat worse than good, and poor is quite a bit worse than fair.
This data should be presented on two pages: the 121.195 data on a green page, and the advisory data with the 15% margins on a red page, at the top of which is bold type stating "If you need this page, SERIOUSLY consider diverting..."
AA does have the data on board for an inflight evaluation, and it includes the 15% margin. What is interesting is the way this data is presented, which I suspect is typical of many operators. There are four columns. The left two cover dry and good/wet braking actions, do not require reverse thrust, and include the 67% and 92% margins required by 121.195. The right two contain the data for medium/fair and poor braking action, DO require reverse thrust, and includes only the 15% margin.
What doesn't jump out of the page and grab you by the throat is the increasing workload requirement in parallel with the rapidly diminishing margin. Instead, it just looks like good is a bit worse than dry, fair is somewhat worse than good, and poor is quite a bit worse than fair.
This data should be presented on two pages: the 121.195 data on a green page, and the advisory data with the 15% margins on a red page, at the top of which is bold type stating "If you need this page, SERIOUSLY consider diverting..."
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Quote:
Safetypee, the Operations Specifications are regulatory requirements tailored to each operator. They are generated from a standard, generic template, and are how the FAA adjusts the regulatory corpus, so-to-speak, to cover a wide variation in operator mission profiles, equipment, geography, etc.
Precisely.
safetypee is totally misinformed.
Safetypee, the Operations Specifications are regulatory requirements tailored to each operator. They are generated from a standard, generic template, and are how the FAA adjusts the regulatory corpus, so-to-speak, to cover a wide variation in operator mission profiles, equipment, geography, etc.
Precisely.
safetypee is totally misinformed.
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At the risk of drifting this thread, I didn't have the impression that Safetypee was misinformed at all; just that the obscurities of the FAA, and particularly Op Specs, might not be something he was familiar with, any more than I am completely familiar with JAR-OPS or the descendants thereof...
I mean, after all, if we all knew everything, there wouldn't be much need for this dialog...
I mean, after all, if we all knew everything, there wouldn't be much need for this dialog...
Mansfield thanks for the additional information which helps to improve my understanding of the US approach.
I agree with your views on the need for improved data presentation. In the example, for the two left columns it appears that they are only differentiated by the description of runway braking action and not as recommended in EU regulatory guidance by contaminant type, depth, etc; a much fuller description.
This suggests that US performance calculations have to cover a much wider range of situations, requiring the operator/crew to obtain additional information about the runway conditions (e.g. type/depth of contaminant) and skilled judgement in matching the reports with the performance data.
Thus my concern is that the industry (particularly the US) is exposed to additional, unmitigated risk in the event of a reverser ‘hiccup’ by using marginal performance on contaminated runways.
This concern is enhanced in that regulators and the industry are now actively discussing Operational Landing Distances - “the maximum landing performance realistically achievable by a line pilot adhering to standard techniques”. All indications are that this will be longer than the certification unfactored actual landing distance or the manufacturers current QRH unfactored distances for the conditions.
Thus, there is tacit recognition that current methods of calculating the baseline wet/contaminated landing performance are inadequate, but at this time operators have not been alerted to this risk.
IMHO, the current 15% margin above actual landing distance (contaminated) may only represent the proposed Operational Landing Distance which leaves operators without any distance safety margin. Thus adding a further 15% factor to existing requirements might provide a more realistic minimum landing distance on top of which operators could then judge any other risk, i.e. ‘reverser hiccup’.
TALPA Matrix.
Boeing view. Airplane Performance.
Operational Landing Distances – Airbus view. Page 8.
Boeing and Airbus views – EU conference. – Zip file for download.
I agree with your views on the need for improved data presentation. In the example, for the two left columns it appears that they are only differentiated by the description of runway braking action and not as recommended in EU regulatory guidance by contaminant type, depth, etc; a much fuller description.
This suggests that US performance calculations have to cover a much wider range of situations, requiring the operator/crew to obtain additional information about the runway conditions (e.g. type/depth of contaminant) and skilled judgement in matching the reports with the performance data.
Thus my concern is that the industry (particularly the US) is exposed to additional, unmitigated risk in the event of a reverser ‘hiccup’ by using marginal performance on contaminated runways.
