American Airlines jet goes off runway in Jackson Hole, Wyoming
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There was a problem, our industry gets better because we fix problems, not blame...
It is that type of BS that causes incidents/accidents, not prevent them.
AA has a definite history of overruns (more so than any other US air carrier), perhaps it's time for the FAA to have a really close look at their line operations.
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411A has made some good points and I don't think anyone should ''bash'' him.
Tankering fuel into a critical airport may save money, but it adds to the approach speed and landing run...try as you might, that's the way it is.
American has had quite a few over runs...at least that made the newspapers. I don't have the numbers, I really don't care. But Little Rock, Jamaica, Jackson Hole should be waking someone up.
We seem to have forgotten the ''spot'' landing. Whether you know it or not, a simple commercial license requires the demonstration of landing within 200 feet of a designated spot. How many pilots on the line work on this on every landing? Or do they go for the passenger pleasing grease job.?
Think about it...Maybe this was a two or three hour flight from ORD...Takeoff, flip on autopilot...descend...click autopilot off...you have actually hand flown about 7 minutes or so. On a critical landing airport...get the feel for the machine by clicking AP off early on.
And always know if the runway slopes up or downhill. if you level off/flare on a runway that is descending beneath your gear, you will land long.
Good Luck and happy new year.
Tankering fuel into a critical airport may save money, but it adds to the approach speed and landing run...try as you might, that's the way it is.
American has had quite a few over runs...at least that made the newspapers. I don't have the numbers, I really don't care. But Little Rock, Jamaica, Jackson Hole should be waking someone up.
We seem to have forgotten the ''spot'' landing. Whether you know it or not, a simple commercial license requires the demonstration of landing within 200 feet of a designated spot. How many pilots on the line work on this on every landing? Or do they go for the passenger pleasing grease job.?
Think about it...Maybe this was a two or three hour flight from ORD...Takeoff, flip on autopilot...descend...click autopilot off...you have actually hand flown about 7 minutes or so. On a critical landing airport...get the feel for the machine by clicking AP off early on.
And always know if the runway slopes up or downhill. if you level off/flare on a runway that is descending beneath your gear, you will land long.
Good Luck and happy new year.
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How are the thrust-reversers locked out on the 757 when the jet is in the air mode? Are the reverse levers locked in the fully stowed position or will they move to the deploy position? Just trying to explain why the reverser failed to fully deploy the first time...
Thanks in advance.
Best,
GC
Thanks in advance.
Best,
GC
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I hear NTSB have removed party status from AA because they took the FDR to Tulsa and downloaded data themselves.
AA, up to their old tricks...nothing new.
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Excerpt from NTSB email:-
During this incident investigation, the Safety Board learned that the recorders were flown to Tulsa, Okla., where American Airlines technicians downloaded information from the DFDR; the CVR was not accessed by American.
"Although a thorough examination by our investigators determined that no information from the DFDR was missing or altered in any way, the breach of protocol by American Airlines personnel violates the Safety Board's standards of conduct for any organization granted party status in an NTSB investigation," said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman.
"Because maintaining and enforcing strict investigative protocols and procedures is vital to the integrity of our investigative processes, we have revoked the party status of American Airlines and excused them from further participation in this incident investigation."
American Airlines has assured the Safety Board that a full review of proper procedures and internal controls would be undertaken to ensure that such an occurrence is not repeated.
Despite their removal from party standing, the NTSB will provide American Airlines with any and all information needed to ensure a timely response to operational safety deficiencies identified in the course of the investigation.
"Although a thorough examination by our investigators determined that no information from the DFDR was missing or altered in any way, the breach of protocol by American Airlines personnel violates the Safety Board's standards of conduct for any organization granted party status in an NTSB investigation," said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman.
"Because maintaining and enforcing strict investigative protocols and procedures is vital to the integrity of our investigative processes, we have revoked the party status of American Airlines and excused them from further participation in this incident investigation."
American Airlines has assured the Safety Board that a full review of proper procedures and internal controls would be undertaken to ensure that such an occurrence is not repeated.
Despite their removal from party standing, the NTSB will provide American Airlines with any and all information needed to ensure a timely response to operational safety deficiencies identified in the course of the investigation.
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411A - "One would hope so, however it does not help to 'fix the problem' by allowing tankering fuel into a limiting airfield, especially when it's icy.
