American Airlines jet goes off runway in Jackson Hole, Wyoming
Guest
Posts: n/a
Looking out the side port, the approach seems shallow, fast and stable. Snowy runway and a greaser don't reckon with operations given the conditions? There weren 't a single 'gasp' or "Jesus" on touchdown, so maybe the landing was "Too Good".........
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: US
Posts: 2,205
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Passengers were told that the landing was going to be a little firm(news clip of interview w/passenger). IMO it seemed slightly firm, so the opinion battle is tied 1-1.
"Fast"? Huh? How do you reach that conclusion? How fast was it? Five knots? Ten knots?
"Shallow"? Again, I'm not sure how you reach that conclusion. Hopefully we can agree that the aircraft appeared to touchdown at, or before, the PAPI's.
"Fast"? Huh? How do you reach that conclusion? How fast was it? Five knots? Ten knots?
"Shallow"? Again, I'm not sure how you reach that conclusion. Hopefully we can agree that the aircraft appeared to touchdown at, or before, the PAPI's.
Thanks for the runway length responses. Looking at the video the touchdown looked fine. Not to hard or soft and nice and early given the runway length and conditions. It was the subsequent stopping that was the problem.
Guest
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: On the Beach
Posts: 3,336
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
airman 1900:
It is not really boxed in by rocks, at least not for high-performance jet transport or biz jet. It just looks that way because of the terrain to the west and east. But, to the north it is wide open, and will RNAV procedures, even a OEI procedure to the south is not terrain-limited for high-performance airplanes
You don't have to be a TERPs expert to know some legally designed approaches are not particularly safe. High minimums is the big clue.
Hitting rocks in the totally boxed in by mountains JAC airport, with a blown engine is definitely an issue. In my opinion, the terrain at JAC is as challenging when compared to air carrier served airports in AK. Lack of nearby alternates, other than IDA, must be considered.
The valley floor is wide enough for an ILS with low minimums. I’m not a TERPS expert. In my opinion, legally designed approaches aren’t all equally safe.
You don't have to be a TERPs expert to know some legally designed approaches are not particularly safe. High minimums is the big clue.
Join Date: Sep 2010
Location: Double Oak, Texas
Age: 71
Posts: 180
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Doors, no matter the wrong way number write up for funway/runway length.
In the same general conditions there is gonna be about a 12-13 knot slower true airspeed at a sea level airport, the aerodynamic braking will be more effective and the engines will spool quicker and provide more energy.
In the same general conditions there is gonna be about a 12-13 knot slower true airspeed at a sea level airport, the aerodynamic braking will be more effective and the engines will spool quicker and provide more energy.
Looking out the side port, the approach seems shallow, fast and stable. Snowy runway and a greaser don't reckon with operations given the conditions? There weren 't a single 'gasp' or "Jesus" on touchdown, so maybe the landing was "Too Good".........
bear
bear
One of the more ridiculous posts I have ever read on PPrune.
Your post reminds me of a story relayed to me by one of our First Officers.
He was standing in the cockpit door with the standard 'Buh-byes' to the deplaning passengers when a snotty passenger sarcastically remarked, "you were a little fast on that landing weren't you?"
The Captain who was standing behind the FO leans forward and says, "excuse me sir, what seat were you in?".
"18A" replies the passenger.
Without missing a beat, the Captain looks to the First officer and says, "Call maintenance and notify them that the airspeed indicator at 18A is reading a little high".
Stunned passenger walks off.
Join Date: Sep 2010
Location: Brentwood, CA
Posts: 22
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Does the 57-2 require wheel spin up for ground spoiler deployment? If the runway was iced the wheels may have just been skating without rotating enough to activate the boards. That, coupled with a late/botched reverser activation may explain what happened. Was there a slight tailwind also?
Probably a series events, failures, etc just like every other incident.
Probably a series events, failures, etc just like every other incident.
Join Date: May 2005
Location: In some Marriott
Posts: 49
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Found this on a different forum.
Ok, you have three components at work here. I can speak with authority on the 777, but from those I have talked to that should know, the 757/767 systems are similar.
First are the thrust reversers. For the reversers to deploy, the airplane must be on the ground, throttles must be at idle, and the respective engines must be running. Clue #1, the airplane didn't think it was on the ground OR the throttles weren't fully closed.
Second are the spoilers. When the spoilers are armed, they extend on the ground when the landing gear is fully on the ground, and both throttles are at idle. If they are NOT armed, they will extend when the throttles are put into reverse thrust. Clue #2, in addition to the above, the throttles may not have been at idle for some reason.
Third is the auto brake system. Auto brakes are applied when the wheels have spun up and both throttles are at idle. Clue #3, the throttles may not have been at idle. Or at least the plane didn't think the throttles were at idle.
The common denominator here appears to be the throttle position. IF the throttles were not fully closed, all three of those systems would not have operated properly. Given the design of the reverser levers, I can't see how it is possible that the throttles were NOT at idle. Stranger things have happened, I guess.