This concern is enhanced in that regulators and the industry are now actively discussing Operational Landing Distances - “the maximum landing performance realistically achievable by a line pilot adhering to standard techniques”. All indications are that this will be longer than the certification unfactored actual landing distance or the manufacturers current QRH unfactored distances for the conditions.
Thus, there is tacit recognition that current methods of calculating the baseline wet/contaminated landing performance are inadequate, but at this time operators have not been alerted to this risk.
IMHO, the current 15% margin above actual landing distance (contaminated) may only represent the proposed Operational Landing Distance which leaves operators without any distance safety margin. Thus adding a further 15% factor to existing requirements might provide a more realistic minimum landing distance on top of which operators could then judge any other risk, i.e. ‘reverser hiccup’.
TALPA Matrix.
Boeing view. Airplane Performance.
Operational Landing Distances – Airbus view. Page 8.
Boeing and Airbus views – EU conference. – Zip file for download.
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************************************************************
NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
January 12, 2011
************************************************************
NTSB ISSUES SECOND UPDATE ON JACKSON HOLE B-757 RUNWAY OVERRUN INCIDENT
************************************************************
In its continuing investigation of the runway overrun of a jetliner in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:
At about 11:38 am MT on Wednesday, December 29, American Airlines flight 2253, a B-757-200 (N668AA) inbound from Chicago O'Hare International Airport, ran off the end of runway 19 in snowy conditions while landing at Jackson Hole Airport. No injuries were reported among the 181 passengers and crew on board.
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) weather conditions prevailed around the time of the incident with a ceiling of 400 feet, light snow and visibility of 1 mile. Winds were 10 knots from 240 degrees. Runway friction measurement data obtained before and after the event have been provided by the Jackson Hole Airport Authority for further evaluation by the NTSB.
In the continuing investigation, work groups have been formed to examine the subject areas of air traffic control, airports, meteorology, flight crew operations, airworthiness, maintenance records, cockpit voice recorder (CVR), flight data recorder (FDR), and airplane performance.
The NTSB systems investigator conducted testing on the incident airplane from December 31, 2010, through January 6, 2011. Operational testing and examination was accomplished on the spoiler/auto speed brake, air/ground, autobrake, and thrust reverser systems. No discrepancies were found in the air/ground, autobrake, and thrust reverser systems.
Examination of the auto speed brake mechanism in the cockpit pedestal found that the linear actuator aft attachment was improperly installed and was missing a bushing. This loose connection allowed the cam to be rotated slightly relative to the switch, which could cause the switch roller and the notch in the cam to not always align. System operation with this condition present is being investigated.
The maintenance group convened at the American Airlines facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma, to review airplane logbooks.
The group focused primarily on the spoiler/speed brake, air/ground, and thrust reverser systems. No significant issues with any of these systems were recorded prior to the incident, and there were no open minimum equipment list (MEL) items at the time of the incident. The airplane was manufactured in June 1992 and, at the time of the incident, had accumulated 58,879 hours and 20,518 cycles. No discrepancies were noted during the last periodic service maintenance check conducted on December 26, 2010. The last heavy maintenance was accomplished in October 2005. The auto speed brake actuator was replaced in January 2008.
The CVR group convened on January 4, 2011, at the NTSB recorder laboratory. The group completed a transcript of the last 30 minutes of the recording and a summary of the previous 90 minutes. The transcript will be released when the public docket is opened.
The FDR group has begun the process of determining which of the documented parameters are installed and should be functional, and is checking the recorded data for validity.
The group has verified the following factual information:
* The FDR download contains the last 43.9 hours of data, more than the required 25 hours, and includes all of the incident flight.
* The recorded speed brake handle position indicates that the speed brakes were manually extended by the flight crew during the approach after which the handle was left in the armed position until landing. The FDR records only the speed brake handle position and not the individual speed brake (spoiler) panel positions.
* The FDR data indicate that the aircraft touched down at approximately 132 knots.
* At touchdown, the air/ground parameter changes to "ground" for approximately one second and then switches to "air" for approximately ½ second before changing back to "ground" for the remainder of the recording.
