American Airlines jet goes off runway in Jackson Hole, Wyoming
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SLF here!!
So let me get this straight an internationally renowned professional airline which carries more than 10 million passengers around the world, can freely make a decision to look at Flight Data concerning their own aircraft after an accident before this information is relayed to the NTSB/AAIB.
I don,t know about most of you guys but this development seriously disturbs me. This development alone should cost this arrogant airline a few days in the courts for an explanation and a heavy fine to boot for completely ignoring and undermining the authority of the US Governments NTSB. This was not down to ignorance on American Airlines part its smacks more like arrogance and we can do what and when we want...
So let me get this straight an internationally renowned professional airline which carries more than 10 million passengers around the world, can freely make a decision to look at Flight Data concerning their own aircraft after an accident before this information is relayed to the NTSB/AAIB.
I don,t know about most of you guys but this development seriously disturbs me. This development alone should cost this arrogant airline a few days in the courts for an explanation and a heavy fine to boot for completely ignoring and undermining the authority of the US Governments NTSB. This was not down to ignorance on American Airlines part its smacks more like arrogance and we can do what and when we want...
Hi Sevenstrokeroll,
In BA on all types the NHP operates the reversers on touchdown and manually deploys the spoilers if the auto deployment fails. It's part of the 'monitored approach' technique. On some types there is also a NHP SOP call of 'spoilers deployed, reverse green' to aid both pilots' awareness of a/c configuration after touchdown.
Works for me.
LD
ps ref your comment you can do everything right and still go off the end, a major British airline in a widebody jet had an interesting landing last year after the airports groundstaff accidentally deiced the runway with weedkiller instead of deicing fluid. The airport was shut for a few hours after the first arrival of the day slithered to a halt with not much tarmac remaining!
In BA on all types the NHP operates the reversers on touchdown and manually deploys the spoilers if the auto deployment fails. It's part of the 'monitored approach' technique. On some types there is also a NHP SOP call of 'spoilers deployed, reverse green' to aid both pilots' awareness of a/c configuration after touchdown.
Works for me.
LD
ps ref your comment you can do everything right and still go off the end, a major British airline in a widebody jet had an interesting landing last year after the airports groundstaff accidentally deiced the runway with weedkiller instead of deicing fluid. The airport was shut for a few hours after the first arrival of the day slithered to a halt with not much tarmac remaining!
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Downloading FDR data
Running off the end of the runway is not an accident according to NTSB 830. Unless they damaged more than 25k worth of stuff off the end it is not even an incident. Why should they get the FDR data? AA paid for the FDR, they own it, not the NTSB. Time to read up on the rules boys.
I am only looking at this from a legal point of view. I am not saying I agree with it.
I am only looking at this from a legal point of view. I am not saying I agree with it.
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From CFR 49, Part 830:
As far as the DFDR goes, the operator owns the tape, not the data on it. That's why the Board gives the operator a replacement tape in cases where the aircraft is still operating, and why, eventually, the entire recorder and tape is returned to the operator or designated salvage agent following a hull loss.
Some have suggested that AA was trying to hide something. They may be administratively inept, but I seriously doubt that their technical grasp of a DFDR is so poor as to think that it can be altered without leaving a trail. The data might be corrupted, but not "cleaned up". Trying to hide something in this way is so far down the stupid list as to not merit consideration, in my opinion.
No, they're just so used to downloading DFDR data for their own purposes that they failed to internally read the fine print...which is still inexcusable under the circumstances and given the potential effect it can have on the corporate interest, but not surprising in a large corporation.
Aircraft accident means an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage. For purposes of this part, the definition of “aircraft accident” includes “unmanned aircraft accident,” as defined herein.
Substantial damage means damage or failure which adversely affects the structural strength, performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and which would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component. Engine failure or damage limited to an engine if only one engine fails or is damaged, bent fairings or cowling, dented skin, small punctured holes in the skin or fabric, ground damage to rotor or propeller blades, and damage to landing gear, wheels, tires, flaps, engine accessories, brakes, or wingtips are not considered “substantial damage” for the purpose of this part.