Having said all that, there is one other system that may have come in to play here. It is called an Air/Ground Sensing System. There are sensors on each main landing gear (Can you say "Squat Switches"?) that sense when the airplane is on the ground. Signals from those sensors configure various airplane systems to the appropriate air or ground status. If for some reason those sensors did not sense that the airplane was on the ground, I can see how the above three systems would have not operated properly.
First are the thrust reversers. For the reversers to deploy, the airplane must be on the ground, throttles must be at idle, and the respective engines must be running. Clue #1, the airplane didn't think it was on the ground OR the throttles weren't fully closed.
Second are the spoilers. When the spoilers are armed, they extend on the ground when the landing gear is fully on the ground, and both throttles are at idle. If they are NOT armed, they will extend when the throttles are put into reverse thrust. Clue #2, in addition to the above, the throttles may not have been at idle for some reason.
Third is the auto brake system. Auto brakes are applied when the wheels have spun up and both throttles are at idle. Clue #3, the throttles may not have been at idle. Or at least the plane didn't think the throttles were at idle.
The common denominator here appears to be the throttle position. IF the throttles were not fully closed, all three of those systems would not have operated properly. Given the design of the reverser levers, I can't see how it is possible that the throttles were NOT at idle. Stranger things have happened, I guess.
Having said all that, there is one other system that may have come in to play here. It is called an Air/Ground Sensing System. There are sensors on each main landing gear (Can you say "Squat Switches"?) that sense when the airplane is on the ground. Signals from those sensors configure various airplane systems to the appropriate air or ground status. If for some reason those sensors did not sense that the airplane was on the ground, I can see how the above three systems would have not operated properly.
How about if the thrust levers were not in the idle position after touchdown? Would the levers move to the deploy position but no further? That would not explain the apparent lack of ground spoiler deployment but it could explain why the reversers didn't deploy on the first attempt
An eyewitness reported it had snowed a lot the day before and the snow off the end of the runway was pretty deep. Lucky - Mother Nature's EMAS
Best,
GC
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Rockytop, Tennessee, USA
Posts: 5,898
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
At every airline, there are a few, who make it through is/her PC/LPC that does not merit the pass. But alas for whatever reason, there is always a friend or colleague out there willing to sign off an inadequate pilot.
A publically documented example is the FO in one of the FedEx MEM crashes (the one with the Christmas presents being tossed out the window). She had failed checkrides and been given a 609 ride by the FAA before she was hired at FedEx. She continued to have training issues at FedEx and was late for three out of ten reports in the weeks preceeding the accident. Among other things, the NTSB recommended improved remedial training programs in the wake of this accident:
Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carrier operators to establish programs for flight crewmembers who have demonstrated performance deficiencies or experienced failures in the training environment that would require a review of their whole performance history at the company and administer additional oversight and training to ensure that performance deficiencies are addressed and corrected.
Anybody know if she got her job back (or got one of those occasional settlements where she is paid not to come to work for the rest of her career)?
I do seem to note that in the past couple of years the FAA has fought back somewhat on the 'everybody eventually passes' philosophy and some folks who have been carried for years suddenly are facing a 709 (new name for 609) ride.
Every airline has their John Wayne type that will follow SOPs three times a year... two simulator periods and one line check a year... and the rest of the year??? up for grabs. For fear of their job, few F/Os come foward to comment on blatant disregard for SOPs and or poor performance of their skipper.
FO's aren't too afraid to speak up in the U.S., in fact they perhaps have the other problem.
Actually, of course, I really do want them to speak up if they think something is wrong.
Airbubba;
In other industries it seems the percent breakdown of those who are forever off the radar, retiring with "Who was so-and-so?", and those who continually cause problems for management and union alike is about 80/20, but in airline work I'd say it was closer to 95/5, in Flight Ops anyway. At least it was for us when I was doing union representation work.
Concerning standards, training and SOPs:
The purpose of operational FOQA programs is to indicate when SOPs aren't being followed and convey that information to management and the line pilots alike, (always deidentified of course).
No one here has yet mentioned that while these programs are not intended to monitor individual pilots, if a serious event is re-occurring and the association gatekeepers who do the daily analysis of data and make the crew calls determine its the same person, then that matter has to be addressed. Such processes are (or should be) part of any management - association FOQA Agreement.
These cowboys with their own procedures, personal fuel policy and Sky God CRM fortunately seem to be scrolling off the seniority lists. There will always be a small handfull of people who cause most of the problems for the union and the company but they are under much tighter rein than in years past from what I can see.
Concerning standards, training and SOPs:
The purpose of operational FOQA programs is to indicate when SOPs aren't being followed and convey that information to management and the line pilots alike, (always deidentified of course).
No one here has yet mentioned that while these programs are not intended to monitor individual pilots, if a serious event is re-occurring and the association gatekeepers who do the daily analysis of data and make the crew calls determine its the same person, then that matter has to be addressed. Such processes are (or should be) part of any management - association FOQA Agreement.
Select reverse just enough to activate contacts, but not moving the thrust levers fully back / not checking indications; thrust levers inadvertently move forward / slip / vibrate back to idle.
Hazard of using reverse idle / hands not on thrust levers - habit?