* During the time period when the air/ground parameter switched back to "air," the speed brake handle position momentarily moved toward the down position and then returned to the armed position where it stayed for the remainder of the recording.
* Thrust Reverser (T/R) discrete parameters indicate that the T/Rs moved into the in-transit position during the ½ second that the air/ground logic parameter indicated "air."
* The T/Rs remained in the in-transit position for approximately 10 seconds before transitioning to the stowed position for one second. The T/Rs then moved back to the in-transit position for an additional 6 seconds before becoming deployed.
* The T/R discrete parameters indicate that approximately 18 seconds elapsed from the time the T/Rs began moving until they were fully deployed.
Additionally, the team has examined security camera videos provided by the airport as well as a video of the landing taken by one of the passengers.
The accident docket, which will contain additional factual information, is expected to be opened in 60-90 days. It will be available on the NTSB website at NTSB - FOIA requests
NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
January 12, 2011
************************************************************
NTSB ISSUES SECOND UPDATE ON JACKSON HOLE B-757 RUNWAY OVERRUN INCIDENT
************************************************************
In its continuing investigation of the runway overrun of a jetliner in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:
At about 11:38 am MT on Wednesday, December 29, American Airlines flight 2253, a B-757-200 (N668AA) inbound from Chicago O'Hare International Airport, ran off the end of runway 19 in snowy conditions while landing at Jackson Hole Airport. No injuries were reported among the 181 passengers and crew on board.
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) weather conditions prevailed around the time of the incident with a ceiling of 400 feet, light snow and visibility of 1 mile. Winds were 10 knots from 240 degrees. Runway friction measurement data obtained before and after the event have been provided by the Jackson Hole Airport Authority for further evaluation by the NTSB.
In the continuing investigation, work groups have been formed to examine the subject areas of air traffic control, airports, meteorology, flight crew operations, airworthiness, maintenance records, cockpit voice recorder (CVR), flight data recorder (FDR), and airplane performance.
The NTSB systems investigator conducted testing on the incident airplane from December 31, 2010, through January 6, 2011. Operational testing and examination was accomplished on the spoiler/auto speed brake, air/ground, autobrake, and thrust reverser systems. No discrepancies were found in the air/ground, autobrake, and thrust reverser systems.
Examination of the auto speed brake mechanism in the cockpit pedestal found that the linear actuator aft attachment was improperly installed and was missing a bushing. This loose connection allowed the cam to be rotated slightly relative to the switch, which could cause the switch roller and the notch in the cam to not always align. System operation with this condition present is being investigated.
The maintenance group convened at the American Airlines facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma, to review airplane logbooks.
The group focused primarily on the spoiler/speed brake, air/ground, and thrust reverser systems. No significant issues with any of these systems were recorded prior to the incident, and there were no open minimum equipment list (MEL) items at the time of the incident. The airplane was manufactured in June 1992 and, at the time of the incident, had accumulated 58,879 hours and 20,518 cycles. No discrepancies were noted during the last periodic service maintenance check conducted on December 26, 2010. The last heavy maintenance was accomplished in October 2005. The auto speed brake actuator was replaced in January 2008.
The CVR group convened on January 4, 2011, at the NTSB recorder laboratory. The group completed a transcript of the last 30 minutes of the recording and a summary of the previous 90 minutes. The transcript will be released when the public docket is opened.
The FDR group has begun the process of determining which of the documented parameters are installed and should be functional, and is checking the recorded data for validity.
The group has verified the following factual information:
* The FDR download contains the last 43.9 hours of data, more than the required 25 hours, and includes all of the incident flight.
* The recorded speed brake handle position indicates that the speed brakes were manually extended by the flight crew during the approach after which the handle was left in the armed position until landing. The FDR records only the speed brake handle position and not the individual speed brake (spoiler) panel positions.
* The FDR data indicate that the aircraft touched down at approximately 132 knots.
* At touchdown, the air/ground parameter changes to "ground" for approximately one second and then switches to "air" for approximately ½ second before changing back to "ground" for the remainder of the recording.