It is that type of BS that causes incidents/accidents, not prevent them.
AA has a definite history of overruns (more so than any other US air carrier), perhaps it's time for the FAA to have a really close look at their line operations."
Put up or shut up time -
how much ferry gas was on the flight?
how about posting the data about the overrun allegations you're making?
It is that type of BS that causes incidents/accidents, not prevent them.
AA has a definite history of overruns (more so than any other US air carrier), perhaps it's time for the FAA to have a really close look at their line operations."
Put up or shut up time -
how much ferry gas was on the flight?
how about posting the data about the overrun allegations you're making?
Last edited by misd-agin; 1st Jan 2011 at 01:37. Reason: spelling
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"How are the thrust-reversers locked out on the 757 when the jet is in the air mode? Are the reverse levers locked in the fully stowed position or will they move to the deploy position? Just trying to explain why the reverser failed to fully deploy the first time..."
Most likely an electrical relay that is closed through the WOW switches. I don't have any 757 experience but the progressions sounds very similar to Gulfstreams. In the G-II/G-III the TRs are not inhibited ever, while the G-IV requires WOW for TRs to deploy.
On the G-IV the TR levers will be locked and no electrical signal will make it to the hydraulic actuators in order to allow them to receive pressure, which is required for TR unlock and deployment. The only way a TR will deploy inadvertently is if the solenoids that prevent the actuators from pressurizing fail or a series of electrical relays fail.
The only way I could think that the reverser would fail in that way would be if the TR unlocked but didn't deploy fully. This would be a mechanical failure on the aircraft for which I have technical knowledge. In other words the TR mechanical linkage failed or jammed.
Most likely an electrical relay that is closed through the WOW switches. I don't have any 757 experience but the progressions sounds very similar to Gulfstreams. In the G-II/G-III the TRs are not inhibited ever, while the G-IV requires WOW for TRs to deploy.
On the G-IV the TR levers will be locked and no electrical signal will make it to the hydraulic actuators in order to allow them to receive pressure, which is required for TR unlock and deployment. The only way a TR will deploy inadvertently is if the solenoids that prevent the actuators from pressurizing fail or a series of electrical relays fail.
The only way I could think that the reverser would fail in that way would be if the TR unlocked but didn't deploy fully. This would be a mechanical failure on the aircraft for which I have technical knowledge. In other words the TR mechanical linkage failed or jammed.
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how much ferry gas was on the flight?
Beancounters should never dictate flight ops procedures, yet they continue to do so at many airlines.
how about posting the data about the overrun allegations you're making?
Note how far down the runway the touchdown point as reported.
This also was a tankering sector, as I recall.
ASN Aircraft accident McDonnell Douglas MD-82 N215AA Little Rock National Airport, AR (LIT)
The Captain was an ORD-based Chief Pilot.
Big time problems at American Airlines, make no mistake.
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During this incident investigation, the Safety Board learned that the recorders were flown to Tulsa, Okla., where American Airlines technicians downloaded information from the DFDR; the CVR was not accessed by American.
I'm actually more interested in this development then the rest of the thread about the runway excursion.
Can we expect criminal charges over this behaviour?
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Can we expect criminal charges over this behaviour?
Some folks think I bash AA unnecessarily, however, this DFDR incident aptly demonstrtates the arrogance that is AA, all the way through to the head shed.
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I'm sorry!? Can we go back to this, did I read that correctly!? AA employees removed the DFDR themselves without running it by the FAA or NTSB, flew it elsewhere and downloaded the data first, by themselves, without supervision!?
I'm actually more interested in this development then the rest of the thread about the runway excursion.
Can we expect criminal charges over this behaviour?
I'm actually more interested in this development then the rest of the thread about the runway excursion.
Can we expect criminal charges over this behaviour?
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
December 31, 2010
************************************************************
NTSB ISSUES UPDATE ON JACKSON HOLE B-757 RUNWAY OVERRUN
INCIDENT
************************************************************
In its continuing investigation of the runway overrun of a
jetliner in Jackson Hole, Wyo., the National Transportation
Safety Board has developed the following factual
information:
At about 11:38 am MT on Wednesday, December 29, American
Airlines flight 2253, a B-757-200 (N668AA) inbound from
Chicago O'Hare International Airport, ran off the end of
runway 19 in snowy conditions while landing at Jackson Hole
Airport. No injuries were reported among the 181 passengers
and crew on board.