Incident means an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations.
The $25,000 damage to property reference is part of a list of "serious incidents" which require immediate notification. The definition of an "incident" as stated above gives the Board the necessary reach to investigate an incident that does not require immediate notification. Nevertheless, once they're on it, you play by their rules, even if your company is too big to fail. Board investigators are actually deputized, carry a badge and have the power of subpoena. In my experience, they also have pretty thin skins with respect to interfering with an investigation. This is not a recent development; AA had to have been truly asleep at the switch to let this happen.Substantial damage means damage or failure which adversely affects the structural strength, performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and which would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component. Engine failure or damage limited to an engine if only one engine fails or is damaged, bent fairings or cowling, dented skin, small punctured holes in the skin or fabric, ground damage to rotor or propeller blades, and damage to landing gear, wheels, tires, flaps, engine accessories, brakes, or wingtips are not considered “substantial damage” for the purpose of this part.
Incident means an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations.
As far as the DFDR goes, the operator owns the tape, not the data on it. That's why the Board gives the operator a replacement tape in cases where the aircraft is still operating, and why, eventually, the entire recorder and tape is returned to the operator or designated salvage agent following a hull loss.
Some have suggested that AA was trying to hide something. They may be administratively inept, but I seriously doubt that their technical grasp of a DFDR is so poor as to think that it can be altered without leaving a trail. The data might be corrupted, but not "cleaned up". Trying to hide something in this way is so far down the stupid list as to not merit consideration, in my opinion.
No, they're just so used to downloading DFDR data for their own purposes that they failed to internally read the fine print...which is still inexcusable under the circumstances and given the potential effect it can have on the corporate interest, but not surprising in a large corporation.
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Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49 : CFR49 831.13
All information concerning the accident or incident obtained by
any person or organization participating in the investigation shall be
passed to the IIC (Investigator In Charge)through appropriate channels before being provided to
any individual outside the investigation. Parties to the investigation
may relay to their respective organizations information necessary for
purposes of prevention or remedial action.
Pertaining to the NTSB; from the NTSB's "Flight Data Recorder Handbook for Aviation Accident Investigations"
"This handbook has not been adopted by the NTSB Board
Members, is not regulatory in nature, is not a binding statement of policy, and is not all-inclusive. The recommended procedures are not intended to become obligations of the NTSB
or to create any rights in any of the parties to an NTSB investigation."
Violating protocol (I don't condone it) caused AA to be removed from party status in the investigation, but I sincerely doubt AA violated Federal law. I'm guessing the torches and pitchforks can be put away.
All information concerning the accident or incident obtained by
any person or organization participating in the investigation shall be
passed to the IIC (Investigator In Charge)through appropriate channels before being provided to
any individual outside the investigation. Parties to the investigation
may relay to their respective organizations information necessary for
purposes of prevention or remedial action.
Pertaining to the NTSB; from the NTSB's "Flight Data Recorder Handbook for Aviation Accident Investigations"
"This handbook has not been adopted by the NTSB Board
Members, is not regulatory in nature, is not a binding statement of policy, and is not all-inclusive. The recommended procedures are not intended to become obligations of the NTSB
or to create any rights in any of the parties to an NTSB investigation."
Violating protocol (I don't condone it) caused AA to be removed from party status in the investigation, but I sincerely doubt AA violated Federal law. I'm guessing the torches and pitchforks can be put away.
I'm guessing the torches and pitchforks can be put away.
Notwithstanding one contributor whose credibility has plummeted and is on permanent auto-ignore, the dialogue has been quite civil given that protocol was broken by those who should know better.
In response to a poster's question, I commented, with reasons, early in the thread that changing data was almost impossible and that wouldn't have been a motive anyway because, as a number of posters have (in my view, correctly) stated that AA people involved in this would know how difficult such a process was and why, if even possible, any alteration of data would cause far more trouble and attention than the original "non"-event.