* During the time period when the air/ground parameter switched back to "air," the speed brake handle position momentarily moved toward the down position and then returned to the armed position where it stayed for the remainder of the recording.
* Thrust Reverser (T/R) discrete parameters indicate that the T/Rs moved into the in-transit position during the ½ second that the air/ground logic parameter indicated "air."
* The T/Rs remained in the in-transit position for approximately 10 seconds before transitioning to the stowed position for one second. The T/Rs then moved back to the in-transit position for an additional 6 seconds before becoming deployed.
* The T/R discrete parameters indicate that approximately 18 seconds elapsed from the time the T/Rs began moving until they were fully deployed.
Additionally, the team has examined security camera videos provided by the airport as well as a video of the landing taken by one of the passengers.
The accident docket, which will contain additional factual information, is expected to be opened in 60-90 days. It will be available on the NTSB website at NTSB - FOIA requests
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Sounds like perhaps a very soft T/D as written earlier here by others, as evidenced by the air/ground logic flip-flopping which could be caused by gear tilt sensor angle cycling. I am guessing the power levers were not at idle at touchdown. If the auto S/B's were functioning properly, they would have deployed simultaneously(NTSB says they were armed), with the A/G logic when it first changed to ground.....IF the throttles were both on the idle stop.
On dry and long runways, if stabilized approach, on glide path; a soft touchdown in the first 1500 feet of runway to me was a fine accomplishment. On wet, slippery runways AA has taught (drilled it in) for decades for pilots to plan for and fly a firm touchdown within the runway touchdown zone and quickly and efficiently apply up to maximum aerodynamic braking, wheel braking and thrust reverse. AA has for years now required thrust reverse on all landings.
NTSB interim report....
"Examination of the auto speed brake mechanism in the cockpit pedestal found that the linear actuator aft attachment was improperly installed and was missing a bushing. This loose connection allowed the cam to be rotated slightly relative to the switch, which could cause the switch roller and the notch in the cam to not always align. System operation with this condition present is being investigated."
On dry and long runways, if stabilized approach, on glide path; a soft touchdown in the first 1500 feet of runway to me was a fine accomplishment. On wet, slippery runways AA has taught (drilled it in) for decades for pilots to plan for and fly a firm touchdown within the runway touchdown zone and quickly and efficiently apply up to maximum aerodynamic braking, wheel braking and thrust reverse. AA has for years now required thrust reverse on all landings.
NTSB interim report....
"Examination of the auto speed brake mechanism in the cockpit pedestal found that the linear actuator aft attachment was improperly installed and was missing a bushing. This loose connection allowed the cam to be rotated slightly relative to the switch, which could cause the switch roller and the notch in the cam to not always align. System operation with this condition present is being investigated."
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1/2 second of the mg tilt switch sensing air mode shouldn't have caused all the manual braking problems, spoilers not returning to extended and no reverse after returning to ground mode. Maybe the reversers were being pulled back the whole time during the 1/2 second air mode and were binding not allowing them to reverse properly. At least we know now that they touched down on speed short of the thousand foot mark.
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funny how the southwest airlines/midway deal took 18 seconds for thrust reverser deployment too.
I flew one plane (piece of shirt, metroliner) about 25 years ago...it had an air ground over ride switch/button. whatever the plane ''thought'' the over ride would tell it differently.
I do think all planes should have the over ride, I also think that a timer should be selected at the middle marker that would signal on ground after an appropriate time to runway. (over ridden with GA switch)
I flew one plane (piece of shirt, metroliner) about 25 years ago...it had an air ground over ride switch/button. whatever the plane ''thought'' the over ride would tell it differently.
I do think all planes should have the over ride, I also think that a timer should be selected at the middle marker that would signal on ground after an appropriate time to runway. (over ridden with GA switch)
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JAC Investigation
An undetected maintenance error, compounded by pilot mistakes, likely caused an American Airlines Boeing 757 to roll off the end of a Wyoming runway in snowy conditions last month, according to people familiar with the details.
Federal safety officials, these people said, are now examining whether the same maintenance lapse discovered after the Dec. 29 incidentwhich didn't injure any of the 181 people aboardmay affect some of the carrier's other planes.