The aircraft came to rest in hard packed snow about 350 feet
beyond the runway overrun area. An initial inspection did
not reveal any structural damage to the aircraft. Shortly
after the aircraft came to a stop, in accordance with
American Airlines’ procedures, the pilots pulled the circuit
breaker to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) to preserve all
of the recorded information for investigators.
The CVR and DFDR (digital flight data recorder) arrived at
the Safety Board’s recorder laboratory on Thursday evening,
Dec. 30, where investigators were standing by to download
the contents of both recorders. The CVR provided a two-hour
recording of excellent quality audio; the voices of each of
the pilots on the flight deck were clearly audible. The DFDR
provided 1200 recorded parameters of flight data and
captured the entire incident.
The crew, who were interviewed on Thursday evening,
indicated that they saw the runway prior to reaching the
minimum descent altitude before touchdown. Both crewmembers
characterized the flight and approach to landing as
uneventful prior to the runway overrun. The first officer
was the flying pilot.
The accident docket, which will contain additional factual
information, is expected to be opened in 60-90 days. It will
be available on the docket section of the NTSB website at
http://go.usa.gov/rjR
PROTOCALS FOR TRANSPORTING AIRCRAFT RECORDERS IN INCIDENT
INVESTIGATIONS
The Safety Board has long-established protocols for the
handling and transportation of CVRs and DFDRs that contain
recorded information from a commercial aviation incident,
which by definition is one where no serious injuries or
substantial damage to the aircraft or other property has
occurred.
In such incident investigations, the Safety Board frequently
asks the airline involved to transport the recorders on
their own aircraft as such an arrangement often provides the
most expeditious means of conveying the devices to Safety
Board labs in Washington. The airline is instructed to
transport the recorders without delay and without accessing
the information contained within them by any means. This
practice has worked efficiently and without complication for
more than 40 years.
During this incident investigation, the Safety Board learned
that the recorders were flown to Tulsa, Okla., where
American Airlines technicians downloaded information from
the DFDR; the CVR was not accessed by American.
"Although a thorough examination by our investigators
determined that no information from the DFDR was missing or
altered in any way, the breach of protocol by American
Airlines personnel violates the Safety Board’s standards of
conduct for any organization granted party status in an NTSB
investigation," said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman.
"Because maintaining and enforcing strict investigative
protocols and procedures is vital to the integrity of our
investigative processes, we have revoked the party status of
American Airlines and excused them from further
participation in this incident investigation."
American Airlines has assured the Safety Board that a full
review of proper procedures and internal controls would be
undertaken to ensure that such an occurrence is not
repeated.
Despite their removal from party standing, the NTSB will
provide American Airlines with any and all information
needed to ensure a timely response to operational safety
deficiencies identified in the course of the investigation.
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411A:
Someone apparently learned well from the School of Bob Crandall.
Most likely not, however...I expect the FAA/NTSB will have their say and a few heads might roll at AA.
Some folks think I bash AA unnecessarily, however, this DFDR incident aptly demonstrtates the arrogance that is AA, all the way through to the head shed.
Some folks think I bash AA unnecessarily, however, this DFDR incident aptly demonstrtates the arrogance that is AA, all the way through to the head shed.
‘Removed party status…’
Seems rather pedantic particularly where the organization is central to the investigation. So much for encouraging open and honest reporting / investigation.
Does the NTSB action contravene ICAO Annex 13 ?
Seems rather pedantic particularly where the organization is central to the investigation. So much for encouraging open and honest reporting / investigation.
Does the NTSB action contravene ICAO Annex 13 ?
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Most likely an electrical relay that is closed through the WOW switches. I don't have any 757 experience but the progressions sounds very similar to Gulfstreams. In the G-II/G-III the TRs are not inhibited ever, while the G-IV requires WOW for TRs to deploy.
On the G-IV the TR levers will be locked and no electrical signal will make it to the hydraulic actuators in order to allow them to receive pressure, which is required for TR unlock and deployment. The only way a TR will deploy inadvertently is if the solenoids that prevent the actuators from pressurizing fail or a series of electrical relays fail.
The only way I could think that the reverser would fail in that way would be if the TR unlocked but didn't deploy fully. This would be a mechanical failure on the aircraft for which I have technical knowledge. In other words the TR mechanical linkage failed or jammed
On the G-IV the TR levers will be locked and no electrical signal will make it to the hydraulic actuators in order to allow them to receive pressure, which is required for TR unlock and deployment. The only way a TR will deploy inadvertently is if the solenoids that prevent the actuators from pressurizing fail or a series of electrical relays fail.