Hazard of using reverse idle / hands not on thrust levers - habit?
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: USofA
Posts: 1,235
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes I have seen this. It could be a rigging probem and when the airplane touched down the slight jolt will cause this small movement. It's more of a mechanical issue than an operational issue. NOT saying that's what happened in this video, but only maybe.
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: USA
Posts: 40
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
NTSB revokes AA party status...
BOAC;
It appeared in the video as though the reverser 'tried' to open but could not. It then "re-stowed", (hydraulically or pneumatically depending upon the engine mfr). Therefore we could ask, what are the interlocks that prevent reverser deployment/use and when are they released to enable the reverser translating sleeve to move aft and when is the thrust reverse lever released to command max reverse?
I flew the 76' for a number of years. To answer your question, I did not see nor experience any difficulty with reverse deployment. I don't know how common the engines/reverser systems are between the 75/ and the 76' and of course, not having any difficulty doesn't mean a thing.
It appeared in the video as though the reverser 'tried' to open but could not. It then "re-stowed", (hydraulically or pneumatically depending upon the engine mfr). Therefore we could ask, what are the interlocks that prevent reverser deployment/use and when are they released to enable the reverser translating sleeve to move aft and when is the thrust reverse lever released to command max reverse?
I flew the 76' for a number of years. To answer your question, I did not see nor experience any difficulty with reverse deployment. I don't know how common the engines/reverser systems are between the 75/ and the 76' and of course, not having any difficulty doesn't mean a thing.
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: US
Posts: 2,205
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Have I seen it? No, at the pointy end we don't get to see it.
Have I experienced it, especially on the 757? Yes.
One evented ended with 4 tires being replaced. Chief Pilot said - "I've been on the airplane for 10 years and never had that happen."
My reply - "I've been on the airplane for 6 months and had it happen."
That fact that it never happened to him didn't prevent it from happening to me.
Have I experienced it, especially on the 757? Yes.
One evented ended with 4 tires being replaced. Chief Pilot said - "I've been on the airplane for 10 years and never had that happen."
My reply - "I've been on the airplane for 6 months and had it happen."
That fact that it never happened to him didn't prevent it from happening to me.
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: alameda
Posts: 1,053
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In all the planes I've flown with reversers or reverse pitch, I've always found it difficult once in awhile to get into reverse.
rigging, my hand being off...trying to get into reverse too quickly after touchdown...all could have prevented or slowed my selection of reverse.
with so many automatic things, I think reverser auto deploy might be a consideration one day.
but we must remember that reversers are not counted in landing data/performance (except swa 737-700)...and the reasoning at the dawn of the jet age was that they don't always come out when you need them most.
comments???
rigging, my hand being off...trying to get into reverse too quickly after touchdown...all could have prevented or slowed my selection of reverse.
with so many automatic things, I think reverser auto deploy might be a consideration one day.
but we must remember that reversers are not counted in landing data/performance (except swa 737-700)...and the reasoning at the dawn of the jet age was that they don't always come out when you need them most.
comments???
misd-agin;
Interesting...I've experienced it on the '9 (where the interlocks were, for lack of a better description, "held in place with lots of pressure on the reverse levers and released when the pressure was reduced" kind of thing - is that what you meant? Sorry, just trying to get a clearer picture - in our case I don't think it was an air-ground thing. No prob if you'd rather not speculate.
Interesting...I've experienced it on the '9 (where the interlocks were, for lack of a better description, "held in place with lots of pressure on the reverse levers and released when the pressure was reduced" kind of thing - is that what you meant? Sorry, just trying to get a clearer picture - in our case I don't think it was an air-ground thing. No prob if you'd rather not speculate.
Think of it this way.
The interlocks are a failsafe feature that release at a given set of conditions.
Other safety features are no pressure to deploy unless critical (on-ground) conditions are satisfied.
Yet another safety feature is an auto-stow command if an interlock was released and the other conditions are not satisfied.
So to continue the "what-ifs' one needs to know the timing of conditions that trigger each of these features (the reverser logic vs pilot commands). I have forgotten these myself, but that's why we have manuals and of course DFDR data.
The interlocks are a failsafe feature that release at a given set of conditions.
Other safety features are no pressure to deploy unless critical (on-ground) conditions are satisfied.
Yet another safety feature is an auto-stow command if an interlock was released and the other conditions are not satisfied.
So to continue the "what-ifs' one needs to know the timing of conditions that trigger each of these features (the reverser logic vs pilot commands). I have forgotten these myself, but that's why we have manuals and of course DFDR data.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Not here
Posts: 222
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Here is plot of the flights speed and deceleration obtained from the video.
I also included the decelerations of SWA1248 Chicago runway overrun and landing flights just prior to SWA1248 (see the dots in the lower left of the graph).
The 2 lines are for the Jackson Hole incident. I estimate that they went off the overruns at 70 knots.
I also included the decelerations of SWA1248 Chicago runway overrun and landing flights just prior to SWA1248 (see the dots in the lower left of the graph).
The 2 lines are for the Jackson Hole incident. I estimate that they went off the overruns at 70 knots.