Arriving at Jackson Hole, Wyo., amid light snow and low visibility, the twin-engine Boeing 757 slid more than 600 feet off the end of the strip into hard-packed snow.
Investigators are examining why the pilots didn't promptly recognize certain automation failures that allowed the jetliner to keep barreling down the runway. The probe is examining whether the maintenance lapse caused those failures. Investigators are also examining why the pilots didn't manually deploy certain panels on the wings designed to help slow the aircraft.
A spokeswoman for the AMR Corp. unit and officials at the Federal Aviation Administration declined to comment.
The incident has attracted widespread attention because earlier this month, the National Transportation Safety Board determined that American violated long-established "standards of conduct" by improperly downloading information, for its own use, from the plane's flight-data recorder before turning the device over to the government. As a result, the board took the unusual step of barring American from further participation in the federal probe.
In an update of its preliminary findings released Wednesday, the safety board disclosed that the runway incident followed problems experienced by two separate systems designed to help decelerate the jetliner.
Panels on top of the wings, known as spoilers, failed to automatically pop up and help slow the aircraft, according to investigators. The safety board said that a portion of the linkage to an electrical switch needed to automatically activate the spoilers on the ground "was improperly installed" during earlier maintenance procedures. Investigators didn't indicate when mechanics made the alleged mistake.
Contrary to American's checklists and safety procedures, the cockpit crew apparently failed to try to manually deploy the spoilers in Jackson Hole, according to people familiar with the details.
In addition, the safety board said separate devices at the rear of the engines also designed to help the plane come to stopcalled thrust reverserstook too long to deploy. "Approximately 18 seconds elapsed" from the time the plane's landing gears touched the runway "until [reversers] were fully deployed," according to the update. Typically, the devices should kick in and start redirecting engine thrust in a matter of seconds. They are controlled by the crew.
The plane's cockpit-voice recorder, however, indicates that the pilots commanded the reversers to deploy as soon as the plane touched down, according to people familiar with the details. One angle the safety board is pursuing is whether the earlier maintenance errorpotentially binding or restricting the operation of various controls in the cockpitcould have caused the delayed response from the reversers.
To help answer that question, these people said, the FAA has told American to inspect a portion of its Boeing 757 fleet for similar maintenance lapses.
According to the board's latest findings, the 18-year old jetliner experienced "no significant issues with any of these systems" prior to the incident, and all required maintenance items were up to date prior to last month's flight from Chicago to Jackson Hole.
Almost precisely a year earlier, An American Airlines Boeing 737 ran off the end of a wet runway at Kingston, Jamaica, after touching far down the strip. Unable to stop with almost half the 8,900-foot runway behind it, the plane barreled off the strip at more than 60 miles per hour and broke apart. There were no fatalities.
In that event, Jamaican and U.S. investigators have concluded that the plane's brakes, reversers and other systems basically operated as designed, but standing water on portions of the runway likely made it difficult for the pilots to stop in time.
Federal safety officials, these people said, are now examining whether the same maintenance lapse discovered after the Dec. 29 incidentwhich didn't injure any of the 181 people aboardmay affect some of the carrier's other planes.
Arriving at Jackson Hole, Wyo., amid light snow and low visibility, the twin-engine Boeing 757 slid more than 600 feet off the end of the strip into hard-packed snow.
Investigators are examining why the pilots didn't promptly recognize certain automation failures that allowed the jetliner to keep barreling down the runway. The probe is examining whether the maintenance lapse caused those failures. Investigators are also examining why the pilots didn't manually deploy certain panels on the wings designed to help slow the aircraft.
A spokeswoman for the AMR Corp. unit and officials at the Federal Aviation Administration declined to comment.
The incident has attracted widespread attention because earlier this month, the National Transportation Safety Board determined that American violated long-established "standards of conduct" by improperly downloading information, for its own use, from the plane's flight-data recorder before turning the device over to the government. As a result, the board took the unusual step of barring American from further participation in the federal probe.
In an update of its preliminary findings released Wednesday, the safety board disclosed that the runway incident followed problems experienced by two separate systems designed to help decelerate the jetliner.