The only way I could think that the reverser would fail in that way would be if the TR unlocked but didn't deploy fully. This would be a mechanical failure on the aircraft for which I have technical knowledge. In other words the TR mechanical linkage failed or jammed
How about if the thrust levers were not in the idle position after touchdown? Would the levers move to the deploy position but no further? That would not explain the apparent lack of ground spoiler deployment but it could explain why the reversers didn't deploy on the first attempt.
Best,
GC
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alf5071h:
The integrity of the ethics of party status far outweigh having AAL continue as a party in these circumstances. Boeing and the engine manufacturer will still be parties, as well as the AAL pilot's union and the FAA. It can reasonably be argued that continuing AAL's party status under these circumstances would actually impede the investigation.
Plus, AAL will still be required to cooperate by producing facilities and evidence to the extent demanded by the Board. To compare it to a criminal investigation, AAL is now the suspect, thus subject to all that entails. Suspects don't participate in the investigation of their crime, yet they are convicted much of the time.
‘Removed party status…’
Seems rather pedantic particularly where the organization is central to the investigation. So much for encouraging open and honest reporting / investigation.
Does the NTSB action contravene ICAO Annex 13 ?
Seems rather pedantic particularly where the organization is central to the investigation. So much for encouraging open and honest reporting / investigation.
Does the NTSB action contravene ICAO Annex 13 ?
Plus, AAL will still be required to cooperate by producing facilities and evidence to the extent demanded by the Board. To compare it to a criminal investigation, AAL is now the suspect, thus subject to all that entails. Suspects don't participate in the investigation of their crime, yet they are convicted much of the time.
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Pertinent NTSB regulation:
§ 831.11 Parties to the investigation.
(a) All Investigations, regardless of mode.
(1) The investigator-in-charge designates parties to participate in the investigation. Parties shall be limited to those persons, government agencies, companies, and associations whose employees, functions, activities, or products were involved in the accident or incident and who can provide suitable qualified technical personnel actively to assist in the investigation. Other than the FAA in aviation cases, no other entity is afforded the right to participate in Board investigations.
(2) Participants in the investigation (i.e., party representatives, party coordinators, and/or the larger party organization) shall be responsive to the direction of Board representatives and may lose party status if they do not comply with their assigned duties and activity proscriptions or instructions, or if they conduct themselves in a manner prejudicial to the investigation.
(3) No party to the investigation shall be represented in any aspect of the NTSB investigation by any person who also represents claimants or insurers. No party representative may occupy a legal position (see § 845.13 of this chapter). Failure to comply with these provisions may result in sanctions, including loss of status as a party.
(4) Title 49, United States Code § 1132 provides for the appropriate participation of the FAA in Board investigations, and § 1131(a)(2) provides for such participation by other departments, agencies, or instrumentalities. The FAA and those other entities that meet the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of this section will be parties to the investigation with the same rights and privileges and subject to the same limitations as other parties, provided however that representatives of the FAA need not sign the "Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation" (see paragraph (b) of this section).
(b) Aviation investigations. In addition to compliance with the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, and to assist in ensuring complete understanding of the requirements and limitations of party status, all party representatives in aviation investigations shall sign "Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation" immediately upon attaining party representative status. Failure timely to sign that statement may result in sanctions, including loss of status as a party.
§ 831.11 Parties to the investigation.
(a) All Investigations, regardless of mode.
(1) The investigator-in-charge designates parties to participate in the investigation. Parties shall be limited to those persons, government agencies, companies, and associations whose employees, functions, activities, or products were involved in the accident or incident and who can provide suitable qualified technical personnel actively to assist in the investigation. Other than the FAA in aviation cases, no other entity is afforded the right to participate in Board investigations.
(2) Participants in the investigation (i.e., party representatives, party coordinators, and/or the larger party organization) shall be responsive to the direction of Board representatives and may lose party status if they do not comply with their assigned duties and activity proscriptions or instructions, or if they conduct themselves in a manner prejudicial to the investigation.
(3) No party to the investigation shall be represented in any aspect of the NTSB investigation by any person who also represents claimants or insurers. No party representative may occupy a legal position (see § 845.13 of this chapter). Failure to comply with these provisions may result in sanctions, including loss of status as a party.