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I agree with DA50. This didn't even qualify as an incident since no damage was done to the aircraft or no injuries to passengers. AA therefore was not required to forward the black boxes before reading them. I think by now the investigators know why this happened. We will have to wait to hear the results. I don't think the pilots have to worry.
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ANY time a 121 certificated air carrier runs an airplane off the end of the runway, is cause for an NTSB report and investigation.
AA management...unbelieveably stupid in withholding the DFDR data...even for one minute.
This would be called...AA arrogance, personified.
IE: nothing has changed at the AA head shed.
AA management...unbelieveably stupid in withholding the DFDR data...even for one minute.
This would be called...AA arrogance, personified.
IE: nothing has changed at the AA head shed.
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bubbers44:
The NTSB had decreed it an incident worthy of a go-team and party status to the participants. Party status requires signing a very specific agreement.
I agree with DA50. This didn't even qualify as an incident since no damage was done to the aircraft or no injuries to passengers. AA therefore was not required to forward the black boxes before reading them. I think by now the investigators know why this happened. We will have to wait to hear the results.
If you fail to arm the speedbrakes on the 737 they will come out automatically if you have the thrust levers in idle and select reverse. If you cannot for some reason select reverse, say the thrust levers are not quite closed, then the speedbrakes will not deploy and you will sail down the runway as demontrated here. Anyone know if this is similar on the 757?
The speedbrakes are critical to the stopping distance required. As far as planning is concerned the reversers are nice to have rather than need to have as already pointed out. Of course if you are focussed on why the reversers will not deploy you might overlook the speedbrakes and misinterpret why the end of the runway is fast approaching.
Some esoteric systems failure is always possible and indeed to be hoped for from the pilot's perspective. Hopefully the report should not take too long and then we will all know for sure.
The speedbrakes are critical to the stopping distance required. As far as planning is concerned the reversers are nice to have rather than need to have as already pointed out. Of course if you are focussed on why the reversers will not deploy you might overlook the speedbrakes and misinterpret why the end of the runway is fast approaching.
Some esoteric systems failure is always possible and indeed to be hoped for from the pilot's perspective. Hopefully the report should not take too long and then we will all know for sure.
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I think it will all boil down to this...sometimes getting into reverse is difficult. sometimes if you are too fast in selecting reverse something sort of jams up and it takes longer to get into reverse then if you had tried the whole thing a bit on the slower side..
so much is done to avoid reverse in flight that little is done to make ground selection of reverse perfect. not getting reverse might also distract the crew from other things in the stopping process.
so much is done to avoid reverse in flight that little is done to make ground selection of reverse perfect. not getting reverse might also distract the crew from other things in the stopping process.
So much is being said about reverse; are we complacent, now having a dependency on reverse to stop.
The certification requirements for landing distance on a dry/wet runway do not require reverse to stop in the distance available.
In EU land, full reverse may be required on a contaminated runway if the landing performance is calculated with this assumption. The additional risk in these operations should be mitigated by infrequent exposure – by decision to maintain a safety margin, not frequency of weather.
The US does not have a requirement (rule) for operating on a contaminated runway. Neither, when operating according to advisory guidelines, is there any mitigation for the increased risk. The responsibility is entirely with the operator …<$> The crew …<$> The Captain.
Thus even when using calculated contaminated runway landing distances, if operators continue as normal they will be exposed to a higher risk of an overrun if they experience any minor technical failure or variability in human performance.
The risk of operating on a contaminated runway appears to be significantly increased by the poor standard of the reporting of runway braking action. Braking action is difficult to measure, quantify, or provide a meaningful relationship with aircraft performance; this alone justifies a overly cautious attitude to these operations.
There is overwhelming evidence for the need of a significant landing distance safety margin - higher factors than for a wet runway. Operators / crews must be aware of the risks due to inadequate runway state information, the dependence on reverse and other retarding devices, and less than timely/skilled execution of procedures.
The certification requirements for landing distance on a dry/wet runway do not require reverse to stop in the distance available.
In EU land, full reverse may be required on a contaminated runway if the landing performance is calculated with this assumption. The additional risk in these operations should be mitigated by infrequent exposure – by decision to maintain a safety margin, not frequency of weather.