Panels on top of the wings, known as spoilers, failed to automatically pop up and help slow the aircraft, according to investigators. The safety board said that a portion of the linkage to an electrical switch needed to automatically activate the spoilers on the ground "was improperly installed" during earlier maintenance procedures. Investigators didn't indicate when mechanics made the alleged mistake.
Contrary to American's checklists and safety procedures, the cockpit crew apparently failed to try to manually deploy the spoilers in Jackson Hole, according to people familiar with the details.
In addition, the safety board said separate devices at the rear of the engines also designed to help the plane come to stopcalled thrust reverserstook too long to deploy. "Approximately 18 seconds elapsed" from the time the plane's landing gears touched the runway "until [reversers] were fully deployed," according to the update. Typically, the devices should kick in and start redirecting engine thrust in a matter of seconds. They are controlled by the crew.
The plane's cockpit-voice recorder, however, indicates that the pilots commanded the reversers to deploy as soon as the plane touched down, according to people familiar with the details. One angle the safety board is pursuing is whether the earlier maintenance errorpotentially binding or restricting the operation of various controls in the cockpitcould have caused the delayed response from the reversers.
To help answer that question, these people said, the FAA has told American to inspect a portion of its Boeing 757 fleet for similar maintenance lapses.
According to the board's latest findings, the 18-year old jetliner experienced "no significant issues with any of these systems" prior to the incident, and all required maintenance items were up to date prior to last month's flight from Chicago to Jackson Hole.
Almost precisely a year earlier, An American Airlines Boeing 737 ran off the end of a wet runway at Kingston, Jamaica, after touching far down the strip. Unable to stop with almost half the 8,900-foot runway behind it, the plane barreled off the strip at more than 60 miles per hour and broke apart. There were no fatalities.
In that event, Jamaican and U.S. investigators have concluded that the plane's brakes, reversers and other systems basically operated as designed, but standing water on portions of the runway likely made it difficult for the pilots to stop in time.
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An undetected maintenance error, compounded by pilot mistakes,
AA...the largest FAA maintenance fines of any US air carrier...ever.
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as a carpenter has different grades of sandpaper for different jobs, so too an airline pilot must have different grades of landings.
this runway required a hard landing/firm landing and if by shear luck you get a soft landing this should alert the PRUDENT airline pilot of possible air / ground shift/tilt shift problems and manual stopping in all forms should be initiated.
this runway required a hard landing/firm landing and if by shear luck you get a soft landing this should alert the PRUDENT airline pilot of possible air / ground shift/tilt shift problems and manual stopping in all forms should be initiated.
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I see that the video (taken by one of the pax) has been removed. Perhaps some of you later posters have not had a chance to watch it. My recollection was that it indicated a positive rather than a soft landing.
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HT, I agree it was a firm landing from the video. AA haters will continue to find fault with the pilots and AA maintenance but what I have seen shows an onspeed touchdown at 900 ft past the threshold with an immediate attempt to reverse shown by the reverser trying to deploy but only deploying slightly. The rest of the data hasn't been released yet so we will have to wait for the rollout details. The approach and touchdown looked like it was textbook. The rest will come later.
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The reverser jacket was cracked before T/D. IMO. Never did see the Spoilers. How long to stow/deploy after defeated by air logic in the initial "deploy"?? I count five seconds. Then there is ten seconds for "Spool up". Fifteen seconds for T/R and no spoilers. Oops there's the end. An extremely well choreographed AllAces Landing.
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A charter operation flying corporate jets into Jacksonhole suspends all flights when snow removal operations are required because Jacksonhole is not allowed to use any sand or chemicals on the runway because of the environmental impact. Also the truck with the MU meter is not accurate on testing braking action. They ran a few jets off the end so even though airlines are operating, they don't. This is straight from one of their pilots that flies into Jacksonhole.
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I thought it was obvious why I posted it but if Jacksonhole doesn't use normal procedures to clear their runway and won't use normal procedures to improve braking action and test it maybe the FAA should look into the safety of flying into Jacksonhole. If a charter operation gives up a lot of revenue to ban operations because of snow removal and runway conditioning maybe someone needs to look into it. All the airlines are still operating so maybe they should just look at if they are following approved procedures that other airports are required to follow.