(4) Title 49, United States Code § 1132 provides for the appropriate participation of the FAA in Board investigations, and § 1131(a)(2) provides for such participation by other departments, agencies, or instrumentalities. The FAA and those other entities that meet the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of this section will be parties to the investigation with the same rights and privileges and subject to the same limitations as other parties, provided however that representatives of the FAA need not sign the "Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation" (see paragraph (b) of this section).
(b) Aviation investigations. In addition to compliance with the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, and to assist in ensuring complete understanding of the requirements and limitations of party status, all party representatives in aviation investigations shall sign "Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation" immediately upon attaining party representative status. Failure timely to sign that statement may result in sanctions, including loss of status as a party.
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411A- so a comment is made about ferry gas and you assume(word chosen for a reason) that they'd have ferry gas on an IFR day with snow falling at the airport? So you have no facts, do you?
As far as mentioning the 3 incidents that you did? There were probably more during that timeframe. With over 9 million flights during that period of time, and no one having a 100% success rate for millions of events, incidents are bound to happen.
Is the rate higher, lower, or the expected rate due to the amount of exposure? You said you had the facts, how about producing them? Who's better? Who's worse?
Here are some data bases to help you. In some AA does OK, it some it doesn't. Feel free to twist them anyway you want. Keep in mind none of them discuss runway overruns, which is what you posted about -
Airline accident ratings
Plane Crashes and Other Significant Airline Safety Events by Airline
Fatal Events and Fatal Event Rates of Selected Airlines in Europe Since 1970
Fatal Events and Fatal Event Rates of Airlines in Latin America and the Caribbean Since 1970
Fatal Events and Fatal Event Rates of Airlines in Africa and the Middle East Since 1970
Plane Crashes for Airlines in Asia, Australia and the Pacific Region
As far as mentioning the 3 incidents that you did? There were probably more during that timeframe. With over 9 million flights during that period of time, and no one having a 100% success rate for millions of events, incidents are bound to happen.
Is the rate higher, lower, or the expected rate due to the amount of exposure? You said you had the facts, how about producing them? Who's better? Who's worse?
Here are some data bases to help you. In some AA does OK, it some it doesn't. Feel free to twist them anyway you want. Keep in mind none of them discuss runway overruns, which is what you posted about -
Airline accident ratings
Plane Crashes and Other Significant Airline Safety Events by Airline
Fatal Events and Fatal Event Rates of Selected Airlines in Europe Since 1970
Fatal Events and Fatal Event Rates of Airlines in Latin America and the Caribbean Since 1970
Fatal Events and Fatal Event Rates of Airlines in Africa and the Middle East Since 1970
Plane Crashes for Airlines in Asia, Australia and the Pacific Region
I wouldn't be too quick to label AAL as arrogant or criminal.
They are a very large entity and have checks and balances against procedures, one of which is comply with the norms (as stated above) of NTSB procedures.
CVRs and DFDRs are downloaded by airlines quite often after an incident. It's what's known as being proactive in an investigation of a low level incident before repeating it enough times to result in an accident. The issue here is the subjective judgement of a few within AAL that this was a minor incident and to get the downloading down ASAP and make furtur assessments afterwards. At the same time others within AAL would be communicating with the FAA and posibly the NTSB (according to reporting standards) and at this time as soon as the NTSB says they will take over the investigation, then all TSB protocols must be followed.
I suspect that somebody misunderstood or failed to coordinate the timing of the actions (folks out of office for holidays etc.) and that's what is going to now get corrected. BTDT
They are a very large entity and have checks and balances against procedures, one of which is comply with the norms (as stated above) of NTSB procedures.
CVRs and DFDRs are downloaded by airlines quite often after an incident. It's what's known as being proactive in an investigation of a low level incident before repeating it enough times to result in an accident. The issue here is the subjective judgement of a few within AAL that this was a minor incident and to get the downloading down ASAP and make furtur assessments afterwards. At the same time others within AAL would be communicating with the FAA and posibly the NTSB (according to reporting standards) and at this time as soon as the NTSB says they will take over the investigation, then all TSB protocols must be followed.
I suspect that somebody misunderstood or failed to coordinate the timing of the actions (folks out of office for holidays etc.) and that's what is going to now get corrected. BTDT