The US does not have a requirement (rule) for operating on a contaminated runway. Neither, when operating according to advisory guidelines, is there any mitigation for the increased risk. The responsibility is entirely with the operator …<$> The crew …<$> The Captain.
Thus even when using calculated contaminated runway landing distances, if operators continue as normal they will be exposed to a higher risk of an overrun if they experience any minor technical failure or variability in human performance.
The risk of operating on a contaminated runway appears to be significantly increased by the poor standard of the reporting of runway braking action. Braking action is difficult to measure, quantify, or provide a meaningful relationship with aircraft performance; this alone justifies a overly cautious attitude to these operations.
There is overwhelming evidence for the need of a significant landing distance safety margin - higher factors than for a wet runway. Operators / crews must be aware of the risks due to inadequate runway state information, the dependence on reverse and other retarding devices, and less than timely/skilled execution of procedures.
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The US does not have a requirement (rule) for operating on a contaminated runway. Neither, when operating according to advisory guidelines, is there any mitigation for the increased risk. The responsibility is entirely with the operator …<$> The crew …<$> The Captain.
Thus even when using calculated contaminated runway landing distances, if operators continue as normal they will be exposed to a higher risk of an overrun if they experience any minor technical failure or variability in human performance.
Thus even when using calculated contaminated runway landing distances, if operators continue as normal they will be exposed to a higher risk of an overrun if they experience any minor technical failure or variability in human performance.
Last edited by Airbubba; 11th Jan 2011 at 19:42.
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The US does not have a requirement (rule) for operating on a contaminated runway.
Much mis-information for those on the eastern side of the great Atlantic divide.
No surprise.
Airbubba, I presume that an Ops Spec is part of the licence to operate, thus in that sense it is a rule.
However, the requirement for an assessment does not help with a distance safety margin, nor with risk management on the frequency of exposure.
My understanding of SAFO 06012 is that “the landing distance available on the runway to be used for landing must allow a full stop landing, in the actual conditions and airplane configuration at the time of landing, and at least an additional 15% safety margin,”, but the full text is far from clear. This implies that the runway conditions have been accurately established and that the crew has baseline landing performance for those conditions.
The 15% margin is a minimum, which may not provide any realistic margin over what an average crew might achieve depending on how the performance is calculated (e.g. air distance / flare time).
Furthermore, unless specified, the method of calculating the performance and any dependency on reverse appears not to be to an agreed standard. Note the Midway accident, some aircraft performance was using reverse, others were not.
As you state “ … how it is implemented seems to depend on the views of the POI … ” My (dated) experience of some POI’s knowledge did not provide me with any basis of confidence.
411A, for info, quote from Federal Aviation Administration – Regulations and Policies Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee “FAR 121.195(d) and FAR 135.385(d) do not specifically address contaminated runways, but rather slippery runways, and do not require any additional landing distance over that for wet runways.”
However, the requirement for an assessment does not help with a distance safety margin, nor with risk management on the frequency of exposure.
My understanding of SAFO 06012 is that “the landing distance available on the runway to be used for landing must allow a full stop landing, in the actual conditions and airplane configuration at the time of landing, and at least an additional 15% safety margin,”, but the full text is far from clear. This implies that the runway conditions have been accurately established and that the crew has baseline landing performance for those conditions.
The 15% margin is a minimum, which may not provide any realistic margin over what an average crew might achieve depending on how the performance is calculated (e.g. air distance / flare time).
Furthermore, unless specified, the method of calculating the performance and any dependency on reverse appears not to be to an agreed standard. Note the Midway accident, some aircraft performance was using reverse, others were not.
As you state “ … how it is implemented seems to depend on the views of the POI … ” My (dated) experience of some POI’s knowledge did not provide me with any basis of confidence.
411A, for info, quote from Federal Aviation Administration – Regulations and Policies Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee “FAR 121.195(d) and FAR 135.385(d) do not specifically address contaminated runways, but rather slippery runways, and do not require any additional landing distance over that for wet runways.”